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Abstract
Tax The Rich: Teachers’ Long Campaign To Fund Public Schools
Kelly Goodman
2021
Why did teachers’ long campaign to fund schools with progressive income taxes on the rich fall
short? Labor-liberals hoped to equalize opportunity for students by shifting school taxes from
local communities like Detroit and Los Angeles to the states. Businessmen and conservatives
instead centralized cuts by changing how budget decisions are made, imposing constitutional limits
to slow the growth rate of state government. Tax limits are distinct from tax cuts. Tax the Rich
builds on the established literature about the grassroots politics of education, and moves in new
directions by centering the agency of organized interests—teachers unions, business associations,
and farmers organizations—powerful enough to build enduring coalitions and to structure fiscal
options. The story begins in 1930, when the Great Depression turned farmers against the property
tax, recast business boosters as tax limiters, and forced teachers to defend school finance; it ends
in 1980, when tax revolts went national with former California governor Ronald Reagan’s election
as president. Michigan and California, laboratories for tax limitation campaigns and educational
court cases, are the reference points. After property owners defaulted on their local taxes in the
early 1930s, and later voted down renewals and increases during the 1960s, liberal and labor
organizers searched for alternative taxes based on ability to pay while conservative and business
operatives persuaded voters to constitutionally tie legislators’ purse strings. Paying for education
in a democracy at times requires antidemocratic decisions, on left and right, by labor and business.
Tax the Rich argues resources never matched Americans’ ambitions to make schools the hidden
welfare state.
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Introduction
When I toured my future high school in a white, working-class suburb four miles north of
Detroit, I learned only one-quarter of graduating seniors enrolled in college. My parents did what
many with the newfound means to leave Macomb County, home of the Reagan Democrats, would:
they drove west on a highway named for a former United Auto Workers union president to the
midcentury modern bloomfields. Voting with their wheels, my parents sunk their present and
future wealth into property in a highly-ranked public school district. Leaving our historic farm
house for a split-level nestled between private lakes, I wondered why we had to change our whole
lives for educational opportunity. My family’s journey is a common reaction to the American
system of fractured local, state, and federal school finance. The dissertation title begins with a
policy recommendation—tax the rich—and the chapters describe why it was so hard to do.
Why did teachers’ long campaign to fund schools with progressive income taxes on the
rich fall short? Labor-liberals hoped to equalize opportunity for students by changing the way K12 public education is financed by shifting school taxes from local communities like Detroit and
Los Angeles to the states. Business leaders and conservatives instead centralized cuts by changing
how budget decisions are made, imposing constitutional limits to slow the growth rate of state
government. Tax limits are distinct from tax cuts. Tax the Rich builds on the established literature
about the grassroots politics of education, and moves in new directions by centering the agency of
organized interests—teachers unions, business associations, and farmers organizations—powerful
enough to build enduring coalitions and to structure fiscal options.
The story begins in 1930, when the Great Depression turned farmers against the property
tax, recast business boosters as tax limiters, and forced teachers to defend school finance; it ends
in 1980, when tax revolts went national with former California governor Ronald Reagan’s election
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as president. Michigan and California, laboratories for tax limitation campaigns and educational
court cases, are my reference points. After property owners defaulted on their local taxes in the
early 1930s, and later voted down renewals and increases during the 1960s, liberal and labor
organizers searched for alternative taxes based on ability to pay while conservative and business
operatives persuaded voters to constitutionally tie legislators’ purse strings. Tax the Rich argues
resources never matched Americans’ ambitions to make schools the hidden welfare state.1
Teachers were at the center of political coalitions to finance schools, but during the 1930s,
farmers were the swing vote between progressive income taxes on the rich and regressive sales
taxes on the poor. At that time, businessmen joined chambers of commerce to form research
bureaus and taxpayers’ associations to reduce school funding. Manufacturers’ conservative lobby
swayed some teachers to its side by supporting small salary increases to deter unionization.
Populist farmers sided with commercial farmers, impelling Michigan legislators to pass a sales tax
before the rise of industrial unionism. Hardening into a path dependence, the regressive state sales
tax made future resolution of financial issues more difficult.
Decades later, labor leaders and foundation grantees filed lawsuits seeking to render
local school property taxes illegal. School finance reform lawsuits briefly compelled governors
and legislators to increase urban school funding, particularly where teacher strikes or citizens
committees had not. Still, budgets never doubled as unions had hoped. The dissertation connects
the history of private and public employee unions, particularly the United Auto Workers and the
American Federation of Teachers, as the public sector expanded during the 1960s.2 Excluded from

1

Tracy Lynn Steffes, School, Society, and State: A New Education to Govern Modern America, 1890-1940
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2012). Molly C. Michelmore, Tax and Spend: The Welfare State, Tax
Politics, and the Limits of American Liberalism (Philadelphia, PA: University Of Pennsylvania Press, 2014).
2
Wisconsin passed the first public employee collective bargaining law in 1959; Michigan followed in 1965,
California in 1975 for teachers. Joseph A. McCartin, "Bringing the State's Workers In: Time to Rectify an
Imbalanced US Labor Historiography," Labor History 47, no. 1 (2006): 73-94. Joseph A. McCartin, “‘A Wagner
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the National Labor Relations Act, public employees secured state statutory protections with the
help of labor leaders personally and strategically committed to public schools, and with the
cooperation of the administrative state.
When school boards settled union contracts they could not afford with teachers in the late
1960s, states were forced to balance municipal budgets in the 1970s, reopening public finance to
influence by business leaders and bankers. Business associations functioned as political operations
with apparatuses for electoral and policy work, in addition to lobbying.3 Short of direct or indirect
electoral control, business associations designed rules for fiscal governance with the logic of
market competition. Business and conservative programs for budget restraint initially developed
along separate but similar lines, then intersected as local, state, and federal campaigns shared
political operatives, economic advisors, and business donors.
Grassroots and elite political actors transformed tax limitation, a feature of municipal
charters since the long depression of the 1870s, into a state constitutional restriction on property
taxation during the Great Depression, and on overall spending in the 1970s stagflation.4 By pitting
“special interests” against each other for a slice of a shrinking public budget, constitutional limits
on taxes slow the overall growth of government. Decided by a majority vote on ballot initiatives,
or at legislative sessions and constitutional conventions, such fiscal rules required a supermajority
vote by the people or state legislators to increase taxes. A majority could limit taxes but not raise

Act for Public Employees’: Labor's Deferred Dream and the Rise of Conservatism, 1970-1976." Journal of
American History 95, no. 1 (2008): 123-48.
3
Benjamin C. Waterhouse, Lobbying America: The Politics of Business from Nixon to NAFTA (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2014).
4
The dissertation’s focus on state constitutions is inspired by the work of John Wallis on canal debt and Naomi
Lamoreaux on general incorporation in the nineteenth century, for example Naomi R. Lamoreaux and John Joseph
Wallis, “Economic Crisis, General Laws, and the Mid-Nineteenth-Century Transformation of American Political
Economy,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series no. 27400, June 2020.
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them. Telling the long history of the fiscal concept of tax limitation, I find restrictions on majority
rule in the American states rather than European salons, a homegrown anti-majoritarianism.5
Conservatives tested policymaking in the states, creating the political conditions for
national power by failing and learning, and building institutions along the way. Teachers who won
union elections and contracts during the 1960s persuaded white-collar professionals under difficult
circumstances; they were skilled campaigners who fought off tax limitation for five years. To
construct the modern Republican Party, operatives had to break teachers unions’ grip on public
budgets, the most formidable obstacle to reducing the size of state government. Public choice
economists, future Supreme Court justices, and the Reagan gubernatorial administration first
campaigned for tax limitation in California in 1973, and first succeeded in Tennessee in 1978.
Tax the Rich applies two methods—ideas in action and the politics of federation—to a deep
source base.

This dissertation uses archival holdings, private papers, and organizational

publications from multiple collections in more than a dozen states to follow academic research and
popular knowledge into political campaigns, and to follow fiscal policies from state to state, and
into the federal government. Federated organizations with local, state, and national chapters
quickly spread model legislation. I focus on the labor and business ideas, tactics, and strategies
behind campaigns, committees, commissions and the many other forms of democratic,
constitutional, and bureaucratic governance of schools.6 As organized interests switched venues
for influence, school finance politics were sometimes administrative or participatory, sometimes
high or grassroots.

5

Angus Burgin, The Great Persuasion: Reinventing Free Markets since the Depression (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2012). Quinn Slobodian, Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018).
6
Louis Galambos, "The Emerging Organizational Synthesis in Modern American History," The Business History
Review 44, no. 3 (1970): 279-90.
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Organizations drew on the applied social sciences to guide the distribution of school
money.

A section of each dissertation chapter considers public finance and educational

administration, public administration, economic education, labor education, legal theory, political
science, or economics.
Ideas about teacher and taxpayer control of education mattered when business
conservatives put them into action.7 By obscuring the ways that ideas travel, intellectual historians
can miss some of the politics that make ideas influential or marginal. For example, General Motors
successfully lobbied to end a publicly-funded workers’ education program run by the American
Federation of Teachers’ tax expert in 1948, as described in Ch. 2 “The Sentinels.” In the postWorld War II period, business conservatives feared public sector union control of what was taught
in school and how much it cost would lead to a fall from freedom to slavery or from democracy to
dictatorship. In reaction, Detroit executives and experts alongside better-known Californians
funded the conservative intellectual movement.8
Rather than the federal level where war was the driving force of fiscal innovation, this
dissertation focuses on political economy in the states.9 The intersection of organized interests
and fiscal federalism constructed a twentieth-century American state of federations and ballot
initiatives.10 Companies and unions negotiated over public benefits like education in statewide
school finance and tax limitation campaigns instead of industrial labor contracts.11 Tax the Rich

7

I adapt George Nash’s claim about the effectiveness of conservative ideas in action. George H. Nash, The
Conservative Intellectual Movement in America, Since 1945 (New York: Basic Books, 1976).
8
Kim Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands: The Making of the Conservative Movement from the New Deal to Reagan
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009).
9
W. Elliot Brownlee, Federal Taxation in America: A Short History (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2004).
10
Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities,
1877-1920 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982)..
11
Jennifer Klein, For All These Rights: Business, Labor, and the Shaping of America's Public-Private Welfare State
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003)..
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shows how conservatives practiced for the Reagan Revolution in the states by slowing the growth
rate of government, starting with public schooling, which occupies a central place both in state
budgets and American social life.12
Who will govern the schools: the teachers or the taxpayers?
My dissertation adds labor leaders to the established history of education literature about
parents, students, administrators, and activists who lobbied for routine funding and sued over
racialized taxation.13 Union teachers and their allies in the labor movement changed fiscal rules
to make raising money for schools easier, often out of the public eye. To take one example of
hidden labor influence, public sector unions pressured the administrative state for bargaining rights
through attorney general opinions, which preceded legislative bills in states like Michigan.14
Organizationally divided between a moderate professional association, the National
Education Association, and a militant labor union, the American Federation of Teachers, teachers
pursued different political strategies and fiscal policies during a moment of possibility when school
budgets grew during the late 1960s and early 1970s. At the same time, union teachers differed
over whether to include casual workers like paraprofessionals in their bargaining units.15 Despite
these differences, all teachers benefitted from the financial and political support of organized labor
during the 1960s when teacher union recognition and contract campaigns spread improvements in
wages, benefits, and working conditions from cities to suburbs across the country.

12

Gareth Davies, See Government Grow: Education Politics from Johnson to Reagan (Lawrence, KS: University
Press of Kansas, 2012). For an earlier account of why government did not grow, see Gilbert E. Smith, The Limits of
Reform Politics and Federal Aid to Education, 1937-1950 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1982).
13
See Walsh and Steffes for example.
14
Here I model my analysis of public sector union relationship with school boards, labor boards, and state attorneys
general on Nancy MacLean’s history of how private sector unions interacted with the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. Nancy MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Workplace
(New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2006).
15
Juravich, The Work of Education, forthcoming.
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Influential political theories of community governance—pluralist politics, class critiques,
urban regimes— can obscure political initiatives by federated organizations.16 Coalitional views
miss front groups that intentionally hid the interests behind their work. In the 1930s, business
associations organized or cooperated with taxpayers association and research bureaus. At the same
time, farmers’ anti-property tax politics were grassroots. In the 1940s, conservatives separated
economic education from business associations to hide businessmen’s role. In the 1970s, tax
limiters recruited grandmothers and moderates as spokespeople but ran campaigns with paid
canvassers, realtors and direct sellers, professional consultants, and libertarian and conservative
parties. Misdirection was a strategy more than a conspiracy.
Organizations of interests represented by institutions of government shaped political
responses to economic forces.17 In the 1930s, business governed the Detroit city council, which
had financial oversight of the school board. By the 1960s, labor governed a fiscally autonomous
Detroit school board. In between, racism and deindustrialization structured the neighborhood and
workplace, fracturing the school tax base before white flight accelerated. For the most prominent
historian of Detroit’s public school district, the existence of a consensus across classes before the
1930s and races before the 1960s was a necessary condition for funding schools. However, the

16

Robert Alan Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1961). E. E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America (New
York: Holt, 1960). Paul E. Peterson, City Limits (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1981). John Gaventa,
Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois
Press, 1982). Clarence N. Stone, "Urban Regimes and the Capacity to Govern,” 1993.
17
Here I am thinking through what school finance reveals about urban history and tax politics that is different from
Sugrue or Self, and how that intersects with UAW history. Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race
and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996). Robert O. Self, American
Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003). Nelson
Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor (New York,
NY: Basic Books, 1995). Kevin Boyle, The UAW and the Heyday of American Liberalism, 1945-1968 (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1995).
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labor school board sought state or metropolitan school funding while the earlier business school
board cut spending.
All types of federations made education history by learning and sharing how to operate
in statewide structures, outside the characteristic neighborhood and metropolitan boundaries
of urban history, and in addition to the distinctive local and national levels of political history.
Liberal groups from the League of Women Voters to the United Automobile Workers supported
novel finance policies like progressive state income taxes and strategies like school finance reform
lawsuits. The Ford Foundation financed academic research and state and federal litigation that
used market rather than egalitarian logic after cases modeled on the Detroit Board of Education’s
lawsuit to fully fund students’ education need were dismissed in district court.18 Restrictive fiscal
policies spread first through media like a midwestern agricultural publishing company and later
lobbies like the conservative state legislators’ American Legislative Exchange Council. Business
associations the National Association of Manufacturers and the U. S. Chamber of Commerce
circulated fiscal policy between local, state, and national governments.
How did the conservative movement gain political power?
Conservatives tested policymaking in the states, creating the political conditions for
national power by failing and learning, and building institutions along the way. Even now as
historians of conservatism reflect on what the rise of Trumpism means for the field and the country,
the new U. S. president can easily reverse executive orders while a signal legislative success, the
2017 federal tax cuts and cap on state and local tax deductions, endures.19 Despite its ubiquity on

18

While counterfactual history is a dangerous game, one alternate path would have been reworking the educational
need legal standard with state constitutions, rather than the U.S. constitution, in mind.
19
Rick Perlstein, “I Thought I Understood the American Right. Trump Proved Me Wrong,” The New York Times
Magazine, April 11, 2017.
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the right, tax reform has lost historical specificity as a political project while welfare reform is now
a byword for neoliberalism. Citing polls that the only public service voters wanted to cut at the
end of the 1970s was welfare, scholars then and now argue aid to poor mothers with children was
a symbol or code for race.20 By the 1970s, education was about race for many observers of school
desegregation as well. Still, as the dissertation argues, the complicated relationship between
education and taxes was always also about political economy.
Reaganism arose through denigration of school teachers, in addition to welfare recipients.
In 1970s Los Angeles, where teachers merged their National Education Association and American
Federation of Teachers locals but lacked the protections of labor-friendly agencies or laws,
conservatives began to dismantle the government from within. They applied the logic of public
choice theory to argue that public employees in general and teachers in particular selfishly
increased the size and cost of government. Constructing a future presidential campaign platform,
the Reagan gubernatorial administration pursued welfare reform and tax reform together. By
pitting “special interests” against each other for a slice of a shrinking public budget, conservatives
advocated constitutional limits on taxes to slow the overall growth of government. “Let’s have
the school teachers demonstrate that their need is greater than the need of the people who want to
create welfare,” economist Milton Friedman told conservative talk show host Clarence Manion
while promoting California’s 1973 tax limitation ballot measure.21 To make it harder for teachers
to demonstrate their need, Governor Reagan vetoed a collective bargaining bill for teachers.
Nonetheless, for five years, teachers across the country fought off similar ballot measures.
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the National Education Association competed with the American
Federal of Teachers to win union representation elections in city after city and suburb after suburb.

20
21

Citing 1980s social science, theorist Melinda Cooper is the latest to make this argument.
Milton Friedman, 236 “A Simple Idea Whose Time Has Come: Tax Limitation.”
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National Education Association affiliates in the states organized against tax limitation with the
help of political consultants, providing benefits more essential to members than group insurance
or education research. With member dues and political contributions, the California Teachers
Association and Michigan Education Association funded many of the professional campaign
services conservatives themselves relied on. Teachers also collected petition signatures and
canvassed for votes, capitalizing on their stature and skill as educators. American Federation of
Teachers members who won union representation elections and contracts in big cities had spent
the 1960s talking to their colleagues at work, on the phone, and at home under difficult
circumstances; they were effective campaigners.

To build the modern Republican Party,

operatives had to break teachers unions’ grip on state budgets, the most formidable obstacle to
reducing the size of government.
Conservatives challenged moderates on contentious state and local finance issues, pushing
the Republican party right and elevating new leaders. Indeed, the Republican National Committee
chair for Ronald Reagan’s successful 1980 presidential run was formerly a U.S. senator from
Tennessee who had introduced the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s legislation for a federal spending
limit and endorsed the first state tax limit to pass in 1978 in his home state. National organizations
of businesses and conservatives including the American Legislative Exchange Council spread
model legislation to constitutionally limit the overall size of government. Written by public choice
economists and future Supreme Court justices, strategized by a sitting governor, 1970s tax
limitation was practice for the Reagan revolution in the White House. In the years since, journalists
and social scientists have offered structural, behavioral, and technical explanations of the tax
revolt.22 I argue elite conservatives organized the tax revolt, beginning in the states.
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See the introduction to Ch. 6 “Don’t Spend It Faster Than I Can Make It” for the extensive literature.
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What influence do free market ideas have on social movements?
Business conservatives believed public sector union control of what was taught in school
and how much it cost would lead to a fall from freedom to slavery or from democracy to
dictatorship. The solution to this problem took many forms, including stopping public employees
from bargaining collectively or voting in elections. Here, I consider campaigns to limit teachers’
power to influence public budgets. Set into action during the long campaign for a constitutional
limit on federal taxation, and conceptualized as public choice theory during the 1960s, the next
generation of tax limiters revived ideas about the destructive effects of government spending
during 1970s debates about state constitutional limits. Professionals like executives, managers,
economists, engineers, journalists, and salespeople practiced social movement politics to change
the U. S. political economy.23
Tax limiters brought the market into the state to limit government, not to protect
homeowners or capitalism. Thus, tax limiters were fundamentally different from the tax cutters
behind California’s 1978 ballot measure Proposition 13 who protected homeowners from the real
estate market by restoring informal tax privileges lost when values appreciated, prices inflated,
and the state modernized assessment.24 Tax limiters turned the American state against itself as
bureaucrats cut their own budgets, unlike European social theorists who saved global capitalism
from fascism, depression, and war through international collaboration on neoliberal ideas,
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institutions, and laws.25 Drawing from pre-New Deal sources including property tax limitation
amendments to state constitutions and governmental research bureaus founded to fight urban
political machines, tax limiters used the tools of fiscal federalism to slow the growth of
government.
The world of economic conservatism was made by the exchange between fringe operatives
and the mainstream GOP, between peripheral theorists and the Chicago school, between everyday
ideas and fiscal policy.26 Conservative gatekeepers, including the founder of National Review and
advisors to Reagan, marginalized the far-right political operative who promoted tax limitation in
dozens of states; however, he worked behind the scenes. Public choice theories of non-market, or
public, decision-making made their way into the respected Chicago school from increasingly lessprestigious universities where economist James Buchanan and his center set up shop. Since
politicians struggled to control concentrated benefits like public schools with diffuse costs, as
public choice economists like Buchanan argued, interest groups should have to compete for their
share of a fixed amount. Rather than by excluding extremists, the right rose by idea laundering.27

25
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Popular economic ideas about tax spenders, bribes to voters, destruction of production, and
bankruptcy in a democracy both echoed and shaped this charge about the dangers of public
spending from the 1930s on, as Ch. 2 “The Sentinels” documents.
By the 1970s, public choice theory served as the economic logic underpinning tax and
spending limitation campaigns. Economists studied non-market—or as they later called them,
public—choices with James Buchanan in seminars and centers at Virginia universities in the 1950s
and 1960s. Public employees, who public choice theorists called bureaucrats, were motivated by
self-interest and thus tried to increase the size of government. While recent scholarly attention to
contemporary libertarians can exaggerate Buchanan’s influence, when it came to fiscal policy, the
public choice theorist thought performance contracting—a defense industry practice to link pay
with results—or privatization would be more effective than budgetary limits.28 By contrast, the
California ideologue and political operative Lew Uhler, who had tried and failed to dismantle the
Office of Economic Opportunity from within the Reagan gubernatorial administration, knew tax
limitation was power limitation. Uhler recruited economist activists to restrict the power of public
employees through tax limitation: a Buchanan student teaching in California, a Chicago-trained
bureaucrat committed to cutting government from the outside, and University of Chicago professor
of economics Milton Friedman himself.
Conservative economists were street fighters, while the public finance experts who
opposed constitutional fiscal rules stood above the fray, issuing reports and holding press
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Economy 50, no. 3 (2018): 640-648.
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conferences. Within a year of ending his Mont Pèlerin Society presidency in 1972, Friedman was
tax limitation’s most persuasive publicist. For the next decade, Friedman used his Newsweek
column, Nobel prize press, speeches to the American Legislative Exchange Council and the
National Association of Manufacturers, visits with state legislators, media interviews, and
correspondence with tax limiters to campaign for successful state limits and an unsuccessful tax
limitation and balanced budget amendment to the U. S. constitution during Reagan’s first
presidential term.
During the 1970s fiscal crisis, labor-liberals also made government finance decisions
without a majority vote. Normally, states required local voters to approve school tax renewals or
increases. If voters refused to fund schools, districts could only borrow for so long before slashing
spending. I recover an alternative to austerity during fiscal emergencies: a non-voted city income
tax, approved by the Michigan state legislature and levied by the Detroit school board
beginning in 1973. Three years before New York City secured private loans with public cuts,
bankers and businessmen were willing to maintain a smaller welfare state in K-12 schools.29
What is the relationship between political economy and education?
“Tax the Rich” conceptualizes the political economy of school finance as the search for
alternatives to the local property tax.30 By contrast, the political history of education implies
homeowners, planners, lenders, insurers, developers, and elected and appointed officials decided
the value of taxes on private homeownership, and thus the amount of school funding.31 Although
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parents and historians focus on unequal property wealth and compensatory federal aid, by the end
of the 1960s, states paid up to half of K-12 costs with taxes on income and sales. The difficulty
of changing where Americans live makes the analysis of raising school money from sources other
than property all the more important. A new generation of scholars is writing about the constant
struggle to fund schools, which until recently was a thematic continuity rather than a research
subject in education history.32 Borrowing, the subject of recent works of urban and suburban
history, provided important political leverage for financiers during the economic crises of the
1930s and 1970s but otherwise made up a small fraction of annual school costs.33
“Tax the Rich” focuses on the fiscal policies that outlasted regimes—on political economic
ideologies that structured and challenged—and on organizations with the institutional influence to
build enduring coalitions across election cycles.34 Labor support for education was not guaranteed,
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but too often overlooked by revisionist historians of education.35 At the very moment canonical
historians of education critiqued public schools as insufficiently democratic, conservatives backed
by academic economists restricted school funding through direct and representative democracy.36
Rank-and-file teacher union activists who overemphasize division within organizations wrote
internal histories that minimize the conservative reaction provoked by teacher unionization.37
1960s teachers’ politics were more complicated than a perpetual conflict with student and
community needs.38 Liberal school boards, slow supporters of limited racial integration plans,
rapidly secured public sector unionism.39 American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees contracts improved Black workers’ non-instructional school district jobs.40 Outside
New York, teachers had options besides striking to resolve disagreements over race and education.
American Federation of Teachers members in Detroit intervened in a metropolitan busing court
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case to prevent layoffs while National Education Association members in Los Angeles elected a
Black national president in 1968. Competition between the teachers union and the professional
association, which often disagreed, opened space for Black teachers to change their unions from
within.41
Teachers bargained over education policy in addition to wages and benefits; education
policy set teachers’ working conditions.42 During the 1960s, the American Federation of
Teachers argued reducing class size was more effective for improving schools than changing
management.43 The union’s More Effective Schools program, which halved class size, was a
feature of early contract negotiations in Detroit and Los Angeles, in addition to New York.
Small classes meant more teachers, and more teachers also meant more union members. Early
1970s teacher strikes forestalled teacher evaluations and accountability, even if they failed to
change the structure of school finance. However, as school finance lawsuits turned from the
Detroit school board’s egalitarian vision of poverty law to California law professors’ neoliberal
logic of school choice, legal theory supported tuition vouchers. Under American Federation of
Teachers president Albert Shanker, a Cold War liberal, the union endorsed charter schools, which
began as an experiment in teacher, rather than principal, management.44
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I begin writing the history of education economics, largely absent from the history of
education research, by identifying advisors to school funding campaigns.45 For much of the
twentieth century, educational administrators debated the relationship between quality and
money in education: would better schools persuade Americans to pay, or would more money
make schools better? Today, education economists ask which schools or teachers can do more
with less. Institutionalized as a subfield of economics by the 1960s, education economics
used inferential statistics to sort through the answers rather than historical analysis.
Organizations drew on the applied social sciences, featured in a section of each dissertation
chapter, to guide the distribution of school money. The early twentieth-century literature on state
aid to education, drawn from public finance and educational administration, developed in response
to the practical problems of unequal local school property taxes and shifting sources of income
and wealth. As public administration professionalized and defended public services during the
New Deal, academics left lay researchers and taxpayers associations to their advocacy of economy
and efficiency in government.

After the war, economic popularizers promoted economic

education to protect private or free enterprise while businesses defunded public labor education.
Drawing on the rights revolution, legal theories of educational need promised expansive school
finance reform beginning in 1968. Instead, an old educational administration idea of equal reward
for equal effort renamed “power equalizing” divided the base of support for public education and
justified tuition vouchers. In the streets rather than the courts, Detroit teachers struck for more
than a month in 1973, forcing a school finance settlement that had eluded Ford Foundation grantees

45

Starting with public finance economist and American Federation of Teachers member Harold Groves, continuing
with the popular education economist of midcentury, Charles Benson, then public choice economists like James
Buchanan and his students, and the radical political economists Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis. Ellen Condliffe
Lagemann, An Elusive Science: The Troubling History of Education Research (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2000).

18

who gamed out decisions in political science seminars. Economists trained at the University of
Chicago and the University of Virginia shared their academic work on deregulation, optimal
taxation, and public choice with businesses and conservatives, and helped them write and promote
effective ballot initiatives and legislative bills to put the research into action.

Part I Farm and Free Enterprise, 1930 to 1957
Ch. 1 “Tax Slackers” describes how twentieth-century school finance was constrained by
the pre-New Deal political economy. The chapter begins with an intellectual history of the conjoint
development of the state income tax and school finance formulas in Progressive-era New York
that provides conceptual background for the dissertation. It then charts the emergence of a
grassroots political movement of farmers organized to pass overall property tax limits in the
midwest, leading legislators to the state sales rather than income tax, and creating a rift with the
newly powerful labor movement. Often allied with business associations to cut property taxes,
farm organizations had different opinions than many businesses about the income tax, which
farmers thought should fund schools. After all, high income was the return on a good education.
Yet, unable to pass an income tax, farmers compromised with businessmen to lobby for a sales
tax.
Ch. 2 “The Sentinels” explains the development of the concept and institutions of
“economic education” outside business associations during the 1940s and 1950s. Taught as
everyday ideas, economic education replaced labor education as an interpretative source of
industrial life for the masses, and influenced early attempts to pass a federal constitutional limit on
income taxation during an era when marginal federal rates were as high as 91 percent. This chapter
adds the Detroit automobile industry into the postwar conservative intellectual movement, and
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points out forgotten continuities by tracing how business conservatives used municipal research
bureaus to fight urban political machines that were responsive to immigrants and workers.

Part II Liberal-Labor Alternative, 1957-1973
Ch. 3 “The Detroit Education Cases” embeds three foundational court cases in the subfields
of school finance, public sector unionism, and urban history in a story of political possibility in the
late 1960s and early 1970s. While everyone from taxpayers to Republican governors to the labor
movement and the Ford Foundation agreed local property taxes were a problematic school funding
source, they had competing definitions of preferred school funding criteria. Detroit teachers and
autoworkers who took over the city’s school board in order to legalize public sector unions thought
states should allocate enough money to meet students’ educational needs. At the same time,
teachers across Michigan joined together to outlaw public money for private schools.
Ch. 4 “Tax the Rich in Michigan” complicates the timeline of school desegregation,
showing how court orders for metropolitan busing for racial integration both exacerbated an urban
school fiscal crisis in the early 1970s and were political leverage for union teachers who intervened
in the case to keep their jobs. However, teachers and liberals were increasingly divided from each
other and the labor movement in trying yet again to tax the rich to fund public schools, which
Michigan voters refused to do. Faced with a mounting Detroit school deficit, the Ford Foundation,
experts, bankers, state legislators and state administrators intervened for an unlikely compromise:
an income tax imposed on (not voted on by) individual (but not corporate) residents of the city.
Ch. 5 “Tax the Rich in California” shows school finance ballot initiatives came slightly
earlier in California than Michigan, when the state’s National Education Association was an
influential education lobbyist willing to tax both the poor and rich for schools. After the Detroit
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school board’s egalitarian vision failed in the courts, the Ford Foundation’s network of experts
changed the course of school finance reform lawsuits. Tuition voucher advocates from California
thought states should reward local taxing effort, and at much lower levels than the doubled school
funding teachers union envisioned. The foundational California Supreme Court decision to make
unequal local school property taxes illegal briefly increased education budgets, but collapsed under
the weight of conservative reaction.

Part III New Right Reaction, 1968-1980
Ch. 6 takes a Sandra Day O’Connor description of Arizona’s 1974 tax limitation bill as its
title. “‘Don’t Spend It Faster Than I Can Make It’” is an alternative origin story of the tax revolt
often associated with California’s Proposition 13 property tax cut. Repositioning an earlier
California ballot measure to limit the overall size of government by constitutionally slowing its
rate of growth, the chapter reveals the elite conservative roots of the tax revolt in Ronald Reagan’s
gubernatorial administration and public choice theory. Before there were tax cuts, there were tax
limits. Conservatives learned by losing, and rose to national power in 1980 by testing ideas and
building institutions like the American Legislative Exchange Council through tax campaigns.
Ch. 7 “Model Legislation” describes a parallel business effort to limit government taxing
and spending that soon converged with California conservatives’ campaigns. Following political
operatives, economic advisors, and business donors from California to Michigan, the chapter
shows how businesses reacted to the budgetary pressures of school finance reform and teacher
unionism. Businesses organized connected local, state, and national efforts to cut government,
fine-tuning an organizational repertoire that succeeded when economic crisis created political
opportunity at the end of the 1970s
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Ch. 8 “Victory in the States” followers tax limiters to Tennessee, where the first state
constitutional limit on the overall size of government passed just months before California’s
Proposition 13 property tax cut, and back to Michigan again. To win, tax limiters learned to
simplify amendments, reduce property taxes, fundraise from businesses, recruit activist
economists and conservative and libertarian party members, and neutralize teachers. Businesses’
and conservatives’ campaign for a tax limitation amendment to the U.S. constitution fell a few
votes short in the U.S House and a few states short in the subsequent campaign for a federal
constitutional convention. Nonetheless, the cadre trained by tax limitation worked in state houses
and the White House. The Reagan presidency marked an era of retrenchment in local, state, and
federal support for public education, and of the expansion of private education.
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Interlude: Education and Business Research About Schools and Taxes Before the New Deal
During the 1920s, economists and educational administrators designed new formulas to
equalize local school spending. The basic problem of school property taxes was this: if local
property wealth varied depending on whether there were industrial plants or residential homes or
family farms, then the same tax rate produced different revenue in different places. Whatever the
differences in local taxation, the responsibility for education belonged to the state.

State

constitutions set standards like “efficient” or “thorough” education, or delegated criteria for free
schools to the legislature. To subsidize low-spending school districts, all but nine states levied a
statewide school tax on income, sales, or property by the 1920s.1 The era of mass high school
attendance put pressure on state and local tax bases. Within five years of the first state legislative
bill to equalize local school spending, the U. S. Chamber of Commerce created a State and Local
Finance Committee. One of business leaders’ prime recommendations to limit state and local
spending was to establish a research bureau or taxpayers association. Thus, business expertise
replaced economic and education expertise in school finance during the Great Depression.

The Columbia School of State Aid: Subsidies for an Adequate or Minimum Education
The Columbia school of state aid developed model funding formulas to allocate state
subsidies to local schools for “equal educational opportunity.” Columbia University, with its
preeminent Teachers College and its leading economics department promoting redistributive
taxation, trained and employed scholars who proposed two competing ways to equalize
educational opportunity, by rewarding local effort or by guaranteeing an adequate or minimum
foundation. Though today this field has its own specialty journals and courses, school finance, in

1
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fact, has direct roots in progressive economics.2 In 1923, the New York state legislature adopted
the formula for an adequate or minimum foundation. A state with both the income and sales tax,
New York became a model for American states without one or either as the “foundation” program
spread during the 1920s.
During its early days as a discipline, economics taught public finance alongside subjects
long since abandoned to less prestigious departments, from the history of economic thought to
money and banking. By 1892, twenty-one universities offered public finance courses that mixed
methods from history and law, perspectives both comparative and policy-oriented, and the German
focus on spending with the British on revenue. Unlike the federal government, which received
direct revenue from production and trade through excise taxes and the tariff, state and local
governments depended indirectly on returns through taxes on real estate, personal property,
corporations, intangibles like money, credit, and securities, inheritance, luxuries like racing or
alcohol, or tolls, fees and special assessments.3 Cities such as Chicago used special assessments
so targeted they taxed businesses for only those sidewalks adjacent to their property.4 During the
long depression of the 1890s, as Henry George’s single-tax on land gained popularity and the
Supreme Court restricted income taxation in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Company, public
finance economists sought to tax the profits of industrialization and urbanization.5
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Public finance’s lineage in political economy and law attracted figures who both theorized
and changed finance, none more prominent than Columbia University professor Edwin R. A.
Seligman. The prevailing benefits theory of taxation held that taxpayers should pay taxes for
services and infrastructure that benefitted them, a logic similar to contemporary user fees. A new
theory of ability to pay came to undergird progressive income taxation with rates graduated by
income class. Seligman changed the meaning of ability (or faculty or capacity) to pay from
classical economist John Stewart Mill’s idea of personal sacrifice to economic power.6 Seligman
and his students proposed that governments should strengthen democracy by applying economists’
empirical research and employing expert administrators to tax as much income as possible—
whether it came from stocks, personal property, or salaries.7
As Columbia economists trained students to use empirical methods and state action for
social reform in the American states and around the world, a distinctive practice grew in
midwestern universities in a region where property taxation had been challenging to implement.8
Wisconsin and Chicago alongside Columbia and Harvard trained the majority economists with an
advanced degree between 1904 and 1928.9 The more than two hundred public finance dissertations
written in these and other universities during this period frequently examined state and local taxes.
University of Wisconsin professor T. S. Adams wrote the state’s 1911 income tax law, the first in
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the nation since faculty taxes faded in the nineteenth century. Richard T. Ely at Wisconsin and
Henry C. Adams at Michigan wrote the subfield-defining textbooks.10 Tax administrators made
Ohio a testing ground for replacements of the general property tax.
At the first meeting of the National Tax Association in Columbus in 1907, called by Ohio’s
governor, professional tax administrators, public finance economists, businessmen and lawyers
together resolved to change constitutions, laws, and administrations to make taxation more just
and simpler.11 Rather than the American Economic Association, once a bastion of radicals now
overtaken by avatars of professional conservatism, Seligman and Henry C. Adams instead found
their public platform in the National Tax Association, an organization of practitioners as well as
theorists. After a 1906 New York tax commission proved unwilling to endorse a state income tax,
Seligman campaigned for the federal income tax, ratified in 1913, and wrote tax law, including
Connecticut’s 1914 corporate income tax and New York’s 1919 personal income tax. In the
beginning, New York’s personal income tax ranged from one to three percent depending on net
income.12
Seligman left a redistributive legacy in school finance as well. During his lifetime of study
in Morningside Heights, including law and graduate school at Columbia, Seligman mentored
American public finance economists as German historicists and institutionalists had mentored the
first generation of progressive economists like himself. His students went on to test school taxes
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in New York, and relying on National Tax Association model bills, advocate for greater levels of
state aid.13
The idea that the state should equalize rather than exacerbate local school funding
differentials took modern form in Stanford University education professor Ellwood P. Cubberley’s
1905 book School Funds and Their Apportionment, begun as a dissertation at Teachers College.
An Indiana native who followed the president of his alma mater Indiana University west,
Cubberley became the dean of educational administrators, figuratively and literally leading
Stanford’s Department then School of Education beginning in 1898 after a stint as San Diego
superintendent.14 Cubberley dismissed several bases for distribution of state aid to local schools
related either to taxes and wealth or to increasingly elaborate measures of educational work hours.
Instead, the scholar proposed state aid be distributed based on need and effort. For example, while
some school districts could afford to make the effort to establish kindergartens, others in need of
them could not. Recognizing that educational efforts would vary over time and place, Cubberley
combined the number of teachers employed and the number of school days students attended into
a standardized measure of cost. Defending the feasibility of conditions on state aid, Cubberley
argued that if, as was common practice, state legislatures could require minimum teacher salaries
and school district consolidation in exchange for state aid, then legislators could impose
equalization formulas as well.
Scholars and practitioners continued to debate the implication of Cubberley’s argument
that urban areas should subsidize rural ones. In New York, farm organizations like the Grange
and Farm Bureau in addition to education organizations like the State Teachers’ Association and
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the State College of Agriculture commissioned a study of state aid to rural schools. In his 1922
study report, University of Pennsylvania professor Harlan Updegraff, an alumnus of Columbia
University Teachers College master’s program, suggested the amount of state aid should
correspond to a community’s “true wealth” and also its “demonstrated interest” in paying for
schools with local funds.15 For example, among two equally poor school districts, the district that
tried harder to tax local property owners would receive more in state aid under Updegraff’s
formula. The following year, however, the legislature voted down a bill to reallocate aid to the
benefit of rural schools. Columbia’s public finance experts did not see this as a failure, charging
that such a bill distorted constitutionally-required uniform tax rates.16 The Columbia economists
insisted in every forum they could that subsidizing local tax effort was a standard incompatible
with their goal of statewide equalization, which required a minimum amount of per pupil spending.
School finance studies proliferated in the early 1920s after educational administrators
investigated the “emergency in education” exposed by WWI.17 A combination of draft board
examinations of unprepared soldiers, Protestant administrators’ nativist fears about Catholic
immigrants, and teachers’ strategically-timed demands for raises, the emergency launched
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investigations of school resources. Teachers College professor of education administration and
National Education Association president George D. Strayer presented an alternative to Updegraff.
At a Citizens’ Conference on Education called together by the U. S. Commissioner of Education,
Strayer spoke on teachers’ “salary situation,” suggesting a study of education revenues.18 Leaving
the “character and extent” of public education to others, the National Education Association
founded an Educational Finance Inquiry to consider the problem of cost in 1921.
Along with Columbia economists, professors and students at the university’s Teachers
College formulated taxes for equalization based on students’ minimum educational needs rather
than their neighbors willingness to tax local property. The Rockefeller Foundation’s General
Education Board and the Carnegie Corporation, as well as some smaller funds, underwrote an
inquiry into how to pay for education costs. Advised by the National Bureau of Economic
Research, the American Federation of Labor, and various universities, the inquiry raised the stakes
of the “financial question” for the national economy while using New York as its case study.
Teachers College staffed the resulting commission with Seligman as an advisor and Strayer as the
director.19 Another colleague of theirs, Columbia University economist Robert Murray Haig, split
his time as commission associate director and secretary and chief of staff to the New York
legislature’s Joint Committee on Taxation and Retrenchment, assembled years earlier to draft the
state’s income tax.20 These reformers determined there was no new tax revenue to find for
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education, the most expensive state and local program—they would have to change the existing
school finance system.21
The 1923 Strayer-Haig formula for allocating funds to school districts based on how much
money they needed to meet students’ minimum education needs, what followers called the
“foundation program,” set the terms of school finance debates until the 1960s.22 Strayer and the
commission’s report “The financing of education in the state of New York” had considered two
paths to “equal educational opportunity:” the state could directly fund and administer schools or
indirectly subsidize and supervise schools. New York, and ultimately dozens of other states, chose
the latter, complicated formula. While commission directors quickly admitted that the “simplest
method” of school finance would be “uniform state-wide taxes based on ability-to-pay” they
offered an alternative: apply the richest school district’s local tax rate in every other district, and
let the state make up the difference in tax revenue generated from unequal tax bases.23 Thus, the
legislature connected state aid to education to tax ability (measured in local property wealth) rather
than tax effort (measured in local property tax rate).
Strayer supervised several Teachers College dissertations that standardized measures of
state equalization, including Paul R. Mort’s. Mort calculated the cost of “educational need,” the
satisfactory or adequate minimum that Strayer and Haig proposed. Since the number of teachers
needed varied with student age and district size, particularly in rural districts, measuring the major
component of school operating budgets—teacher salaries—had to be done piecewise, estimating
lines of best fit based on breaks in the data.24 Mort proposed that weighted pupils replace teachers
21
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as the unit of educational need. Rotating combinations of Strayer, Haig, Mort and other Columbia
students continued to advise New York state legislators and to author legislation, including a 1924
bill to raise seventy dollars per elementary student based on communities’ ability to pay and state
funds to equalize.25 However, Strayer and Haig’s 1923 report had found local school district
expenditures varied from $26 to $272 per student.26 Thus, state aid never fully equalized
education.
Critics like the Carnegie Foundation thought that if only schools were better, taxpayers
would be more willing to fund them. Faulting the report’s lack of evaluation or interpretation, the
president of the Carnegie Fund for the Advancement of Teaching, the astronomer and former MIT
president Henry S. Pritchett, bemoaned the

“elaborate flourish of scientific statistics” and

considered the “refinements of economic theory” a “harangue.”27 Teacher College professor
Strayer and the National Education Association had tried to sidestep the chicken-and-egg question
of whether more money led to better schools or better schools led to more money when they limited
their post-WWI inquiry to educational finance. At the time, there was no labor alternative to partial
equalization of school finance. Philosopher of democracy John Dewey, based at Teachers College
and among the first to sign a union card of the American Federation of Teachers in 1916, did not
write school tax plans; nor did the unions’ other members.
Surveys proliferated as the Educational Finance Inquiry and Teachers College professor
Paul Mort conducted school finance studies—together and separately—in other states, including
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an unpublished one in Michigan.28 Directed by Mort and funded by the U. S. Congress from 1931
to 1933, a national survey revealed conflict between educational administrators and other groups.29
Representatives from the State Grange, Farm Bureau, and Lansing Chamber of Commerce sat on
the Michigan Advisory Committee for the National Survey of School Finance.

A State

Educational Survey Commission appointed by the Michigan governor scientifically surveyed
school finance but the 1931 legislature failed to pass any alternatives to property taxes.30
As the Strayer-Haig formula during the 1920s, states struggled to shift away from property
taxes both local and statewide as revenue sources. Moreover, cities took on debt when annual
operating budgets did not cover the decade’s municipal and school building boom, undergirded by
surveys Strayer co-authored. When loans came due and property tax delinquency spiked during
the early 1930s, a tax revolt alternately led by farmers and businesses forced new state aid
programs. Mort, author of an influential refinement of the Strayer-Haig formula and director of
many school surveys, advised the Ohio state legislature after voters made the state’s statutory limit
constitutional.31
There would be no more scholarly pairs like Strayer and Haig as neoclassical economics
departments and specialized school finance programs competed to explain and change education.
University of Chicago education professor Henry C. Morrison reached back for Edwin R. A.
Seligman’s 1895 Essays in Taxation to justify taxing based on ability to pay, wherever the taxables
were, for full state funding in 1930.32 The Strayer-Haig formula never specified what type of tax
should fund state aid. Even though he advised the anti-tax California Taxpayers Association,
28
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Stanford education dean Ellwood Cubberley’s own school budget preference was for forty to sixty
percent “from state sources under modern conditions of wealth distribution” which included
income taxes.33 However, the Columbia school of state aid’s ideological commitment to ability to
pay became increasingly detached from available fiscal instruments during the Great Depression
as state constitutions banned income taxation and permitted sales taxation.
The Elaborate System of Business Fiscal Control Before the New Deal
Business organizations deployed the term “economy” specifically to mean vigorous
restraint in public spending; increasingly they would propagandize “economy [as] the best
practical politics” during the early Depression.34 This effort involved constructing an elaborate
infrastructure that could do research, compile data, distribute knowledge, and create the “facts”
and narrative of public revenue and spending. With political machines in charge of Kansas City
and other cities, however, businessmen had trouble obtaining financial figures, especially if there
was a lot of padding going on in various types of projects.35 To argue something should cost less,
taxpayers first had to know how much it cost. In cities like Detroit, chambers of commerce
organized or cooperated with a “bureau of governmental research to serve as a fact-finding agency,
operating either within or without the chamber.”36 Thus they took what had been a Progressive-
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era labor reform and redirected it toward very different aims.37

Taxpayers associations,

particularly in California, often served the same function as research bureaus.
In 1928 when state and local tax bills were twice that of federal, the U.S. Chamber created
a Committee on State and Local Taxation. Indiana banker Felix McWhirter chaired the committee
which included researchers, bankers, manufacturers, railroad and agriculture tax experts, a Yale
professor, and a public utility executive, representing industries with sometimes conflicting fiscal
interests.38 Detroiters served on the State and Local Taxation Expenditures Committee from its
start, including an H. H. Rice, the research bureau director Lent Upson, and banker Henry Hart,
secretary to the investment arm of the Detroit Trust Company and to the Michigan Manufacturers’
Association.39 These three supported a successful private effort by the Detroit Trust Company’s
chairman to cut the city of Detroit’s budget by one-fifth in 1932. Chambers of commerce also
gathered in state conferences; for example, in Michigan in 1929 to consider “possible changes in
state fiscal laws, especially those controlling local governments.”40 The U.S. Chamber cautioned
that private conferences with public officials who took credit for fiscal policies were more
successful than publicity campaigns.41
The U. S. Chamber’s Taxation Division supported six hundred commercial and trade
organizations analyzing local budgets, advising officials, and devising plans to “help taxpayers get
their money’s worth, by increasing the mileage of the tax dollar.” By contrast, the National
Association of Manufacturers focused on national legislation while manufacturers shared state and
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local policy through a National Industrial Council of employers’ associations, trade associations,
and manufacturers’ associations.

During the early 1930s, the National Industrial Council

published a handbook of state legislation, held an annual meeting, and assembled in regional
groups like the Midwest Manufacturers Association.42 Trade associations like the National
Automobile Chamber of Commerce monitored a proposed federal automobile tax, and road
funding in the states, but not overall state and local spending.43
Businessmen were not reckless budget slashers—they looked “at public business as they
look at their own private business” asking questions like “Is this a proper function for our
government to undertake?”44 The U.S. Chamber’s Finance Department asked “if we believe that
our city government is overloaded with employees working earnestly on matters of ridiculous
inconsequence, what can we do about that, so long as most of our energy is required to earn a
living?” and answered join an organization urging politicians to control local spending.45 A
chamber of commerce was best in the long run, but a neighborhood club, citizens’ league, luncheon
club, or taxpayers’ association would do. If no such organization existed, the U. S. Chamber’s
Finance Department explained it was “not a monumental job to put together a taxpayers’
association or similar organization.” Although groups of citizens with a narrow viewpoint—a
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“catch-penny conception of public finance”—might succeed in the short-term, the U. S. Chamber
instructed more moderate business associations to secure respect over the long-term by basing
policy on facts they gathered.46
In large cities with complicated problems, the U.S. Chamber’s Finance Department
recommended businessmen “organize a research bureau” of men who “know something about
public administration and put them to work.” The research bureaus the U. S. Chamber advocated
founded an association for “individuals professionally engaged in governmental research” in New
York in 1915 as a counter to Tammany Hall’s patronage.47 Based in Chicago beginning in 1932,
the

Governmental

Research

Association

was

part

of

the

early

twentieth-century

professionalization of public administration in reaction to urban machine politics. In smaller cities,
the U.S. Chamber’s Finance Department’s thought an energetic secretary was a cheaper substitute
for a research bureau: a “he-citizen with blood in his eye” would get the job done.
Research bureaus and taxpayers associations surveyed divisions of government to find
efficiencies, recommend cost reductions, and address public criticisms.48 Waste included highpriced employees in menial jobs, paying something and receiving nothing, a part day’s work for a
full day’s pay, uneconomical selection, production of poor quality, forces out of control, tied-up
capital, lack of morale. Standards and ratings would permit the researcher to defend findings
against government employees. Humble researchers believed they were most influential when the
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public accepted their recommendations and others helped to implement.49 Bolder researchers
claimed credit for saving taxpayers money.
Taxpayers associations were more openly political than research bureaus. In 1931, Los
Angeles organized a Bureau of Municipal Research but it would be the California Taxpayers’
Association that worked with the city’s chamber.50 Taxpayers associations like the California
Taxpayers Association were dominated by business interests and large taxpayers such as utilities.51
The writer and California gubernatorial candidate Upton Sinclair charged that the Southern
California Edison Company paid for a male campaign manager of the “Women’s Committee of
the Los Angeles Taxpayers Association” and produced literature for the Parent Teacher
Association.52
The Governmental Research Association of professional researchers maintained lists of
state taxpayers’ associations from the 1910s into the 1930s; forty-two existed during the early
Depression, thirty-two of which had programs affecting education costs.53 City and county
taxpayers associations numbered in the hundreds, perhaps thousands, and most frequently
recommended cutting teacher and administrator salaries by reducing school property taxes and
constitutionally limiting the total tax rate.54 When it came to schools, according to one taxpayers’
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association leader, “organized education (had) tried to coldshoulder us out of their field on the
theory that we are blundering amateurs.”55 Taxpayers’ associations charged that educators refused
to discuss “school economies.” Educators responded that “the organization of the taxpayers
associations was such that no cooperation with them was possible.”56 Educators meant that
taxpayers associations existed to cut, not to compromise.
The research director of the National Education Association defended his profession
against the Governmental Research Association’s criticism by challenging research bureaus’
interpretation of facts and terminology. School costs increased despite declining enrollment
because cities built expensive high schools, the education researcher explained.57 The National
Education Association published its own statistics on expenditures in 1930, finding that onequarter of all United States taxes went to public education, an amount that was just one-fifth of
annual expenses on passenger automobiles.58 Nearly half of the increase in total school costs
between 1914 and 1930 were due to inflation. Seeking to redefine the term used by tax critics and
business elites, the National Education Association research director argued that rather than less
money, “economy” meant more efficient spending—better results with less money. Educators
wanted to reduce the tax burden on property, increase state and federal support of education,
consolidate school districts, grant school boards fiscal independence, and adopt business methods
for administration.59 Researchers, by contrast, wanted to reduce but not necessarily replace local
property taxes.
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Taxpayers associations and research bureaus were at times more willing to cut public
services than business associations. As the Depression deepened in 1931, the California Taxpayers
Association research director believed declining assessed property values gave research bureaus
“the greatest opportunity in the last quarter century to aid in bringing about a reduction in operating
costs.”60 However, the state of California’s Director of Finance found that local chambers of
commerce were “for practically every expenditure that their local community doesn’t have to pay
for directly.”61 The U.S. Chamber president acknowledged that chamber leaders wanted “more of
everything that costs money in our own locality” listing “more schools, better education” first.62
Nonetheless, the California Teachers Association secretary judged that the California Taxpayers
Association “may have been responsible for some of the enlargement of classes.”63

A

recommendation to increase class sizes appeared in the California Taxpayers Association’s
magazine, The Tax Digest, alongside other economies in education.
Researchers moved from city to city and state to state, borrowing and circulating fiscal
ideas and policies in person as well as in writing. Lent Upson trained at the New York Bureau of
Municipal Research and after a controversial stop in Dayton, OH, founded the Detroit research
bureau in 1916.64

Employees remembered Upson’s philosophy as “The right to criticize

government is also an obligation to know what you are talking about.” Detroiters read and wrote
for the California taxpayers’ association’s magazine The Tax Digest, and Californians may well
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have seen the Detroit research bureau’s publication Just a Minute…65 Staff at the Detroit Bureau
of Governmental Research and the California Taxpayers Association also directly corresponded
about budgeting techniques.66
Detroit’s research bureau worked with the state’s manufacturers’ association during the
spring of 1931 on a bill to consolidate all school districts in Wayne County into one, and establish
a maximum local school property tax rate.67 The Detroit school board had been lobbying for
financial autonomy from the Detroit city council, which approved school budgets, and thus from
the budget-cutting realtors on the council who wanted to lower property taxes.68 At the twentieth
annual meeting of the Governmental Research Association in the fall of 1931, Detroiters discussed
the urban-rural divide over taxation, prohibition, and legislative redistricting.69 These issues
structured the statewide political contestation which culminated in Michigan’s first constitutional
amendment by ballot initiative in 1932, where Part I begins.
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Ch. 1 Tax Slackers: Overall Property Tax Limitation
High rates of property tax delinquency threatened public schools’ primary source of
funding—property taxes—during the early Great Depression.

Michigan farmers’ fraternal

organization the Grange convened local meetings to decide how to cut farmers’ property taxes and
levy replacement taxes.1 Grange leader Clem Bramble, a respected Lenawee County farmer who
built the Grange Life Insurance Company and led the Bean and Beet Growers’ Associations, was
“an earnest advocate of the income tax.”2 Readers of the agricultural publication the Michigan
Farmer thought a state income tax should pay for public schools because the rich had “received
the greater benefit from education and (had) greater ability to pay that cost.”3 In response to a
request from Bramble, the Rock Elm Grange in Charlevoix County on the state’s northwestern
Lake Michigan coast drew up a letter in opposition to the sales tax and in support of the agricultural
publication the Michigan Farmer’s petition for constitutional property tax limitation.4 The
Madison Grange in Bramble’s home county, on the southeastern Michigan border with Ohio,
endorsed the Michigan Farmer’s petition and appointed a “Key Man” from its membership to
collect signatures.5
Farm interests were the major force behind the 1932 property tax limitation amendment in
Michigan. At the nadir of the Depression, the Michigan Farmer presented an over-all property
tax limitation amendment, modeled on a recent bill in Ohio, raising the limit by one-half and
inserting it in the state constitution in 1932.6 The constitutional amendment restricted property
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taxes to fifteen mills out of 1,000, or 1.5 percent of assessed value. In 1931, the average tax rate
on $1,000 worth of Michigan property was $32.36; the proposal would cap the rate at $15, with
several important exemptions for extant debt repayment and home rule cities.7 While historians
have attributed tax resistance primarily to urban homeowners and realtors during this period,
support for tax limitation in Michigan came more from rural counties than cities with real estate
boards.8 Moreover, a second property tax amendment on the ballot in 1932 closely tied to real
estate investors failed. The rural but not urban property tax crisis led to constitutional change
because in the 1930s farmers but not realtors could mobilize the public.
The story of farmers’ politicization in the 1930s so often focuses on militant uprisings
against banks and business corporations, but there was another (now forgotten) side to their
organizing: farmers’ grassroots fiscal politics. Farmers relied on homespun notions, quotidian
knowledge, and mass communication to build a movement to constitutionally limit state and local
property taxes by ballot initiative in 1932. Taxes were like sugar maples that “may be tapped for
maple sap up to a certain point, but beyond that the tree will cease to grow and will shrivel and
die.”9 Tax limitation was “common horse sense,” a program for balanced finances that “sets a
limit beyond which the safety of the property owner and of the state are endangered.”10
In the scholarly imagination, schools are at once outside the New Deal order and a site of
its collapse when Democratic voters and union members turned against each over busing for racial
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integration in the 1970s.11 Before the New Deal remade the Democratic Party’s constituency,
however, the political alignment of farm against labor interests structured education funding.
Situating the dissertation in the early Depression years, before the New Deal, reveals the twentiethcentury political economy of school finance when race was a peripheral concern for northern and
western voters. Recent scholarship has identified the racialized history of the category “taxconsumers,” yet throughout the 1930s, predominantly white agricultural communities lobbed
accusations of being “tax spenders” at educators.12 On the other side, The Nation appropriated the
construction to call spending critics “tax slackers.”13 The two sides disagreed whether the problem
was who government spent money on, or who refused to pay taxes to support government.
Even before WWII, K-12 schools, as the largest state and local expenditure, attracted
scrutiny from business and taxpayers’ associations advocating cuts.14

Common complaints

included “fads and frills” like home economics and music lessons, teaching those unable to learn,
and allegedly high teachers’ salaries. Hundreds of superintendents reported that press releases
published in newspapers were local taxpayers’ associations “most popular method of publicity.”15
Nationally, critiques of school spending were concentrated in ideological publications like
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Saturday Evening Post, The Country Gentleman, the American Mercury, and the U. S. Chamber
of Commerce’s magazine Nation’s Business.16
Tax limitation was part of a state shift away from the executive budget, originally fashioned
by New York administrators in reaction to perceived corruption by machine politicians.17 When
governors with the authority to line item veto refused to check public spending, sixteen states
passed statutory or constitutional limits on property taxation in 1932 and 1933.18 In the wake of
over-all property tax limitation, the Michigan legislature restored its powers to set total state
taxes.19 Local school authorities gained the right to “economize in certain fields” while the state
Department of Education compelled fewer local expenditures.
The first section introduces the dissertation’s characteristic actors—federated groups of
teachers, businesses, experts, and farmers as they resolved Detroit’s fiscal crisis during the early
depression by cutting one-fifth of municipal spending. Local business leaders relied on the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, which founded or coordinated with research bureaus and taxpayers
associations to cut and limit taxes, and trade associations like the National Association of Real
Estate Boards, which spread policy from Indiana and Ohio. The second section describes farm
weekly the Michigan Farmer’s petition signature gathering campaign that serialized tax politics,
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leaving readers hanging on every word for six months spent qualifying overall property tax
limitation amendment for the 1932 ballot. The third section describes how the search for revenue
after property tax limitation led to taxes on sales rather than income when farmers joined with
businesses to lobby state legislators.

Organizational Division in Farm, School, and Business Interests
Despite their general conservatism, business leaders in Detroit and other cities built a civic
welfare state— boulevards and roads, parks and recreation, museums and libraries, sewers and
schools—without systematic financing during the 1920s.20 Still, with families migrating within
the United States and immigrating from around the world to Detroit for automobile factory jobs,
increasing the population by half to over one and a half million by the end of the 1930s, not enough
schools could be built. Debt came due at the worst time, when property owners stopped paying
their taxes in the early Great Depression. Real estate investors led tax strikes while insurers and
bankers on interlocking boards conditioned credit on municipal spending cuts. Businesses and
their associations ran a cottage industry of tax reduction, cooperating at times with farm
organizations.
In the months after the 1929 stock market crash, Detroit business leaders realigned for
difficult times, setting up a direct clash between financial elites and the city’s strong mayor.21
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From 1930 to 1933 Detroit’s labor-friendly mayor refused to slash education, the city’s largest
expense until the Depression increased the city’s generous unemployment relief.22 Business
leaders wanted to strip the mayor of power and appoint a city manager.23 Concerned that elected
officials would refuse cuts, a local Taxpayers Protective Association considered petition language
to amend Detroit’s charter.24 Five realtors on the nine-member city council had speculated on the
city’s expansion and hoped for a reduction in taxes or moratorium on payment.25 Even the
Michigan governor struggled to pay his Detroit property taxes, which were still lower than the
state average.26 However, delinquency was higher in the state’s largest city.27
Property interests wanted budget cuts and had the clout with financial institutions to
demand them in exchange for rescue loans. The home-rule city’s charter gave Detroiters authority
to sell municipal “calamity” bonds during emergencies but banks refused to offer the financial
products in 1931.28 The realtor-dominated Detroit city council invited banker Ralph Stone to make
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good on his address to real estate investors on what he would do “If I Were King,” beginning with
“form a small committee of representative citizens like yourself.”29 Stone’s committee began to
investigate ways to balance the city’s books by cutting services, and passing the savings on to
property owners. In the early 1930, for example, the Detroit schools had “excessive departmental
budgets.”30 With Detroit a week away from running out of cash at the end of 1931, two Detroit
bankers negotiated with Chicago and New York banks for $4.5 million in short-term credit,
releasable upon the approval of Stone and one of his fellow committee members, the secretary of
the Michigan Manufacturers’ Association. 31
By the close of the 1932 fiscal year, the Stone committee had slashed twenty-one percent
of Detroit’s expenditures.32 Personnel from the private Detroit Bureau of Governmental Research,
founded and formerly led by Stone, assumed oversight of public employees; thus, lenders imposed
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their own facts and figures on the city.33 City voters though rejected realtors’ proposed municipal
charter amendment to limit Detroit’s budget to $61 million during an August special election;
before the Stone committee started cutting, the city had planned to spend nearly double that
amount.34 Three months later, however voters statewide imposed a constitutional limit on property
taxation, which cut state aid to the home-rule city. Fortunately for bond-holding financial
institutions such as the Detroit Trust Company this limit exempted repayment of existing debts.
When retrenchment became inevitable, the Detroit school board protected teachers’ salaries from
being cut more deeply than those of other public workers. Detroit teachers continued to be paid
more frequently in bank notes than Chicago teachers, who received scrip for years.35
The Detroit local of the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), the Detroit Federation of
Teachers (DFT), formed in the winter of 1931 but kept a low profile until the fall of 1934.36 After
a decade of repression by anti-union school boards chronicled in a forgotten expose by Upton
Sinclair, AFT locals across the country stayed out of the public eye until they signed a majority of
teachers as members.37 In the meantime, the DFT used other groups to spread its message: a
YMCA Saturday study group unsuccessfully ran candidates for Detroit school board and the
Detroit Teachers Association (DEA), an affiliate of the National Education Association (NEA),
elected a progressive economics professor.38 Although the AFT denounced its NEA rival as a
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“company union” run by superintendents and principals, the DFT tried to change the DEA from
within.
At the same time, a movement of classroom teachers pushed the staid NEA into motion.
Committed to leadership by those who labored alongside a “quickened sense of professional
responsibility,” classroom teachers and their administrator allies were not class-conscious like
union teachers.39 Classroom teachers aimed to transmit the past and counsel the present and future
with representation from a democratically-run professional organization that aroused their sense
of responsibility and provided machinery for organization, that both conserved and advanced
members’ interests. To this end, the president of the Department of Classroom Teachers warned
Detroit teachers about citizens’ leagues and taxpayers associations that represented selfish interests
and undermined schools.40 The director of Teachers College’s lab school told the NEA that
“Teachers are as much entitled to speak on public questions as are the National Chamber of
Commerce, the American Federation of Labor, the organized farmers, or the American Medical
Association.”41
In the spring of 1932, representatives of Detroit area teachers’ clubs and associations joined
together to bring “energy and a cooperative effort” to the “tax situation.”42 Rural teachers clubs
had only begun organizing in the past few years.43 Seventy-five teachers’ clubs had previously
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operated as one department of the 31,273 member Michigan Education Association.44 When the
Detroit News editorialized that “A Political School Teacher is a Public Enemy,” the Southeastern
Michigan Association of Teachers Clubs defended teachers’ right and duty to “take active part in
all matters pertaining to citizenship and political affairs generally” and especially schools.45
During the coming legislative session, one in ten bills passed would be about education.46
Teachers were a potential social movement base for tax politics but their organizations were
unwilling or unable to call them into action before the New Deal.
Teachers agreed with farmers that a state income tax, rather than local property taxes,
should fund schools, but farmers like teachers were divided into two organizations that often
disagreed: the Michigan Farm Bureau, farmers’ commercial organization, and the Michigan State
Grange, with roots in the Populist Movement. At the beginning of the 1930s, the Michigan Farm
Bureau hired a statistician and planned a new income tax campaign.47 The Michigan State
Grange’s executive committee questioned whether the business-oriented Farm Bureau truly
wanted a partnership but approved financial support for the campaign nonetheless.48 Meanwhile,
a Special Commission of Inquiry into Taxation, composed of four farmer, four business, and one
labor members appointed by the Michigan legislature, held listening sessions across the state in
1930.49 With farmer and labor members in favor and business members in staunch opposition, the
commission recommended an income tax. One year later, when the state House passed an income
tax bill that died in Senate committee, the Grange and Farm Bureau split over the issue.
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The Grange spread like a “prairie fire” during the long depression of the 1870s when
farmers built an organization for social and educational opportunities and economic advantages
through cooperative enterprises, fighting monopolies like railroads, and defending against royalty
patent lawsuits.50 By the early 1930s, the Michigan State Grange had 22,000 members connected
by a state publication, the Michigan Patron, lecturers’ bulletins, bimonthly meetings, and social
events. Grange rituals combined aspects of church, school, and community with attention to
business and public affairs as well as music and recreation. A “staunch friend of educational
institutions,” the Grange cooperated with university and college extension work, hosting county
agricultural agents and lobbying for state and federal aid in the Smith-Hughes Act.51
Women had long been active members of the Grange, connecting community to politics,
often through education. Michigan Farmer sponsored the Michigan State Grange Home
Economics Committee’s canning contest, the proceeds of which funded a handbook that listed
property tax limitation first among Grange achievements.52 The Grange goal of better farm folks
tied such fiscal policy to better farms, homes, neighbors, and higher living standards. Dora
Stockman published a regular column “Farm Rhymes” in the Michigan Patron, edited by Jennie
Buell, a writer for the National Grange Monthly. In addition to these Grange publications,
Stockman wrote for the Michigan Education Journal.53 Also the Grange’s state lecturer, Buell
published suggestions for Grange meetings that balanced serious topics and fun activities—
redecorating, beekeeping, stunts. Debate resolutions included “That farmers are responsible for
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inequality in treatment in prices and tariffs; That, we cannot exist with rubber money and iron
debts; That, shorter working days are needed to relieve unemployment; That, unemployment
insurance is not a ‘dole.’”54

The Grange, therefore, continued to thrive as a grassroots

organization.
Representing farmers as business people more than laborers, the Farm Bureau supplied
products alongside policies. Since 1919, the Michigan Farm Bureau sold services like insurance
and supplies to farmers as both a wholesaler and retailer. The Farm Bureaus of Ohio, Indiana, and
Michigan ran a milling company, and at the end of 1930, founded an oil company. Run as
cooperatives, the Farm Bureau’s company returned patronage dividends. In Michigan, the bureau
included a clothing department, wool marketing association, and seed service. The Farm Bureau’s
general policy emphasized “reducing the taxes the farmer is now paying rather than (advocating)
new ways of spending old or new revenues.”55 At first, the Farm Bureau negotiated extensions
and penalty reductions on delinquent property tax payments.56 Then, the Farm Bureau’s Taxation
Committee promoted cooperation “between agriculture and the other economic groups of the
State.”57 The Farm Bureau’s efforts alone were not enough; agricultural prices would also need
to rise and lending resume for economic recovery. Farmers alongside manufacturers monitored
international competition, learning that the Soviet Union was unlikely to produce agricultural
equipment to rival American companies, but parted ways over the need for new types of taxes.58
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Business organizations fended off the legalization of income or sales taxes with help from
Michigan politicians. At the end of 1931, the Michigan Manufacturers’ Association annual
meeting featured reports from General Manager John L. Lovett on his recent trip to the Soviet
Union and Michigan’s Republican governor on his refusal to call a special session of the legislature
for fear of income taxes and the dole.59 The Detroit Board of Commerce credited its own Public
Affairs Bureau with “LEADERSHIP IN THE EFFORTS THAT KILLED THE STATE INCOME
TAX.”60 Taking more credit, the Detroit Board of Commerce declared itself the “greatest enemy”
of the general sales tax, especially having defeated specific theater ticket, roadside bulletin,
tobacco, and luxury taxes.61
Michigan business leaders also relied on U. S. Chamber of Commerce experts to prevent
income and sales taxes.62 At the U.S. Chamber’s 1931 annual meeting, Detroit real estate activist
Judge Arthur Lacy positioned “widespread unavoidable tax delinquency” as “an involuntary
taxpayer’s strike.”63 When Lacy proposed an appointed commission draft legislation to prevent
the tax strike, he excluded the Grange and the American Federation of Labor.64
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Many business leaders were personally invested in lowering property taxes.

Stone

committee members and U. S Chamber of Commerce members from Detroit were also dedicated
members of the National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB). NAREB proposed a
National Tax Congress could prevent a “governmental bread-line of mendicant units” from
destroying local self-government as counties, then states, then the federal government gave aid
and took control of functions.65 NAREB also attempted to “organize a group in each local real
estate board to deal with local tax problems.”66 Judge Arthur J. Lacy of Detroit led the effort as
chair of the Property Owners’ Division of NAREB, which organized in 107 cities by the summer
of 1931.67 Detroit tax attorney Raymond H. Berry, an assistant vice-president of the Detroit Trust
Company, was chairman of the Property Owners Division of the Detroit Real Estate Board, on
whose board two sat Detroit Trust Company chairman Ralph Stone and Detroit Bureau of
Governmental Research director Lent D. Upson.68 These Detroit property owners were influential
but not all powerful: in late 1931, property owners persuaded the county to cut road taxes in half
but had aimed to eliminate the taxes entirely.69
Detroit budget cutters regrouped to take on state spending. A new Economy League of
Michigan wrote a letter to the editor declaring “Taxes result from expenditures, nothing else.”70
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Its letterhead specified its version of “public economy”: “Economy in All Governmental Activities
/ One Hundred Million Dollars Off Michigan’s Tax Bill.”71 Based on the league’s figures,
Michigan’s tax revenue in 1930 was over $340 million, of which over $264 million came from the
property tax.72 American Life Insurance Company president Clarence L. Ayres, White Star
Refining Company president H. B. Earhart, Michigan Manufacturers’ Association General
Counsel Hal H. Smith, and Detroit Bureau of Governmental Research director Lent D. Upson sat
on the executive and publicity committees; Ayres, Upson, and Woodworth on the publications
committee.73 As it did for the Stone committee’s city cuts, Upson’s bureau supplied the research
for state cuts. The Economy League of Michigan claimed it would not publish statistics “without
prior verification by the Detroit Bureau of Governmental Research.”74
The Economy League of Michigan’s launch coincided with the release of a report
recommending the state adopt the extreme Indiana Plan to allow small groups of taxpayers to stop
government taxing and spending.75 Leaders of the Economy League positioned themselves to gain
appointment to the governor’s Commission of Inquiry into County, Township and School District
Government that endorsed the Indiana Plan, introduced but not adopted in the 1927 and 1931
Michigan legislatures.76 Commercial farmers grew closer to business leaders as commissions and
committees on taxing and spending proliferated. The Commission of Inquiry into County,
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Township and School District Government’s secretary, a statistician, was the Michigan Farm
Bureau’s director of taxation.77 The leadership of the Economy League of Michigan later included
the president of the Michigan Farm Bureau.78
Trade associations like the NAREB which pursued industry-specific interests and
coordinated fiscal policies of general interest in addition to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which
had directed substantial resources to state and local taxation since the end of the 1920s, arrived at
the same conclusion: reducing taxes required reducing expenditures. The two policy solutions
most commonly discussed were the Indiana Plan of executive tax cutting and the Ohio legislature’s
tax limitation. A handful of states tried the Indiana Plan while dozens passed overall tax
limitations.79
The Indiana Plan permitted a small minority to determine what economy meant. During
the 1920s, the statutory Indiana Plan allowed a minimum of ten taxpayers to appeal budget lines
and bond issues to a State Board of Tax Commissioners, which could order decreases but not
increases.80 Passed and repealed alongside a 1919 property tax limit, the State Board of Tax
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Commissioners was reinstated in 1921 after local government expenses increased by half in one
year.81 The Peoples Bank of Indiana chairman Felix McWhirter reported the State Board of Tax
Commissioners had reduced taxes by $50 million during that decade plus while other estimates
including disallowed bond issues pushed the total to $80 million.82 However, spending rose as
new taxing districts and holding companies, in addition to public authorities not bound by debt
limits, circumvented restrictions.83
State legislators and business associations alike attempted to pass their own Indiana Plan
for centralized control over budgets and bonds. Iowa legislators cited the Indiana Plan as
inspiration for a 1923 law and the New Jersey governor declared his support in 1924 but Michigan
legislators failed to pass their version in 1927 and 1931.84 Tennessee’s campaign anchored a 1931
U. S. Chamber of Commerce annual meeting session on “Business Leadership in Public Finance”
led by Indiana banker McWhirter.85 Large city chambers of commerce pledged funds to hire
experts to survey government cost—“the only safe way to control the rising tide of taxes, is to try
to put a stop to the constant increase of governmental costs”—and tax incidence.86 In addition to
an Indiana Plan-style state tax commission, Tennessee’s committee recommended shifting the tax
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burden from agriculture to industry through income taxes on manufacturers and a franchise tax on
railways and public utilities. Thus, business interests adapted model fiscal policy to each state’s
political economy.
In NAREB’s stronghold of the Midwest, realtors and property owners endorsed both the
Indiana Plan and Ohio’s seemingly more reasonable and responsible tax limitation. Addressing
the annual convention of Indiana Real Estate Boards, Detroit Judge Arthur Lacy admiringly
suggested a state motto: “HOOSIER CREDITORS, WE HAVE NONE.”87 Elsewhere, Lacy
described the state’s tax commission as allowing a “wide-awake citizenship (to) in a large way
stop the unnecessary spending of public funds.” 88 At its own convention, NAREB passed a
resolution preferring “the so-called Indiana Plan for the review and control of local expenditures
to “arbitrary limitations on tax rates imposed by state constitutions.”89 During the 1920s, NAREB
spent $100,000 researching taxing systems and corrective measures, distilling six proposals for tax
action in 1931, including limits on real property taxes to a fixed percentage of true value (the Ohio
limit) and a budget agency to reduce tax levies and veto bond issues (the Indiana plan).90
NAREB’s recommended one percent limit would annually take one-sixth of real estate
appreciation equivalent to more than a sixteen percent income tax; thus property would still bear
an equal tax burden.91 That “multitudinous tax-spenders’ organizations (were) concentrating
efforts to defeat limitation (was) one of the arguments in its favor.”92
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The U.S. Chamber discussed how to replicate Ohio’s 1929 constitutional property tax
limitation amendment during its 1930 annual meeting roundtable “What’s Ahead for Business in
Taxation?”93 The Ohio state superintendent of schools had exploited loopholes in prior statutes to
impose taxes on districts where two-thirds of voters would not override the limit to fund schools;
by 1930, property taxes reached 22 mills.94 Ohioans constitutionally limited overall property
taxes: the combined tax rates of the state and all political subdivisions—county, township,
municipality, school district—could be no more than 1.5 percent of a property’s assessed value as
of 1929, then 1 percent as of 1933. As under statutory limits, two-thirds of voters could authorize
extra levies to override the limit.95 For the first time in 55 years and 12 legislative and ballot
campaigns, Ohioans amended the state constitution’s taxation sections.96 The chairman of the
Cleveland Chamber of Commerce Committee on Taxation, whose colleagues took “a great deal of
the credit” for the constitutional limit, shared state business lessons for a federal tax program.97
NAREB claimed one of its own, Adam Schantz of Dayton, as the leader of Ohio’s property
tax reduction between 1929 and 1933. As in Detroit, tax cutters in Ohio’s industrial cities aligned
with business associations and real estate boards: Schantz was a real estate owner, manufacturer,
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and director of a utilities company. With property taxes already supplying nearly three-quarters
of state and local government taxes, NAREB hoped the new over-all limitation would be harder
to evade or amend than from past statutory limitations on levies and bonds funding specific units
of government.98 However, the property tax limit did not stop interest group politics: the “powerful
school lobby” which Schantz thought exerted “almost a sinister influence” over legislators insisted
on a replacement tax.99 The 1933 sales tax yielded twice the reduction in property taxes, with sixty
percent of the new revenue going to schools. Urban real estate owners paid more in new taxes
than they saved in property taxes.100
By the 1932-1933 fiscal year, government expenditures and taxation was a subject of
“major interest” to chambers and was the “dominant note” of discussion at the U.S. Chamber’s
meeting.101 In San Francisco, the city whose 1873 “dollar limit” inspired state tax limits beginning
with Rhode Island’s 1878 law, businessmen met to discuss tax action in spring 1932.102 Indiana
banker McWhirter addressed “Control of State and Local Expenditures” and chaired a panel on
State Control of Taxes and Debts.” 103 A Utah banker described the founding of a taxpayers
organization to control debt through research, analysis, and contact with public officials.104
Spokesmen representing different classes of property agreed the government should spend less,
fundraised from railroads and public utilities, and hired a lawyer to write budget laws.105 A
member of the Burlingame, CA Chamber of Commerce recruited co-sponsors of a resolution that
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the U.S. Chamber endorse the formation of taxpayers associations, advise its members how to, and
produce publicity and informational materials, adopted by the panel attendees and forwarded to
the Board of Directors.106
By 1932, states increasingly reduced property taxes with overall limits defined in law rather
than piecemeal decisions by commissions. Even in Indiana, where as few as ten taxpayers could
challenge public spending before a State Board of Tax Commissions, legislators imposed statutory
limits on property taxation—one percent on farms, and one and a half percent in cities—with a
generous emergency override provision.107 Limits were templates that varied state by state based
on interest group alignment. While homeowners and realtors influenced sixteen state statutory
laws or constitutional amendments in 1932 and 1933, next in Michigan, Washington, and West
Virginia, I follow farmers and lawyers, who defined the boundaries of the tax base teachers and
businesses were after from the left and right.108

The Michigan Farmer’s Petition Drive to Amend the State Constitution to Limit Property
Taxes
Agitating for national legislative support during the crisis of falling crop prices and rising
farm costs, farmers took measures into their own state ballot boxes. Protesting their economic
pain, farmers opposed freight rate increases, blockaded roadways, spoiled food, and demanded
price supports. Nationally, the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 paid farmers to reduce their
supply of crops and livestock; however, destroying production was distasteful, and aid was
distributed unevenly. After the U.S. went off the gold standard in 1933, the currency reflation
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raised prices and eased farmers’ mortgage debts. In 1930 and 1931, however, farmers’ state and
local property taxes were a burden no federal program could lift. Feeling trapped, Midwestern
farmers consequently pursued a financial strategy of desperation, dropping appeals for fair taxes
in search of immediate relief. Managed by agricultural publishers, the grassroots campaign for
overall property tax limitation, known as fifteen mill tax limitation in Michigan, relied on
thousands of rural canvassers.
State by state, farmers cut property taxes to stay on their land. At the start of the Great
Depression, the property tax supplied 78 percent of Michigan’s tax revenue, a much larger
proportion than in similar states.109 The Depression forced all manner of Michigan property
owners to abandon 9,755,469 acres in 1930, and to sell for taxes in 1931.110 Oil and timber
temporarily inflated land value, and thus property owners paid higher taxes even as rates stayed
the same. Property ownership was an urban as well as rural phenomenon: the Detroit Commerce
League promoted homeownership as the cure for Bolshevism in the immigrant city, and General
Motors lent money to buy the consumer products like automobiles and refrigerators it
manufactured for homes it financed and built.111 Only 84.6 percent of the amount of property
taxes levied in 1932, including previously delinquent taxes, was collected.112 Delinquency peaked
in 1933, with 49.1 percent of total property taxes unpaid, and only 38 per cent of property taxes
levied that year collected.
A regional agricultural publishing company owned by the Republican U.S. Senator from
Kansas, Arthur Capper, adapted Ohio’s constitutional language for Michigan. It is necessary to
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dwell for a moment on the details of farmers’ role given teachers’ perception of, and the elaborate
system of, business and real estate fiscal control in the Midwest. What had begun as the Economy
League of Michigan a year before was known popularly by many names, and perceived to be
behind many tax cuts.113 The Michigan Education Association attributed fifteen mill tax limitation
to a “Michigan Tax Economy League.”114 While it is possible that the Economy League of
Michigan turned to overall property tax limitation after its preferred Indiana Plan was defeated in
the 1931 state legislature, Michigan farmers’ weekly magazine the Michigan Farmer and fraternal
organization the Grange did most of the work.115 NAREB’s National Property Owners Division
head Judge Arthur Lacy of Detroit, who quoted from another of Capper’s publications, may well
have reached out to the Michigan Farmer about tax limitation.116 Wherever the Michigan Farmer
first learned of the fiscal concept of tax limitation, Capper believed that “farming must profit by
the example of other industries in organizing for self-protection.”117 Detroit attorney and Michigan
Farmer legal editor John R. Rood, formerly a University of Michigan law professor, researched
similar tax limitations in a dozen states, and kept tabs on a contemporaneous campaign in West
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Virginia.118 Rood’s subsequent split from the Michigan Farmer demonstrated a divergence
between farm and real estate interests over property taxes.119
The Michigan Farmer sent staff on a listening tour across the state during the summer of
1931 to attend meetings of all sizes and understand what relief farmers needed. Wherever two or
three farmers gathered, the Michigan Farmer reported, they discussed taxes, their “one common
interest.”120 An Oceana County farmer speculated that a “petition whereby each and every
taxpayer will sign this paper and go upon record refusing to pay one cent of realty tax” would lead
within ninety days to an income tax, hopefully without exemptions.121 An Ontonagon County
farmer who attributed high taxes to parasitic officials, untaxed investors, corrupt and mistimed
elections wanted equal taxation above all else.122

The Michigan State Grange’s executive

committee voted to tell the governor to call a special session of the legislature “to relieve in a
measure, the confiscatory tax on real estate.”123 Republican Governor Brucker told six hundred
Grangers he decided not to call the session until the threat of starvation had receded, seemingly to
lower the risk of a dole passing.124
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The Michigan Farmer’s proposed constitutional amendment restricted property taxes to
fifteen mills out of 1,000, or 1.5 percent of assessed value. In 1931, the average tax rate on $1,000
worth of Michigan property was $32.36; the proposal would cap the rate at $15, with several
important exemptions.125 Fifteen or 15 mill tax limitation, as it came to be called, was a “safe and
sane remedy” that “would afford a maximum of possible present tax relief, with a minimum
curtailment of needed public service.”126 Michigan Farmer editors called together a handful of
representatives of farm organizations and the state bureaucracy—“leaders in farm thought” like
the state commissioner of agriculture—to develop constitutional language for property tax
reduction, and to qualify the resulting limitation for the 1932 statewide ballot.127 Magazine staff
claimed thousands of subscribers had appealed to them to coordinate an amendment for tax
relief.128 Extolling farmers as producers of real wealth and economical in their business, the farm
weekly’s editors judged they were seemingly the only group that could effectively cut public
expenditures.129 Thus, the Michigan Farmer’s dedicated, specialized audience became the base
of a social movement; editors molded farmer-readers into campaigners.130
Funded by federal, state, and county appropriations, agricultural agents formed a network
that could be used for politics as well as science. The agricultural college Michigan State’s cooperation extension service supervised seventy county agents who taught soil conservation, land
utilization, home economics, and farm accounting, promoted industries, and controlled pests in
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normal years, and secured crop production loans, planted welfare gardens, and made tax studies
during the depression.131 At demonstration and other meetings, county agents reached hundreds
of thousands each year.132 County agents visited farms and office, communicated on the telephone
and by letter, and distributed bulletins. County agents also occasionally spoke on taxes at Granges
and mass meetings, where they were requested by name. In Huron County, a county agent hosted
several hundred farmers at the Bad Axe court house discussing tax limitation with the Michigan
Farmer’s editor, and state representatives who also supported income taxes.133 Closer to the fall
1932 election, the Calhoun County agent “gave an informal as well as instructive talk” to the Home
Grange about taxation and proposed constitutional amendments.134
By late November 1931, the Michigan Farmer’s proposal had all the suspense of a
serialized story in a popular magazine. After searching for suggestions from every state, the
Michigan Farmer selected a remedy several states had tried: “to place a limit on the tax that can
be legally levied on property, and thus automatically put a limit on public spending.”135 In
Michigan, an initiative petition required ten percent of voters to sign, and four months’ notice
before an election to submit. The magazine had contemplated a campaign too late in 1930, and
was delayed in 1931 by the regular legislative session and summer farming season. In October,
the agricultural publication began preparing readers to support its tax relief program, asking “every
subscriber to stand by ready to act when the hour arrives.”136 On November 21, editors promised
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an “up-to-date Magna Charta for the taxpayers of our state.”137 Finally published on November
28, the “Proposed Tax Limitation Amendment” took over the front cover of the Michigan Farmer:
The total amount of taxes assessed against property for all purposes in any one year shall
not exceed one and one-half per cent of the assessed valuation of said property, except
taxes levied for the payment of interest and principal on obligations heretofore incurred,
which sums shall be separately assessed in all cases; PROVIDED, that this limitation may
be increased for a period of not to exceed five years at any one time, to not more than a
total of five per cent of the assessed valuation, by a two-thirds vote of the electors of any
assessing district, or when provided for by the charter of a municipal corporation;
PROVIDED FURTHER, that this limitation shall not apply to taxes levied in the year
1932.138
The amendment language could not cover all contingencies but was strategically designed to avoid
significant opposition from cities. Home rule meant municipal corporations with existing statutory
limits would have to opt-in to the tax limit of 1.5 percent of assessed value but would be bound by
the maximum 5 percent limit. Every other division of government from the state to the rural school
district was automatically included under the more restrictive limit. The amendment would reduce
taxes on railroads and utilities as well as farms. The Michigan Farmer anticipated a “stock
argument:” the amendment would reduce the school fund, but the legislature could levy new taxes.
The magazine pledged to reveal details and ask for volunteers—“of which we have no doubt there
will be an adequate army”—in the next issue.139
To collect 86,000 signatures, the Michigan Farmer signed up a Key Man or Woman to
approach every voter in their township or village. Readers clipped an application coupon to send
in to editor Burt Wermuth offering services as a signature gatherer. By December 12, the magazine
claimed to have heard from “officers in subordinate granges, presidents of farm bureaus, farmers’
club officials, supervisors, township treasurers, assessors, editors, preachers, and a whole host of
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others.”140 2,007 people volunteered in the first two weeks.141 The Michigan Farmer continued
recruiting circulators by advertising additional benefits: returning property sold for taxes to the tax
rolls, encouraging home and farm ownership and property improvements. The reader’s column
“Straight from the Farm” filled with sign-ups. On December 19, the magazine printed hundreds
of names, organized by county with the first to volunteer from each subdivision appointed Key
Man.142 The Michigan Farmer had “no way of telling who might be best qualified for bringing
the petitions to the attention of voters” but encouraged others who would help to collect twentyfive names each. By the end of 1931, 6,019 people “armed with petitions were travelling over
every sort of road in Michigan in all kinds of weather at their own personal expense to give their
neighbors a chance to support this proposal.”143 The magazine offered suggestions both legal—
circulators should be qualified electors—and practical—visit signers at home.144 Despite boasting
five Granges, no one had volunteered from Wayne County, home to Detroit, the state’s largest
city, but another list of names would be published in the new year.145 Urban property owners did
not approach property tax limitation with the same zeal as farmers. By the new year, the Michigan
Farmer had mailed 20,000 petitions and begun to experiment with assigning turf, determining that
four people per township was more successful than one per school district.146
Endorsements rolled in from farmer organizations, including the Michigan State
Association of Farmers Clubs and the Michigan State Grange.147 After discussing the Michigan
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Farmer’s “Tax Limitation Amendment,” the State Grange’s executive committee unanimously
adopted the following resolution:
“Whereas the Michigan Farmer has started a movement to reduce and limit taxes on
property; and whereas we believe that the rate fixed by them is as high as real estate can
bear; and that any additional taxes that may be necessary, must be raised from other
sources; Therefore be it resolved; that we approve this step and pledge our assistance and
cooperation in advancing the interest of this proposed amendment.”148
The State Grange spread the message to members, publishing the resolution in the Michigan
Patron, and offering a copy of its 1932 roster to the Michigan Farmer for “sending out blank
petitions for signing.” The chairman of the State Grange tax commission wrote in to the Michigan
Farmer to pledge his members as circulators in their home county.149 A resident of Fruitport
Township, the chairman spoke on the amendment at the Ottawa County Pomona Grange, offered
to enlist Farm Bureau officers in Muskegon County, and friends in Muskegon Heights. The farm
weekly was “peculiarly indebted to the State Grange for its willingness temporarily to sacrifice a
tax program of their own in order to join in this effort to limit property taxes.”150
Grange members across the state were dedicated Michigan Farmer readers and enthusiastic
tax limitation campaigners. In January, members of the Paris Grange, on a riverbank near Big
Rapids, and the Ironwood Grange, in the upper peninsula, read aloud the Michigan Farmer’s tax
limitation proposal.151 Nearer to Detroit, the Brandon Grange of Oakland County met in the new
year and appointed their own Key Man.152 By the end of the month, the Algoma and Carlisle
Granges of Kent County and northern Michigan’s Grand Traverse Grange had endorsed the
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limit.153 That winter, Berrien County Grangers heard a talk on tax limitation after a rendition of
the song “Stay in your own back yard” and before film from the Michigan Department of
Conservation.154 By the fall, the Berrien County Pomona had voted on each of the eight ballot
initiatives, going on record in favor of fifteen mill limitation.155
Farmers planned to force the legislature to approve an income tax by restricting property
tax revenue. The tax limitation amendment would “compel the Legislature to do that which they
have refused to do, viz: “Build all roads from the gasoline tax and pay all the school expenses
above three or four mills from revenues derived from other sources, and the main source will be
an income tax; therefore, vote for this amendment.”156 However, the Michigan Municipal League
worried that a revenue crisis would yield “a tax system more inequitable and burdensome than at
present.”157 Another constitutional amendment to levy a general income and profits tax on
inhabitants and corporations was in the works.158 Governor Brucker proposed combining the
amendments into one dollar of property tax decreases for one dollar of income tax increases. The
Michigan Education Association agreed that real estate taxes must be reduced at the same time
and by the same amount as any special taxes for education were enacted.159 The House’s taxation
committee chair introduced an income tax amendment that many hoped would be passed alongside
tax limitation, but his resolution fell twelve votes short of the necessary two-thirds majority.160
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Sixteen representatives from Wayne County voted against the resolution according to the
Michigan Education Association.161 However, Grange leaders anticipated opposition from daily
papers that “mostly represent wealth that will fear the passage of this amendment because it may
force an income tax in support of education, which it should.”162 The Michigan Farm Bureau
resolved that any additional funds for schools come from a graduated state income tax with lower
exemptions than the federal income tax.163 However, such a school tax “shall be devoted dollar
for dollar to property tax relief, and shall not be confiscatory in rate.”164
The Michigan Manufacturers’ Association (MMA) and its influential lobbyist known as
“Mr. Big” took another approach to the problem of property taxes: reduce, not replace. When
Governor Brucker called a special section of the legislature to consider road taxes in February, the
MMA announced “The Lid is Off.” The MMA anticipated “about everything that is known to the
human mind in the form of taxation will probably be before the legislature” including the
introduction of income, sales, and chain store taxes in addition to the increase of gas taxes.165
MMA lobbyist and General Manager John L. Lovett told members that their “duty as a
manufacturer and businessman” was to make sure legislators did not vote for new taxes, and
attached lists of senators and representatives to lobby. The legislature redistributed highway
weight and gas tax revenue to counties, paused road construction, raised city debt limits, and re-
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opened closed banks, but defeated resolutions to tax income or retail stores.166

Through

appropriation cuts, the legislature reduced the state property tax by nearly twenty percent.167
As pressure for government spending built, the MMA urged its manufacturer members that
“Tax Payers Must Be Aroused.” Manufacturers in several counties had “cooperated in the
organization of such bodies” as taxpayers leagues. Rather than “taxation limitation schemes (that
would) be initiated and placed upon the ballots which, if passed, will seriously handicap the
operation of all public units” the MMA urged members to call meetings with officials to “bring
about an orderly reduction in taxes” by cutting public expenditures.168 The Michigan Farmer’s
initiative petition to which manufacturers referred would cut “at least half of the taxes necessary
to support the state, counties, cities, school districts, townships and villages,” and the farm weekly
advocated the income tax raise the $150 million of lost revenue.169 The MMA estimated the state
income tax rate would be higher than the federal rate.
The Michigan Farmer’s legal editor John R. Rood falsely claimed the farm weekly as a
co-sponsor of another property tax petition, attempting to attach a real estate ballot initiative to
farmers’ well-known tax limitation. Rood organized a “Home Patriots” group out of his Detroit
law office to qualify the ballot initiative to exempt $3,000, the value of a homestead, from property
taxation. The National Association of Real Estate Boards championed homestead exemptions as
tax policy, and Rood’s proposal was likely one of the real estate board’s.170 However, the
Michigan Farmer feared the loss of tax revenue from another property tax ballot measures would
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close rural schools, among other results “akin to anarchy.”171 Calling the amendment “vicious”
closer to election day, the Grange’s Michigan Patron argued some school districts would have no
property left on tax rolls except to cover debt.172 By contrast, Grange Master Bramble estimated
that tax limitation would only reduce “the state, county, and township treasury” by one-quarter,
and the school fund by fifteen percent.173 Capper’s Michigan farm weekly further denounced
Rood senior on its cover and printed the Grange’s rejection of the homestead exemption petition.174
The tax limitation campaign quickly became part of community life. Although winter
weather made petition gathering difficult, as many as 4,500 signatures a day were mailed to the
farm weekly’s Detroit office. A reader from Iron County wrote in with a poem for the last push:
“I’ve surely had my ups and downs, / During this tax campaign, / Meeting a few folks here and
there / Who refused to sign their name. / The township and government officials / Says the petition
is all the bunk, / And before they’d try to help us out / They’d rather see it flunk. / Now, things
would be lots better / If taxes were much less, / So come on, let’s get together, / And make this
fight a success.”175 As of mid-March, eighty-three percent of the state’s more than two thousand
villages, cities, and townships had taken part “in this popular movement to make farms and homes
safe from excessive taxation in Michigan.”

The Michigan Farmer named each missing
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municipality and issued one final call for petition signatures, asking readers to call on, phone, or
write their city friends.176
Campaigners turned spring elections and town meetings into venues for escalating cuts.
Michigan’s Attorney General approved the Michigan Farmer’s request to collect signatures before
or after annual town meetings on April 4, an election day.177 Signature gatherers also participated
in their township’s meeting and voted down local appropriations. State legislators, on break during
the special session, “saw the mood of the electors at the township meetings where the tax limitation
proposal was a subject of seemingly universal discussion” and cut $6,000,000 from the state
budget upon returning to the capitol.178 During an election where tax limitation was the “theme
song,” many Key Men ran for township supervisor and won. Meeting on county boards, these
supervisors reduced spending by millions. Townships’ and counties’ tax-cutting spirits spread to
other subdivisions of the state. During school meetings held over the summer, voters “cut out the
frills” and reduced costs by the tens of millions.179 At the end of the summer, chambers of
commerce and civic organizations reported counties and cities had reduced government costs
between ten and thirty percent.180
The petition campaign brought out the best and worst in people. An eighty-four year old
Flint resident, Mrs. Emma Butterfield, collected nearly two sheets worth of signatures walking
door to door. In April 1932, the Portland Grange’s Lecturer’s hour lecturer was open to the public
of Ionia County for a discussion on tax problems; 150 attended.181 Repeatedly, editors warned
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about tax opportunists. A group of men in central Michigan sold Key Man cards for dollars or
chickens, lying that petition gatherers were paid.182 Another solicited memberships for a “Tax
Association” at a dollar apiece.183 The Michigan Farmer handed in two and a half times as many
signatures as required to qualify the measure for the ballot, more than 220,000 names.184
Farmers had to be a 1932 Minute Man and a modern Paul Revere, “getting out an
overwhelmingly favorable vote.”185 Readers could request the farm weekly mail materials to their
city cousins who needed convincing.186 In September, the Michigan Farmer began printing
endorsements from leading farm figures—a former state senator and master of the Michigan State
Grange, a banker and officer of the American Hampshire Sheep Association, the state
commissioner of agriculture, and the state collector of internal revenue.187 However, Michigan’s
Attorney General criticized tax limitation, and the press shared his letter.188 The Michigan
Education Association thought the amendment was impossible to interpret without the courts.189
Responding to the charge that the proposal was poorly worded, the Michigan Farmer argued critics
should have had their “‘perfect remedy’ prepared and sold to the people of the state.”190
Alongside politicians and editors, the Michigan Farmer perceived educators as the chief
opponents of tax limitation. The Michigan Municipal League, the Michigan Federation of
Teachers Clubs, and University of Michigan professors had lined up against the amendment.
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Together with parents’ and womens’ groups, these good government and education groups
appealed to Michigan voters to vote no on unscientific and irrational tax reforms—tax limitation
and Rood’s homestead exemption.191 Two sources of school funding would be reduced by tax
limitation: property taxes and the primary school fund, which taxed public utilities like general
property. The editor of the Ohio Farmer assured readers to the north that the 1929 Ohio limit did
not close schools—frills were eliminated and overbuilt districts paid more in maintenance.192 The
Michigan Farmer suggested the limitation amendment was good husbandry like trimming a lamb’s
tail.193 The Michigan Farmer found “many teachers over the state who labored with us in spite of
much pressure from above.”194

Educators cited different Ohio tax experts than did farmers and businessmen. An Ohio
researcher, educational administrator, and lawyer all predicted school system collapse from
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Michigan’s two proposed property tax cuts.195 Even a representative of the Farm Bureau and State
Grange in Ohio known at the “best friend” of his state’s fifteen mill limitation told a Detroit
newspaper he would vote no on the Michigan amendments, which would wreck government. In
the college town of Ann Arbor, parents and teachers gathered to hear an Ohio State University
professor speak on tax limitation. Building representatives for the NEA affiliate began finding out
how many teachers owned and paid taxes on property.196
The week of September 30, every Grange in the nation—8,000 Granges in 35 states with
approximately 800,000 members—met upon the request of the National Master.197 Two weeks
before the November 8 election, more than twelve hundred members attended the Michigan State
Grange’s four-day annual session featuring presentations of tax data, a visit by the vice president
of the United States, and resolutions in favor of a federal excise tax for education and a state
income tax.198 In Michigan’s Shiawassee, Newaygo, Calhoun, and Branch counties, grangers
discussed the tax limitation amendment on its own, or alongside other amendments on the ballot
like temperance, in meetings with fellow members or with the general public.199
At the same time, teachers gathered to defend school finance but not in nearly the numbers
or with such high profile speakers. More professors than politicians spoke when teachers clubs
across the country conferenced in Dearborn, MI a month before the election. Teachers College’s
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Bureau of Education Service director told the assembled club presidents schools as currently
constituted were “the result of prosperity” but teachers “could help bring better times by
encouraging honest analyses of the shortcomings of our present economic order.”200 In a state like
Michigan, that meant examining schools’ dependency on the automotive and agricultural
industries. Michigan’s state superintendent instead proposed raising aid for education through
federal taxation or at least reserving some revenue sources for state, not federal, taxation.201 The
Michigan Education Association announced its opposition to tax limitation late in the campaign,
after the Dearborn, MI mass meeting.202 Assembled late, the education coalition was also
weakened from the start by sexist doubts about female teachers’ ability to participate in politics.203
Of the eight amendments on the November 8, 1932 ballot, two passed: fifteen mill tax
limitation and prohibition repeal.204 The Grange, which supported temperance and an unsuccessful
ballot measure to restrict voting on fiscal issues to property owners, did not win on all its issues
but did pull enough votes on taxes. Farmers counteracted the state trend to vote down ballot
initiatives, and the national trend to vote in President Roosevelt’s Democratic Party; the margin of
victory for overall property tax limitation in Michigan was close: 29,162 out of more than 1.3
million votes cast. Before the votes were even counted, the Michigan Farmer took credit for $25
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million in immediate cuts and $100 million more annually from tax limitation.205 Waiting for an
official vote certification, the Michigan Education Association called a legislative conference of
education organizations to study the political, legal, and financial effects of the amendment.206
Total school district operating expenditures dropped from $92 million in 1930-1931 to $80 million
in 1938-1939.207 After rising to $15.14 per student during the 1932-1933 school year, the state’s
primary school fund distributions fell as low as $10.41, double the decrease the Michigan State
Grange predicted for local school budgets.208
By the end of 1932, Michigan women’s clubs and leagues of women voters formed the
Detroit Council on Public Education to lobby against the Michigan Economy League’s proposal
to further reduce school spending.209 However, school districts cut services, staff, and the
instructional year. Student-teacher ratios increased after tax limitation, rising an average of 2.5
students to 31.8 total in fifteen mill cities, and 0.9 to 27.9 in non-fifteen mill cities like Detroit.210
The school year after tax limitation passed, teachers’ salaries averaged half of their 1930-31
level.211 Teacher salaries in fifteen mill cities had yet to return to pre-depression levels by 1940.
The National Education Association’s Joint Commission on the Emergency in Education found
that heavy cuts in Michigan’s city schools led to the most severe budget crisis outside the south
and mountain west.212
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The Sales Tax Coalition Funds Schools Through Regressive Taxes
The Michigan Farmer’s overall property tax limitation launched a search for alternative
sources of funding that ended with the state sales tax. While state voters had twice rejected income
tax ballot measures during the 1920s, labor and farm leaders who advised state tax commissions
and committees continued to prefer it to various regressive sales taxes, which fell heavier on the
poor. Farmers represented by the populist Grange and the commercial Farm Bureau hoped to
provoke the state legislature to approve an income tax by cutting property tax revenue. And yet,
no organized interest was more powerful than business, and none more opposed to income taxes.
The State Grange’s executive committee resolved that while it continued to “favor a graduated
Income Tax; If this does not furnish sufficient funds to meet the absolute necessities of the State,
the Committee suggests a sales tax on all commodities except the ordinary and necessary foods,
clothing and fuel used by the common people of our State.”213 Four farm organizations’ legislative
committees resolved that equalization of school taxes be part of the legislative response to tax
limitation.214 A Conference of Michigan Farm Organizations formed to lobby the 1933 state
legislative session, which passes a sales not income tax.215 Whether farmers were outmaneuvered
by business, ambivalent about the income tax, or less focused on replacing rather than reducing
taxes, farmers alone could not tax the rich, and teachers and labor unions were not in a position to
help.
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Established agricultural interests that limited property taxes represented fewer and fewer
actual farmers. The State Grange felt pressure from the left as a Farmers Union began holding
meetings in Michigan.216 As Democratic politicians swept the November 8, 1932 election ballot
from top to bottom, “most of the rural stalwarts” in the state legislature including a Michigan
Farmer columnist were “replaced by inexperienced men.”217 This columnist, a legislator from
Ionia County was chairman of the Michigan Farm Bureau’s resolutions committee that rejoiced in
the passage of fifteen-mill limitation.218 Metaphorically describing the work before this new
legislature, the farm weekly pictured a “public taxation tree” that must be pruned of dead wood
and water sprouts rather than grafted with new fruit.219 Taxpayers’ pocketbooks, like soil, could
sustain only so much.
After the fifteen-mill property tax limitation passed, the Michigan Manufacturers’
Association (MMA) urged members to start taxpayers’ associations with other businesses and farm
groups to keep cutting taxes. Nationally, the U. S. Chamber of Commerce shared methods to
reduce state and local spending.220 Michigan manufacturers preferred a state sales tax to an income
tax. With the savvy of an experienced and influential lobbyist, the MMA looked ahead to the 1933
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legislative session, urging members to help elect legislators, drafting them to run as necessary. If
there was no taxpayer group “actively working with your county and city officials to cut budgets
and reduce taxes, the members of the MMA should take the lead in forming such a group.”221
Together, business groups and farm organizations could study budgets, make recommendations,
spread information, and lobby legislators.

The MMA’s lobbying aims though were more

streamlined than farm organizations’ objectives to simplify and eliminate school districts and other
government functions. “Now” General Manager John Lovett insisted was “the time to organize
and cut.”222 The Michigan Farmer proposed redistricting rural schools to halve their number
without making students walk more than two miles one way.223
Urban residents pushed populist farmers to defend tax limitation alongside business
associations, preserving relationships between organizations lobbying for replacement taxes. The
City of Detroit’s corporation council sued the editors of the Michigan Farmer, a corporation, for
illegally participating in the tax limitation campaign, and listed the Michigan Milk Producers, the
Michigan Farm Bureau, the Michigan State Grange, and the Michigan Manufacturers’ Association
as co-defendants.224 The Michigan Farmer received offers of legal help and had no intention of
“ceas(ing) in our effort to aid the taxpayers of Michigan in their fight for a better tax deal.”225 The
Milk Producers authorized paying up to $100 for their share of the legal defense. The executive
committee of the State Grange voted to appropriate up to $150.226 The Grange’s Master Bramble
consulted the other defendants about their willingness to finance a defense lawyer.
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Legislators and judges determined what effect the short and simple fifteen mill tax
limitation amendment had. The Property Tax Limitation Act of 1933 set minimum tax rates for
counties, school districts, and municipal corporations, and established a county tax commission to
allocate the remaining mills under the 1.5 percent or 15 mill limit. The Michigan Supreme Court
ruled that an override vote to increase property taxation to up to 5 percent for five years required
two-thirds of electors present and voting, not of all electors in the state, to pass. After the state’s
highest court issued an opinion that municipal corporations were not covered by the limitation,
eleven cities voted for fifteen mill tax limitation, and nine against.227 Detroit never adopted fifteen
mill limitation, but its school district regularly negotiated for a share of the Wayne County Tax
Commission’s fifteen mills. Real estate valuations increased more in cities under the fifteen mill
limitation than those outside it.228

Fig. The Michigan Education Association’s cartoon reaction to the passage of tax limitation captured labor’s support
and teacher’s leading role.229

Within months of tax limitation’s passage, the Michigan Education Association campaigned
for new school taxes with a seven-phase public relations program including a petition to the
governor and state legislators, a weekly radio program on Detroit stations, printed materials on
school costs and taxes, a newspaper on education bills, an information service for the press, and
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cooperation with community and teacher organizations.230 The approximately-fifty thousand
member Michigan Congress of Parents and Teachers committed to a program of public relations
for 1933. By the end of January 1933, most counties had held a meeting about education funding,
and six hundred school board members, taxpayers, and teachers had met in Detroit.231
Statewide organizations including the Michigan Federation of Labor and a variety of
women’s, service, and parents’ groups called a Citizens’ Conference on the Crisis in Education for
the next month.232 The president of the Michigan Federation of Labor reminded readers of the
Michigan Education Association’s magazine that organized labor supported “almost every
measure enlarging the usefulness of public schools which has been approved by progressive
educators.”233 A national conference had been held in Washington, D.C. in the first days of the
new year. Rather than a depression necessity, the school emergency resulted from an uninformed
public and selfish interests advocating “false economy at the expense of children.”234 The crisis
was nearer than conference planners knew. The Michigan Education Association’s Legislation
Committee voted to postpone its Citizens’ Conference on the Crisis in Education when Detroit
banks closed the day before the conference.235 Four hundred attendees did not receive the message
in time, and gathered in Detroit, passing a weak resolution in support of the Michigan governor’s
school finance plan to earmark revenue from a new sales tax for schools.
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In the middle of the campaign for replacement school taxes, Detroit, the first big city to
close banks, provoked the Michigan Bank Holiday of 1933.236 School districts’ demand deposits
were inaccessible, and many schools on the “verge of closing.”237 Donaldson Brown, a member
of the General Motors board and chairman of its finance committee, shuttled back and forth
between Detroit and New York on the overnight train, negotiating with bankers, politicians, and
executives for a week in February 1933. The state legislature granted the executive branch powers
to approve bankers’ conditions for re-opening banks.238 Ford Motor Company took over the
Guardian Trust Company. General Motors recapitalized the National Bank of Detroit, whose stock
it held until the 1940s.239 General Motors President Alfred Sloan authorized the Michigan
Manufacturers’ Association to say the automobile company had a purely patriotic motive, and “no
desire to remain in the banking business.”240 Detroiters who gained access to their accounts in late
March were surely inclined to believe him. Outstate, around $8 million in school funds remained
in banks closed for the rest of the year.241
Amidst the financial chaos, farmers struggled to bring the same passion to campaigning for
replacement taxes in the state legislature as they did for property tax limitation at the ballot box.
Individual granges took varying degrees of action in response to a February 1933 letter from
Master Bramble sharing resolutions from a conference of the State Grange and Farm Bureau. The
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Batavia Grange of Branch County read Bramble’s letter at its February 25th meeting, and passed
a motion to draft, sign, and send a resolution in opposition to the sales tax or any other form to
state legislators and the governor.242 In Ottawa County, the Georgetown Grange simply endorsed
the resolutions and sent the result to the state senator and representative.243 In Allegan County,
Grangers read Bramble’s letter on farm problems and taxation in between planning a dance and a
singing contest.244 In Ionia County, the Ronald Grange lent its hall out for another organization’s
tax meeting.245 On the shores of Lake Huron on the state’s east coast, Alcona and Iosco Counties
appointed a three-person committee to “draw and send our conclusions on tax situation.”246 When
the committee concluded its work, grangers circulated petitions for economy in government and
against the sales tax.247 The Bores Grange in Midland County, home of Dow Chemical Company,
passed a motion in support of state income taxes.248
As the depression deepened, farmers’ organizations switched sides in the spring of 1933,
joining a coalition with business associations like the Michigan Manufacturers’ Association to
enact a sales tax. The State Grange “reluctantly consented to the sales tax for a limited time as an
emergency measure to raise funds for welfare work and to equalize school costs until revenues can
be secured from other sources than real estate.”249 Even though the Michigan Manufacturers’
Association split its legislative attention between the National Industrial Recovery Act, passed in
June, and state taxation bills, which as late as May had included income taxes, the highly-organized
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business lobby was more able to persuade legislators than unpaid teachers and unemployed auto
workers. Communist Party organizers who fed the homeless had more pressing concerns than
mobilizing for an income tax. By 1933, forty-six percent of non-agricultural workers were
unemployed.250
Effective July 6, 1933, the state of Michigan levied a three percent tax on sales at retail
store counters—that is, on consumer goods. As many Democratic as Republican state legislators
voted for the sales tax, suggesting political party did not determine support.251 More influential,
surely, was the Michigan Manufacturers’ Association’s General Manager, the state’s most
powerful lobbyist. Michigan’s sales tax authorization legislation included an unusual provision to
prevent businesses from advertising that they absorbed the tax.252

If not businesses, then

consumers would pay. Farmers were consumers of intermediate goods like seeds, feeds, fertilizers,
and farm supplies, which were taxed under the new law.253 Detroit tax attorney Raymond Berry,
who had been campaigning against income and property taxes for years, sued on behalf of buyers
of intermediate goods.254 After a series of court reversals, Michigan businesses successfully
lobbied the state legislature to remove the tax on “consumption or use in industrial processing or
agricultural producing” in 1935.255 The Farm Bureau, which sued on behalf of local co-operatives,
considered the outcome one of its “most outstanding victories.”256 Businesses and farmers shared
credit.
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Even after the sales tax passed, the Grange’s Master Bramble thought the time was now
for a “proper Income Tax.” As Bramble noted, even a newspaper publisher like Scripps-Booth was
prepared to support a tax that would affect its business. However, in the summer of 1933, the
income tax lost by one vote in the state senate. The State Grange rededicated itself to electing
rural senators and representatives who supported the income tax. Master Bramble felt “that it
would be useless to submit it to a popular vote on account of the propaganda spread by ‘Big
Business.’”257 However, by the next fall, that is precisely what happened. When Michigan farmer
and teacher organizations split over a 1934 income tax ballot measure, the National Education
Association and Farm Bureau affiliates joined with the manufacturers association and General
Motors in issuing a statement urging a no vote.258 Non-union teachers and commercial farmers
rejected the income tax prerogatives of union teachers and populist farmers. The voter education
campaign “was left entirely in the hands of the Michigan Manufacturers’ Association, and the
loyal co-operation of its members enabled the voters to have full knowledge in reference to
Michigan’s Tax problem.”259 The income tax ballot measure failed.
While over-all property tax limitation faded, it left a mark in states across the country.
Nevada’s five percent statutory over-all property tax limit became constitutional in 1936 but was
high enough to preserve school funding. Similarly in California, voters increased the limit on
annual school tax growth to five percent; Californians discussed over-all property tax limitation,
but only after raising replacement revenue from a sales tax in 1933, and an income tax in 1935.260
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From 1934 to 1936, over-all limitations were defeated by legislatures in New Jersey, New York,
and Illinois, and property tax rate limits failed in Oregon, Colorado, and Georgia.261 By 1936,
property tax limitation had reduced Michigan state revenue by $50 million, with only $38 to $40
million replaced by taxes on retail sales, chain stores, and liquor.262
Michigan teachers were unwilling to fight for political influence like teachers in other states.
For example, the Los Angeles Times editorialized that the “most powerful lobby ever assembled
in (California) is that of schoolma’ams.”263 The California Teachers Association hired help:
political consultancy Whitaker and Baxter ran the National Education Association affiliate’s
school finance campaigns beginning in the 1930s.264 By contrast, when the chairman of the
Michigan Education Association’s Committee on Lay Leadership asked and answered a series of
questions about teachers’ involvement in school finance, the message was suggestion rather than
persuasion. “Shall the teacher ‘fight’? Shall she contribute from her meager funds to employ
professional lobbyists to work for legislative relief at the state capitol? Shall she become a
propagandist?” Answering that the teacher should embed herself in the community, the male
committee leader recommended the position of friend and fellow, rather than stranger or
propagandist.265
The state affiliate of the National Education Association, but not of the labor-aligned
American Federation of Teachers, backed a sales tax so long as schools were guaranteed a split of
sales tax revenue.266 However, the amount the legislature appropriated dropped from the $25

Irving G. Hendrick, "The Impact of the Great Depression on Public School Support in California," Southern
California Quarterly 54, no. 2 (1972): 177-95.
261
Norrix, Effects of Over-all Property Tax Limitation, 22.
262
Real Estate Tax Limitation, 17, 108.
263
Editorial, “Lobbies,” Los Angeles Times, January 26, 1933.
264
See Whitaker and Baxter collection at the California State Archive.
265
Harold Steele, “Give the Public All the Facts—to Encourage SYMPATHETIC LAY LEADERSHIP,” Michigan
Education Journal 10 (8) (April 1933): 374-5.
266
<>

89

million the education association recommended to $15 million, and only in the summer of 1934.267
Still, this sales tax revenue would be nearly half the state’s contribution to schools.268 The
legislature appropriated aid for schools from the sales tax for just two years, turning educational
lobbying for school aid acts into a high stakes annual activity. As eleven cities added fifteen mill
limitation to municipal charters, the state’s share of school costs rose from 22 to 41 percent of total
spending over the course of the 1930s.269 However, the state did not fully replace local school
property tax revenue lost due to tax limitation. Earmarked school funds from taxes on public
utilities fell as dramatically as property taxes—utility companies were taxed in the same way as
property. Moreover, the state stopped taxing local property altogether, and redirected its spending
to replace this lost revenue rather than to subsidize localities.
Without elastic income tax or earmarked sales tax revenue, Michigan teachers
painstakingly assembled a new school finance coalition including farm and business interests
every year; thus, the income tax remained out of bounds as annual appropriations took precedence
over progressive tax reform. A Michigan Educational Planning Commission, whose Finance
Committee included representatives of the Michigan Manufacturers’ Association, Farm Bureau,
State Grange, Michigan Real Estate Association, and Wholesalers Bureau of the Detroit Board of
Commerce surveyed school district costs and recommended the state pay $25 million from existing
revenue sources.270 Reorganizing as a National Industrial Conference to pass a school aid act in
1935, this group was joined by state agencies, the Oil and Gas Association of Michigan and the
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Michigan Farmer.271 The Michigan Education Association’s executive director “made a brief
statement of appreciation on behalf of the school people for the co-operation of the Conference.”272
The Farm Bureau judged state aid for rural high school students and an equalization formula based
on school census “represented more nearly the proposals originally advanced by the Michigan
State Farm Bureau than it did those of any other interested organization.”273
Labor was missing from this school finance coalition because unions opposed taxes that
fell heavily on the working class, like those on consumer sales. While twenty states passed sales
taxes during the 1930s, twenty-three passed income taxes.274 Michigan’s sales tax erected a high
barrier for school finance: with the income tax unconstitutional and the property tax
constitutionally limited, the only way to raise revenue was through a tax labor could not stand.
Professional teachers and labor unions were often on opposite sides of ballot initiatives to change
school finance in the decades after.

Conclusion
Teachers’ clubs were so concerned with rural teachers’ low salaries they compared their
wages to unskilled laborers protected by the National Recovery Act’s industrial codes.275 A
committee of teachers from small Michigan cities studied an NRA Code for teachers and urged
the Michigan Education Association to sign on.276 Increasingly desperate for school funds,
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teachers’ clubs quoted labor papers to expose the false consciousness of the “common man” who
did “not realize that many heavy taxpayers and groups holding large properties resent educating
his children and that they would be glad to avoid this tax and turn his family back toward peasantry
and serfdom.”277 The leftist education journal Social Frontier advocated reconstructing society
through schools, urging progressive teachers to ally with the labor movement.278
During the three years union teachers organized underground from 1931 to 1934,
professional teachers grew more militant, challenging their education associations from within to
find sources of school funding. The Ann Arbor Teachers Club protested the Michigan Education
Association Board of Directors’ decision to re-elect its executive secretary who “had not kept
himself aware of the fact that the legislature was proposing to cut the schools out of their share of
the Sales Tax appropriation.”279 By the fall of 1933, the executive secretary was on sick leave.280
While Ann Arbor teachers led the increasingly radical federation of teachers clubs, the Detroit
economics professor whom teacher unionists had supported as president of the rival local
education association gained influence, representing teachers’ club on the Michigan Education
Association Legislation Committee, responsible for school finance.281 Yet it was precisely during
those years 1931 to 1934 that business organizations, the Farm Bureau, and the Grange wrested
control of the tax narrative, spread researched facts widely, and developed model legislation that
would constrain education.
AFT locals in Detroit, Ann Arbor, Grand Rapids, and Kalamazoo determined they needed
their own statewide organization to lobby on school finance, and formed the Michigan Federation
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of Teachers in 1935. From the beginning, Michigan Federation of Teachers president and former
Detroit teacher Arthur Elder noted that economists recognized the income tax as “the most
equitable form of taxation” while unnamed others considered the sales tax “a most vicious
form.”282 While the education association’s willingness to campaign for a guaranteed split of sales
taxes for schools throughout the 1940s divided teachers, the Michigan Education Association and
Michigan Federation of Teachers joined together to pass a law granting teachers tenure.
By the end of the 1930s, both the American Federation of Labor and the newly formed
Congress of Industrial Organizations proposed that income and estate taxes fund schools. As
Michigan convened another commission to study taxes, Labor’s Non-Partisan League of Michigan
spoke “on behalf of the United Automobile Workers of America and other affiliated unions” in
favor of replacing the state sales tax with a graduated income tax.283 “With the passing of the Tax
Limitation Amendment,” labor’s statement to the commission read, “the state education system
was seriously imperiled and labor found itself in the position of having to accept the sales tax for
the time being.” Labor identified real estate interests as the inspiration for the constitutional
amendment, arguing that utilities and large property owners saved much more than homeowners.
As General Motors workers sat down on strike in Flint, and the industrial union movement
spread from Michigan across the country, rural interests still had the power to set fiscal rules.
Teachers and unionists refusal to recognize the Michigan Farmer’s and the Grange’s role in tax
policy narrowed the political coalitions available to support taxing the rich. When teachers and
farmers lost on the income tax, they lost for a long time. By 1937, nearly half of state tax revenue
came from the sales tax. Over the years, taxes on business activities resembled a sales tax that
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could be passed on more than an income tax born by earners. With a consumer sales tax but not
an income tax until 1967, Michigan missed the opportunity to directly tax the industrial wealth of
the state before companies moved plants to the suburbs and the south.
Detroit’s tax cutters represented national business associations and their research bureaus
or taxpayers associations at work in other state and local governments. Later, they would become
known as “The Sentinels.” Building on their policy advocacy work of the 1930s, Chrysler
Corporation vice president B. E. Hutchinson and White Star Refining Company president H. B.
Earhart spent the 1940s funding and founding free market educational institutions. Lent Upson’s
successor as director of the Detroit Bureau of Municipal Research, Loren B. Miller, who like the
research bureau’s accountant went by the nickname “Red,” advised the region’s business leaders
where to donate to stop governments from going into the red.
State property tax limits in place, business conservatives pivoted to campaign for federal
income tax limitation beginning in 1938, building organizational and ideological infrastructure
along the way. The research movement split from the professionalizing discipline of public
administration, and re-branded itself a movement of private citizens representing the likes of
Detroit’s early depression budget cutters. Researcher Loren B. Miller, who would advise funders
of the postwar conservative intellectual movement from his position as Detroit research bureau
director, requested details on “Michigan’s 15-mill limitation” while on the Dun and Bradstreet
bond desk during the Great Depression.284 The resulting school money cuts, the Detroit Bureau
of Governmental Research dismissively judged, were “causing a lot of ‘weeping, and wailing and
nashing of teath (sp)’, etc.”285
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Ch. 2 The Sentinels: Warnings About Government Spending
Overall property tax limits passed during the early Depression created a fiscal emergency
for schools that lasted beyond the economic recovery. Civic coalitions seeking to fund Detroit
schools after WWII called themselves “Save our Schools.”1 The SOS went out to taxpayers in the
Arsenal of Democracy burdened by consumer goods rationing and the nationalization of defense
plants, which removed valuable industrial property from tax rolls.

Conservative Detroit

businessmen called themselves the Society of Sentinels, appropriating the acronym to send a
different message than the socialist trade unionists in “Save our Schools” or moderate businessmen
invested in spending more on urban education. A few years before, the National Labor Relations
Board had sanctioned the Society of Sentinels’ founder, trailer manufacturer Harvey Fruehauf, for
spying on and firing union workers at the company’s Detroit plant.2 The Fruehauf case was part
of the U.S. Supreme Court ruling that upheld the constitutionality of the Wagner Act, the
transformative New Deal labor law. Conservative backlash to the New Deal shaped Detroit school
politics when the Sentinels campaigned to reduce taxes and eliminate “unnecessary activities of
government.”3
The Society of Sentinel’s objectives took a constitutional form: “constitutional restrictions
of the present unlimited tax power of the government,” a reference to the campaign to limit federal
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income taxes to twenty-five percent.4 While income taxes applied to the masses after the war, the
richest paid marginal rates as high as 38 percent on corporate income, and 91 percent on personal
income in 1946.5 Far from farmers’ state property tax limitation discussed in Chapter 1 “Tax
Slackers,” the federal income tax limitation—what trade unions called the “Millionaire’s Tax
Amendment”—would protect the rich. During the twenty-year campaign to amend the U. S.
constitution, courts protected books and pamphlets—and the privacy of the donors who funded
them—while restricting direct lobbying. Although businessmen took federal tax cuts in 1961 and
1964, they spent the previous two decades campaigning against federal spending in general and
aid to education in particular.6
I argue business associations used economic education and everyday ideas for fiscal
politics, in addition to public relations and ideological formation.7 While scholars have described
the collapse of the federal aid to education coalition from within, this chapter focuses on external
forces.8 Businessmen wanted schooling but they wanted less, and to pay less, than teachers thought
they should. Most of all, business associations wanted education by donation, not taxation.9
Alongside the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
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supported voluntary alternatives to federal aid: company contributions to private colleges and
universities and to the development of curriculum for primary and secondary schools, in addition
to bank-financed school construction.10
Business conservatives believed a mechanism in the fall from freedom to slavery or from
democracy to dictatorship was public sector union control of what was taught in school and how
much it cost.11 To share their beliefs, business conservatives compared public spending to slavery,
tyranny, and theft in the context of municipal unemployment relief during the early Great
Depression and a post-WWII strike wave that included public sector workers. Set into action
during the long campaign for a constitutional limit on federal taxation, and conceptualized as
public choice theory during the 1960s, the next generation of tax limiters revived ideas about the
destructive effects of government spending during 1970s debates about state constitutional limits,
the subject of Ch. 5 “Don’t Spend It Faster Than I Can Make It” and Ch. 6 “Model Legislation.”
This chapter is about who decided what was an issue, and how they taught their ideas,
while the rest of the dissertation is about political power as voting and agenda setting—who
decided what issues went on the ballot, legislative calendar, court docket, and convention agenda.12
Ideas about government spending mattered when businessmen put them into action. Perhaps
Detroit and Los Angeles businessmen read the NAM’s pamphlet “You are a ‘Sentinel’ for private
enterprise,” which urged a “personal evangelistic spirit”—personal time, effort, conviction, and
belief—which enabled “a handful of zealous people to make an impression far beyond their actual
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importance...or beyond what money will buy.”13 NAM had observed as much in the radicals,
“pinks,” and economic planners. Business leaders could not pay to protect private or free
enterprise; they needed to proselytize.
At the same time, business educators like Leonard Read tried to pry businessmen away
from NAM and its insular defense of capitalism towards new ideological institutions for economic
education. While the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce’s publication The Economic Sentinel
carried the byline “That works of merit may have a larger audience,” it took Read, who was also
the chamber’s director, opening the Foundation for Economic Education in 1946 to reach a mass
audience. Pairing the well-documented history of business conservatism in Los Angeles with
Detroit’s lesser-known role emphasizes continuities in economic thought about the perils of
government spending before and after the New Deal.14
Detroit’s Society of Sentinels founder Harvey Fruehauf was also a trustee of the Detroit
Bureau of Governmental Research under its new director, an advisor to the businessmen who
funded the postwar conservative intellectual movement.15 While Ford Motor Company backed
the moderate Committee for Economic Development, and launched the liberal Ford Foundation in
its image, Detroit’s other two big automakers Chrysler and General Motors remained on the right.16
By reconstructing the deep involvement of Detroit executives and experts in establishing economic
education after the war, I show how difficult the fight for economic security was between the
Wagner Act and Taft-Hartley, shifting historians of Detroit’s focus from flaws in liberalism and
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struggles between leftists.17 Even if solidarity had triumphed over sexism in the home, and over
racism in the neighborhood and workplace, in a union town like Detroit, conservatives would have
suppressed labor ideas and spread anti-unionism and anti-Keynesianism. Automakers signed
opposed the labor movement’s priorities in the public sphere first by sharing a program of
economic education, then by shutting down labor education. Forced out of the realm of ideas,
labor competed in the political and judicial system. As Part II shows, labor politics and lawsuits
struggled to change state fiscal structures.
The first section describes business critiques of textbooks and introduces actors. The
second section shows how pre-New Deal research bureaus and taxpayers associations, in addition
to business associations and post-WWII neoliberal institutions, shaped a new program of economic
education.

The third section traces a genealogy of old ideas about government spending

repackaged by these institutions to constitutionally limit taxation. The fourth section adds conflict
over labor education to the Cold War narrative of political repression.18

Business Critiques of Textbooks and the Search for “Sound Economics”
Writing to a popular economic educator, the retired chemical company executive and
prolific funder of conservative causes Jasper Crane looked to education as the arena for struggle
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over slavery and freedom.19 If educators and thought leaders accepted “sound economics,” they
would tell truth to the people. In addition to an idea and a discourse, free enterprise was a lesson
and a practice; it was taught. Historical figures familiar to readers of Elizabeth Fones-Wolf and
Kim Phillips-Fein intervened in textbook debates to influence teachers’ and professors’ lessons on
capitalism. Social studies critics such as Jasper Crane, Loren Miller, and NAM leader Henning
Prentis Jr., in addition to free enterprise textbook promoters Raymond C. Hoiles and B. E.
Hutchinson, were architects of an alternative curriculum, a program of economic education.
One of NAM’s anti-union “Brass Hats,” Henning W. Prentis, Jr., president of the
Armstrong Cork Company of Pittsburgh, PA urged manufacturers to take up their citizenship
duties alongside their management ones as industrial statesmen.20 Under Prentis’s leadership
during the Great Depression, NAM ran the multimedia public relations campaign the “Tripod of
Freedom” to convince Americans their freedom rested on representative democracy, civil and
religious liberty, and “free private enterprise.”21 Answering his own question “What can I do,”
Prentis first proposed that businessmen learn political philosophy, then get active in politics, and
donate to civic and industrial organizations.22 Prentis feared 30 million K-12 students in early
1940s public schools, the next generation’s voters, “would be easy prey for the demagogue” unless
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they knew principles of the American republic.23 Teachers had a role in “Counteracting the Union
Influence” as one NAM pamphlet had it.
NAM wanted to stop the trend of teacher unionization, which bred sympathy with organized
labor by presenting the “management story” and giving “positive proof of management's interest
in the teacher's welfare."24 NAM found that when management protested school construction or
“the upgrading of teachers’ salaries to a just level,” there could be no common interest or mutual
confidence between industry and education.25 In 1941, NAM’s annual Congress of American
Industry declared support for “reasonable financial support” for public education, to be “a
necessary claim upon our American society to which other public services of lesser value should
be subordinated.”26 NAM did not define how much money was reasonable, or what services were
lesser.
The NEA joined NAM’s Department of Group Relations on a countrywide tour in the early
1940s to promote management-teacher cooperation. AFT leaders agonized over whether to even
meet with business leaders as antiunion as the NAM’s.27 Receiving no reply to his entreaties,
NAM’s director of Group Relations dropped by the AFT’s Chicago headquarters unannounced to
invite teacher union leaders to hold a joint event.28 The NEA but not AFT participated in 45
regional meetings and more than 250 community group discussions. Rather than federal aid to
education, however, the topic was what training and attitudes business wanted schools to teach.29
The president of the Detroit Federation of Teachers who attended a “love feast” for school and
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business representatives reported that spokesmen for businessmen relentlessly criticized schools.30
The American Federation of Teachers’ tax expert and labor educator Arthur Elder thought the
NEA-NAM conferences would be “productive of little good.”
Prentis and NAM objected to the new K-12 curriculum of social studies written by a “host
of puny iconoclasts, who destroy since they cannot build.”31 In Prentis’s interpretation of
American history, institutions were free, and the country was a republic, not a democracy.
Beginning at the end of the 1930s, NAM’s Department of Group Relations had asked schools,
churches, and farm organizations to teach free enterprise.32 At the beginning of the 1940s, as many
as half of United States middle schoolers learned a different lesson from Teachers College
professor Harold Rugg’s ambitious social studies text Man and his Changing Society. Rugg, who
thought schools could reconstruct society, used issues and problems from students’ lives to
introduce critiques of business practices like advertising and of the economic interests of U. S.
constitution drafters.33 Although challenging to teach from, Rugg’s textbook was the best-selling
work of social studies in the 1930s. However, sales of Man and his Changing Society fell
precipitously after the American Legion and NAM alleged the textbook was anti-American in
1941. Rugg identified these attacks as a pattern in the history of education: when progressives had
power in government and education, they became targets of reaction.34
Business conservatives’ complaints to university administrators also changed economics
curriculum, as the controversy over the first textbook to bring Keynes to introductory economics
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demonstrates.35 Conservative author Rose Wilder Lane reviewed Lorie Tarshis’ The Elements of
Economics: An Introduction to the Theory of Price and Employment, for Merwin K. Hart’s
National Economic Council in 1947.36 Hart, an executive at cereal manufacturer Cream of Wheat,
was later marginalized for his alleged fascism and accepted anti-Semitism but funded at the time
by Lammot du Pont, then the chairman of Du Pont and General Motors.37 Frank Gannett, owner
of the New York-based newspaper chain and chairman of the committee campaigning to
constitutionally limit federal income taxes, wrote the Cornell University provost to complain that
college courses used the Tarshis text.38 The director of the Detroit Bureau of Municipal Research,
an adviser to funders of the conservative intellectual movement, tried to deliver a copy of Tarshis
to Henry Ford through the research bureau’s president, a Ford Motor Company and Ford family
attorney, “just hoping it might jar him, or at least contribute to an awakening.”39
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Business conservatives shrank the mass audience of Lorie Tarshis but not the specialist
audience of Paul Samuelson. Tarshis was poised for professional and public influence as he
accepted a position at Stanford University and published “An Exposition of Keynesian
Economics” in the discipline’s leading journal, the American Economic Review.40 Sales of
Tarshis’s textbook plummeted while another Keynesian economist in the academy, Paul
Samuelson, went on to win the Nobel prize in economics, and his textbook to be published in
twenty editions and counting. Samuelson had written carefully, lawyerly but was still accused of
“playing peek-a-boo with the Commies,” in his words.41 For its difficulty and complexity,
Samuelson’s work much like Keynes’ before him, launched a scholarship of interpretation in
university economics departments but lacked the popular appeal of Tarshis. Still, Lammot du Pont
had believed MIT economist Paul Samuelson’s forthcoming textbook Economics to be a milder
but still dangerous form of Keynesianism than Tarshis’s and lobbied the president of his alma
mater MIT to drop Samuelson.42 Criticism of his and Tarshis’s books, Samuelson thought, did not
“reflect well on conservative business pressuring of colleges.”
A new business association, the Committee for Economic Development (CED) aimed to
bring social scientists together with executives to conduct economic research.43 An extension of
the federal government’s Business Advisory Council’s “post-armament” economic planning, the
CED began recruiting the prior summer when a University of Chicago vice president and trustee
secured research funding from the U.S. Department of Commerce.44 From the start, NAM “Brass
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Hats” like Armstrong Cork’s Henning Prentis and isolationists like Sears, Roebuck & Company’s
General Robert Wood were invited to join the CED, as were conservative General Motors and
General Electric executives.

However, the CED accommodated Keynesian spending and

progressive taxation, and in its early years, the commissioned reports by tax expert Harold Groves,
a favorite of the labor movement.45 In the race to produce postwar tax studies, the CED rejected
Herbert Stein’s National Bureau of Economic Research paper as too conservative because it argued
against government spending to create purchasing power, graduated tax rates, and supported
reducing inflation over unemployment.46 As of 1944, the CED position was flexible monetary
policy and a fiscal policy of automatic stabilization, with personal income taxes at the center, and
lower excise, sales, and corporate taxes.47 Human capital theorists affiliated with the CED argued
that increased state and local taxes would yield a return when invested in skills and knowledge.48
The CED distinguished its school curriculum developed with teachers from the educational
material for companies other business associations promoted in schools.49 A University of
Chicago trustee and early CED organizer aimed to “raise the whole level of economic literacy,”
which was the only way to “develop effective support in this country for sound economic
programs.”50 The dean of the Harvard Business School, a CED member, thought that if “new
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honest knowledge” were “disseminated intelligently” to professors of business and economics, and
to teachers of social studies, then “the attacks—the violent attacks—upon private enterprise in this
country” would end.51 When the CED’s Joint Council for Economic Education held workshops
between educators, business leaders, and university and foundation researchers to bring “economic
understanding into the public schools,” a minor controversy emerged over whether business and
labor should be on the same program.52 Teacher consultation was different than teacher control.
When the CED debated adding a board member from “the high school level,” the board considered
a National Education Association leader, a big city schools superintendent, and professors of
education.53 Instead, the committee added university presidents, who were often business leaders,
and publishers.54 The recently retired U.S. Commissioner of Education Dr. John Studebaker
recommended that business executives and managers ask boards of education and school
administrations why economics was not a required course.55
By the early 1950s, secondary schools had access to a new economics textbook that taught
free enterprise. Dr. Studebaker himself commented on and shared the manuscript of Foundation
for Economic Education economist Fred Fairchild’s secondary school textbook Understanding
Our Free Economy a “straight-forward portrayal of those economic principles which relate to the
free economy.”56 A tax expert who consulted for the insurance industry, chambers of commerce,
and manufacturers associations, the Yale professor Fred Fairchild sat on the U.S. Chamber’s
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Committee on Federal Finance during the 1930s and NAM’s National Industrial Conference
Board’s Economic Advisory Council during the 1940s.57 Writing with a high school teacher from
research collected by a Foundation for EE employee, Fairchild rebutted Lorie Tarshis in
Understanding Our Free Economy, first published in 1952 and in updated editions for the next
decade.58 In a concluding chapter on supergovernment, Fairchild worried that freedom would not
survive a government with unlimited power to seize wealth and incomes. The textbook posed
problems for students like “Karl Marx expressed the opinion that abuse of the graduated income
tax would destroy Western democracy. Is there probability of this result occurring? In what ways
could it be prevented?”59
Foundation for Economic Education readers and trustees promoted Understanding Our Free
Economy for use in the public schools. Southern California newspaperman Raymond C. Hoiles
found Fairchild’s book to be the best on civics he had read, and offered to help “get this book into
the public high schools.”60 Hoiles, who hoped “free enterprise would eliminate tax supported
schools,” had been searching for works to replace Frank Magruder’s American Government.
Foundation for Economic Education trustee and Chrysler vice president B. E. Hutchinson
recommended Fairchild’s textbook to the head of a college preparatory high school in Grosse
Pointe, MI, home to many wealthy auto executives.61 Despite a legal requirement for Houston
schools to purchase state-approved books, a business admirer secured an order for 300 copies of
Fairchild’s unapproved textbook.62 Fairchild separated his work from what he perceived to be
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propaganda to keep his textbook in the schools: if Understanding Our Free Economy was
“regarded as favorable to free enterprise,” it was “because that is the way the truth points.”63
Leaders of teachers’ two organizations the AFT and NEA also published social studies
textbooks. New York social studies teacher, and future American Federation of Teachers president,
Charles Cogen co-authored the textbook Economics in Our Democracy.

A few years earlier,

McGraw-Hill published Economic Roads for American Democracy by a department of the
National Education Association.6465 The McGraw-Hill Publishing Company was at the center of
the transformation of the business press from specialty industry and trade association outlets to
general audience publications.66

McGraw-Hill published many Committee for Economic

Development reports, including economist (and AFT member) Harold Groves’ “Production, Jobs
and Taxes,” and distributed its books and tax policy statements widely.67 That teachers’ textbooks
were published by McGraw-Hill indicates how mainstream their ideas were.

However,

conservative correspondents Jasper Crane and Loren Miller were furious that the NEA’s McGrawHill textbook presented economic systems other than capitalism as compatible with democracy.68
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“For industry as a whole to ballyhoo or ‘sell’ free enterprise is, to my notion, just a stupid
waste of money. For one thing, it leaves no deposit of knowledge. But most of all, it just
can’t be done. So long as I can pick up a paper almost any day of the week and find either
individual industries or industrial groups who obviously do not believe in free enterprise as
proved by their own actions and statements, any such program is just plain futile.”69
Loren Miller to Jasper E. Crane, January 30, 1948.
Economic education was a mid-century defense of capitalism, an update of business
leaders’ early twentieth-century program to prepare the public for industrial society. Skeptical that
NAM could change public attitudes towards business without improving businesses from within,
itinerant researcher Loren B. “Red” Miller took over the Detroit Bureau of Governmental Research
and directed businessmen’s investments to new institutions of economic education in the mid1940s.70 Miller’s connections and convictions led a Reason magazine editor to call the researcher
the “Ur-source” for the funding of American libertarianism.71 Miller introduced Friedrich Hayek
to Harold Luhnow, whose Volker Fund financed the Austrian economist’s position at the
University of Chicago, advised Du Pont Company executive Jasper Crane to ask Hayek about his
“international liberal society of scholars,” persuaded Luhnow to fund American travelers
(including Miller) to the resulting Mont Pèlerin Society meeting, and fundraised money for the
Foundation for Economic Education’s Hudson Valley headquarters.72 However, when Leonard
Read launched the Foundation for Economic Education in 1946, Miller declined Read’s invitation
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to join the first libertarian think tank.73 Miller instead advised businessmen to cooperate rather
than compete in funding economic education, and to themselves decide what programs to fund
rather than delegate to intermediaries like himself. Recovering Miller’s role in the postwar
conservative intellectual movement shows how restrictions on majority rule came from the prewar research movement in American cities, a homegrown anti-majoritarianism, in addition to postwar European social theory.
Miller was a warm correspondent who cultivated relationships and connected elites, a
natural fundraiser long devoted to economy and efficiency in government. A personal friend of
Detroit Research Bureau Director Lent Upson, with whom he traded gossip, puppies, and tax-free
liquor, Miller was a professional colleague as well.74 During the 1930s, Miller worked for Dun
and Bradstreet’s Municipal Debt Service in New York, the Municipal Finance Officers’
Association based in Chicago, and Newark’s Bureau of Governmental Research, Inc, and on two
separate stints, Upson himself.75 Upson thought Miller “one of the ablest research men in the
field.”76 Miller moved to Kansas City, MO for a promotion to research bureau director, and
befriended Volker Fund trustee Harold Luhnow; the relationship lasted when Miller left for
Detroit, MI in 1944, where he met another prominent funder of conservatives causes: Harry Boyd
Earhart, the retired oil refiner based in nearby Ann Arbor, who was also a trustee of the Detroit
Bureau of Governmental Research.77
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Together, Upson and Miller split the research movement to retain control over its direction,
separating private citizens from public administrators who founded the American Society for
Public Administration with university professors in 1939.78 Miller urged the rebranded citizens
research movement not to be “choosy or snooty to those who may fight blindly” without the facts,
such as taxpayers associations and leagues, since all those committed to economy in government
were allies.79 Miller was skeptical of including Chamber of Commerce research bureaus, however,
like his employer the Newark Chamber of Commerce’s Municipal Research Bureau.80 Perhaps
Miller realized the research movement’s message would be more persuasive if “commerce” was
not in the name. As citizen researchers prepared to break with business associations, they
approached the Sloan Foundation, established in 1934 by General Motors president and CEO
Alfred P. Sloan, for grant funding.
Miller approached the Tax Foundation about creating a “citizens front” of research and
popular action.81 In 1937, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce supported the creation of a Tax
Foundation by industrial leaders including NAM’s Henning Prentis, Du Pont Company’s Jasper
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Crane, and Chrysler Corporation’s B. E. Hutchinson.82 Sharing fundraising advice, Upson told
Miller to emphasize “that the point of view of the bureaus is precisely that of the taxpayers—the
best interest of the public, but that over a long period of years we have learned that activity has to
be supported by a lot of facts.”83 Citizen research had an “essential role to fill in modern
democracy: being the bulwark between a more or less defenseless citizenry…and the constant
force both of official sources and advocates of special interests.”84 Miller classified “debt limits,
cash basis laws, budgets, initiative, referendum, recall” as “citizen controls.”85 By 1947, the
Governmental Research Association was “largely supported by a grant from Tax Foundation.”86
The research movement intentionally aligned with organizations skilled in persuasion in
order to translate ideas into action. The Tax Foundation conducted public expenditure surveys in
Michigan, New York, and elsewhere.87 Teachers argued these surveys were deceptive and some
Tax Foundation employees agreed. One Tax Foundation analyst “found it exceedingly difficult to
adjust myself to a program in which the importance of a research or factual approach does not
seem to be recognized” and wrote Miller’s mentor Lent Upson looking for research jobs.88
Detroit’s research bureau director advised the Michigan Public Expenditure Survey on a
constitutional amendment to cut county government costs, and reported on his proposal to the Tax
Foundation’s executive director.89 From 1939 to 1941, Michigan’s state and local chambers held
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taxpayers meetings with speakers from home-rule cities that added overall property tax limitation
to their charters, leading up to a “get the axe—cut the tax” campaign in the state legislature.90
Teachers appealed to public and school board opinion to increase salaries to preDepression levels by exposing public expenditure surveys and the Detroit Bureau of Governmental
Research’s salary reports by as fronts for business interests.91 Teacher unionists observed a “rather
close connection” between the Detroit research bureau and Michigan Public Expenditure Survey,
noting their joint research and adjoining offices.92 A Detroit school board member served as
president of the School Public Relations Association working with the National Education
Association to combat “organized forces (tax survey groups, et al) crossing your state line today
to ‘enlighten’ the public on the ‘facts’ of school extravagances.”93 Teachers’ case for bias would
have been strengthened if they saw the ten-page statement of libertarian principles Miller made
Detroit research bureau employees sign.94
Writing to research bureau funders Luhnow and Earhart during the summer between
victories in Europe and Japan, Miller proposed an organization to structure the postwar world.95
A central agency or clearing house, a tax-exempt “Economic Research Institute,” would research
economic education, advise, counsel, monitor, and evaluate member organizations, and fund
graduate fellowships. Or as Miller later put it, an outfit “that just sits around thinking of what
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might be done.”96 Miller wanted to match skillful popular writers with funders and distributors,
and measure the reception of their work. Businessmen should choose programs, soliciting advice
from experts like Miller, without funding a permanent staff. Operating “out of the public eye,”
the agency would appraise but not run programs.97 Essentially, Miller wanted to form a cartel of
economic educators who made joint decisions about the direction of their industry.
When Hayek sent Luhnow the “aims and organisation of the society which I have
mentioned before,” it was Miller who sent the letter on to other American funders, including
Crane.98 Giving intellectual leaders who could “espouse a true liberal philosophy…some measure
of prestige and respectability” required “a rallying point and meeting ground.”99 As Crane
circulated the “Suggestions of Hayek and Loren B. Miller” as one memo subject line put it, the Du
Pont Company’s economist was skeptical that an international “club” or “prayer meeting” could
solve the United States’ problems.100 Crane, who was more sympathetic to the potential long-term
influence of the ideas of freedom, liberty, and individualism, suggested an American society,
perhaps the “Patrick Henry Society.”101 Miller also shared a memo by University of Chicago
economist Henry C. Simons for an “American society of liberal scholars.”102 Crane and Miller
agreed such scholars needed to show that individualism and capitalism were compatible with
human welfare, as measured by living standards and individual opportunity.103
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A frequent correspondent of Crane’s in 1945 and 1946, Miller vetted thinkers and books
alongside the likes of business educator Leonard Read.104 Perhaps Isabel Paterson’s The God of
the Machine Crane wrote Miller “might be the New Testament of capitalism.” Miller preferred
Rose Wilder Lane’s The Discovery of Freedom.105 While Lane’s book lay next to Crane’s bedside,
it was not the bible of freedom historian Kim Phillips-Fein argues the Du Pont executive searched
for.106 Ayn Rand’s The Fountainhead deserved a promotional campaign, Miller thought.107 These
female writers, the “three furies” of libertarianism were popular among businessmen and the public
but lacked academic credentials.108

Among the three male economists the Foundation for

Economic Education would promote, Crane and Miller preferred Ludwig von Mises, defined
“sound economics” by economic journalist Henry Hazlitt’s book Economics in One Lesson, and
loved Cornell economist F. A. Harper but wanted to know how many businessmen actually read
his work.109 Reporting from the Swiss mountains during the first meeting of the Mont Pèlerin
Society in 1947, Miller observed University of Chicago economists like Milton Friedman scorned
the “Mises-Read-Watts-Hazlitt-Harper school of thought” and did not have a use for it or want
anything to do with it.110 This separation between high and low preserved professors’ legitimacy
but often masked similarity in economic ideas.
Coordinating a concerned few to influence the “trend of economic and social affairs” in
the United States, Miller’s agency would redirect “those interested in American competitive
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economy” away from supporting efforts “operating under the color of impartiality.”111 Here,
Miller surely had NAM’s information arm, the National Industrial Conference Board in mind.
When Miller appealed to Lammot du Pont to convene a discussion about the proposed agency or
clearinghouse, du Pont listed thirteen organizations and individuals to invite that he already
donated to including NAM and the National Industrial Conference Board, Merwin K. Hart’s
National Economic Council, the American Economic Foundation, and Leo Wolman.112 Crane and
du Pont called first Miller, then vice president of the National Industrial Conference Board Leonard
Read to Du Pont Company headquarters “for a talk on some of these matters.” Indicating Miller’s
sway, Read also visited Detroit.113 Switching business lobbies, Read had left the Los Angeles
Chamber of Commerce to work for the National Industrial Conference Board, but quickly departed
over the Board’s policy of presenting both sides of an issue.114
At the same time, the Detroit research bureau director Miller continued to advise Crane,
Earhart, Luhnow, and others to coordinate amongst themselves rather than delegate to Read.115
Miller believed businessmen’s investment in ideas should be active, rather than passive venture
capital; otherwise, only self-starters would receive funding.116 Supportive of Read’s principled
conviction and ability but skeptical of his approach, Miller suggested Read could head the
proposed agency/investment council, or General Motors executive Alfred Sloan’s eponymous
foundation, dedicated to economic education as it was.117 Read could even supervise Hayek’s
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(never completed and Luhnow-funded) study rather than leave it to “semi-socialist” University of
Chicago researchers who had prepared material for the Committee for Economic Development.118
With the creation of the Foundation for Economic Education under Read’s leadership in June 1946,
Read replaced Miller as conservative business funders’ confidant.119
The Foundation for Economic Education recruited from Miller and Crane’s circles as well
as Read’s. Donaldson Brown, finance committee chairman of General Motors’ board and a former
Du Pont executive, was one of six founding members of the Foundation for Economic Education,
alongside Yale economist Fred Fairchild, tire manufacturer David M. Goodrich, economic
journalist Henry Hazlitt, pollster Claude Robinson, and Columbia economist Leo Wolman, a New
Dealer turned critic.120

Brown and Robinson had been on Miller’s list for his agency or

clearinghouse while Wolman was on Crane’s. Read also invited NAM members to be trustees—
so many that FEE scheduled its fall board meeting just before NAM’s Congress of American
Industry.121 NAM leader Prentis backed FEE too.122
Chrysler Corporation vice president B. E. Hutchinson became an active trustee of FEE,
supported financially in its early years substantially by Midwestern industrialists.123 At some
point, “Hutch” compelled Leonard Read to send materials to his son’s University of Vermont
professor, whose history of economics was “full of economic heresy and misinformation in
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general.”124 However, even Hutch hired the Michigan Manufacturers’ Association director to
“pull his deals for him, to ‘protect’ his interest.”125 Miller advocated less self-interested economic
education. Chrysler’s economist endorsed and published pamphlets for FEE and the Committee
for Constitutional Government, two indirect lobbies for free enterprise successful enough to attract
congressional scrutiny, as described in the next section. Chrysler employees stuck their necks out,
what founder Walter Chrysler lamented too business leaders would not do in the wake of the
Wagner Act.126
General Motors executives were close to the Du Pont family of anti-New Deal crusaders
who owned a controlling interest in General Motors stock throughout this period. While the
American Liberty League faded during the Great Depression, General Motors Corporation in
addition to the Du Pont Company contributed to the lasting postwar project of economic education.
Lammot du Pont contributed $5,000 per year, or General Motors stock, to the American Economic
Foundation until his death.127 As part of a Thought Starters Series begun in the mid-1930s, General
Motors’ director of customer research published pamphlets endorsing economist Orval Watts’s Do
We Want Free Enterprise?128 Watts, a disciple of the eugenicist and Harvard economist Thomas
Nixon Carver, was a bold choice for a publicly-traded corporation, and would go on to play a
crucial role in the early Foundation for Economic Education.
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Detroit research bureau director Miller thought the closest to a national economic policy
agency “on our side” was the small Committee for Constitutional Government.129 Newspapermen
like Felix Morley and John Chamberlain founded the Committee for Constitutional Government
in objection to President Roosevelt’s threat to expand the size of the U.S. Supreme Court to dilute
the power of conservative justices. Committee members were more concerned with the legislation
and administration the court upheld than with judicial power itself. To permanently slow national
spending, businessmen supported the Committee for Constitutional Government’s federal
constitutional amendment to limit tax rates on income from wages, capital, and estates to twentyfive percent beginning in 1938.130 When the U.S. House failed to pass the federal limit out of
committee, tax limiters aimed to call a constitutional convention through the states instead. 31
states passed resolutions in favor of the twenty-five percent income tax limit by 1957.131 Stalled
by WWII, the federal tax limitation campaign had resurfaced amidst what sociologist Isaac
William Martin calls rich people’s movements against the income tax.132 In 1949, the Committee
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for Constitutional Government spent $620,632 on legislation, presumably the 25 percent income,
estate, and gift tax limit, second most that year after the American Medical Association’s campaign
against universal healthcare.133
The House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities, known as the Buchanan committee
after its chairman, investigated supporters of the federal tax limitation beginning in 1949.134 After
an FBI investigation, Chairman Frank Buchanan charged that the Foundation for Economic
Education was in the “twilight zone” of lobbying. FEE trustee B. E. Hutchinson, the vice president
of Chrysler Corporation, wondered if FEE’s opposition to rent control provoked congressional
scrutiny during a furor over “the real estate lobby.”135 A newspaper columnist had also revealed
that FEE was run by corporations propagandizing against federal aid to education, in addition to
the Marshall plan, social security, and rent control.136 The executive secretary of the Committee
for Constitutional Government to tell the U. S. Congress who purchased literature, and thus
circumvented the 1946 Lobbying Act.137 Indicted by a federal grand jury for contempt of Congress
for this silence, the Committee for Constitutional Government’s executive secretary received a six
month-suspended jail sentence before his conviction was overturned on appeal in 1953.138
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Courts ruled books and pamphlets were protected free speech and free press, while direct
lobbying—buttonholing a legislator and telling them how to vote—was restricted.139 For example,
the Committee for Constitutional Government’s pamphlet “Housewife’s Dilemma” by Chrysler
economist John C. Scoville about the benefits of competition unmediated by third parties like
unions would be protected.140 The U. S. Chamber and NAM publicly joined the cause of federal
constitutional tax limitation in the early 1950s.141 During the 1950s, NAM’s National Industrial
Council of state manufacturers, trade, and employers’ associations searched for test cases to
challenge state taxes on interstate commerce, which were later upheld by the Supreme Court, then
lowered by Congress.142
During Buchanan’s congressional hearing on interest group influence in politics, a cereal
manufacturer and a real estate man testified that politicians and the people were the sources of
corruption—not them. A letter between two real estate board leaders read into the congressional
record used language similar to National Association of Manufacturers’ economist Noel Sargent’s
stock quote “Bribes to Voters,” described below. A National Association of Real Estate Boards
vice president wrote that “popularity contests” would “lead to disaster and to some form of
dictatorship as the currency is progressively devaluated by public spending in order to buy

139

"Limits on Congressional Inquiry: Rumely v. United States," University of Chicago Law Review 20, no. 3
(Spring 1953): 593-597.
140
John W. Scoville, “Housewife’s Dilemma: An Analysis,” Committee for Constitutional Government, 1947.
141
In 1952, the U.S. Chamber endorsed federal constitutional tax limitation, declaring “There should be adoption of
an appropriate amendment to the Constitution to limit the taxing power of Congress.” Policy Declarations, 1952, 7980, Chamber papers, Hagley. Earlier, the Chamber recommended a congressional committee tie an expenditure ceiling
to revenues. As NAM more actively engineered fiscal policy to its liking, manufacturers signed on to the limit too.
When it came to taxes during the 1940s, NAM focused on excess profits taxes, double taxation of corporate income,
tax privileges for cooperatives, and a flat rate income tax. <>, Box 183, NAM 2020. At first, NAM aimed to reduce
the top individual income tax rate to 35 percent, and argued economic growth would make up the lost revenue. NAM
promoted "pay-as-we-go" which meant "taxing as we spend.” NAM Government Finance Department, H.L.L. 12-2750, A Program to Pay-As-We-Go," First draft--for consideration of Taxation Committee Advisory Group, 2, January
4, 1951, Folder Taxes PAY-AS-WE-GO 1950, Box 185, NAM 2020.
142
Box 186, NAM 2020.

121

votes.”143 Only male direct taxpayers should be allowed to vote, the “foe of rent controls”
concluded.144 Quoting an earlier speech of his own, the National Economic Council’s Merwin K.
Hart testified that the United States was a republic, and the attempt to turn a representative
government into a democracy would “lead to a mobocracy, governed eventually by a dictator.”145
The fall from democracy into dictatorship echoed another quote about “The Hard Core of
Freedom,” created by a midwestern journalist, attributed to a forgotten Scottish historian, and
publicized by the Foundation for Economic Education. Economic education’s lucid ideas replaced
the research movement’s stylized facts. NAM leader Henning Prentis Jr. believed that ideas
influenced the “mass mind” more than facts alone.146 Committee for Constitutional Government
leader Reverend Norman Vincent Peale believed Americans needed a Commonsensia of the many
more than an intelligentsia of the few.147

The Commonsensia
Rather than sell free enterprise like any other product, business leaders wanted their ideas
to sell themselves, to become common sense.148 Economic education included everyday ideas
143
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about how to make democracy safe for capitalism found in pamphlets and textbooks, in addition
to “after-dinner talks, advertisements, newspaper columns, trade journals, sermons, and political
speeches.”149 The boundary between propaganda and scholarship blurred when textbook authors
reprinted pamphlets—Harvard political economist Thomas Nixon Carver included parables while
NAM economist Noel Sargent used his own and others’ apothegms. Even the research director of
the politically moderate Committee for Economic Development worried unlimited government
would have destructive effects in similar terms to lay economists. The business Keynesianism
exemplified by the Committee for Economic Development was not so settled, as Robert M. Collins
suggested, on limiting government revenue rather than limiting government spending.150
Popular writers from British historian Arnold Toynbee to German writer and teacher
Oswald Spengler to American urban planner Lewis Mumford connected political corruption to
civilizational decay in a cyclical philosophy of history; among business leaders, a version by
NAM’s Henning Prentis, Jr. was best known.151 During the winter of 1941, Prentis began
constructing his own “time-worn historical cycle” of stages: fetters, faith, freedom, folly, fear.152
While first tyranny, then bondage, replaced fetters, and freedom was narrowed to liberty, over the
years Prentis inserted new descriptions of welfare and emotion: economic well-being became
abundance, selfishness and complacency substituted for folly, then apathy and dependence for
fear. Prentis’s cycle, memorialized in a 1943 speech to the National Industrial Conference Board
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published by the Newcomen Society in North America, was once attributed to Scottish historian
Alexander Fraser Tytler.153 Decades later, Du Pont Company executive Jasper Crane remembered
“the circular sequence of events that used to be mentioned by Henning Prentiss-- / Freed to fullness
/ Fullness to folly / Folly to fear / Fear to fetters / Fetters to freedom, etc.”154 More than how many
s’s were in Prentis’s name or which f’s in his cycle, what mattered was the ring of truth, what
historian Lawrence Glickman calls “repetitious familiarity.”155
Conservative business leaders criticized the New Deal with reference to the problems of
democracy in Greece and Rome. The Greek historian Polybius, in Prentis’s telling, attributed the
fall of democracy into “rule of force” to the masses’ demand for “gifts.” Loosely translated, Prentis
feared the tyranny of the majority. Prentis warned an audience of university students that the
preservation of representative (not majoritarian) democracy depended on public decision-making
based on “the general national welfare—not on narrow considerations of individual or group
selfishness.”156 During the Great Depression, a variety of mass market books compared the United
States to the Roman Empire, including The New Deal in Old Rome by Missouri journalist and
amateur historian Henry J. Haskell and the Italian historian Guglielmo Ferrero’s polemical works.
Worried about the effects of passing public assistance laws during the early 1930s, the
NAM economist Noel Sargent wrote a stock quote, “Bribes to Voters,” about a political “game”
that would lead to “national disaster.”157 Politicians would “financially outbid each other” in
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promising voters greater and greater aid for old age, unemployment, or sickness. The “successful
candidate” would be the one who could “promise most in the way of greater payments from the
public treasury.”158 Sargent included a version of “Bribes to Voters” from a 1930 speech before
the Hartford Manufacturers Association in the “American Government” government chapter of a
textbook manuscript “The Case for Economic Freedom.”159 Sargent concluded the manuscript
with apothegms by himself and Chrysler’s economist John Scoville, who published for the
Committee for Constitutional Government and endorsed Bastiat reprints. Sargent developed the
textbook for a project begun in 1944 by NAM’s Economic Principles Commission but never found
a publisher.160 McGraw-Hill worried “The Case for Economic Freedom” would not sell without
a guaranteed run, backed by a business association like NAM.161 However, business ideas needed
to be detached from the appearance of business support in order to spread.
Even the Committee for Economic Development’s research director had worried about the
effect of democracy on government spending and economic stability. Ted Yntema, a professor of
business administration at the University of Chicago, where he received his Ph.D. in economics in
1929, spent the next two decades conducting research for the Cowles Commission, the National
Bureau of Economic Research, and the Committee for Economic Development, working in the
federal government during the New Deal and WWII, and consulting for companies including U.S.
Steel and Ford Motor Company, where he became vice-president of finance in 1949.162 At the end
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of the decade, Yntema was most concerned by the seeming conflict between democracy and
capitalism.”

When democracy involved “the privilege of voting somebody else’s money”

government spending itself was a conflict. Rather than deficit spending, businessmen should focus
on “the total amount of government spending, especially the transfer payments that are involved.”
Yntema was not an extremist who ruled out redistributing property, but he thought “there has got
to be some kind of a limit and an understanding of what is involved.”163
An older generation of economic thinkers who advised the research movement influenced
economic educators’ approach to limiting government.164 By the 1940s, the retired Harvard
political economist Thomas Nixon Carver was an intellectual past his time—evolutionist,
marginalist, eugenicist— but as recently as the 1920s, he was a popular author and speaker.165
Carver, who had served as principal of a village school in Iowa and co-authored secondary school
textbooks, wrote for the “ordinary student.”166 Responding to a critical reviewer of one such book,
This Economic World, Carver implied problems arose when economics students did not progress
through the stages of “intellectual development” from “blindly optimistic” to “violently
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pessimistic” to seeing “a certain degree of harmony.”167 Carver took on what he considered the
economist’s and statesman’s responsibility “to rationalize human desires, that is, to teach people
to desire the right things.”168 After the stock market crashed, Carver shared a now familiar formula
for business success: fewer regulations, lower taxes, more respect.169 By the time the first New
Deal programs passed in the spring of 1933, the newly retired professor had traversed the country,
lecturing at colleges and in the Carnegie Foundation’s “experiment in adult education in
Economics” in Iowa.170
Arriving in California, Carver taught a theory of economic harmony to businessmen shaken
by New Deal reforms and socialist writer Upton Sinclair’s run for governor.171 Casting about for
institutional sponsors, Carver distributed a manuscript of his lectures “What Must We Do to Save
Our Economic System?” to Irénée du Pont of the American Liberty League and advised Virgil
Jordan of the National Industrial Conference Board.172 While Carver sought a public audience
with his syndicated newspaper columns, and political influence as the Republican Party’s
economist, it was his work with utility executive William Mullendore, business educator Leonard
Read, and his disciple, the economist V. Orval Watts, that Carver considered “most important.”173
These four men turned the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce into “the spearhead of an active
crusade for the return to the principle of freedom of enterprise.”174
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The Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce began a “program of self-education in free
competitive enterprise” at the start of 1943.175 LA Chamber leader Leonard Read believed that
businessmen’s best contribution to “sound thinking” would begin not with mass education, but
with improving one’s own thinking. This was, after all, the individualist solution. However,
business leaders needed to learn free enterprise, as they had learned their own enterprise, in order
to “debate with a socialist, a radical labor leader or any other ardent collectivist.” In the early
1940s, business leaders knew free enterprise as the “antithesis of dreaded socialism” rather than
on its own terms. Every week, the LA Chamber organized as many as five concurrent lunch
lectures by an economist—“a free enterpriser at heart.” Once the program of self-education was
complete, Read and his LA Chamber allies made their ideas public.
No thinker mattered more to Read than the nineteenth-century French economic liberal
Frédéric Bastiat, who Read introduced to the modern conservative movement, where Bastiat has
become ubiquitous.176 After one of Read’s own talks, retired political economist Thomas Nixon
Carver reportedly told the LA Chamber leader that he sounded like the legislator and polemicist
Bastiat, and sent translations.177 Read, like Bastiat, was an economic popularizer. When Read
incorporated the mailing list he started with utility executive William C. Mullendore and
economist V. Orval Watts to distribute Bastiat and others, he called it Pamphleteers, Inc.178
Another origin story of Bastiat’s reintroduction to America claimed the southern California
publisher Raymond C. Hoiles found Bastiat in a used bookstore in London.179 A friend of FEE
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and devotee of Bastiat, Hoiles funded the translation and publication of Bastiat’s Economic
Sophisms and Harmonies of Political Economy and advertised the volumes through his Register
Publishing Co.180 Chrysler economist John Scoville endorsed another Bastiat translation, Social
Fallacies, “the most prized book in (his) library” and “the bible of all who believe in human
liberty.”181 Rose Wilder Lane, a widely read conservative author in her own right, wrote that she
wished she “had read Bastiat forty years ago.”182
FEE’s founding vice president, economic journalist Henry Hazlitt took the one lesson of his
1946 book Economics in One Lesson from Bastiat’s pamphlet “Ce qu’on voit et ce qu’on ne voit
fas,” often translated as “(On) That Which is Seen and Not Seen.”183 Hazlitt modernized,
extended, and generalized what he called “The Broken Window” chapter to argue that the “art of
economics” was looking at consequences unseen due to shortsightedness, or selfishness.184 In
Bastiat’s telling, a shopkeeper’s careless child breaks a window; while the cracked pane of glass
and its repair are seen, the new shoes or book the shopkeeper would have otherwise bought are
not. Contemporary commentators translate Bastiat’s parable as opportunity cost. However, “(On)
That Which is Seen and Not Seen” has changed meaning several times in the context of its
application.185 In Hazlitt’s time, the American political economy canon grouped Bastiat and Jean
Baptiste Say together as French “optimists” who believed in harmony between classes.186 After
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Say’s law that supply creates its own demand broke down during the Great Depression, political
and business leaders cited Bastiat to deny increasing returns to public spending: destruction did
not lead to production.187 Hazlitt and the Foundation for Economic Education deployed “The
Broken Window” to disprove the existence of a Keynesian multiplier and to reject industrial and
public sector workers’ demands for private contracts and public goods. With a grant from the
Volker Fund, the Foundation for Economic Education offered free copies of Hazlitt’s book and an
accompanying study guide to 21,850 high school superintendents and principals.188
These paths of quotidian knowledge creation converged as FEE hired journalists to interpret
economists, fostering a publishing community in which small-town journalists could meet big
league conservatives. A Committee for Constitutional Government member, the journalist John
Chamberlain, became editor of The Freeman magazine just before its transfer to FEE. A joiner,
Chamberlain sat on the executive committee of the anti-urbanist Decentralist Conference during
the 1940s alongside another journalist, the agronomist and conservationist Elmer T. Peterson, who
wrote inventively in the Oklahoma City paper the Daily Oklahoman.189 Peterson and his Great
Plains circle became involved with the Committee for Constitutional Government through another
journalist, Felix Morley, the former Washington Post editor, Haverford College president, and
prolific conservative writer.190 While his work did not make its way into the magazine until a 1958
co-authored piece, Peterson had known FEE founder Read for years.191 During a two-day
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“clergyman’s seminar” in Oklahoma City, Read and his former Los Angeles Chamber of
Commerce lawyer visited Peterson and pitched Read’s piece “The Libertarian Candidate” for a
Daily Oklahoman column.192
Small-town journalists like Peterson could print ideology in local newspapers like the Daily
Oklahoman published by activist members of national conservative business networks. A member
of the Newcomen Society of North America like NAM’s Henning Prentis, the pioneer publisher
E. K. Gaylord had vertically integrated his communications corporation, buying a railroad to
deliver newspapers, and television and radio stations to broadcast the news. Gaylord promoted
the 1944 re-election of an anti-union school board in the pages of his influential newspaper the
Daily Oklahoman. When Oklahoma City teachers organized a union, the school board had forced
them to sign yellow dog contracts and fired those who refused. An American Federation of
Teachers organizer wrote Gaylord that the national federation would combat the yellow dog
contract, and publicized its commitment, distributing 1,000 copies of his letter to Oklahoma
teachers, issuing press releases, and talking to Daily Oklahoman reporters.193 After his public fight
with union teachers, Gaylord joined NAM’s Committee on Cooperation with Education, convened
in the late 1930s and first chaired by Henning Prentis, Jr., later Lammot du Pont.194 Gaylord’s
membership signaled the Committee on Cooperation with Education was done cooperating with
education.
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Daily Oklahoman journalist Elmer T. Peterson created a new entry in the pantheon of
economic theorists deployed for the conservative ascendancy. Peterson attributed a quote about
the inevitability of bankruptcy in a democracy to a forgotten Scottish historian, updating longstanding critiques of urban machine politics for a new era of industrial and professional unionism.
Peterson introduced Alexander Fraser Tytler twice in the Daily Oklahoman: first in 1948 as a
professor at Edinburgh University, and more lastingly in 1951 as a “somewhat obscure
Scotsman.”195 Between Tytler mentions in the Daily Oklahoman, Peterson identified an “old, old
pattern” that lead to despotism and slavery, as in “ancient Rome:” money from the “public
treasury” made people helpless and the state indebted.196 Peterson conveyed some of the Scottish
Lord’s skepticism of democracy, but appended a suspicion of government spending that appears
nowhere in the original.
A democracy cannot exist as a permanent form of government. It can only exist until the
majority discovers it can vote itself largess out of the public treasury. After that the
majority always votes for the candidate promising the most benefits with the result the
democracy collapses because of the loose fiscal policy ensuing, always to be followed by
a dictatorship, then a monarchy.197
Editorialists like Peterson feared a “mortal danger facing western culture,” particularly
from public employees.198

Peterson quoted urban planner Lewis Mumford’s stage of city

development the “tyrannopolis,” where “politics becomes competition for the exploitation of the
municipal and state exchequer by this or that class or group,” leading to ‘municipal and state
bankruptcy and loss of autonomy.”199 Quoting the same unnamed but “esteemed Oklahoma
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correspondent” who introduced him to Tytler and told him to “take the ballot away” from selfish
voters to save the country from communism, Peterson himself noted the founding fathers had done
just this by denying voting rights to “government employees” resident in Washington, D.C.200 One
of Peterson’s favorite lines cited government employment statistics from Dunn and Bradstreet as
evidence that politicians purchased votes.201 Here, Peterson elaborated on NAM economist Noel
Sargent’s “Bribes to Voters” quote about politicians buying votes by providing public benefits.
Later, when The Freeman provided the “ominous air of credibility” Peterson saw in Tytler, the
Daily Oklahoman quoted both Peterson’s and NAM leader Henning Prentis’s Tytler.202 Borrowed
and repurposed ideas began to circulate under their own momentum.
A description of Tytler as an eighteenth-century moral philosopher writing on Athenian or
Greek democracy first appeared at the end of a 1961 article “The Conscience of the Majority” by
Leonard Read in The Freeman.203 Before it was an article, Read’s argument about the dangers of
a conscienceless majority was a speech to an Oklahoma City crowd at the end of 1960.204 Peterson
was there, and like Carver all those years before in Los Angeles, could very well have approached
Read after to tell him who he sounded like. Someone surely read the Scottish professor’s books
and noticed the quote was missing. Now, the internet allows everyone from University of
Edinburgh librarians to the voice actor Loren Collins, whose website hosts the popular essay “The
Truth About Tytler,” to correct the record.205
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Read may not have cared that the Tytler quote was too good to be true. Peterson, after all,
had followed Read’s own process: ideas shared amongst the right people repeated until they
became timeless. An insider account of the Foundation for Economic Education described the
way Read made economic knowledge: dinner party talk would appear in the Foundation’s
newsletter, then a small-town newspaper, then a national periodical like the Saturday Evening
Post, where anyone could read Read’s idea and cite it back to him.206 Newspaper chains owned
by the Hoiles and Pulliam families and businesses like General Electric freely distributed FEE
publications.207
That the Bastiats and Tytlers were available was a result of Read’s program of education.
In a draft “Proposal for the Spread of Economic Knowledge,” perhaps written by Read and sent to
Carver for review, or perhaps it was the other way around, the anonymous author found the “hope
of democracy” in the economist who “must convince a majority of the voters before anything
constructive can be done.”208 Rather than advise a dictator or teach in a classroom, the professional
or lay economist would reach voters in their “homes, shops and farms.” Read’s The Freeman
article spread Peterson’s apocryphal quote in much the same way Pamphleteers, Inc. and the
Foundation for Economic Education shared Bastiat’s parables.209 Thanks to Prentis’, Sargent’s
Carver’s and Peterson’s interpretations and inventions, voters could cite seemingly timeless
wisdom rather than the depression-era metaphor of a family on a household budget, tightening
belts to avoid debt. Keystone institutions of the conservative movement spread fake fiscal ideas
at the same time conservative businesses shut down publicly-funded labor education.
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The Repression of Labor Education, and the Rise of the CIO in School Finance Politics
Labor union dues could not fund the same ambitious educational program as business
donations but public funding briefly supported labor education. The University of Michigan
accepted the state legislature’s appropriation for a new Workers’ Educational Service in 1944
under the directorship of Arthur Elder, the American Federation of Teachers’ (AFT) tax expert
and a former Detroit teacher.210 The public university had previously declined a Detroit research
bureau director’s proposal for a School of Public Affairs; however, the university’s publiclyelected board was open to influence by business. When General Motors attacked the Workers’
Educational Service’s unsound economics, the corporation successfully persuaded the university
to end labor extension programming. Administrators and board members cut labor out to preserve
political support and state funding for education. In the process, teachers lost their own tax expert
and the United Automobile Workers (UAW) became increasingly involved in school finance by
the 1960s, where Chapter 3 “The Detroit Cases” begins.
Elder coordinated with the UAW on labor’s preferred tax policy and extension courses.
Elder, who received his master’s degree in government from Wayne State University, wrote a
thesis on the effects of fifteen mill limitation on Michigan schools, and his recommendations for
reforming school finance.211 Since founding the Michigan Federation of Teachers in 1935 to lobby
for state aid to public education after property tax limitation, Elder had been an unwavering
advocate of funding schools with progressive income taxes. On the occasion of the Detroit mayor
appointing Walter Reuther to a city finance committee, Elder counseled the then-UAW vice
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president that financing government was the most important area to have labor representation.212
At the teacher union leader’s instigation, Reuther designated an alternate rather than decline the
position.213 Elder believed state action was necessary to resolve the city’s problems, and requested
the UAW redirect a wayward state tax commission with a statement from union officers or a
resolution from union members.214 A conference on taxation would publicize labor’s position, and
if unions requested it, Elder could promote the conference through the Workers’ Educational
Service.215
Elder also solicited advice from prominent public finance economists to influence taxation.
Elder was a member of the AFT executive committee from 1937 until his untimely death in
1953.216 As chairman of the AFT’s Committee on Taxation and School Finance, Elder recruited
University of Wisconsin economist Harold Groves as a committee member in 1943.217 At the
same time, Groves advised the Committee for Economic Development.218 Elder also moved
between labor unions and moderate organizations. Well-versed in professional tax debates, Elder
was a member of the National Tax Association of professionals and practitioners, and
corresponded with economists, including Walter Heller, a professor at the University of Minnesota
and prominent economic policy advisor. A 1946 Workers’ Educational Service conference,
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“Problems in Taxation and Finance,” featured Heller speaking on Federal-State Tax Relations and
officials from the Michigan Department of Revenue and the Michigan State Tax Commission.219
Teachers and industrial workers often disagreed over when to redirect sales tax revenue—
to schools, or cities—and when to lower the tax burden, by exempting food or repealing regressive
taxes. To some extent, the Workers’ Educational Service built common ground: one attendee at
the 1946 conference “Problems in Taxation and Finance” complimented Elder on the “spirit of
cooperation which existed between the A.F.L. and the C.I.O. groups” otherwise at odds until their
1956 merger.220 However, the AFL refused to join the CIO in preparing a petition drive to lower
the gas tax during the summer of 1951 when Teamsters president Jimmy Hoffa decided not to get
involved.221
Teachers organizations also disagreed about the sources of education funding. A member
of the AFL, the AFT pushed the craft union left on taxes while the CIO challenged the NEA’s
support of sales taxes for school funding.222 The CIO’s Department of Education and Research
slipped up and distributed the NEA’s pamphlet “A New Frontier for Labor Organizations,” printed
by a non-union shop no less.223 In addition to cleavages based on race and religion, the economic
idea of human capital drove a wedge between the NEA and the AFT when it came to federal aid
to education.224 Economist Harold Groves supported the AFT’s campaign for federal aid to
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education, advising Elder to emphasize educational need over minimum standards but generally
recommending compromise.225
The Workers’ Educational Service could also draw on the AFT’s membership base among
university professors for instructional material. A number of instructors and professors had joined
the AFT during its 1916 founding, or started locals during the 1930s when state legislatures
required loyalty oaths and university administrations and boards attacked professors’ academic
freedom.226

Moreover, university locals supported K-12 teachers’ salary demands during

Depression-era budget cuts. Professors were also policy experts for labor. For example, a
professor of journalism at the University of Michigan, the president of the state of Michigan’s AFT
affiliate, prepared a strip film for the AFT advocating federal aid.227 Economists such as the labor
economist and CIO research and education director John R. Walsh, Marxist theorist Alan R.
Sweezy, and public finance economist Harold Groves were all members of the AFT during the
1930s.228 Indeed, Groves chaired the AFT’s Finance Committee, and wrote for its magazine.229
In the short-term, Elder was more of a threat to business taxpayers as a member of a
teachers union than as its tax expert. Detroit teachers joined the post-WWII strike wave, walking
out in 1947. A teacher unionist later recalled that the school board had been “made up of
businessmen whose prime concern was to maintain low property taxes, and particularly low
business taxes.”230 However, the city council had the authority to set the school budget at the time.
After the city council raised teachers’ salaries, business groups feared they would have to switch
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the council from at-large city districts to neighborhood wards to limit labor’s influence.231 Instead,
business leaders supported a successful state legislative ban on public worker strikes.232
Elder wanted participants in Workers’ Educational Service programs to become better
union members and leaders, as well as better citizens and communicators.233 In 1947, thousands
of people attended classes, forums, conferences, institutes, lectures, and screenings.234 Courses
ranged from parliamentary procedure, shop steward training, and collective bargaining to state and
federal legislation and social philosophy.235 Some classes were held in union halls while a UAW
educator taught a crucial economics course at the University of Michigan’s Rackham Memorial
building in Detroit.236

Inspired both by American agricultural extension and British labor

education, the Workers’ Educational Service was voluntary, inclusive, and responsive to students’
needs and interests. Before the GI bill opened higher education to veterans of all classes, the
University of Michigan’s president visited England to learn from the country’s experiment in adult
education. Success, the president determined, depended on cooperation between universities and
unions. Faculty oversaw teacher selection and teaching methodology but Elder and his Detroit
office staff did not always clear hires by the university.
In the spring of 1948, a General Motors economist and several Michigan Bell Telephone
personnel managers sat in on the course “Economics For Workers” led by a former Detroit
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Federation of Teachers member then on the UAW Educational Department staff.237 During each
class, the instructor shared a pamphlet from a different labor union, including two of the UAW’s—
“The Economics of Inflation” and “Prices”—with cartoons mocking capitalists. The General
Motors president was upset by a cartoon in one UAW pamphlet depicting him as an overweight
observer of a bullfight, watching inflation (the bull) rampage workers and shouting “More!
More!”238 Writing in defense of the UAW teacher that General Motors surely was not “a guardian
of public thought,” the Michigan Committee on Civil Rights received a response from the
company’s president: “personal insults of me and my own position…are inexcusable on the part
of any tax-supported institution and teacher.”239 The telephone company personnel managers who
were not singled out thought the course was valuable, not subversive.240 Elder later admitted that
the pamphlets may have been a mistake, but maintained the course was based on the U. S.
president’s annual economic report.241 At the time, Elder called General Motors’ economist a
plant, and claimed the corporation was “trying to destroy this program and other similar programs
throughout the country.”242
After two classes, General Motors decided public money funded the teaching of communist
doctrine, and escalated quickly. In a hearing on federal aid to workers’ education before the U.S.
House Committee on Education and Labor, General Motors’ economist testified that the Workers’
Educational Service taught Marxist ideas.243 To a local newspaper, the University of Michigan
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president noted “Everything that someone doesn’t like seems to be construed as Marxism.”244
Rather than address the issue with the instructor or university administrators, General Motors
executives verbally complained to Michigan’s governor. In a gubernatorial and presidential
election year, the controversy over labor education became a campaign issue, covered extensively
in the press and with increasing vitriol. UAW education director Victor Reuther told union locals
“that the great General Motors Corporation doesn’t want workers to be educated.”245
Publicly-supported workers’ education was a departure for the labor movement and the
university. As recently as the 1930s, UAW leaders trained at New York’s private Brookwood
College where labor could control the curriculum. By contrast, Michigan’s flagship public
university offered extension courses like a 1947 Foremens’ Institute that showed a General Motors
film the foremen’s union called “fascist” and featured an anti-labor public relations spokesman.246
In 1948, the University of Michigan established a real estate program, with a Real Estate Board
member in charge. At the same time the university investigated the Workers’ Educational Service
for bias, it announced the business school would train undergraduates for careers in chambers of
commerce, after a request by the Michigan State Chamber of Commerce.247
Labor unions defended the Workers’ Educational Service by discrediting the right and
dissociating the program from the reds. As the University of Michigan deliberated about Elder’s
future, the acting U.S. secretary of labor wrote in support of “one of the most comprehensive
programs” of workers’ education in the country.248 Everyone from a director of labor education
programs in Georgia, to conservative labor leaders from Kentucky and New York professors wrote
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the University of Michigan president in support of Elder’s program. Contrasting its own members’
experience of the “Economics for Workers’ course with that of paid company spies, the
Communication Workers of America reminded the Board of Regents that General Motors’
espionage had been discredited by the La Follette Committee a decade before.249 The United
Steelworkers argued that since “red” labor groups were “bitterly opposed to workers’ education,
particularly workers education openly under public auspices” it was General Motors that gave “aid
and comfort to the real subversives.”250 The university’s own officers believed workers’ education
might “come into existence as the servants of special interests” if not run by established
educational agencies.251
These protests were to no avail: the University of Michigan’s board fired Elder. During a
special session of the university board called by the Michigan governor at the behest of General
Motors, the president of a paper company introduced a motion to suspend new programs while
administrators studied and reported on the Workers’ Educational Service.252 Eight Republican
trustees unanimously voted to suspend courses that June and again in September. In between,
General Motors shared a memo with the Michigan Manufacturers’ Association, which likely
directed business lobbyists to contact state legislators.253

Observing an attempt to cut the

University of Michigan’s public funding, its officers recommended trustees either support the
program or end it. Had the matter “not been thrown into the arena of public discussion,” the
officers would have recommended Arthur Elder continue as director of a reorganized and redefined
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service.254 However, in “a field of activity which is highly sensitized to fear of undue influence”
Elder had “not been sufficiently discerning to anticipate and avoid justifiable criticism.”255 In
October 1948, the Board of Regents combined the Workers’ Educational Service with another
academic unit and eliminated Elder’s position.256 Union members boycotted courses, and the
program ended in February 1949.
By attacking Elder, a leading labor educator, companies attacked workers education in
general. In 1947, Elder had run a Labor Education Service in the U. S. Department of Labor,
where he worked part-time on teaching materials, surely drawn from the Workers’ Educational
Service.257 That same year, Elder served on the executive committee of the American Labor
Education Service.258 Despite his national influence, Elder lacked local support. The advisory
committee of the Workers’ Educational Service, including university professors and
representatives from the Michigan Congress of Industrial Organizations and the Michigan
Federation of Labor, had no say in the university’s decision to terminate Elder. A civil rights
group launched its own investigation into the University of Michigan Board of Regents’ “star
chamber methods” but was unable to pressure the university or governor to so much as meet.259
The state civil rights group recruited members from across the country for a Commission of Inquiry
on the Workers Educational Service.
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As Elder moved on from Midwest tax and school politics, the UAW stepped up. At the
Midwest Workers’ Education Conference weeks after the University of Michigan fired him, Elder
presented on a panel titled “How Far Can New Educational Needs of Trade Unions Be Met
Through the Cooperation of Universities and Colleges.”260 The UAW instructor who shared the
objectionable cartoons was invited to attend, and by the next such conference, spoke on a similar
panel focused on current programs.261 The UAW’s education director convened a steering
committee to plan a Workers’ Education Association of Michigan in the new year.262 The UAW
circulated its own publications, and for three short years, ran a radio station which it gifted to
Detroit’s Wayne State University.263 By March 1949, American Federation of Labor secretarytreasurer George Meany put Elder on the payroll of the craft union, which ran a Workers’
Education Bureau.264 Continuing to work as a labor educator, Elder directed the International
Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union’s training institute, headquartered in New York.265
Elder thought moderating radicalism in teachers’ own ranks would build consensus but
underestimated reaction from the right. Allied with Detroit unions like the UAW attempting the
same exclusion of communism and tolerance of socialism, Elder could never do enough to satisfy
influential anti-union employers. Filling the gap left by the end of workers’ education, businesses,
trade associations, and organizations for economic education invited teachers and students to
privately-funded talks, exchanges, and tours. Establishing trust with education was a necessary
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condition for teachers and their students to believe businessmen’s economics, thought the CED
and Ford Foundation board member who solicited business donations to private colleges and
universities during the 1950s.266 However, teachers like Elder believed NAM and the U. S.
Chamber’s programs were propaganda that “carried to their logical conclusion would mean the
end of the free public schools.” After the controversy in Michigan, Elder was skeptical that labor
groups should do much more than press for labor’s inclusion in the curriculum or representation
on school boards and library committees. Labor simply did not have the “monetary resources or
personnel to compete with industry sponsored programs which are so largely financed through tax
exempt funds contributed largely by workers as consumers.”267
Elder’s fellow Detroit union leaders picked up his tax work, bringing the AFL-affiliated
teachers’ union school finance program into the CIO. The CIO supported federal aid to education,
both for school construction and in general, in a 1950 convention resolution. In 1953, the CIO
Committee on Economic Policy held a Conference on Taxation featuring papers by public finance
economist Richard Musgrave and Walter Heller.268 As CIO President, Walter Reuther gave a
speech to the U.S. Congress on “Taxation…The Key to Mass Buying Power And Full Employment
in An Expanding Economy.”269 At the same time, the UAW tracked support for the “Millionaire’s
Tax Amendment”: the Committee for Constitutional Government, the American Taxpayers
Association, and the Western Tax Council pushed hardest for it while the NAM endorsed it, and
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the Chamber backed something similar.270 The American Federation of Labor also kept a watch
on the Committee for Constitutional Government.271

Conclusion
Industrial and craft workers successfully countered twenty-five percent income tax limitation
with their own political—not economic—campaign on voters and politicians.272 By 1957, the
campaign for a “Millionaires’ Amendment” was three state resolutions short of a constitutional
convention.

The Committee for Constitutional Government rebranded Americans for

Constitutional Action, naming itself in reaction to labor and Cold War liberals’ Americans for
Democratic Action, which had gained influence in the states.273 UAW Citizenship Department
director Roy Reuther proposed blocking the amendment in the states with “an educational
campaign in local meetings, press, radio, shops and local committees, aimed at pouring resolutions,
letters and delegations on State Legislators, Governors and Members of Congress.” Instructing
unionists “What to do,” Reuther advised denouncing “this or any other phony ‘limitation’ device.”
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Campaigning for right-to-work laws in state legislatures at the same time, anti-union businesses
may also have provoked labor lobbying in state houses that carried over to fiscal measures.274
After Sputnik, tax limiters did not win passage in a single legislature, although one chamber each
in Rhode Island, Arizona, and West Virginia authorized a federal constitutional convention in
1958.275
Only a few business statesmen, including William C. Mullendore, Jasper Crane, Henning
Prentis, and B. E. Hutchinson, were still active in economic education at the end of the 1950s.276
The American Economic Foundation’s founder Fred G. Clark lamented that industrial leaders were
“largely among the ‘victims’ of the Harold Rugg textbook era when the teaching of basic economic
principles was not only ignored, but purposely avoided.” Using the language of the body politic,
Clark identified “two malignant growths:” (1) the power enjoyed by labor leaders to compel us to
obey their commands and (2) the progressive personal income tax (the 16th Amendment).”277
These two conditions were mutually reinforcing as the labor movement campaigned for graduated
state income taxes. In part to stave off federal aid to education by demonstrating that state and
local school taxes were sufficient, a new generation of auto company leaders like American Motor
Company’s George Romney led blue-ribbon civic commissions, for example, to fund Detroit
schools in 1959.
As state and local governments in fiscal crisis during the 1950s negotiated short-term grand
bargains with the business community, the labor movement pursed a long-term redistribution of
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fiscal power. Moderate civic organizations aligned with labor against business. The National
Municipal League and League of Women Voters supported constitutional conventions to revise
state constitutions with nineteenth-century prohibitions on progressive taxation. The League of
Women Voters came to support a graduated income tax in 1957, perhaps through its many
consultations with former AFT tax expert Arthur Elder. After a series of ballot initiative losses
during the 1940s and 1950s—to repeal overall property tax limitation, to lower the gas tax, to
exempt food from the sales tax, and to pass school taxes locally—Michigan labor unions tried to
set policy through legislative redistricting, which rural interests had long blocked. By the time
legislatures redrew political boundaries in the mid-1960s, suburbs gained influence at the expense
of cities.
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Interlude on “the threshold of real democracy:”1 Tax and Electoral Reform in the States

Part II begins in the 1960s “heyday” or “high tide” of liberalism after the United Auto
Workers (UAW) and allied labor unions and liberal groups changed state fiscal and political rules.2
Union membership in the private sector peaked in 1953 at just over one-third of workers; by 1964,
forty-five percent of Michigan workers were unionized.3 UAW president Walter Reuther was one
of the ten most recognizable Americans, an advisor to Presidents Kennedy and Nixon on urban
social policy.4

Labor unions shared high political influence with businesses, foundations,

agencies, and other groups, and also grassroots politics with the civil rights movement. The federal
government opened access to education for Black students, to voting by Black citizens, to
healthcare for the poor and elderly. By turns public and private, the Great Society aimed to
facilitate democratic participation and decision-making, import business practices and budget
processes, and increase the federal role in state affairs. Education policy during the 1960s also
reflected multiple priorities as general federal aid to education went to public and private school
students, and federal agencies contracted with public and private entities for evaluation and
experimentation.5
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Despite lobbying by increasingly powerful teachers’ organizations, federal aid under the
1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act averaged no more than ten percent of school costs.6
Constitutionally charged with the responsibility for education, states debated how to pay more
when hard-won federal reforms came up short.7 While the U.S. constitution makes no provision
for public schooling, state constitutions set standards like “efficient” or “thorough” education, or
delegate to the legislature. In the view of school finance reformers over the last century, while the
state could delegate tax collection to municipalities, tax revenue was the state’s to distribute. In
addition to local property taxes, state aid from the general fund or earmarked revenue sources
financed schools. Since the turn of the twentieth century, state aid formulas aimed to guarantee
“equal educational opportunity.”8
State constitutions mediated the transition from business reaction to labor influence. The
dissertation begins and ends with successful constitutional amendments to limit majority rule on
public spending. During midcentury, liberal groups passed model constitutions to permit income
taxation and won a series of legal cases to enforce constitutional requirements to apportion state
legislatures based on population. Thus, the rural counties and small towns of Part I were replaced
briefly by urban, then suburban influences, in Part II. However, labor set political reform on an
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unstable legal foundation after business and farm opposition cut off representative and direct
democratic means. Part III describes how business and conservative interests struck back,
amending state constitutions to limit taxes on income and sales, in addition to property.

Liberals and Model Constitutions
Michigan funded half of its public services with property taxes by the early 1960s.9 The
property tax remained a problematic source of school funding: it was regressive by design and
manipulated in practice. Leading public finance economist Richard Musgrave, who briefly taught
at the University of Michigan, determined that the poorest Michigan households paid three and a
half percent of their income towards residential property taxes, while the richest households only
paid one percent.10 Tony suburbs like Grosse Pointe or Bloomfield Hills spent more on schools
than industrial areas like River Rouge that had the highest property value per pupil.11 Tax assessors
elected in 1,760 districts infrequently and subjectively measured property value as a parcel’s sale
price. School districts also taxed subject to constraints like overall property tax limitation, the
subject of Ch. 1 “Tax Slackers.”12
By the early 1970s, even tax assessors testified to the state legislature that “the financing
of education should not come from the local property tax.”13 Unlike in California, where
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sociologist Isaac William Martin argues assessment professionalization removed informal tax
privileges, leading voters to halve their property taxes in 1978, these minor Michigan reforms like
assessor certification and training did not foment the same revolt.
Available alternatives to the local property tax did not equalize school funding or raise
revenue progressively. Educational administrators constructed a formula to standardize local
property owners’ ability to pay, and thus school districts’ need for state subsidy.14 State aid to
education never kept pace with rising property values: property wealth nearly doubled between the
lowest and highest quartiles of school districts but state aid only increased by half as much15 After
all these adjustments, per pupil spending varied by a factor of three across school districts.16
Moreover, the state’s school aid fund, which subsidized school districts, received revenue from
regressive taxes on sales, cigarettes, and gas, and through appropriations from the general fund.17
As schools competed for property tax revenue with other city services or regional amenities like
the zoo or art museum, the state shifted more and more sales tax revenue to local districts.
Public finance economists were less engaged in home state politics and less aligned with
an ideological base than public choice economists, as will become increasingly important in Part
III. When Detroit levied a city income tax in 1961 with the help of public finance economist
Harvey Brazer, Musgrave’s replacement at the University of Michigan, proceeds went to
municipal not educational needs.18 The UAW opposed the flat rate income tax for more than a
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year on the Detroit tax study committee, and before the City Council.19 National tax policy quickly
pulled Brazer to Washington, D. C. where he worked as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy
in the Treasury Department under President Kennedy. Later, when Detroiters pursued school
finance reform in the courts and state legislature, Brazer consulted for New Yorkers instead.20
Michiganders needed to permit the state legislature—in addition to city councils—to tax
income in order to increase funding for schools. After periodic attempts to revise the 1908 state
constitution, which prohibited income taxation, voters decided to call a constitutional convention
in 1961.21 Constitutional articles that resembled statutory laws, amended dozens of times by voters
and legislators, constrained the legislature. The Committee for a Sound Constitution shared a
widespread liberal view: the legislature should tax “free of constitutional restrictions.”22 During a
1959 recession, the state government struggled to pay bills when state legislators controlled less
than forty percent of the budget.23 Municipal bond traders took notice, threatening credit ratings
even in prosperous places.
The League of Women Voters of Michigan organized for years to modernize the state’s
“horse and buggy” constitution. In typical League style, the campaign began with study: of success
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and failure in other states, and of the National Municipal League’s “model state constitution.”24
In 1957, the League resolved to spend the next two years attempting to call a constitutional
convention, or con con. Educating and entertaining voters by equal measure, the League trained
hundreds of members to use informational materials creatively, from skits contrasting fashion and
transportation in 1908 and 1958 to “constitution coffees” to mock con-cons in the schools. Local
leagues talked to 800 groups throughout the state, including the supportive Junior Chamber of
Commerce. Women’s groups across the political aisle supported “improving provisions on the
status of women.”25
These largely female campaigners persisted over opposition from segments of the state
Republican Party and the entire Democratic Party.

The Michigan Congress of Industrial

Organizations Council opposed calling a convention before delegates were elected based on
population, rather than area.26 Even an organization as theoretically committed to constitutional
revision as the Michigan Municipal League only announced its formal support late in the fall. The
Michigan Education Association, perhaps with an aim to elect legislators more receptive to
lobbying, sent members to get out yes votes.27 With more yes votes than the last attempt in 1948,
but not a majority of all those voting in the election—rather than simply on the constitutional
convention issue—the 1958 ballot measure failed.
Trying again in April 1961, the League succeeded by joining cause with the Junior
Chamber of Commerce, changing voting rules, and addressing labor and Democratic concerns
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about delegate selection.28 First, the groups put a constitutional amendment on the 1960 fall
election ballot which required a convention vote in the spring 1961 election. If voters approved
holding the spring 1961 election ahead of the 16 year schedule, then a majority of those voting on
the question, rather than in the election, could call the constitutional convention. Then, voters
would elect a delegate to represent each state senate and state house district. Delegates from
metropolitan districts would make up 47% of the total, whereas before they accounted for 35%.
Still, the state legislature was split 67 Democrats to 77 Republicans. Both the Michigan Farm
Bureau—for fear of rural domination—and Michigan AFL-CIO president August Scholle—for
fear of metropolitan domination—opposed the ballot measure to schedule another constitutional
convention vote. Once Michigan voters approved a vote, however, the Michigan AFL-CIO and
the UAW endorsed the convention call.29
Malapportioned senate districts, from which constitutional convention delegates were
elected, limited possibilities for change.30 Several months into the convention, delegates removed
the 1932 ballot amendment for overall property tax limitation from the draft constitution, only to
reinsert a loosened version weeks later.31 The League of Women Voters of Detroit supported a
graduated personal income tax with deductions for dependents, but “of course” the local league
would “also support a flat rate income tax if that is the only type introduced.”32 However, the local
league also supported a sales tax with exemptions for food and drugs because “all people should
bear some of the tax burden so that they know they are helping to support government services.”
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The constitutional convention proposed a flat—not graduated—rate income tax. Perhaps in
exchange, sales taxes were capped at four percent. Voters narrowly approved the 1963 Michigan
constitution. Lawyers redoubled their efforts to reapportion the legislature.

Labor and Legislative Redistricting
In Tennessee, where the state constitution has never permitted a tax on wage income, the
League of Women Voters targeted another inequality: the malapportionment of the state
legislature.33 A malapportioned state legislature also allowed state legislators, who drew U.S.
House districts, to malapportion the national legislature. Advocacy lawyers sued elected state
officials to force courts to make a political decision they had avoided since the 1940s: whether
state senates, unlike the U.S. Senate, should be apportioned based on population.34 The 1959
Tennessee lawsuit Baker v. Carr created an opening for the U. S. Supreme Court to establish the
principle of “one person, one vote” through its 1964 opinion in Alabama case Reynolds v. Sims.35
(Tennessee will again appear as an important site of transmission in the last chapter of this
dissertation, “Victory in the States.”) Plaintiffs’ attorneys “exchanged briefs, memoranda, ideas,
and strategies” as redistricting lawsuits spread from state to state.36 The National Municipal
League was the clearing house for legal development.
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Labor federations filed reapportionment lawsuits and friend of the court briefs to
redistribute political power in the states; they sought to establish rights and redistribute money.
Advocacy lawyering for collective economic rights co-existed with privacy rights that justified
abortion, among other individual rights, in the Warren court. However, the labor movement’s use
of the legal system for economic egalitarianism conflicted with the civil rights movement’s use of
the same for pluralist protection of the rights of minority groups.37 Labor turned to the courts only
after direct democracy failed: legislative redistricting ballot initiatives in 1948 in California and in
1952 in Michigan lost as the results replicated the business and farm versus labor political
coalitions of Part 1.
The California Teachers Association’s for-hire public relations specialists and campaign
managers Whitaker & Baxter worked at cross purposes to union teachers on legislative
reapportionment.38 Leone Baxter had managed the Redding Chamber of Commerce in the early
1930s before joining with political journalist Clem Whitaker to develop an organizational
repertoire of tactics used to this day.39 Whitaker & Baxter-run ballot measures increased school
funding in 1944, 1946, and 1952, in part, by establishing a minimum teacher salary.40 In 1948,
the California Chamber of Commerce hired Whitaker & Baxter to defeat a labor-backed
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reapportionment ballot measure. California Governor Earl Warren, elected with the help of
Whitaker & Baxter, opposed labor’s measure. Years later as the chief justice of the U. S. Supreme
Court in the reapportionment cases, Warren switched sides.41
The Michigan Federation of Labor sponsored a 1952 ballot initiative to redistrict the state
senate based on population.42 The Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, the Farm Bureau
Federation, and the Michigan Manufacturers Association opposed labor’s ballot measure, and
sponsored a successful, competing ballot measure that promised a compromise between area and
population yet worsened malapportionment. As of 1952, the League of Women Voters of
Michigan supported neither of these ballot measures, preferring a mix of population and area as
the basis for allocating state senate seats.
Michigan’s was the most malapportioned state senate in the United States, and California’s
the second most. Labor unions in both Michigan and California had tried and failed for decades
to persuade state legislatures to redistrict based on population and thus shift political power from
rural to urban areas.43 During the 1950s, Michigan’s Democratic Party needed to win seventy
percent of votes for a majority in the state senate, whose districts varied in population size by a
factor of seven.44 By 1960, the California senate, apportioned by county, assigned the same
number of senators—one—to six million residents of Los Angeles County and to tens of thousands
of residents in rural counties. However, in California unlike Michigan, rural counties often aligned
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with urban counties, leading business associations to oppose legislative redistricting in Michigan
and support it in California.
Malapportionment’s function was to maintain political power. The political director of the
International Ladies Garment Workers Union, where the Detroit teacher union leader Arthur Elder
worked after General Motors purged him, was active in reapportionment debates in the 1950s and
1960s.45 Detroit labor lawyer Theodore Sachs consulted attorneys in Minnesota and Tennessee
before filing suit, and the NAACP’s general counsel consulted Sachs after he filed.46 A Detroit
native, Sachs joined a local law firm in 1951 and represented the Detroit Federation of Teachers
throughout the 1960s, including in the agency fees case Abood v. Detroit Board of Education and
the desegregation case Bradley v. Milliken.47 Sachs cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s barring of the
“white primary” as evidence for its jurisdiction.48 Race was not central to legal briefs and oral
arguments, although “(m)alapportionment was certainly about race and ethnicity.”49
By the end of the 1950s, former glassworker and president of the state federation of labor
August Scholle openly pushed for the political power to pass labor’s agenda through the Michigan
legislature.50 It was “not possible just to be in favor of a lot of good programs without being in
favor of finding the funds to pay for them” Scholle told fellow unionists.51 Scholle had been an
active opponent of the state sales tax throughout the 1940s, and a proponent of the graduated rate
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income tax throughout the 1960s.52 However, in Scholle’s senate district, his vote represented
1/12th of the power of a vote in the smallest senate district.53

Fig. August Scholle, February 20, 1942, Virtual Motor City 77371_4, Detroit News Photograph Collection, Walter P.
Reuther Library, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University.

Scholle wanted the right to “equitable representation in the legislature.”54 However, fearing
the embarrassment of certain defeat, the state’s Democratic governor and party tried to dissuade
Scholle and constitutional and election lawyer Theodore Sachs from filing at the eleventh hour.55
With Sachs as his attorney, Scholle sued the secretary of state to declare the 1952 ballot measure

52

See Folder 7 Sales Tax 1946, Box 117; Folder 1 Petitions, 1948 - sales tax and reapportionment, Box 103; Folder
4 Taxation 1946-1947, Box 15, Michigan AFL-CIO Records, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State
University, Detroit, MI.
53
Sachs, “Scholle V. Hare.”
54
Scholle quoted in a press release cited in Ibid., 1610.
55
Sachs, “Scholle V. Hare.”

160

for senate apportionment based on area and population unconstitutional.56 Filing Scholle v. Hare
in December 1959, Sachs timed the suit to stop malapportionment based on the 1960 U.S. Census
before 1960 elections.
The Michigan and U.S. supreme courts delayed ruling in Scholle v. Hare until an earlier case
filed months before in Tennessee—Baker v. Carr—was settled. United Auto Workers officers
asked Sachs to file an amicus brief in Baker v. Carr that broadened claims about
malapportionment’s legal consequences to include political, legislative, and economic effects.
Sachs’ brief, filed September 1961, was the only document in the Baker v. Carr litigation to use
the term “one man-one vote.”57 A Georgia case changed this gendered term to the enduring “one
person, one vote.” Voting rights were protected by legislation, jurisprudence, and administration.
The rights revolution in the courts provoked a political backlash that shows the early but
unsuccessful influence of conservative networks. In California, Whitaker & Baxter defeated
redistricting campaigns in 1960 and 1962. The right-wing John Birch Society, with its southern
California stronghold, began an “Impeach Earl Warren” campaign in 1961 that lasted until the
chief justice’s retirement in 1968.58 The AFL-CIO asked state affiliates to keep a watch on the
Birchers.59 A U. S. Senator from Illinois allied with business associations hired Whitaker & Baxter
to promote an amendment to the U. S. constitution permitting one chamber of state legislatures to
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be districted based on factors other than population.60 At a congressional hearing, Detroit labor
lawyer Theodore Sachs testified this amendment would effectively repeal the Voting Rights Act
the U.S. Congress planned to pass in 1965.61
“One person, one vote” left several important legacies for school funding.

Most

immediately in Michigan, the newly-seated legislature appropriated significantly more school
money from the general fund in 1965.62 Michigan’s legislature went from the most to the least
malapportioned in the nation when a 1964 commission split evenly between political parties
redrew 32 state senate districts.63 Voters flipped the state senate from majority Republican (23 of
34 seats) to majority Democratic (23 of 38 seats).64 Both chambers of the legislature were
Democratic for the first time since the 1930s. Redistricted legislatures passed public employee
collective bargaining bills in states that resisted the wave of legalization begun in Wisconsin in
1959. Scholle v. Hare labor lawyer Theodore Sachs drafted Michigan’s 1965 Public Employee
Relations Act and Scholle v. Hare plaintiff August Scholle “led in the fight for adoption by the
Michigan Legislature.”65
An old worry arose anew: would more money make schools better? States filled gaps in
education research in addition to funding. Starting with a series of studies of finance and school
district reorganization in 1964, the legislature paired funding increases with consolidation,

60

Ibid., 8.
Sachs was then general counsel for the Michigan AFL-CIO. Smith, Ch. 9 in On Democracy's Doorstep, 2014.
Statement of Theodore Sachs Before United States Senate Subcommittee On Constitutional Amendments, May 20,
1965, Folder 56 Sachs, Ted 1965, Box 289, Michigan AFL-CIO Records, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs,
Wayne State University, Detroit, MI.
62
Thomas report, Table 6-9 Receipts of the Michigan School Aid Fund and the Primary School Interest Fund, 195667, 189.
63
Sachs went back to court to enforce redistricting with two 1963 decisions in Marshall v. Hare and Calkins v.
Hare.
64
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_party_strength_in_Michigan#20th_century_%E2%80%93_1965_to_1999
65
John R. Runyan and Carrie Sharlow, “Michigan Lawyers in History: Theodore Sachs,” Michigan Bar Journal,
February 2015, 34-36, https://www.michbar.org/file/barjournal/article/documents/pdf4article2569.pdf. “Friends of
Gus Scholle gather at Banquet to honor ‘Old Grey Fox’ of the Labor Movement,” Detroit Teacher, 31 (2), October
27, 1971, 4.
61

162

dissolving 266 of Michigan’s thousands of local school districts by 1967. In 1966, the state
legislature commissioned the Michigan School Finance Study, known as the Thomas report after
its lead author University of Chicago education researcher J. Alan Thomas.66 Importantly, the
Thomas report compiled individual student records, which could support stronger conclusions
about the impact of classroom and school investments than the Coleman report’s district-level
data, which skeptics cited as evidence of the importance of home and community rather than school
for student success. More sophisticated education research cast doubt on the necessity of school
money but never settled the debate.67 For their part, foundations believed money would make a
difference. The Ford Foundation, the foundation with the largest endowment at mid-century,
observed “rhetoric about the uselessness of dollars” would be more persuasive if suburban districts
volunteered to “share their resources with less privileged urban districts.”68
The big question everyone asked was how to fund yearly operating expenses in public
schools. Under fifteen percent of students were in nonpublic schools and only fifteen to twentyfive percent of school taxes serviced debt in the mid-1960s.69 By the early 1970s, though, school
districts relied on short-term debt to make payroll. The Thomas report included plenty of proposals
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by professional researchers but no shared strategy.70 A Citizens Advisory Committee of school
groups and civic, religious, business, labor, and farm leaders presumably shaped the report’s
conclusion that the state should finance schools. Thomas’ colleagues at the University of Chicago
recommended a statewide property tax replace the local, and any additional state aid be sourced
from the income tax.71
Michigan, the only state to levy an income tax and not graduate the rate, began refusing to
tax the rich to fund schools in 1968. After the Michigan legislature used its authority under the
1963 state constitution to levy a flat rate income tax in 1967, the League of Women Voters of
Michigan convinced legislators to put graduation on the 1968 ballot.72 While the graduated income
tax lost three to one, the League defeated attempts to remove or limit the flat rate income tax.73
For several years, advocates filed lawsuits to change state tax policy until the teacher labor
movement took charge of the ballot initiative process in 1972, as told in Ch. 4 “Tax the Rich in
Michigan.”

Conclusion
The labor movement’s involvement in legislative redistricting presaged its role in school
finance reform as litigant. University of Chicago education researcher Arthur E. Wise inspired
labor lawsuits for school finance equalization in Detroit, Chicago, and other cities. In Chicago,
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Wise studied with and worked for the author of the Thomas study commissioned by the redistricted
Michigan state legislature. A student of representative branch paralysis, Wise observed a pattern:
“State legislatures had been struggling with miserly state school finance equalization formulas for
at least as long as they had failed to reapportion themselves.”74 Wise drew on precedents from the
reapportionment cases and others to propose school finance lawsuits. In what could perhaps be
viewed as a mock trial of his legal arguments, Wise’s dissertation committee included a critic of
the “egalitarian revolution” of lawsuits filed against discrimination under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment to the U.S. constitution.75
Scholars like Wise looked to equal protection jurisprudence to propose spending more on
students with greater needs in the home and neighborhood.76 First in a 1965 seminar paper and
later in his book Rich Schools, Poor Schools: The Promise of Equal Educational Opportunity,
Wise argued the courts would strike down school districts drawn with discriminatory boundaries
as they had legislative districts just years before.77 A supporter of increased spending on schools
in poor neighborhoods, Wise rejected the facile translation of the U. S. Supreme Court’s recent
“one person, one vote” ruling as “one student, one dollar.”78
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The poverty law approach to school finance merged two contradictory legal traditions in a
venue traditionally hostile to the labor movement, the federal courts.79 Unlike criminal rights,
voting rights, and desegregation litigation, school finance litigation was more successful in state
than federal courts. As school board members and parents who sued to make wealth discrimination
illegal soon discovered, education rights were more circumscribed, especially after Lewis F.
Powell, Jr. and William H. Rehnquist joined the highest court in the fall of 1971.80
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Ch. 3 Detroit Cases: Legal Program for Finance Equalization
Alongside his fellow members of the Detroit Board of Education, and with co-plaintiffs
like his client the United Auto Workers (UAW), attorney Abraham Zwerdling believed Michigan
should fund students’ “educational need.” The school board, which worked with the Detroit
Federation of Teachers (DFT) to halve class sizes in the More Effective Schools program, argued
the state could pay double for students who “lack the pre-school background and extracurricular
educational experience” of their peers.1 In February 1968, the Detroit school board filed a
pioneering lawsuit challenging Michigan’s school finance system under the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment to the U.S. constitution.2 The Detroit case had once been expected
to reach the U.S. Supreme Court. The New York Times reported that the chastened “mechanics”
of the Great Society, “exiles” from the federal government, were backing the city’s “lawsuit that
could radically change the method by which most states allocate school funds.”3
This chapter and the next show how demands for full-state funding of education rose and
fell during the conjuncture of public sector unionism, urban tax revolt, Black nationalism, and
foundation activism at the end of the 1960s.

I combine observations from the history of

education—American schools are the welfare state—and labor history—social movement unions
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fight for the common good—to show how labor unionists took a personal and strategic interest in
Detroit schools.4 Members of craft unions like the DFT and industrial unions like the UAW had
organized together in depression-era Detroit, sharing lecture halls, running education classes,
campaigning with the Socialist Party, and making families. After winning recognition by Detroit’s
auto companies, the UAW bargained for healthcare in private contracts and education in public
budgets.
At the end of the 1960s, American voters were increasingly reluctant to fund public schools
through local property taxes, and districts cut school days short and ended school years early. As
a percentage of Michiganders’ income, the state and local tax burden rose from more than 9.5
percent in 1959 to 10.4 percent in 1969 even as U. S. inflation reached six percent.5 The basic
problem of local school property taxes was this: if property wealth varied depending on whether a
school district included industrial plants or residential homes or family farms, then equal tax rates
generated unequal revenue. Suburban school districts raised larger sums with lower tax rates than
urban school districts. State constitutions charge state legislatures with responsibility for public
education; throughout the twentieth-century, reformers attempted to equalize local resources with
state revenue.6
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Two court cases from California and Texas feature prominently in the history of school
finance reform: Serrano v. Priest, the first of many state court cases to find unequal local school
property taxes unconstitutional in August 1971 and Rodriguez v. San Antonio Intermediate School
District, the U.S. Supreme Court case that ruled the U.S. constitution off limits for claims of wealth
discrimination in March 1973.7 I recover an earlier case, Detroit Board of Education v. State of
Michigan, filed by the labor lawyer Abraham Zwerdling. The labor movement’s version of school
finance reform sought enough funding to meet urban students’ educational needs from state taxes
on the income of rich individuals and corporations.
Rather than a legal history of court cases, this chapter is a political history of roads not
taken, built in the Motor City by autoworker and teacher union leaders and navigated by foundation
officials.8 Before a state court could try Detroit Board of Education v. State of Michigan, lawyers
filed a number of school finance lawsuits in 1968 that laid other tracks. By the time the Ford
Foundation’s narrower, neoliberal school finance litigation finally prevailed in the California
Supreme Court in 1971, as Ch. 5 “Tax the Rich in California” describes, Detroit labor leaders had
moved on. Zwerdling, whose Detroit home was picketed and life threatened, left for Washington,
D.C. to become the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employee’s general
counsel.9 The American Federation of Teachers tried to fund schools through union power and
teacher unity rather than litigation.
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Detroit’s early role in school finance reform has been forgotten next to the city’s precedentsetting education cases, Abood v. Detroit Board of Education filed in 1969 and Bradley v. Milliken
filed in 1970. The Detroit school finance case filed in 1968 has remained in obscurity in part
because Detroit Board of Education v. State of Michigan never went to trial, and was dismissed in
state court in 1969, before being refiled in 1971 in a changed research and legal environment.
Detroit teachers who objected to union dues sought a different kind of school finance control in
the landmark public sector union case Abood. Detroit teachers like Louis Abood and his National
Right to Work Foundation lawyers sued the Detroit Board of Education in 1969 to make union
dues voluntary. Before the school finance and service fees cases were resolved, the NAACP sued
on grounds of racial discrimination after Detroit voters recalled Zwerdling’s pro-integration school
board in 1970 in what became the U.S. Supreme Court case that foreclosed metropolitan busing,
Milliken v. Bradley.10
This chapter and the next add schools to the period of Detroit’s lost alternative, 1967 to
1973.11 Detroit labor-liberals tried to balance leading white workers and responding to Black
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radicals by asking the state and federal government to intervene. School finance reform was not a
compromise policy when metropolitan integration failed: in the north and west, the two approaches
to equal educational opportunity happened at the same time.12 However, division over race ended
the possibility of increased funding. Section one describes how the UAW and AFT assembled a
labor-led

coalition

to

fund

Detroit

students’

educational

needs.

Some teachers withdrew from the coalition over conservative reaction and Black selfdetermination: section two begins with labor as plaintiff in school finance reform litigation, and
ends with labor as defendant in union dues cases. Section three shows how public money for
private schools and judicial desegregation orders split autoworkers from teachers, who substituted
liberals for unionists in ballot initiative campaigns.
The Emergence of a Powerful Coalition of the Working Class and Teachers
There is a revolution sweeping the land, and it is a revolution from the bottom up. A
Carnegie Foundation grant has not spurred it. Conant’s books have had little impact.
Commissioner Howe’s speeches seem almost irrelevant. But angry young junior high
teachers, articulate high school social studies teachers, amazingly tough Latin teachers, and
more madly militant women teachers than one could have ever expected, have been the
creators, mid-wives, and anxious prodders of this movement.
AFT Research Director Peter Schnaufer quoted in Mary Ellen Riordan, “The President’s Column,”
Detroit Teacher 26 (Special), April 14, 1967, 2.
Dismissing the efforts of foundations, academics, and administrators to shape education
from the top down, teachers organized to control their schools during the 1960s. Detroit Federation
of Teachers (DFT) president Mary Ellen Riordan was proud that her city “was in the vanguard of
the revolution” of teacher unionism.13 Outside their power base in the auto industry, Detroit laborliberals supported union teachers organizing to secure resources to match rhetoric about the role
of education in American society. School district administrators and school board members were
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labor leaders.14 In 1967, the school board wanted to say yes to teachers’ demands, but after years
of city voters rejecting local school taxes and civic leaders negotiating emergency revenue deals,
the Detroit school board could not afford the DFT’s second contract. Just over a week before the
uprising of Black Detroiters alternately described as riot, rebellion, or revolution began on July 23,
school board member Abraham Zwerdling received a memo from a prominent local law firm
declaring Michigan’s school finance system, with its reliance on unequal local property taxes,
unconstitutional.15 However, the moment of possibility for fiscal reform opened in 1967 was
marked from the start by disagreement within the labor movement over how to meet Black
community demands and whether to keep white students in Detroit schools.

Solidarity House and the Schoolhouse
Under Walter Reuther’s direction, the Industrial Union Department of the newly-merged
American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) funded teacher
organizing campaigns in the late 1950s. AFT field organizer and later president David Selden
used these funds to win teachers their first union contract in New York in 1962. A Michigan
native, Selden grew up in Pontiac, worked in auto plants during the Great Depression, and taught
public school in Dearborn. Selden had a view of the Ford Motor Company’s behemoth Rouge
River factory from his classroom window, and taught education classes for autoworkers in UAW
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Local 600.16 Until he became the AFT president’s assistant, however, Selden never personally
met the UAW president who he described as one of “labor’s heroes.”17 As Selden and Reuther
developed a personal and professional relationship, each bet big on teacher organizing. When the
Industrial Union Department offered to match an AFT organizing fund dollar for dollar, with each
labor organization contributing half a million dollars, Selden raised his union’s share mostly by
issuing bonds against union dues anticipated from new members.18
Mary Ellen Riordan recruited many of these new dues-paying members when Detroit
joined New York as only the second AFT local recognized as a collective bargaining agent in
1964.19 Riordan, who lost her husband in WWII and taught for several years in West Berlin during
the 1950s, was a forceful leader and frequent traveler who came to the teachers union from a
Catholic rather than labor background.20 Pope Leo XIII’s 1891 encyclical Rerum Novarum
popularly known as “On Capital and Labor” had an impact on Riordan’s view of labor unions, as
did her experience teaching science in a Detroit elementary school with too few textbooks and
chairs for the students. Other DFT leaders had their own connections to the labor movement. The
DFT president during the 1950s, Antonia “Tony” Kolar, was married to one of the founding
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organizers of the UAW’s Chrysler local.21 The DFT executive secretary, and Riordan’s confidant,
knew Selden from his time organizing the Dearborn teachers union.22

During the United

Federation of Teachers’ recognition campaign, Riordan visited New York and later during the
DFT’s recognition campaign, Selden flew to Detroit.23
Fig. Tony Kolar passes the
presidential briefcase to Mary Ellen
Riordan, Detroit, 1960. Reuther
Library Image 34032.

The DFT approached the UAW for help not only because the AFT “didn’t have any
money.” Riordan thought her members would “get a better reception” from Walter Reuther,
known for his liberal views and successful bargaining, than from the “old guild type unions that
were part of the AFL.”24 However, when Detroit teachers shared how few workers had signed
union cards, the autoworkers told them to “forget it” until they had a “much, much larger
proportion of membership.”25 Reuther himself spoke at the AFT convention in 1962, but not
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earlier as Riordan remembered “because he wouldn’t come to speak to us when we were a small
organization.”26 When DFT membership increased, the UAW facilitated a $25,000 grant from the
AFL-CIO’s Industrial Union Department. Even after Reuther turned the DFT relationship over to
Irv Bluestone, Doug Fraser, and their staffers, teacher unionism was a priority for the UAW.
Fraser, pictured seated in the AFSCME photo below, was himself elected president of the UAW
in 1977. Both the DFT and Detroit Board of Education continued to work closely with Bluestone
for years. While male UAW officers held the largely female rank-and-file teachers to the
organizing standards of any other workers, once the DFT won, men remained the public face of
unionism in Detroit.
At the center of Detroit’s school board was Abraham Zwerdling, the UAW associate
general counsel. During the 1950s, Zwerdling served on school finance committees, one run by
the Detroit Board of Education, the other— “Save Our Schools,” later “Serve Our Schools”—led
by his wife Thelma, his boss Walter Reuther and his wife May, herself a former DFT member, and
other union and teacher officials.27 The National Education Association’s Michigan affiliate called
it a “CIO plot.”28 In addition to Walter, the other Reuther brothers took their turn in school politics:
the Detroit Federation of Teachers courted Victor for a 1945 board run while Roy advised the
board on fundraising during the 1950s.29 Zwerdling campaigned to float school construction bonds
and levy school millage taxes, first as head of the Detroit chapter of the liberal anti-communist
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Americans for Democratic Action, and later at UAW president Reuther’s urging, on the Detroit
Board of Education from 1965 to 1970.30
UAW leaders like Reuther and Zwerdling believed participation in public education was a
form of labor citizenship.31 One of Zwerdling’s law partners stressed to the city’s public workers’
unions “how important it is to have a labor lawyer in office.”32 When Zwerdling was elected
alongside a minister, a telephone company executive, and a doctor as the “most solid liberal
majority” in the school board’s history, Reuther wrote with congratulations.33 Personally, Reuther
considered the victory “important and hopeful.” He liked to see his “bright young friends getting
ahead.” Moreover, a person of Zwerdling’s “courage and commitment” would significantly and
meaningfully contribute to education, “the key to the future of our free society.” The language of
Cold War liberalism had a particular resonance in the auto industry, where Reuther feared
automation would remove jobs for line workers without certificates or degrees.
Zwerdling and the school board secured the wages and benefits of public sector unionism
for Detroiters.

An attorney for the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal

Employees (AFSCME) since the 1950s, Zwerdling kept Reuther’s assistant Irv Bluestone up to
date on the competition between unions seeking to represent bus drivers, cafeteria workers, janitors
and other non-teaching Board of Education employees. In turn, AFSCME informed Zwerdling of
negotiation delays: the city argued its governing documents, not collective bargaining, could
resolve the union’s issues.34 Zwerdling proposed the Board of Education could speed up the city’s
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process by specifying suitable bargaining units.35 When the Detroit Board of Education bargained
with 2,200 members of AFSCME Council 77, Zwerdling signed the first public sector union
contract under Michigan’s 1965 Public Employee Relations Act.36 The DFT, which had endorsed
Zwerdling in 1964 while the Detroit Education Association went for a rival slate, needed the same
back channel support from the school board.37

Fig. “UAW Vice President Doug Fraser (seated) looks over an AFSCME organization chart during a meeting between
the unions at UAW’s Solidarity House in Detroit. Around him, from left: Irving Bluestone, aide to UAW President
Walter Reuther; Alton Cobb, director of Detroit Public Employees, AFSCME Council 77; A. L. Zwerdling, legal
counsel for AFSCME; and other Michigan AFSCME officials.” Reuther Library Image 24709.

The DFT forced the legalization of collective bargaining with the UAW’s help. At the
UAW’s request, Michigan’s attorney general declared teacher collective bargaining legal in
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Detroit.38 Bluestone mediated between the DFT and the Detroit school board over the terms of a
referendum for teachers to choose collective bargaining. After a DFT march and strike threat,
Reuther’s assistant conveyed a message from school board members: hold off on the strike, and
the board would oversee first the referendum, and then a union representation election. Teachers
waited to strike until 1967. As the DFT successfully fought off the Detroit Education Association,
Selden noted “the major difference between the National Education Association and the American
Federation of Teachers is that the NEA is an establishment and we are a movement.”39 Once
teachers secured their 1965 contract, Zwerdling’s law firm turned to advocating labor rights for
university faculty.40 When the DFT’s publication for members, Detroit Teacher, covered the
circuit court’s favorable ruling in the professors’ case, editors introduced Zwerdling as a “good
friend of the DFT.”
After teachers won their first contract with UAW political and financial backing, Riordan
hoped teachers could negotiate professional issues in a “second phase” of bargaining. Preparing
contract proposals in the spring of 1967, Riordan wanted to address curriculum, textbooks,
teaching methods, and the uses of federal aid then decided by supervisors, the “‘ivy league’ crowd
in the colleges of education,” and publishers.41 Filing a grievance with the board for violating the
union contract, the DFT defended a Spanish teacher punished for refusing to use the textbook
Entender y Hablar. The union also surveyed biology teachers about the problematic Patterns and
Processes.42 Earlier, the school board itself voted 4 to 1 to buy no textbooks published by
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Kingsport Press, whose employees had been on strike since March 1963, “if comparable texts are
available elsewhere” thereby balancing its interest in social justice and Detroit children.43
Even while negotiating a contentious 1967 contract with teachers, Zwerdling held planning
sessions with district staff on the AFT program More Effective Schools (MES), first adopted in
New York teachers’ 1965 contract. Together, the Detroit Board of Education and the DFT
submitted a proposal for federal Elementary and Secondary Education Act Title III funds at the
end of the 1966-1967 school year.44 A Detroit delegation that visited an East Harlem MES school
came away impressed in the spring of 1968.45 Later known as Neighborhood Education Projects
and implemented on the city’s eastside beginning in the fall of 1968, Detroit’s MES doubled
teaching staff.46 The DFT’s 1967 contract also cut K-2 class sizes to a maximum of 25 students
in high-poverty schools.47 Detroit teachers thought this existing program would make more of a
difference than all the new programs funded by federal aid.
The DFT needed help from the broader labor movement to redirect funds. Speaking as a
delegate to the 1967 AFL-CIO convention in Miami, Riordan asked the international union to “put
its power and prestige in Washington” behind a “drastic reduction in class size” rather than a “grabbag of pilot projects, remedial and enrichment programs and supplementary educational
services.”48 Writing to the U.S. Office of Education, however, the AFT distanced itself from
industrial unions. While a “production worker performing a simple repetitive operation” could let
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his mind “wander” and still keep up with the assembly line, teachers could succeed only if their
students succeeded, the AFT wrote.49
The Detroit school board’s influence on private sector bargaining was more limited when
it pressed the UAW on the union’s own hiring practices. In 1966, the school board asked
autoworkers and auto companies to accept more Black skilled trades apprentices from Detroit high
schools. Due to the difficulty of replacing highly-trained workers, the skilled trades had always
been a powerful, and selective, group within the autoworkers’ union. Misquoted by a reporter at
a heated school board meeting, Zwerdling wrote Reuther’s assistant to explain that his statement
in the local conservative newspaper—“The only thing that will work is for labor to agree it wants
to do something”—had actually included labor and industry.50 Writing just weeks after students
walked out of Northern High School to protest their principal’s racism, even Zwerdling wondered
whether the district’s apprenticeship programs should continue.51 The DFT wanted to petition
other AFL-CIO unions “to eliminate discrimination against minority groups from the
apprenticeship programs.”52
There were limits to white and Black school leaders’ liberalism. While the Detroit school
district commissioned nonracist textbooks and hired Black teachers and administrators, setting
standards nationwide, school construction sites and student attendance zones kept students
segregated by race. Conferences and workshops on integration elsewhere were more popular than
hometown task forces and proposals.53 In the spring of 1967, the DFT and its statewide affiliate
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hosted a regional conference on “Afro-American History,” questioning whether “American
Education” was a “partner” in the spread of racism. In large groups, Black nationalists demanded
Black administrators in Black schools; in small groups, “tempers flared” and “tears flowed.”
The school board and teachers union recruited Black leaders. The long-time executive
secretary of the Detroit branch of the NAACP joined the school district to lead the Community
Relations Division.54 Detroit elementary school teacher and teacher union leader Zeline Richard
and a handful of district staff ran federally-funded institutes on integration for nearly one hundred
educators from seven school districts during the summer of 1967.55 The director of the institute
feared that metropolitan integration required “(m)assive inter-governmental efforts.” By February
1968, the Detroit school board’s Task Force on Quality Integrated Education agreed—56.7 percent
of Detroit students were Black.56 Richard chaired the DFT’s Quality Integrated Education
Committee, originally the Civil Rights Committee.57 Richard’s journey from integration to selfdetermination typified the experience of many Black Detroiters.
In the beginning, Richard joined a union that “really put up a good fight” and that “held
out beautiful dreams.”58 Richard grew up on the eastside of Detroit in a UAW family with the
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money to pay for her college degree in health and physical education from Wayne State
University.59 After a school tax election victory in 1947, Detroit Public Schools could afford to
hire Richard, a Black woman.60 “I joined the Detroit Federation of Teachers” Richard said
“because my father worked in the plant.”61 Richard signed a union card in 1948 despite the only
other Black teacher at her elementary school’s warning that Richard would “get trouble” from the
principal. When the principal sabotaged Richard’s evaluation by the health department, Richard
fought back and became her school building’s union representative. Richard got more involved in
her union after a disputed call during a basketball game led to retaliation—“Z” lost her certification
as a referee despite her high national rating. During the fight for collective bargaining, Richard
spoke to white and Black teachers across the city about the dignity and equality in a union. The
physical education teacher memorably and publicly challenged union members to act on their
beliefs. The DFT’s executive secretary recruited Richard to run for the DFT executive board
because she was a “rabble rouser.”62 Over time, Richard came to represent a faction of the union
opposed to DFT president Riordan and in support of community control.

The Unions Divided
As National Guardsmen rolled through the motor city in tanks, enforcing a curfew to end
the deadliest urban uprising of the decade, Detroit school board member Abraham Zwerdling
asked the UAW’s Irv Bluestone for help on school finance.63 Months earlier, when the DFT fended
off a representation challenge from the rival Detroit Education Association, Bluestone lauded the
59

Richard attended Detroit Public Schools and graduated from Miller High School. <>
Richard began teaching at Smith and transferred to Lincoln (later Spain) to train for a promotion to senior health
teacher that never came.
61
Richard Oral History, 3.
62
Executive Secretary Helen Bowers.
63
Abe Zwerdling to Irving Bluestone, July 28, 1967, UAW Region 1B Collection, Box 235, Folder 34 Public
Schools; financing, 1973, Reuther Library.
60

182

“wonderful victory” as a “great day for the union movement.”64 Labor leaders like UAW president
Walter Reuther had funded teachers’ organizing campaigns throughout the 1960s, assuming that
once teachers won union recognition they could self-fund political campaigns through union
dues.65 For decades, the two labor communities had worked together to support public schools but
they could no longer hold together a coalition large enough to redistribute resources within their
unions, or within the city. Campaigning for a more generous contract with the Detroit school
board, teachers struck. The DFT’s successful 1967 strike ushered in an era of budgets deficits as
teachers’ interests diverged from autoworkers’—especially those with children in private schools.
In the Detroit streets where protesters fought police who had raided an illegal bar—a “blind
pig”—just a month before, ten thousand striking teachers marched and rallied for two weeks at the
beginning of the 1967 school year. Teachers waved signs that read “Equalize the School Year,”
“Keep Good Teachers in Detroit,” “Quality Integrated Education for All Children,” “Don’t
Economize on Our Kids,” and DFT president Mary Ellen Riordan’s slogan “Teachers Want What
Children Need.”66

The union’s long-time executive secretary noted that Detroit teachers

“understood as well as any UAW man the power contained” in the phrase, “No Contract—No
Work.”67 Concerned with provision of and access to social services, these phrases represent public
sector unionism in particular. Although public worker strikes remained illegal under Michigan
law, no judge stopped the strike in a union town where teachers had the public and the UAW on
their side. Unlike in other Michigan cities that fall, the Detroit Board of Education did not even
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ask for an injunction. Rallying the strikers, one of Reuther’s administrative assistants offered the
UAW leader’s support for teachers’ “attempt to win economic justice.”68
Since 1965, state government had protected teachers’ right to collectively bargain but
agencies, boards, and commissions could not guarantee contract gains when schools were financed
locally. Courts already set budgets in the cash-strapped city, upholding a citizens’ lawsuit to
prevent the school district from starting the previous school year on a half-day schedule.69 While
teachers secured a salary increase with only the threat of a strike in 1965, the $850 per year raise
they won on strike in 1967 was less than the $1,200 demanded.70

The state legislature-

commissioned Michigan School Finance Study identified two problems for school funding: a
“wave of militancy” by teachers and a “wave of violence” in cities.71
Strikers faced opposition from civic groups like the NAACP which desired stability after the
Detroit uprising and from activists who wanted community, not teacher or union, control over
schools and school boards.72 Scholars and participants alike continue to debate whether or not
Black Detroiters’ exclusion from economic prosperity caused the uprising. Nonetheless, the
business response—hiring Black men into disappearing manufacturing jobs—was inadequate.73
Repurposed after the summer of 1967, the National Urban Coalition enlisted businesses in
establishing the Great Society in cities.74 Whether or not more equal education would stop
violence in the model city, the National Urban Coalition invested money in Detroit schools too.
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President Riordan rather than vice president Richard spoke for the teachers union to a
national civil rights audience even after the Detroit uprising of July 1967 showed the urgency of
recognizing Black agency. Although Richard was invited to the U.S. Civil Rights Commission’s
conference “Equality Education Opportunity in America’s cities,” Riordan addressed a crowd that
included the AFT member who designed Berkeley, CA’s desegregation plan in addition to Detroit
school board members and district administrators.75 The tension between the two female union
officers over who would speak was characteristic of a deeper question: was there one union to
speak for. So long as Black and white labor leaders were aligned it may not have mattered. At
the conference, the civil rights and labor leader Bayard Rustin urged “minority groups” to join
with “progressive groups” for as long as they moved in the same direction during this “period of
politics.”
A New Caucus of Black and white AFT members echoed the decolonization movement’s
call for self-determination in the third world.76 A year after the overthrow of Republic of Ghana
president Kwame Nkrumah, and a month away from the Detroit uprising, many teachers were done
waiting for change in their schools. When the DFT’s first Black vice president, Ed Simpkins, tore
up his Progressive Caucus membership and walked out of the 1967 AFT Convention in
Washington, D. C., teachers like Zeline Richard who followed him formed the New Caucus.77
New Caucus members learned parliamentary procedure in order to be heard on their issues—
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racism, the Vietnam war, poverty—within the AFT. Richard speculated that everyone would have
rejoined the Progressive Caucus if so many had not left together.78 Black DFT officers like
Simpkins and Richard believed they “could sit down and break bread together and come to a
decision.”79 Forty percent of Detroit teachers were Black by the end of the 1960s, compared to
eleven percent in New York; “Detroit is not New York” Richard told the NAACP’s labor
director.80
The New Caucus found a home in Detroit, where Black liberation theology and
revolutionary theory inspired political and labor action.81 DFT members affiliated with the New
Caucus thought parents’ fight for community control was similar to teachers’ fight for union
recognition. Administrators and school board members had been “able to swallow New Math,
ungraded primaries, team-teaching, carpeting in classrooms, etc.” but somehow “parent-partners”
and “teacher-partners” stuck in their throats.82 Together, teachers and parents could influence
school board decisions. However, New Caucus leaders like Richard frequently disagreed with
DFT officers affiliated with the Progressive Caucus over school discipline.83 During the protests
and occupations that characterized Detroit schools in the late 1960s, some teachers learned to
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cooperate with “student-partners.”84 When King High School students boycotted over district
administration, the DFT building rep recognized students’ many “valid” demands and reestablished order in the school by enlisting students to enforce rules.85
Surprised by the first public mention of Detroit’s participation in the decentralization
movement, Riordan credited McGeorge Bundy, president of the Ford Foundation. Riordan
thought a November 1967 Ford Foundation report gave “immense status” to a proposal that had
raised discussion in New York to a “fever pitch” and had “been steadily winning acceptance and
support, particularly in big-city ghettos.”86 New York settled on thirty regional school districts,
while Los Angeles contemplated ten and Detroit eight.87 In December 1967, the Detroit school
district’s High School Study Commission recommended reconstituting the seven-member Detroit
school board into a thirteen-member central school board and eight regional school boards.88 The
state legislature authorized this change during the summer of 1969.
Many city residents wanted community control of individual schools more than
decentralization of administrative decisions to regional school districts. In three New York
regional school districts, Ford funded locally elected school boards, which were authorized to hire
and fire personnel and to set budgets and select curriculum. Representatives from New York,
Detroit, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Chicago met at Harvard University during the winter of 1968
to plan an expansion of community control to additional city schools.89 During the fall of 1968,
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leaders of New York City and Washington D.C. school decentralization from I.S. 201 and AdamsMorgan, respectively, rallied alongside their comrades in Detroit.90
The Detroit group Citizens for Community Control of Schools aimed for a “fundamental
redistribution of power.” First, the group advocated control of specific school or summer school
programs, then direct action as needed.91 The Detroit community control magazine Foresight
argued educators had redefined a Black movement for school control. Indeed, the DFT’s magazine
Detroit Teacher ceded a column to community control proponents. The Black community needed
its own “communication arm:” Detroit’s Black Teachers’ Workshop shared information on
education research and activities in Foresight and regular bulletins, which featured New York
consultants and the Detroit activist Grace Boggs, among others.92 Foresight writers, unlike Black
DFT officers, were not interested in breaking bread with teachers.

Teachers unions were

“resistance forces” oriented towards racism and pay rather than students, and interested more in
union than education strategy.93
DFT president Mary Ellen Riordan had to reconcile competing understandings of power.
The school district’s Black male labor negotiator, Aubrey McCutcheon, clashed with Detroit’s
largely white female teaching force when he hired Kelly Girls temp workers to collect information
from teachers’ personnel files. Defending their professional status against an administrator and
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casualized assistants, teachers halted the investigation.94 Writing her Detroit Teacher readers on
the topic of decentralization, Riordan observed that “local leadership however dedicated and
committed” could not “solve the money problem” which she insisted “(e)verybody” agreed was
the “biggest problem faced by big-city schools.”95 Much as in Chicago’s more racially divided
labor movement, though, Black teachers in Detroit would not fight for more resources until they
were equally distributed.96 Many Detroiters had given up on integration. Black parents, many of
them with union jobs in auto plants, had refused to pay taxes for racially segregated schools
throughout the 1960s.97 Teachers had no more resolved racial tensions in their union than had the
autoworkers who funded their organizing drives.
Another path to community control of urban public education was paraprofessional
organizing.98 Often women of color, parapros assisted teachers in the classroom and through union
contracts, accessed teacher training and thus professional careers. A Queens College political
science professor and advisor to the Ford Foundation thought parapros were “the key to increased
participation for the community in the schools.”99 After a showdown between the Ocean Hill-
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Brownsville Governing Board in Brooklyn and the United Federation of Teachers over the board’s
firing of unionized teachers led to a strike at the start of the 1968 school year, community control
became notorious for conflict. By contrast, Ocean Hill-Brownsville’s lead administrator argued
paraprofessionals provided stability in schools. In the following years, United Federation of
Teachers president Albert “Al” Shanker recruited parapros to the teachers union.100 In contrast to
New York, Detroit did not include parapros in its teachers bargaining unit.101 Two generations of
Detroit labor ran against each other for the national union presidency weeks before the 1968 New
York teacher strike raised future AFT president Shanker’s profile.
DFT president Mary Ellen Riordan nominated former AFT field organizer David Selden
as a candidate for president at the 1968 AFT convention in Cleveland.102 Selden ran on a platform
of merging the AFT and NEA because neither teachers organization alone “had enough strength
and power to force the governments involved to come up with the money” necessary to improve
education.103 Like multilevel bargaining in the auto industry, Selden wanted federalist or sectoral
bargaining in the schools.104 Working-class teachers feared the AFT would “give up too much to
merge with the NEA,” the larger and wealthier teachers organization they were taught to look at
as the “devil.”105 Black teachers felt unwelcome in the NEA, where segregated local association
were tolerated into the 1960s.
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Selden’s refusal to support the principle of self-determination, associated with the policy
of decentralization or community control, spurred the year-old New Caucus to run a last-minute
slate of challengers with Richard for president.106 Although Richard counted one-hundred caucus
supporters, she received 586 votes out of nearly 2,400 total after a twelve-hour campaign.107
Despite the New Caucus’s strong showing, the rest of the teachers union was not persuaded to
support community control. By the end of 1968, union teachers could not reach consensus to ally
with professionals in the National Education Association or radicals in the community. At first
teachers were unified, but as racial issues became more salient, their unity deteriorated.

Fig. Images 11863 and 11985, Reuther Library. Zeline Richard on the left, David Selden on the right, representing an
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At the same time, teachers’ ties to the labor movement weakened. Selden hoped articulate
workers like teachers in an important industry like education would be the “base for a liberal
organization” of their own. Contemplating an organization outside the AFL-CIO— a “Council of
Unions For Professionals”—Selden used to say, “look if auto workers can do it teachers can do
it.”108 However, the UAW’s new labor federation fell short of its urban policy promises to build
housing and organize unions of community members and the unorganized.109 Teachers needed
support from central labor councils affiliated with the AFL-CIO in disputes with boards of
education, and remained in the labor federation.110 Selden antagonized AFL-CIO president
George Meany by defending unions that continued to accept assistance from the autoworkers.
Although the AFT was the fastest growing union in the AFL-CIO during the 1960s, Meany refused
to seat Selden on the powerful executive council.
Labor in the Courts: School Finance Reform and Teacher Union Agency Fees
This situation is somewhat ironic in that minorities' fights for equal educational opportunity
were the wellspring of the present school finance reform movement. Indeed, one of the main
theoretical foundations of the movement was Arthur Wise's book, Rich Schools Poor
Schools, which was rooted in the desire to improve equal educational opportunity for
minorities. Then as the early movement leaders went to court, their first lawsuits asked the
courts to rule that states must provide education aid based on differential student needs (with
Detroit and Chicago's large Black student populations mainly in mind). Only after the
Supreme Court dismissed this contention (McInnis v. Ogilvie, followed by Burrus v.
Wilkerson) did the activist lawyers turn to the Serrano 'fiscal neutrality' principle.
National Urban Coalition grant proposal to the Ford Foundation, April 1974
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While ideas about race and power worked their way through the union, schools still needed
funding and teachers looked to a different set of ideas to equalize resources. University of Chicago
education researcher Arthur Wise proposed that the quality of a student’s school should not depend
on their geographic location, parental circumstances, or “how highly his neighbors value
education.”111

Wise argued the courts would strike down school districts drawn with

discriminatory boundaries as they had legislative districts just years before.112 As he told fellow
members of the Detroit Board of Education, UAW attorney Abraham Zwerdling objected to
quality of education being “largely governed by parental status and geography,” or as the attorney
put it more bluntly, by “how big and fancy the houses are.”113 Hearing the same answer to budget
requests in the state capitol—“No”—again and again, the school board unanimously approved
Zwerdling’s motion at an early 1968 meeting to sue for state aid in the “court of last resort.”114
Just over a week later, the Detroit school board filed suit to compel Michigan “to discharge its
Constitutional obligation to provide equal education opportunity for all children.” All seven
school board members and DFT president Mary Ellen Riordan witnessed the lawsuit’s filing at
Wayne County Circuit Court on February 2, 1968.115
Detroit teachers were at center of a national conversation about fiscal reform. A winter
1967 conference in Detroit gathered city school board members, state legislators, and educational
organization leaders from across the country.116 Teachers College adjunct professor James A.
Kelly, soon-to-be a Ford Foundation program officer directing a network to reform school
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finances, gave the conference keynote address. Locally, goals were modest: the Parent-Teacher
Association campaigned to pass a one-half of one percent tax on property. However, the Detroit
Board of Education believed it had reached a “tax limit” and could no longer fund schools by
taxing the mostly Black, elderly, and poor residents of Detroit, who also had to fund police and
other city services while nearby school districts could raise larger sums with lower tax rates.117
Between 1966 and 1969, only one-sixth to one-quarter of Detroit’s property taxes went to
schools.118
Detroit school board member Abraham Zwerdling personally welcomed “the demise of the
local property tax for school finance.”119 At the start of the 1960s, Michigan still depended
primarily on the regressive property tax, which made up nearly half of state and local tax
revenue.120 As a proportion of their income, the poorest Michigan households paid three and a
half times the rate of residential property taxes as the wealthiest.121 The Michigan school aid fund,
which distributed state aid to local districts for equalization, received revenue from regressive
taxes on sales, cigarettes, and gas, and appropriations from the general fund, which significantly
increased in 1965, after the “one person, one vote” legislature was seated.122 Unionized teachers
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and autoworkers wanted the state to fund education with the income tax Michigan legislators
finally approved in 1967.
Union leaders took the same collective action approach to policy as to contracts: “We’ll
never have the necessary tax action unless we demand it” they declared.123 Together with teachers,
the Parent-Teacher Association brought 1,200 allies to a rally at the state capitol during the spring
of 1967, and wrote, telegrammed, and called legislators “at home on the weekend” to “vote for
fiscal reform and increased State aid.” After teachers’ fall 1967 strike ended with a favorable
settlement, their union continued lobbying for funding to pay for the new contract. A DFT vice
president testified before a joint state legislative committee on education about increasing the
state’s portion of education budgets.124 When the DFT Sources for School Revenues Committee
consulted him, Detroit’s State Senator Coleman Young urged “political action.”125
Even business leaders attempted to persuade the state to share more with its cities.
Department store owner, and New Detroit, Inc. chair, Joseph L. Hudson, had convinced
Republican Governor George Romney to put state aid to Detroit on his agenda for the legislature’s
upcoming special session in 1968.126 Detroit representatives in the legislature drafted bills for
“inner-city schools:” the Senate proposed $5.2 million and the House $12.8. Neither chamber
seemed likely to debate these bills, much less pass them. Detroit of course would have been the
largest recipient of any categorical urban funds but even a full share would have barely covered
the district’s deficit. Estimates showed that more than one-third of the next year’s school district
budget of $235 million would come from state aid. Although state aid had increased by seven
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percent over the prior year, accountants predicted a $19 million deficit.127 The deficit would grow
if local property taxes expiring in 1972 and 1973 were not renewed.128
Midwestern metropolitans from University of Chicago education researcher Arthur Wise
to the Detroit school board members were all influenced by a district court’s consideration of legal
remedies ranging from compensatory funds to metropolitan integration in the 1967 Washington
D. C. racial discrimination case Hobson v. Hansen.129 Filing under the equal protection clause of
the U.S. constitution’s fourteenth amendment reflected Wise’s new legal theory; it was also the
quickest way to seek relief. The Supreme Court’s Baker v. Carr ruling, supported by the Michigan
AFL-CIO, allowed state lawsuits based on constitutional grounds to be filed in federal courts.130
Moreover, filing in the circuit rather than district court offered school finance reformers a “shorter
route of appeal” to the U. S. Supreme Court.131
Labor lawyer Abraham Zwerdling positioned the school finance lawsuit as an attempt to
conserve the institution of public education rather than “a bold, radical step.” The UAW and the
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Detroit City Council “expressed support for the Board’s action.” The DFT and its statewide
affiliate the Michigan Federation of Teachers considered joining the fifteen co-plaintiffs to the
suit. As DFT president Riordan contemplated the next round of contract negotiations, she argued
the board and the union “SHOULD be on the same side, doing their bargaining across the table
from the State legislature and the governor.”132 Even a united organizational front would struggle
to pass routine state school aid bills without a legal precedent.
As labor and poverty lawyers filed school finance lawsuits modeled on Detroit’s, foundations
began to show interest. AFL-CIO general counsel Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. made the case that other
school districts should try the Detroit Board of Education's legal strategy.133 School finance was
a long-term project of Americans for Democratic Action, whose Detroit chapter Zwerdling led and
whose national board Rauh led. Rauh also convinced a Ford Foundation education program officer
to join a November 1968 conference of attorneys, researchers, and foundation officials from
Illinois, Texas, California, and Michigan, funded by what was then known as the Potomac Institute
and later as the Taconic Foundation.134 Days after the election of Richard Nixon to the presidency
portended an upheaval in federal education policy, school finance reformers suffered a judicial
defeat. The Northern Illinois District Court dismissed the fourteenth amendment case McInnis v.
Shapiro, filed on behalf of a Chicago student whose “educational need” the court judged was not
a constitutional standard.
Ford Foundation grantees joined labor unions in filing amicus briefs to preserve school
finance litigation as an equalization strategy when the U. S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the
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Chicago case.135 The NEA’s Committee on Educational Finance recommended filing briefs as “a
friend of the Court” or perhaps even as “a party to the suit” as school districts and governors
appealed early cases.136 With the Ford-funded Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
and the National Urban Coalition, the National Education Association submitted an amicus brief
in the Virginia case Burruss v. Wilkerson arguing the court’s dismissal of the Illinois case had had
a “chilling effect,” preventing cases in Michigan, Wisconsin, and Texas from “being filed or
pressed.”137 Yet except for submitting an amicus brief when the Texas case Rodriguez v. San
Antonio Intermediate School District was later refiled, the AFT was notably absent in earlier
cases.138 By the end of the 1960s, the AFT was focused on its internal leadership struggle over
community control.

The Detroit Board of Education as Defendant
Detroit teachers clamored to be included in political decisions about race, control, and
money as the Michigan legislature debated decentralization and the governor planned for school
finance reform during the summer of 1969. Symbolic of the explosive situation, the DFT’s brandnew office burned nearly two years to the day after the Detroit uprising set city blocks on fire.139
Right-to-work policies that undermined the union or agency shop were a bigger threat to the
teachers union than the unexplained fire. The newly Republican state legislature resisted labor’s
agenda and debated collective bargaining restrictions.140
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Conservative legislators and lower courts attempted to weaken public sector unions. In
1968, Representative Joseph P. Swallow, a prosecutor from northern Michigan, had introduced a
bill to ban national organizations like the AFT that struck government, which would force the DFT
to disaffiliate from the union federation.141 Companion bills required compulsory arbitration,
limited the scope of bargaining issues to wages and benefits, and permitted decertification of
bargaining agents who struck. The DFT judged the state legislature aimed to turn “the clock back
to the day when one of the requirements for being a teacher was also being a mouse.”142 Moreover,
the Swallow bill required mandatory injunctions during public workers’ strikes, forcing judges’
hands in a state where as recently as 1967, many had refused to bring their gavels down on teacher
strikes. In conservative western Michigan, where an “instant injunction” had stopped a teachers’
strike, the NEA-affiliated Holland Education Association appealed the circuit court judge’s
opinion.143 Attorneys for the DFT and Michigan Federation of Teachers joined successful
arguments before the state Supreme Court, which overruled the lower court five to two.
Michigan’s administrative state retained pro-labor margins longer than the redistricted
legislature. In a case originating just northwest of Detroit in Oakland County, the Michigan Labor
Mediation Board ruled “that an agency shop is the only legal type of Union security” under the
1965 Public Employment Relations Act, and that a “Public employer is required to bargain for an
agency shop.” The Michigan board was the first state labor board in the country to rule in favor
of the public sector agency shop.144 As the public employer, a board of education thus had the
authority to terminate non-union teachers who did not pay what were then known as service fees
in lieu of union dues. With a two to two vote in the summer of 1969, the State Tenure Commission
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sustained the Saginaw Board of Education’s dismissal of a teacher who did not pay fees required
by the Saginaw Education Association’s 1967 contract’s agency shop provision.145 The Detroit
Education Association left the Michigan Education Association rather than support the state NEA
affiliate’s negotiation of agency shop provisions in local union contracts.146
Detroit’s NEA affiliate appealed to the courts to protect minority rights when it lost popular
support. When the Detroit Education Association challenged the DFT’s representation of Detroit
teachers, it won 3,848 votes out of 9,587 in 1964 and 3,709 votes out of 10,119 in 1967: even as
the bargaining unit grew, the Detroit Education Association’s margin shrunk.147 This was a
significant minority that nonetheless repeatedly lost. By the end of the 1968-1969 school year,
when the union held a referendum on the inclusion of the agency shop provision in the contract
proposal, only 1,708 Detroit teachers voted no.148 Nonetheless, a co-founder of the right-to-work
group Detroit Teachers Opposed to Compulsory Unionism argued that the Detroit school board
signed off on the agency fee provision because “a majority of the Board are union-sponsored,
union-backed, and union-financed.”149 Surely anticipating judicial review, the 1969-1970 DFT
contract stipulated that terminations, permitted by the end of March 1970, would not be effective
until legal remedies were exhausted. When they could not influence the DFT from within,
dissenting teachers already asked courts to mediate internal union elections.150
Community control supporters, by contrast, changed school decisions through
representative structures and public pressure. During the winter of 1969, the Detroit school board
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resolved to convene unions, teachers, and administrators to develop a “viable plan for the
transference of meaningful power to the community.”151 The superintendent of Detroit Public
Schools and an education economics professor led a workshop on “Financing Decentralized
Schools.”152 Riordan acceded to the inevitability of community control but wanted to experiment
with demonstration schools before breaking up a school district, which she argued could not be
put back together.153 By then an AFT vice president in addition to DFT president, Riordan attended
the national union’s first regional conference on decentralization and community control, which
adopted a statement urging teachers unions to support both notions and make “mutually
satisfactory” plans with communities.154 On April 8, 1969, the Detroit NAACP made a formal
request for a decentralization plan of “community centered” schools governed by elected boards
of parents.155 While the Michigan legislature permitted Detroit to decentralize school governance
during the summer of 1969, it did not provide funds for planning or operating regional school
boards.156 The Detroit Board of Education applied to the Ford Foundation for a grant, which it
received, to form an Office of School Decentralization.157 This office developed a 305-page report
on policy options, identifying 89 issues for the school board to decide on.158 The lengthy report,
of course, gave board members little direction.
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There was one area the community would not control: hiring and firing teachers.
Decentralization challenged teachers’ hard-won bargaining relationship with the Detroit school
board. On the crucial question of whether regional school boards could fire teachers, the opinions
the school board heard were mixed. An elementary school advisory committee advocated regional
hiring but central recruitment and negotiations.159 The Parent Teachers Association asked the
school board to accept more public input.160 The NAACP’s Education Committee recommended
regional boards hire administrators but follow the decisions of a teacher tenure commission.161 A
committee of Black labor leaders recommended that a Board of Arbitration—one central school
board member, one union rep, and their mutually selected arbitrator—resolve disputes.162 The
DFT executive board resolved to support elected community representation in school operation
subject to the union’s city-wide contract and state law.163 At the behest of the DFT, the Detroit
school board decided to retain responsibility for labor negotiations.164
Divisions over race ran so deep that community control supporters made a dangerous
alliance with right-to-work ideologues.165 At the start of the 1969 school year, the newly-formed
Detroit Teachers Opposed to Compulsory Unionism claimed support from the Detroit Education
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Association and the New Caucus, the pro-community control caucus that had nominated Zeline
Richard for AFT president.166 An open shop meant New Caucus members would not pay dues to
union leaders they opposed. Without mentioning Richard by name, Riordan later acknowledged
that “(t)here had been a tremendous split inside the Detroit local, a political split.”167 When
controversy arose, Riordan had a habit of not did speaking to Richard.168 Riordan kept Black and
white New Caucus supporters off her DFT officer election slate in winter 1969, although Riordan
later filled a vacancy. From her position on the executive board, Richard took up the cause of
three Black female teachers and community control supporters fired without notice and ignored
by their union representative.
Richard warned that the union would have to change to keep Black teachers’ support—she
would still pay dues but how many others would? Richard did not sign the union leadership’s
open letter expressing disappointment that “ANY Detroit teachers would ally themselves with the
onerous Right to Work groups who have long helped to depress the wages of blacks and who are
allied with arch-conservatives and ‘states righters.’”169 Right-to-work policies in the public sector,
however, were an opening to the political right for some Black workers.
Forced to take sides between the labor and business approaches to education, and between
the union and antiunion approach to dues, Richard left the union she could not lead. Ed Simpkins,
the New Caucus leader and the DFT’s first Black vice president, left first, beginning a graduate
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program in education at Harvard University. “In a way” Zeline said “Ed was the labor movement
because he would go out into the schools and fight the battles.”170 When leftist Black trade
unionists moved on, business moved in. After Richard took a leave of absence from teaching to
work as a research assistant at Wayne State University’s College of Education, she joined New
Detroit, Inc. as director of education.171

Richard was active in the United Negro History

Committee, the International Afro-American Museum, the NAACP, and the ACLU—“at the end
of the day, (Richard was) right here with black folks”; she couldn’t “go out in suburbia
somewhere.”172 Leaving the labor movement was Richard’s way to stay in the city and avoid the
kind of criticism Black policemen received since “black people don’t like policemen period!”173
Anti-agency shop teachers argued for freedom of association, a very different claim on the
U. S. constitution’s fourteenth amendment than the Detroit school board’s argument about
educational need.174 The DFT’s executive board kept track of all agency shop cases, which made
similar arguments in the same state courts.175 Reflecting multiethnic opposition to the union, a
Detroit teacher with a Polish rather than Lebanese last name first filed suit against fees. While a
state trial court initially agreed with the DFT’s long-time attorney’s motion to dismiss Christine
Warczak’s original lawsuit, the Michigan Supreme Court’s muddled ruling in a separate case from
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a nearby white ethnic enclave sent the agency shop back to trial court.176 An attorney for the
Michigan Association of School Boards, who had been testifying against collective bargaining
before the state legislature for years, represented three-hundred plaintiffs, with Louis Abood
alphabetically first as the case proceeded through higher courts.177
The first major case the National Right to Work Foundation took was the Detroit agency
fees case. Reporting on the lawsuit in its monthly newsletter, the National Right to Work
Foundation quoted Warczak’s Detroit Teachers Opposed to Compulsory Unionism co-founder,
Ernest Smith, a Black teacher and former labor organizer. Smith asked his fellow teachers to “help
restore freedom of choice.” Over the years, Michigan teachers with labor and civil rights
experience featured prominently in organizational right-work materials and publications like
Reader’s Digest. The choice of Detroit and Michigan was intentional. The National Right to
Work Legal Defense and Education Foundation targeted Detroit’s labor-liberal litigation strategy,
in addition to claiming the civil rights mantle for individual rights, as Jon Shelton argues.178
Warczak’s lawyers filed suit in 1969, after the Michigan labor movement’s involvement in “one
person, one vote” led to a redistricted state legislative that passed a public employee collective
bargaining bill in 1965, and after the Detroit school board’s school finance reform case in 1968.
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Seeking to make teachers represent the public sector union threat, the National Right to
Work Foundation searched for more plaintiffs in Detroit schools.179 By 1970, the foundation had
spent more than $100,000 on the Detroit litigation.180 By 1973, six hundred of approximately
twelve thousand Detroit teachers had signed on to the Abood v. Detroit Board of Education case
that made its way to the Supreme Court. However, as DFT president Riordan pointed out, the two
Detroit cases combined in Abood included administrators as well as teachers.181 Refiled in the fall
of 1969 in advance of payroll deductions under the new DFT contract’s agency shop provision,
Abood challenged nonmembers’ obligation to pay service fees to the union as a condition of
employment.182 Fees and dues, the plaintiffs charged, funded the Detroit Federation of Teacher’s
political work in violation of teachers’ freedom of speech rights. Riordan insisted donations for
political campaigns were collected and kept separately.
The influential antiunion attorney who tried the case before the U.S. Supreme Court,
Sylvester Petro, argued lobbying and politics were more important to public sector unions than
strikes. The court’s unanimous majority concluded public and private employees were “not
basically different”—they had the same skills, needs, and bargaining goals.183 However, in its
1977 opinion the U. S. Supreme Court divided dues into two categories: bargaining and politics.
This ruling meant union nonmembers could withhold dues used for politics but not for bargaining,
for which they had to pay agency or “fair share” fees. Thus, despite their contract language

179

Joseph A. McCartin and Jean-Christian Vinel, ""Compulsory Unionism": Sylvester Petro and the Career of an
Anti-Union Idea, 1957-1987," in The Right and Labor in America: Politics, Ideology, and Imagination, ed. Nelson
Lichtenstein and Elizabeth Tandy Shermer (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012). Sophia Z. Lee,
The Workplace Constitution from the New Deal to the New Right (Cambridge University Press, 2014).
180
Shelton, “‘Compulsory Unionism’ and Its Critics.”
181
DFT Executive Board Meeting — May 7, 1970, Agenda, Box 23, Folder 11 DFT Local 231 v. DB of Edu (3 of
5), DFT records.
182
The provision was effective January 26, 1970 and required non-union teachers to pay a fee equal to union dues
within 60 days. “New Contract Gains for 1969-71,” Detroit Teacher 29 (1), September 1969, 3, 13. Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977)
183
Justice Potter Stewart quoted in Shelton, “‘Compulsory Unionism’ and Its Critics,” 388.

206

requiring fees to equal dues, the DFT and other public employee unions would collect less from
non-members. The courts never did not say whether school finance campaigns were for political
or representational purposes. Years before, teacher unionists would have agreed with Petro’s
argument about the importance of politics, but would have disagreed with the highest court’s
opinion that they could represent members without politics.

Michigan’s Ban on Public Money for Private Schools, and the End of the Detroit Labor
Coalition
Michigan’s moderate Republican governor began replacing school property taxes during
the summer of 1969 in response to lawsuits.184 The Ford Foundation’s network of education
researchers, legal aid lawyers, and politicians across the political spectrum used legal leverage to
directly negotiate with state administrations and legislatures while courts heard school finance
cases. Governor William Milliken of Michigan led a Ford-funded commission that proposed a
constitutional amendment to ban property taxes for school funding.185 By contrast, a liberal
organization like the League of Women Voters of Michigan suggested reforms to make the
property tax a better tax so long as it was levied.186 DFT president Mary Ellen Riordan worried
Milliken’s “announcement of the naming of still another committee to ‘study’ one of the already
most studied of all state problems” amounted to ignoring the problem.187 Why, Riordan wondered,
would a new study be any more persuasive than the Thomas report commissioned by the Michigan
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legislature in 1966. One reason may have been Milliken’s consideration of state funding for
private schools, what opponents called “parochiaid” and organized to stop.
Union teachers and liberal women campaigned against public money for private schools
without the support of the UAW and its many Catholic members. The League of Women Voters
of Michigan joined with teachers organizations affiliated with both the AFT and NEA in
opposition to the governor’s willingness to spend tax revenue, whatever the source, on independent
or religious schools.188 Among other reasons, League members did not think there were “sufficient
funds now for one school system” and did “not want any diversion of funds from the public
schools.”189 The Detroit school board observed that existing auxiliary services for private school
students had reduced those same services for public school students. The Michigan Federation of
Teachers president chaired a Committee for the Advancement of Public Education, which had
opposed bills for state aid to private schools for years.190 Led by the Michigan Federation of
Teachers, members of the League in addition to unions filed a lawsuit against the state for
permitting school boards to pay for private school services.191
While the issue was “a highly emotional one,” the League of Women Voters of Michigan
promised that “in good league fashion we will put the subject in its proper perspective and maintain
an objective viewpoint.”192 From the left, while union members might call aid to parochial schools
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“parochiaid,” league members were sternly advised not to use the term.193 From the right, property
owners associations were not welcome to join the League in lobbying legislators.194 The League
followed an axiom: “Let the people know, Make the people care, Help the people act.”195 While
lobbying legislators, the League was less anodyne, instructing Taxation and Education Chairmen
to practice with a devil’s advocate and use the “eager leaguer” in addition to “your solid regular
members and your bright, young, pretty leaguers…this is why you budgeted the baby-sitting
money.”196 If legislators were not in their offices, the League encouraged visiting them at home.197
By contrast, the Detroit teachers union threatened to withhold contributions and endorsements
from state legislators who voted for “state support of parochial schools.”198
Leaguers and teachers passed a constitutional amendment banning public aid to nonpublic
schools and students during the fall 1970 election. The Michigan Education Association and its
75,000 members collected petition signatures with the Council Against Parochiaid.199 Passing
with 56.78 percent of the vote, the ballot measure was the first successful initiative petition to
amend the 1963 Michigan constitution. Despite the UAW and building trades’ opposition to the
ban, the MFT president judged the “overwhelming support of time, work, and money of a vast
number of persons” in addition to advertising during the last two weeks of the campaign swayed
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voters against “parochiaid.”200 Enrollment in suburban Detroit Catholic schools fell by half
between 1970 and 1971, and remained level during the desegregation crisis.201 In the spring of
1971, the Michigan Supreme Court permitted public funding for shared time programs and
auxiliary services like speech therapy or transportation.202
Detroit school board members reconsidered attendance policies that segregated students by
race as they complied with decentralization legislation passed the summer before. Detroit schools
in the fifth largest school district in the U. S. were 63.8 percent Black by 1970.203 No white
students had been bused to 22,961 vacant seats in ninety percent Black schools. Despite persistent
student protest and activist programming, only one school board member advocated community
control.204 However, this member leveraged his vote for integration after a colleague fell ill and
was hospitalized, remarking that the school board’s “decentralization with integration” plan was a
progressive but minimal intervention with the only alternative “a massive two-way bussing
program.”205
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The Detroit school board’s “decentralization with integration” plan set off a furious
reaction when it leaked days before the board voted four to two to racially integrate a dozen Detroit
high schools.206 The school board redrew high school attendance boundaries east-west to eliminate
ninety percent black and ninety percent white schools, reassigning 10,000 of 290,000 Detroit
students. The Detroit superintendent thought the potential for further integration, rather than the
plan itself, incited student boycotts and parent protests.207 Indeed, board member Zwerdling had
set his sights beyond city limits, which he considered “artificial barriers” protected by a “vast
conspiracy of silence.” Elected school board president in 1969, the labor lawyer urged the
governor and legislature to “redistrict the greater metropolitan area.”208
The DFT executive board resolved to “support and commend the courage of the Detroit
Board of Education.”209 Although union leaders regretted that the school board rushed its decision
without discussion, they understood that under state and federal law, “the Board had no choice but
to move as it did.” Teacher union leaders changed their minds faster than members. Asked to
fund advertisements of “decentralization with integration” endorsements from national figures like
U.S. Commissioner of Education James E. Allen, Jr. and sociologist James S. Coleman, the DFT
membership reversed their executive board’s decision to contribute.210

By attributing a

206

Estimates later filed with the court differed from those in newspapers as to the extent of student population
changes. In the Detroit Free Press’ account, Mackenzie would fall from over ninety percent black to just under
seventy by fall 1972. Southwestern and Kettering, nearly ninety percent black each, would fall to fifty-three and
sixty-five respectively. Overwhelmingly white schools like Cody and Redford would become thirty percent white
while Denby would become majority black. David Cooper, “City School Integration Bid Upheld,” Detroit Free
Press, Undated, pg. 1 in Box 1041, Folder 3, NAACP Legal Department. Mumford was also included in the plan.
207
Joel Aberbach and Jack Walker, “Citizen Desires, Policy Outcomes, and Community Control,” Urban Affairs
Quarterly, September 1972.
208
A. L. Zwerdling, Statement by A. L. Zwerdling, President, Board of Education, to Administrators and
Supervisors of the Detroit Public Schools, September 5, 1969, Detroit Public Schools Community Relations
Division Records, Box 7, Folder 6 1969, Reuther Library.
209
“Resolution,” Detroit Teacher 29 (6), April 1970, 1.
210
DFT Executive Board Meeting — April 30, 1970, Minutes, Box 23, Folder 11 DFT Local 231 v. DB of Edu (3 of
5), DFT records.

211

controversial internal DFT poll to Riordan, the local press and thus historian Jeffrey Mirel
misrepresented the DFT leadership’s evolving reaction to decentralization and integration.211
The state house nullified the Detroit school board’s vote to reassign students for racial
integration.212 Governor Milliken refused to sign the bill into law, and legislators debated
replacements. The NAACP’s executive director called on all Michigan NAACP branches to
contact state representatives in support of the Detroit school board’s integration plan.213 At the
UAW’s annual convention in 1970, the union’s four Detroit-area regional directors, in addition to
four Detroit-resident officials, praised the Detroit school board for “its devotion to the highest
ideals of American democracy.”214 UAW leaders’ endorsement, the Detroit public schools
superintendent thought, would “help smooth the way through the complex transition before us.”215
Detroit’s state senator and future mayor Coleman Young proposed successful compromise
legislation that repealed the “decentralization with integration” plan and essentially ceded
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governance of Black schools to Black communities. Detroit’s overlapping labor, civil rights, and
Black communities had disagreed before and would disagree again in the face of white resistance
to school integration.
Detroit voters recalled the four Detroit school board members who passed “decentralization
with integration.”216 Recall organizers believed their protests of forced student transfers had gone
unheard, and that education quality would improve under a new Detroit school board.217 Parents
fought for their children, argued the westside Detroit police officer who led the charge, while the
pro-integration school board fought for an idea.218 Political scientists at the time judged recall
supporters won out of “(i)ntensity, organization, and commitment.”219 Days after the special
August recall election, Zwerdling said the opposition resulted from the school board “sending
white students into Black schools” for the first time.220
Another ousted board member found the “people who helped get us elected—the UAW,
the NAACP and the others” missing from the recall.221 While Black turnout was low, nearly half
of Black voters did not fill out the recall ballot line. Although the city’s new punch card voting
machines created confusion, apathy contributed too.222 Even the UAW left the recall question off
its endorsement slate. After the untimely death of UAW president Walter Reuther and his wife
May in a spring 1970 plane crash, autoworkers’ energies were focused on their October strike at
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Detroit-area manufacturers.223 AFT President Selden had telegrammed family and friends of
Walter that there was “not another like him" and the teacher union leaders he helped when they
“could not get help from anyone else” had looked to him for “a sort of spiritual guidance.”224
The NAACP pursued legal action rather than electoral politics, suing the state of Michigan
two weeks after Detroit voters recalled four pro-integration school board members. The NAACP
took a prominent northern school desegregation case because the state legislature overturned the
Detroit school board’s “decentralization with integration” plan, an act of intentional segregation
akin to southern nullification of federal court orders.225 The Detroit branch, the NAACP’s largest
financial contributor, pressed the NAACP to pass a convention resolution and to file a lawsuit.
When the labor lost control
The NAACP held a meeting for potential student plaintiffs and their parents: Ronald and
Richard Bradley, two of six plaintiffs, were listed first in the Bradley v. Milliken litigation. The
Bradley children attended DeWitt Clinton, a resegregated and overcrowded elementary school that
held class in temporary trailers.226 Clinton was located in a middle-class neighborhood in
northwest Detroit one mile south of two prominent Catholic colleges, and four miles north of
Sherrill, the site of a 1962 school desegregation lawsuit by Black UAW members. In eight years,
residential integration had expanded outside the inner city.
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The Detroit superintendent, a former teacher and DFT member, arranged a secret meeting
between NAACP lawyers and Detroit school leaders to negotiate conditions for the Detroit school
board to support the desegregation lawsuit.227

In its last days, the “decentralization with

integration” Detroit school board offered to increase integration if the NAACP secured a judicial
declaration against the state legislature’s attendance policy. However, when the NAACP cocounsel Louis Lucas threatened to sue anyways, the Detroit school board’s white attorney George
Bushnell responded “I’ll whip your ass.” When Lucas sued the Detroit school superintendent
without consulting Bushnell—a member of the NAACP board of directors—the attorney resigned
his position in the civil rights organization.
Bradley v. Milliken should be understood as the NAACP’s political maneuver to insert the
civil rights organization into Detroit’s desegregation planning more than a robust legal strategy.228
Defendants included integration supporters. Hurt feelings aside, Lucas believed Bushnell and the
Detroit school board would join plaintiffs “in an attack on the areawide process of segregation”
once the NAACP proved the city schools were segregated in court.229 Another named defendant
in the Bradley v. Milliken litigation was state superintendent Dr. John Porter, who became the
nation’s first Black state superintendent of schools when he was appointed in 1969, and would
later lead the Detroit Public Schools as superintendent.230 Detroit labor leaders had also bargained
with the NAACP: labor support for the lawsuit in exchange for leaving the “racially identifiable
assignment of teachers” out of the case.231 When the NAACP refused, the DFT petitioned to join
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the Bradley suit as a defendant alongside the administrative state it had been alternately
campaigning with and against for the last decade for a say over teacher transfers and seniority.232
Federal courts more than the labor movement or white and Black community control
shaped Detroit school board decisions throughout the 1970s.233 Governor Milliken appointed
interim board members between the August recall of the pro-integration school board and the
November election of new regional and central school board members.

The results of

decentralization were mixed. Fifteen UAW-endorsed candidates won half of the decentralized
regional board seats, compared to the twelve candidates endorsed by recall organizers.234
However, recall organizers endorsed the candidate who tallied the most votes in five of the eight
regions, and thus won five of thirteen central board seats allocated by region.235 Two of the DFTendorsed central board candidates lost, and the third, who had replaced an ill board member, was
already on the board.236 Before the newly-elected regional and central Detroit school board
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members could be seated, an appeals court upheld the NAACP’s Bradley v. Milliken desegregation
lawsuit, and district court judge Stephen J. Roth demanded integration.237
One court-ordered strategy that failed was magnet schools with specialized curriculum but
no additional funding that, like a magnet, would draw students to attend schools outside their
racially segregated neighborhood.238 Confronted by six-hundred white protestors at its November
6, 1970 meeting, the interim Detroit school board voted to close its session to the public: the board
agreed to submit two magnet school plans alongside the “decentralization with integration” plan
to the court.239 The NAACP objected that Detroit’s three past attempts to voluntarily attract
diverse students through magnet schools had not desegregated the district.240 Judge Roth endorsed
a free-standing, full-day magnet school plan advocated by then-school board chair Patrick
McDonald, and ordered it implemented by the fall of 1971.241 McDonald pitched magnet schools
because the “community does not fear such a plan as they would forced bussing plans.”242 The
magnet plan was designed to move students by “educational choice,” which would achieve
integration by “natural,” as opposed to “artificial,” means.243 After a year in operation, the magnet
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school plan had not integrated the district: the NAACP believed it had “too many of the defects
inherent in ‘open enrollment’ and ‘free choice’ techniques.”244
Labor and liberal leaders pursued school funding alongside desegregation.245 Political
party control of the state legislature changed in fall 1970. The House Democratic majority of 58
out of 110 representatives was prepared to put a referendum on the constitutional prohibition
against a graduated rate income tax on the ballot. However, the Senate was split evenly with
nineteen members of each party.246 With a Republican governor, the MFT president thought “the
Republicans have a slight edge” but that “tactful, effective political action of a well organized
group of citizens” could influence “the balance of power in this delicately balanced triangle.”247
In the spring of 1971, a Crisis Conference Coordinating Committee of the state teachers
organizations in addition to administrators, schools board, and the UAW appointed a Tax Task
Force.248 Like the League of Women Voters of Michigan, the Michigan Federation of Teachers
also believed school taxes “should place the tax burden on those with the ability to pay” but
recognized that the “present need for increased state revenues can not be put off until the time the
constitution can be changed.”249 However, the Tax Task Force did not make much progress in the
legislature either. When the AFL-CIO and the UAW called a meeting with state legislators about
a “solution to the crisis in our state schools,” only thirteen attended.250 Whereas the League used
to work with a sympathetic senator to write tax legislation, now the upper chamber blocked
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them.251 The MFT predicted tax reform would not happen until 1973, when a new legislature was
seated—representatives in the state house would not pass a tax bill during their re-election year of
1972.252
A summer 1971 opinion in the Bradley v. Milliken desegregation case disrupted school
finance and tax reform plans.253 After trial testimony by former Detroit school board members
and current administrators, and a variety of social scientists in addition to public and private
housing officials including a Black “realtist,” even the defendants admitted that the NAACP had
convinced the skeptical judge.254 At the end of July 1971, Judge Roth found the Detroit school
board segregated students through school construction and attendance policies.255 Most blatantly,
the Detroit school board built Higginbotham School for children living in a Black neighborhood
separated from a white neighborhood by a six-foot wall erected to secure discriminatory
financing.256 While many of these incidents occurred before Zwerdling’s labor school board took
office in 1965, Roth judged that transportation maintained segregation despite the school board’s
1967 policy.
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The Detroit defendants asked the state for relief, a request repeated for three years of
litigation until the U. S. Supreme Court ruled the suburbs out of bounds for desegregation in the
1974 opinion Milliken v. Bradley. Detroit school board attorney Bushnell argued the state
discriminated against its largest city by denying full bonding authority to the school district, giving
subsidies to suburban but not urban busing and school construction, and manipulating state aid
formulas. Roth, like contemporary urban historians, argued that racially segregated schools and
neighborhoods were mutually constituted.257

The state of Michigan was responsible for

segregation in Detroit schools, Roth ruled. By contrast, the Detroit school board and the DFT had
taken an “exemplary” course in beginning to desegregate school teachers through a “balanced staff
concept.”258 The NAACP counsel attributed this last finding to the “legal craftsmanship” of DFT
attorney Ted Sachs, who had filed an influential “one person, one vote” lawsuit a decade before.
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Figure 1: Two exhibits from the spring 1971 Milliken trial show the residence of Detroit’s Black population overlaid
with existing and proposed school boundaries. Red shading shows the confinement of Black residents to an
expanding urban core.

Judge Roth ruled responsibility for segregation was shared and remedies could cross state
subdivisions like municipalities or school districts, which were “simply matters of political
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convenience.”259 Plaintiffs prominently displayed Architect William Lamson’s maps throughout
the 41 day trial, held from April 6 to July 22, 1971.260 After, a defense attorney asked “Who could
look at the map for four months and not realize that Detroit was segregated?”261 To working-class
Detroit resident and attorney Alex Ritchie, the above maps meant “that the middle class in Detroit
has moved to Warren, to Southfield, to Birmingham, to Bloomfield Hills, and the people who are
left are the people who work at Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors.”262 Between 1960 and 1970,
Detroit lost one-quarter of its population and 22.5 percent of its labor force. Ritchie filed a motion
on July 16, 1971 to add 86 school districts in three southeastern Michigan counties as defendants.
Roth did not admit suburban defendants until he evaluated desegregation areas during the spring
of 1972.
All parties to Bradley v. Milliken doubted Detroit schools could be desegregated within
city borders. White working-class Detroiters intervened in the case to first fight desegregation,
then to share the burden; their attorney Alex Ritchie began suggesting cross- or inter- district
busing for integration was necessary during the spring 1971 trial. Historian Michael Savage argues
this was “tactical metropolitanism” but at the time commenters believed Ritchie when he said that
he, like Judge Roth, was persuaded by trial testimony and evidence.263 Roth began hinting at the
possibility of including the suburbs during the summer of 1971. The NAACP waited to bring up
metropolitan busing as late as possible, perhaps in its Richmond, VA rather than Detroit case.
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Plaintiffs’ counsel knew the risks of seeking a metropolitan remedy without including suburban
districts in the trial but thought case law would support seeking relief from the state school board.
Warren, a large suburb of tract housing and industrial plants adjacent to Detroit’s northern
“Eight Mile” border, was an important site of antibusing protest. Of 20,000 minorities employed
in Warren’s defense and auto plants, only five to seven Black families lived where they worked.
Only one Black teacher taught in a school district staffed by 1,300 instructors.264 In 1970, Warren
voters approved a referendum to withdraw the city’s application for a federal housing grant that
required the end of racial steering, intimidation, and violence.265 The mayor of Warren, a former
Detroit teacher and active union member, led the anti-open housing referendum in Michigan’s
third largest city.266 Within a week of Roth’s finding of de jure segregation in the fall of 1971,
Warren petitioners gathered tens of thousands of signatures against busing.267 A Warren realtor
started Save Our Children, which coordinated the absence of thirty percent of students in the
suburb’s schools. The realtor warned The Detroit News and its readers: “I know there will be
violence.”268 “Judge Roth is a child-molester” bumper stickers amplified the rhetoric of child
endangerment.269 At the end of 1971, a John Birch Society member told Warren residents meeting
in a high school auditorium that integration was a communist plot; “Hang ‘Em” the crowd
responded.270 This is the color line that students bused between school districts would cross.
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Suburban workers split from UAW leaders over busing for school integration. Members
angry that their union supported busing their kids “back to all the dangers in Detroit” shared a
common story with future UAW president Doug Fraser: “I lived in Detroit. I came out to the
suburbs for good schools. I paid my taxes…”271 Fraser argued that UAW leaders “didn’t have the
same influence” in the community that they “did in the workplace.”272 Irv Bluestone, by then the
UAW’s lead negotiator for workers at General Motors, pulled out all the stops to persuade a
suburban UAW local to rescind its donation to an antibusing group. Local union officers,
Bluestone thought, were unwilling to risk their re-election by advocating busing to rank-and-file
union members. Even if union reps had been more courageous, they may not have had control of
the shop floor. The UAW had trouble enforcing union contracts much less societal change as
wildcat strikes spread across the midwest.273

Conclusion
By the 1970s, the Detroit labor coalition had broken into too many pieces.

The

constituencies which could have advocated for a progressive income tax to pay for
desegregation—much less integration—were small and fractured along lines other than race;
teachers and Black Detroiters split over right-to-work and remedies for segregation. Without the
active support of the UAW, teachers failed to hold together a coalition large enough to find funding
during not just citywide, but statewide, economic crisis.274 Stymied locally, teachers began a
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national campaign for one-third federal funding during a moment of bipartisan consideration.
Though a joint AFT-NEA Full Funding Committee had been lobbying with the labor movement’s
help for federal aid, during 1970 budget negotiations, Nixon’s veto held up the annual
appropriation until after the school year started.
In this teachers also no longer had the allies they needed in the federal government. For
U.S. Commissioner of Education, Nixon had just nominated Sidney Marland, former
superintendent of wealthy suburban schools in Darien, CT and Winnetka, IL and of the Pittsburgh
district he half-heartedly attempted to desegregate through voluntary magnet schools rather than
mandatory busing. Pittsburgh teachers took credit for driving the anti-union Marland out of the
city when they organized with the AFT and struck for recognition in 1968.275

The Ford

Foundation’s Edward Meade Jr. delicately suggested alternative candidates to McGeorge Bundy,
assuring him that he had respected their “agreement” to share information only when asked by
commission staff.276 With his Ph.D. in educational administration from New York University and
his intervening years spent at the business-backed Institute for Educational Development, Marland
was a departure from the Columbia and Harvard-trained elite educational administrators of the
past decades, and from his immediate predecessor as commissioner, the pro-busing James E. Allen,
Jr.
Watching school finance cases work their way through the courts, members of Nixon’s
Presidential Commission on School Finance had begun studying new sources of education funding
in the spring of 1970. The Commission quickly landed on a value-added tax (VAT), to be raised
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by the federal government and distributed by states to local school districts.277 When the
Commission’s executive director began soliciting advice during the winter of 1971, he personally
wrote to a Ford Foundation vice president but sent a form letter to the AFT president, soliciting
views from “groups such as yours.”278

After Nixon asked the Advisory Committee on

Intergovernmental Relations to study the VAT, the Ford Foundation funded a 1972 conference led
by Stanford’s Michael Kirst.279 Certainly the AFT offered the President’s Commission no money,
and if Selden shared anything, it may have been objections to Nixon’s proposal to convert federal
revenue sharing from need-based to flat grants or his consideration of a wage freeze.280
By then even the NEA, Ford Foundation program officer James Kelly’s bastion of
traditionalists, speculated about the politics required to enact a VAT: “Organized teacher power,
translated into political clout, may be the only viable force which can shift the traditional base of
financing public education and tap new sources of funds.”281 Brought into the federal government,
college professors but not K-12 teachers—including Kelly on the President’s Commission and
leading school finance reform scholar Joel Berke at the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare—had access to political clout, but their choice of allies made it increasingly difficult to
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use.282 The sophisticated sales tax went as far as Nixon advisor John Ehrlichman, who urged the
president not to advance the plan as news of the Watergate scandal broke in the fall of 1972.283
Teachers turned back to the states, where initiatives to fund schools were on the 1972 fall
ballot. As had been true since 1932, the sales tax complicated school finance reform in Michigan
One of the Governor’s budget aides told the League of Women Voters of Michigan that a valueadded tax was “the best that can be devised”; opponents would “be told to accept it or they can go
on with their old property tax.”284 The governor’s campaign argued that a two percent tax on the
value added to goods at every stage of production would impose the same tax burden on businesses
as the property tax had.285 However, the MFT president countered that “(i)n reality, the value
added tax is another way to increase the sales tax on the consumer.”286 When what was left of the
Detroit labor coalition asked Michigan voters to replace the local school property tax with a state
graduated income tax, the campaign for full-state funding was already lost. However, as described
in Ch. 4, Detroit found another way to tax the rich to fund schools—the non-voted city income
tax—until the tax limitation movement outlawed taxes imposed without voter approval.
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Ch. 4 Tax the Rich in Michigan
The steadily escalating fiscal crisis of Detroit schools worsened in early 1973. If the newlyappointed Detroit Education Task Force could not secure aid from the state, sell a bond to
investors, raise new tax revenue, or some combination of the above, the elected Detroit school
board would close schools for the year on March 15, 1973 and lay off 15,000 teachers.1 In a last
effort to avoid this calamity, politicians, bankers, insurers, businessmen, lawyers, administrators,
unionists, and activists gathered under the sculptural ceiling of a modernist conference center at
Detroit’s urban university to debate how to save the city’s public school district.2 Detroit teacher
union president Mary Ellen Riordan, having won substantial influence over the Detroit school
board, spoke up to defeat a motion to remove the board’s ability to levy new taxes. Voting to keep
Detroit students and teachers in their classrooms through the end of the scheduled school year, the
Task Force split into committees to find money and restore confidence.
Even unions and companies locked in acrimonious private sector bargaining cooperated
during initial negotiations over the school finance crisis.3 However, the Task Force put different
factions in the same room and only replicated rather than resolved their differences. Leaders of
the Task Force’s committees represented United Automobile Workers caucuses which had been
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fighting over radicalism and race in the union since the 1940s.4 A vocal minority of homeowners
association leaders and antibusing activists voted no on the Task Force’s school revenue proposal.
The state superintendent warned that any tax imposed without voter approval—a non-voted tax—
could “accelerate black middle class and white flight from Detroit or enrollment in private
schools.”5 The teachers union was intransigent; teachers would strike unless there were new taxes
to secure their continued employment.
Could teachers tax the rich? Not on their own. Liberal women and teachers across the
political spectrum struggled to advance the progressive income tax as the desegregation crisis
escalated. By the time Michigan teachers finally qualified a progressive income tax for the fall
1972 ballot, a federal judge had just ordered metropolitan busing for integration of 780,000
students in the Bradley v. Milliken case, the Detroit Federation of Teachers (DFT) had obtained a
court order against budget cuts, and the Detroit schools had tried and failed two, soon to be three,
times that year to pass a local school property tax. Taxing the rich gained public support even as
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Education re State Board of Education Meeting with Detroit Board of Education, November 20, 1972, November 20,
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northern court cases threatened white racial privilege: between the 1968 and 1972 Michigan
election losses, the progressive income tax picked up eight percentage points in votes. The
progressive income tax’s eventual failure to pass left the schools in crisis, unable to pay their bills
and unable to satisfy the demands of teachers, students, parents, and the public.
This chapter recovers an alternative to fiscal austerity during the age of neoliberalism.6
Years before New York City secured private loans with public budget cuts, bankers and
businessmen were already willing to maintain a smaller welfare state in K-12 schools.7 Typically,
taxation requires voters to approve a specific tax or spending limit that government agencies and
boards raise revenue up to. In Michigan, the state legislature granted the Detroit school board
authority to tax city residents without their assent to prevent a chaotic school district shutdown in
1973. The only resolution to the urban school fiscal crisis when democracy failed was to
circumvent voters. After Detroiters insisted businesses pay too, the school board substituted a
property tax for an income tax until 1979. It took constitutional tax and spending limitation, the
subject of Part III, to end the Detroit school board’s authority to levy non-voted taxes.
Men dealing in back rooms took charge when voters refused to pay for schools with state
funds.8 Legislators, bankers, and supreme court justices only signed off on the state school board’s
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rescue package for the Detroit school district, which had run deficits since 1967, after private
negotiation and public pressure. When the Detroit schools threatened to close months early in the
spring of 1973, the Ford Foundation funded the Detroit Education Task Force to keep them open,
drawing on political science research by Harold Lasswell and his followers in education
administration. I argue the DFT provoked the state’s financial decisions by striking for more than
a month. States were forced to balance municipal budgets when school boards settled union
contracts they could not afford with teachers.9
The dissertation title begins with a policy recommendation—tax the rich—and this chapter
describes why it was so hard to do. Section one describes how Detroit school district deficits grew
when voters and legislators refused to fund desegregating schools. Section two outlines the debate
over and options for a statewide solution. Sections three and four detail the paralysis of the
political process, with a foundation-brokered resolution when teachers unions refused to back
down and courts reluctantly and only partially intervened.

The Conjuncture of Urban School Fiscal Crisis and Metropolitan School Desegregation
Crisis
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School budgets increased even as racist, retired, unemployed, or religious Detroit voters
refused to pay more for public education. At $895.22, Detroit spent more than the state per pupil
average on city students, but less than the next twelve largest in-state school districts.10 AFT
president David Selden wanted to nearly double this amount to $1,600 for every child in the United
States.11 In Michigan, unfunded mandates piled up annual charges. The state supreme court ruled
textbooks must be free ($3 million), the state legislature decentralized the Detroit district into eight
regions ($4 million), and the U.S. District Court approved the school board’s magnet school plan
for voluntary desegregation ($1.5 million).12 The DFT settled a strong contract during the “plague
year” of 1971, demonstrating the union’s power as a bargaining agent despite divisions over race
and agency fees.13 President Nixon’s 1971 wage freeze bought some time to pay out teachers’
previously negotiated cost of living increases.14 However, when the DFT demanded the 1971
contract include the union’s program to halve class sizes, the Detroit school district covered the
added expense of two Neighborhood Education Centers after state and federal funding ended.15 If
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David Selden, “A Proposal to Pay the Bills: Low Cost Education Is No Bargain,” Detroit Teacher, 31 (3),
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the union could enforce contractual class size caps, the district would have to hire additional
teachers. The DFT began filing grievances in the fall to reduce oversize classes.16 All of this
accentuated the urban school fiscal crisis.
The Detroit school board triggered state scrutiny when it passed an illegal deficit budget at
the start of the 1971-1972 school year.17 After several months of meetings and correspondence
during the fall of 1971, the most optimistic “survival” budget the Detroit school board could pass
was short $18,488,217.18 State officials could not afford to be generous with Detroit schools as
unemployment approached double digits. Governor Milliken had vetoed the state legislature’s
1970-1971 budget to force cuts. Legislators heard the message and cut their own 1971-1972 State
School Aid Act, passed after the start of the school year.19 Some legislators shared public
suspicions about Detroit school budget lines like administrators’ and board members’ chauffeured
cars, an expense of $82,452 or 0.03 percent of the 1971-72 budget of nearly $270 million, and

roughly doubled costs. However, AFT president David Selden lamented that the union’s “most prized program, the
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required an audit.20 Determining that teachers’ salaries were not higher than the state average, and
that the district had not inappropriately used its reserves for operations, the state auditor attributed
the Detroit school district’s financial problems to a low local school property tax rather than
“management weaknesses.”21
The newly conservative Detroit school board quickly changed management practices,
reversing course on desegregation and school finance lawsuits in addition to teacher unionism.22
Awaiting district court Judge Stephen J. Roth’s next Bradley v. Milliken desegregation order,
school board members voted to appeal his finding of segregation at their November 9, 1971
meeting. In a heated personnel discussion while the meeting was open to the public, the school
board president targeted the board’s attorney of ten years, George Bushnell, impugning his work
and motivation in what DFT president Riordan judged “(o)ne of the most shocking displays” of
“public disregard for the normal decent behavior taken for granted among elected officials” that
she had “ever witnessed.”23 Bushnell had represented the Detroit school board in Bradley v.
Milliken litigation for the past year, leading to a finding of segregation. Perhaps the new board
objected to Bushnell’s backroom dealing with the NAACP over the scope of desegregation. Less
directly, the Detroit school board decided to end its pioneering property tax lawsuit, scheduled to
reopen on November 19. By replacing the seasoned lawyer with an intern in educational
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administration, the school board effectively fired Miller Canfield, the law firm that had “spent
literally hundreds of hours in the painstaking preparation of the case over a period of more than
three years.”24 As the Detroit school board abandoned its pioneering school finance reform
lawsuit, other plaintiffs filed suit.
Although Governor Milliken did not support moving students across school district lines,
he took charge of a ballot initiative and lawsuit to move dollars. Before Judge Roth’s fall 1971
desegregation order, Governor Milliken launched his own ballot drive to let Michiganders vote for
property tax relief. When Roth ruled that the Detroit schools were segregated, the state was
responsible, and the suburbs could be part of the remedy, Milliken promised to appeal. The
governor did not believe that state officials like himself had “intentionally caused segregation” or
that “busing is the only alternative.”25 The NAACP scrutinized the Michigan governor’s televised
promise to appeal for “the strategy that will be employed against us as we press school
desegregation in the North.”26 Three days after Judge Roth found the state liable for segregation,
the governor and attorney general announced their intent to file suit against the state treasurer and
three suburban Detroit districts in Milliken v. Green to make unequal local school property taxes
unconstitutional.27 A month after Roth’s order, suburban parents waiting to see whether their
school districts would be included in the desegregation area separately sued to increase school
funding but keep the property tax and local control.28 Given his unusually active and personal role
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in suing the state treasurer and petitioning state voters to reduce disparities in local property tax
revenue for schools, the governor’s strategy seemed to be quality education for all. Citing
Milliken, the National Education Association’s general counsel argued that equalized funding
could invalidate the need for desegregation.29
Federal courts, not state governors or local school board members, had the authority to
make school policy in the last days of 1971. As school desegregation litigation moved northward,
the NAACP had been busy pushing new cities from voluntary to mandatory change. NAACP
executive director Roy Wilkins wrote to district court judge Stephen Roth with hopes that his
recent decision in the ongoing Detroit school desegregation case Bradley v. Milliken “may well
come to be seen as momentous in the same way as that rendered in Brown vs Topeka.”30 Likely
given the boldness of the ruling, Wilkins tempered his draft from “will come to be seen as
momentous” to “may well.” Roth responded that he had “long admired (Wilkins) from afar” and
offered a “prayer that in the remainder of (his) participation in the Detroit school case (he would)
be able to see as keenly and stand as firmly as (Wilkins had) on so many occasions.”31 Roth would
need this determination amidst mounting pressure to limit the desegregation remedy to Detroit.
Elected officials unsuccessfully attempted to deter Roth’s impending metropolitan
desegregation order. On March 17, 1972, President Nixon proposed a moratorium on busing
orders while Congress considered how to provide “equal educational opportunity” without
busing.32 Grassroots antibusing groups campaigned to amend the U. S. constitution to ban busing
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for racial integration in schools.33

One of Michigan’s senators introduced an antibusing

amendment to the U. S. Congress, while the other supported busing and survived a recall attempt.34
A constitutional amendment, Nixon told a national television audience, had a “fatal flaw—it (took)
too long.”35 A day after Roth’s March 22nd deadline for briefs on the legality of a metropolitan
busing plan, the U.S. Attorney General filed a motion to defer further action on Bradley v. Milliken
pending the outcome of Nixon’s bill.36 After determining the Detroit-only desegregation plans
would not work, Roth ordered a metropolitan plan on March 28, 1972.37 The district court
considered the busing plans proposed by the State Board of Education, the Detroit school board,
and the NAACP before adopting much of the NAACP plan.38
Southeastern Michigan’s schools were part of one of the largest desegregation areas ever
proposed. When Bradley v. Milliken was first filed, there was no precedent for metropolitan relief;
during the course of the trial, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg County Board of Education set one
in the south. However, unlike in other regions, city and county lines were not coterminous in
southeastern Michigan, a condition in many cities with metropolitan busing plans such as
Indianapolis, IN, Louisville, KY, and Charlotte, NC.39 Where metropolitan busing was tried, it
33
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did not always break down racial divides: schools and busing routes were located along lines of
the existing political economy.40 On June 14, Roth designated a desegregation area and appointed
a panel to determine an attendance policy for “maximum actual desegregation.”41

The

desegregation area covered 780,000 students in fifty-four of the eighty-six school districts in
Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb counties. The school districts were grouped in fifteen clusters
based on a forty-minute travel time.42 Cross- or inter- district busing would begin with younger
students in the new school year in the fall of 1972. Roth’s plan immediately sparked opposition.
The National Action Group coordinated antibusing efforts throughout the southeastern Michigan
region, claiming thirty-four chapters by the fall and seventy-four by the end of 1972.43
The NAACP general counsel wrote to the civil rights organization’s executive director that
Bradley v. Milliken was “the most significant development in school litigation since Brown.” “We
took a Northern city, made a de jure case out of it, proved it and made it stick, and now we have a
Metropolitan order” the general counsel wrote.44 Roth himself looked to Brown II for “the
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authority, nay more, the duty to” require metropolitan busing for integration.45 One of the early
Bradley v. Milliken lawyers who would go on to serve as lead counsel in the Boston busing case,
worried from the start that the U. S. Supreme Court would not countenance two-way, cross-district
busing in the North.46 Still, regionalizing education for integration “was an idea whose time will
come” and the best case to “speed-up the evolutionary process” was Detroit’s.47 During the
metropolitan desegregation crisis, the urban school fiscal crisis accelerated.
Policymakers weighed their options when news leaked that Detroit schools might close on
May 8, 1972 due to lack of funds.48

In a numbered list including “Despair,” the state

superintendent took notes on executive and legislative leaders’ school funding ideas, from a power
equalizing state aid formula to a constitutional amendment to lower property taxes; the governor
asked “what is your advice.”49 The state superintendent refused to answer the Detroit school
board’s question whether terminating teacher contracts was an option. “The implications of this
third question” the state superintendent wrote “are so immense and complicated that no decision
can be offered at this time.”50 Other ideas contributed to the paralysis. Community control
advocates on the state school board asked whether the state school board, financially responsible
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for public school districts, might dissolve Detroit’s central board and run the schools directly
through the regional school boards.51
Waiting and hoping in vain for the state legislature or courts to provide property tax relief,
the Detroit school board reluctantly scheduled and twice rescheduled local school tax elections
during the spring, summer, and fall of 1972 in order to increase revenue.52 After state officials
insisted that local financial support was a precondition for additional state aid, the school board
put two two-year taxes on the ballot—0.005 percent to replace the expiring 1966-1967 levy and a
0.005 percent increase.53 The literature on white flight would suggest that urban property values,
and thus local school taxes, fell as residents increasingly moved to the suburbs during the 1960s.54
However, after a decade of white flight, freeway construction and urban renewal, Detroit’s
adjusted property tax base, or state equalized value, had returned to its 1960 level by 1969.55
Despite a number of failed local school tax elections during the 1960s, the left-labor coalition had
passed a total of 0.015 percent in property taxes between 1965 and 1970. Thus, it was the new
school board’s willingness to tax property that had dropped, not the tax base.
Named after its austerity budget of the past two years, the Detroit school district ran a
“SURVIVAL campaign” for less in local school taxes than advanced by the previous school board.
The local chamber of commerce and advertising agencies donated staff time, while the community
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($1,579.05), New Detroit, Inc. ($61,772), and school employees ($71,770.25) gave money.56
Unions contributed in-kind too, with half of the school district’s collective bargaining
organizations attending weekly SURVIVAL Committee meetings, the UAW distributing 100,000
flyers, and the Metropolitan Detroit AFL-CIO urging passage in its internal publications and letters
to affiliates. The school district’s central administration ran the campaign through recently-created
regional school districts and boards. Despite the SURVIVAL Committee’s characterization of this
decentralization as a campaign strength, regional speakers’ bureaus rarely returned reports on their
speeches, most regions used letter templates from the central office, and election day precincts
reported back vote tallies rather than organized voter turnout.
Despite all this effort, and the absence of “organized opposition,” the Detroit school tax
renewal lost with 49.25 percent of the vote, and the increase lost with 39 percent of the vote.57
During the campaign, Pontiac, MI antibuser Irene McCabe commented to Michigan papers
covering her protest march to Washington, D. C. that “better teachers not more money” would
improve “inner-city schools” if only colleges and universities would “start turning out teachers
and stop turning out radicals and lunatics.”58 Surveys of Detroit taxpayers showed many felt
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decentralization and/or busing were mistakes, property taxes were unfair, leaders were out of touch
or wasteful, the schools were discriminatory or for other peoples’ children, or that “taxes (were)
already too high.”59 A week after the spring SURVIVAL local school taxes failed, the school
board president grudgingly recognized the “need for reform of the financing of public education”
at the state ballot box. The Democratic Party and the Michigan Education Association had put
forward proposals, and in the absence of “non-partisan, legislative support,” the Detroit Board of
Education urged citizens to “support the petition drive of their choice.”60
Two other issues turned out the anti-local school tax vote in mid-May: a state lottery and
the Democratic presidential primary.61 Antibusers opposed local property taxes at every turn and
suggested taxes on state-sanctioned gambling fund schools instead.62 A particularly regressive
consumption tax that also edged out the numbers game in Black communities, the lottery was a
double tax on the poor.63 By contrast, Michigan’s probusing Let’s Make It Work Committee
advocated for full state funding to replace local property taxes.64 A variety of probusing groups
on the left went further: only nationalization of education would equally distribute funds to all
schools.65 A day after he was shot, pro-segregation candidate George Wallace received a higher
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percentage of votes in Michigan than the local school tax did in Detroit.66 Taken by surprise with
Wallace’s win, the League of Women Voters of Michigan sent off memo after memo re-iterating
the national leagues’ commitment to racial integration, and to local plans to peacefully implement
Judge Roth’s next desegregation order, anticipated any day now.67
To receive an advance against next year’s state aid, the Detroit school district had to
balance its budget by the beginning of June.68 The Detroit school board had previously reduced
expenditures on textbooks and instructional materials, capital outlay to the general fund,
operational staff and employees, but with seventy percent of the budget paying for instructional
staff, some portion of the $16 million in cuts that year and the year prior would come from teacher
layoffs.69 A member of the state school board urged the Detroit school board to cut administrators
before teachers but the Detroit board did not follow this recommendation.70 Anticipating 800
tenured teachers would resign or retire, the board fired 1,548 substitute and probationary teachers
effective at the end of the 1971-72 school year.71 Only a year after regional school boards were
created and elected, community members were forced to choose what to cut, rather than what to
spend money on.72 Regions 2, 3, 4, and 7 cut the weekly schedule to four days, while regions 1
and 5 cut the school day in half, and regions 6 and 8 refused to engage.
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Judge Roth’s sweeping metropolitan desegregation order of June 14, 1972 gave the DFT
legal leverage to stop budget cuts. A metropolitan desegregation area with the Detroit district on
a 117 day school year and with fifty-three suburban school districts on a 180 day school year could
not function. Moreover, the Detroit school board expected to start the next school year with around
11.7 percent fewer employees. Roth required the Detroit school board to maintain “schools of
substantially like quality, facilities, extra-curricular activities and staffs” in the coming 1971-1972
school year. The teachers union went to court to stop layoffs. The DFT had petitioned to join the
desegregation case as a defendant to have a say in situations like this, and filed a motion on June
22 to reverse the staff cuts. Roth issued a revised order on June 30 requiring Detroit to maintain
the same educational program as the year prior.73
Unable to cut the school budget, the Detroit school board turned to the state and federal
government for funds. Detroit’s school board president testified before the U.S. House Committee
on Education and Labor, which had held ten days of hearings on the “enormous implication of the
Serrano, and related court decisions” and now contemplated federal aid.74 For the rest of 1972,
the Detroit Board of Education lobbied for a $35 million grant from Congress, a $35 million grant
from Michigan, and an even split of city taxes going forward.75 However, the state legislature
refused to fully fund the “municipal overburden” provision of the statute governing annual school
appropriation bills, to help cities with high local tax rates like Detroit.76 Auditors hired by the state
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legislature found only one other school district challenged like Detroit: neighboring Harper
Woods, where the State Tax Commission had reduced a commercial property assessment upon
appeal.77 Harper Woods, not under court order like Detroit, shortened its school year after voters
defeated a local school tax.78 The Detroit school district superintendent admitted the only solution
left was to “force implementation of the state’s responsibility for financing public education.”79

Labor-Liberal Ballot Proposals to Make K-12 School Finance a State Responsibility
Teachers tried to tax the rich in Michigan during the nine short months when a legal
precedent made local school property taxes unconstitutional and a desegregation court order made
school budget cuts illegal.80 There was no margin for disagreement. In the fall of 1971, the
Michigan Education Association’s president told a meeting of metropolitan Detroit leaders of the
state’s NEA and AFT affiliates that “organizational unity” was required to do “what we do best—
educating—those with whom we do the poorest job—the public.”81 One of five hundred attendees
approvingly noted “We are here talking to each other instead of in lounges talking about each
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other.”82 However, when Michigan’s two teachers organizations considered merger in 1972
disagreement over how to tax rich individuals and wealthy businesses strained their cooperation.
The Michigan Education Association was wary of losing property tax relief by tying it to the
progressive income tax, which Michigan voters had previously rejected. The Michigan Federation
of Teachers worried separate proposals would reduce and not replace school funding.83 In the
spring of 1972, the Michigan League of Women Voters urged legislators to place a referendum on
the ballot to avoid “costly, time consuming, and—we are convinced—unsuccessful petition
campaigns.”84 The Michigan Federation of Teachers, however, thought the Michigan Education
Association’s ballot initiative petition “may have relieved the pressure on the legislature to act.”85
The League of Women Voters of Michigan’s board worried that the signature drives “will
cancel each other out” and the one most likely to fail “would be the one petition we most desire,
the graduated income tax.”86 The state league had supported the progressive state income tax since
1957, and as other taxes became more difficult to collect, lobbied for it all the more insistently.87
By the fall of 1969, the League of Women Voters of Michigan had reached consensus that the state
should have “major responsibility” for school funding with the “major portion” of funding sourced
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from the income tax.88 Eventually, the state league rationalized that although the Michigan
Education Association’s progressive income tax proposal earmarked education funding in the
constitution, a restriction on legislative prerogative leaguers abhorred, the proposal was more
likely to pass with this “financial security blanket for schools.”89 The several-thousand member
League of Women Voters of Michigan offered to collect 100,000 signatures—twenty-two per
leaguer—for the Michigan Education Association’s switch to a progressive income tax, the
league’s tax policy position.
The Michigan Education Association’s 75,000 members easily cleared the state’s signature
threshold and placed separate proposals to cap the property tax and to permit a progressive income
tax.90 Each Michigan Education Association member collected an average of five signatures. The
Michigan Education Association, initially allied with Milliken, split with the governor after the
state legislature rejected the association’s school finance framework. Republicans, who opposed
taxing the rich at higher rates, refused to reverse the state’s constitutional ban on tax rate graduation
(the progressive income tax). Democrats, who worried the flat rate income tax would rise as high
as seven percent if voters capped property taxes without permitting a progressive income tax,
declined to endorse separate proposals.91 The association made speakers, bumper stickers, and
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brochures available to all teachers and citizens who wanted to inform the public of the benefits of
its proposals.92 A voluntary assessment of four dollars per member paid for these materials and
also for volunteers who collected signatures far from home, in addition to newspaper advertising
and television spots.93 The Michigan Education Association had prepared teachers for the funding
fight, telling them school finances were as “important as your job” as the tax revolt spread to
prosperous places like the college town of Ann Arbor.94 The 1972 election was “the long-awaited
showdown:” either Michigan would adopt statewide financing or accept local school taxes for the
“long pull.”95
Through June, the Michigan Federation of Teachers urged each member to collect twenty
signatures toward the federation’s pledge of 50,000 petition signatures for Better Education/Sound
Taxation or BEST. Teachers could not “expect broad public support” unless they were “willing
to lead the action.”96 American Federation of Teachers locals and federations had influenced the
Democratic Party to support one proposal to cap county, township and school taxes at 0.026
percent but allow both immediate and delayed votes for school enrichment funds; provide renter
relief; ban the flat rate income tax; permit the graduated rate income tax; permit up to a 0.026
percent business property tax for education with a portion of revenue earmarked for vocationaltechnical education and compensatory programs; grandfather in a floor of 1969-72 school
expenditures minus the immediate enrichment.97

The complicated constitutional language
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included a detailed table of variable rates that lowered taxes for low-income families and eighty
percent of all state taxpayers.98 The BEST proposal failed to qualify for the ballot.
The success of a ballot initiative was about organizational priorities in addition to the merits
of constitutional language. More voters may have signed the Michigan Education Association’s
rather than the Michigan Federation of Teachers’ ballot measure(s) because voters were more
interested in their property tax cuts than taxing the rich. Perhaps, though, union teachers were too
overwhelmed to persuade voters on their own. The 19,200 of 20,000 Michigan Federation of
Teachers members who lived in metropolitan Detroit were focused on the desegregation case and
urban school fiscal crisis.

Moreover, Detroit teachers’ contract expired in July 1972.99

Consensus-oriented leaguers did not support controversial tax measures, depriving the BEST
proposal of an experienced and respected advocate for education funding in the campaign’s crucial
early days. The League of Women Voters of Michigan had initially supported the Michigan
Federation of Teacher’s and Democrat’s proposal, but as signature gathering drives proliferated,
the League refused to support any of the “competing and ever-changing” initiative petitions.100 By
the fall, DFT president Riordan admitted the Michigan Education Association’s proposals were
“the only way we’ve got.”101
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In the fall, leaguers actively campaigned for the Michigan Education Association’s ballot
measures, beginning with regional kick-off meetings in late September. Members of forty-three
local leagues would “speak to civic groups, distribute fact sheets, appear on radio and TV
programs, and coordinate their efforts” with property tax cap and progressive income tax proposal
supporters.102 However, campaign materials did not always have the intended effect. Voters were
confused by the concept of marginal rates, and a tax schedule distributed during the campaign did
not calculate effective rates for them; some middle-class taxpayers believed they would pay more
under a graduated than flat rate income tax.103 The state league’s sample editorial was clearer: “In
other words,” ability to pay meant “when your income is reduced, so are your taxes.”104 Most
importantly, the Michigan Education Association’s progressive income tax proposal did not
include a rate schedule.105 Thus, voters could not see precisely how their taxes would change.
Alongside the Michigan Education Association, the League of Women Voters of Detroit ran
a coalition of twenty-two organizations, Detroit Citizens for Tax Reform to campaign for the ballot
proposals. From a rented room at the historic Belcrest Apartment Hotel across from Wayne State
University, the Michigan Education Association paid for an office and staffers for the city-wide
campaign.106 However, the assigned Michigan Education Association staffers were male and
unfamiliar with Detroit, and relied on League of Women Voters of Detroit leaders to introduce
them to the region. The Detroit league’s first vice president held meetings with the Detroit school
district school tax point person, a press conference with the NAACP, and debated the ballot
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measures for hours on a popular local radio program.107 Three weeks before the election, the
Detroit league had distributed literature to leaders of block clubs and churches, and had contacted
groups, politicians, and media for endorsements, securing support from the Michigan Federation
of Teachers, Michigan Association of School Administrators, and the Detroit mayor.108 “We
knocked ourselves out down here in Detroit” the local league reported.109 Indicating the weakness
of the Detroit campaign, only fifteen leaguers made follow-up phone calls to 400 block clubs, and
five members wrote letters to the editor in support of the ballot measures. Local leagues listed
“workers” first when asked what tools they had needed and not received.110
Detroit organizers’ attention was divided between these statewide proposals and a local
school tax. The state legislature authorized a special election for Detroit’s replacement 0.005
percent local school tax on November 7. The Detroit Free Press editorialized that “while fraught
with some risks” for the property tax cap and progressive income tax measures on the same fall
ballot it “was the only responsible thing to do.”111 The Detroit school district conducted the fall
local school tax election along similar lines as the spring election and promoted the statewide
school finance reform measures.112

Numerically, victory was perfectly feasible: district

administrators calculated that the local school property tax would pass if each school board
employee delivered ten votes.113

Campaigners appealed to taxpayers by focusing “on the
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positive”—their love of and honest pride in the school system—while dispelling “any phony
rumors or charges,” correcting any deficiencies or problems, and acknowledging teachers’
sacrifices in forgoing cost-of-living adjustments.114 The script was complicated for volunteers and
employees, but their messaging seemed to work: as the election approached, a poll by the
conservative Detroit paper found nearly three in five voters supported state taxes for schools, and
nearly half supported a graduated income tax.115 These numbers flipped a month later when the
actual vote took place.
Michigan voters soundly rejected the Michigan Education Association’s proposals: three
in five voted no on the property tax cap and two in three voted no on the progressive income tax.
Local school boards, which relied on the property tax to fund schools, were the chief antagonists
of the property tax cap. Several local leagues thought that opposition by unions or the perception
of benefits for business contributed to the defeat. Only the League of Women Voters of Detroit
reported working with unions to pass the proposals.116 The UAW, the AFL-CIO, and the
Democratic Party supported the progressive income tax while sharply criticizing the property tax
cap, which if it alone passed, would shift the tax burden to wage earners and consumers.117 The
Detroit Chamber of Commerce, the Michigan Farm Bureau and the Republican Party took the
opposite position.118 The progressive income tax did not pass in any league’s jurisdiction, where
newspapers were the most common objectors.
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The Michigan Education Association and the League of Women Voters of Michigan
disagreed over the impact of Judge Roth’s metropolitan desegregation order on the ballot
measures’ loss. The association cited voter confusion, selfishness, and distrust, to legislative
partisanship and paralysis, and, finally, to “fear of loss of local control, of busing, and of more
taxes.”119 When thirty-three of forty-three local leagues responded to the state league’s survey,
more than half those responding selected the top reasons for defeat as: “it would cost more money”;
“people didn’t understand them”; “it would lead to loss of local control.” Next, local leagues
referenced distrust of the legislature, and fear of granting it more power. Only three leagues listed
voters’ beliefs that the ballot measures “might lead to busing” or that “Detroit would benefit
unfairly.” Leaguers had tried to head off questions about busing during the ballot campaign: a
sample Q & A separated the long-discussed “need for reducing our dependence on the property
tax” from courts’ decision to order and finance busing cross-district. Any metropolitan busing,
the state league admitted, would probably be “paid for by the state through some sort of general
tax levy.”120
Voters likely believed centralized control of school finance would expand rather than limit
the scope of busing. During the summer of 1972, Judge Roth’s Desegregation Panel recommended
that the state school board collect and distribute school tax dollars in the fifty-four desegregation
area districts beginning with the 1973-74 fiscal year.121 A Michigan Tax Control League, Inc.
filed a lawsuit to keep allegedly incomplete property tax cap language off the ballot because voters
might unknowingly vote to bus students around the region or consolidate school districts.122
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Governor Milliken’s lawyer interpreted the suit as “an obvious attempt by antibusing groups to
link the proposal with the Detroit School Case,” Bradley v. Milliken, which if not given publicity
“ought not to hurt the campaign.” This lawyer reiterated the governor’s strategic separation of
busing and funding: “The last thing we need is to have the proposal linked to a busing plan in the
Detroit metropolitan area.” From the “thousands of letters” that were “pouring into (his) office,”
Milliken had known for more than a year that school financing and busing “though separate (were)
being confused.”123
School boards pressured Republican politicians with legal threats after the school finance
ballot proposals lost. That fall, the Detroit school board received legal advice that Judge Roth’s
order made state officials as well as board members responsible for keeping Detroit schools open
for the full 180 day school year. A day before the November 1972 election, the Detroit school
board’s business manager had written the state superintendent to “insist upon an advance payment
of State Aid.”124 When the ballot measures failed, the Detroit school board’s lawyers warned that
state inaction could “be construed as a violation of” Judge Roth’s order and “could bring further
litigation” in the desegregation case.125 After meeting with district leaders, the state superintendent
reported to the governor that “Detroit officials indicated they were prepared to enter Federal Court
to obtain an order directing the state to provide the necessary funds to operate the schools.”126
Perhaps school boards learned from teachers’ intervention in Bradley v. Milliken that the only way
to make education finance policy was through the courts.
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Michigan politics were national politics during the fall 1972 presidential campaign. U.S.
representative William Ford of Detroit’s western suburbs held hearings of the House General
Subcommittee on Education on the National Education Association’s proposal to fund one-third
of school costs with federal funds.127 Ford’s working-class constituents supported funding but not
busing. Ford proposed “to eliminate the need for busing” by providing equal and quality
neighborhood schools during the subcommittee hearing, and also endorsed a constitutional busing
ban.128 President Nixon campaigned for re-election with a similar maneuver: merely investigate
school finance reform while taking extreme measures to stop busing.129 The day Nixon won
resoundingly in November 1972, Bradley v. Milliken district court judge Roth had a heart attack
while visiting his wife in the hospital. Anonymous callers threatened “I hope the bastard dies.”130
The judge’s recovery and metropolitan integration’s legality were temporary: Roth died days
before the U. S. Supreme Court overturned the lower courts in the summer of 1974.
Decision by Task Force During the Urban School Fiscal Crisis
Political paralysis set in after voters rejected Michigan’s fall 1972 school finance ballot
initiatives. The state superintendent refused to support Detroit’s rescue package while the Detroit
mayor refused to sign on to the state’s endorsement of a non-voted local tax.131 Seeking to break
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the impasse, the National Urban Coalition-backed New Detroit, Inc. sought out the Ford
Foundation to create an umbrella organization that could hopefully create a consensus to move
forward.132 At the end of 1972, New Detroit, Inc. approached the Ford Motor Company for an
introduction to the Ford Foundation’s school finance program officer.133 The Ford Foundation
kept a “fund for Michigan” in case of situations like this, and had worked closely with New Detroit,
Inc. co-chair Stanley Winkelman in the past. A Jewish businessman committed to Detroit,
Winkelman owned a chain of women’s clothing stores by the same name and had served on the
school district’s High School Study Commission.134 For two and a half hours on December 14,
1972, Ford’s school finance program officer found himself sitting in the Dearborn offices of a Ford
executive where Winkelman handed him an ambitious proposal: half a million dollars for a
respected, informed “agent” capable of evaluation and communication “in ways that will be heard,
understood, and believed by all.”135
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The Ford Foundation aimed to bring social science to a blue-ribbon commissions that could
build consensus. The Detroit Education Task Force director conceptualized the Task Force as a
“third party,” a “creature” of the school board, but not its “captive.”136 The work of a third party
included “supporting the school system, legitimizing, linking, convening, holding a forum,
exploring, idea generating, data gathering, learning, teaching, questioning, provoking,
communicating, brokering, consulting, proxying.”137 New Detroit, Inc., the city’s self-described
“cynical” education reporter confidentially told the Ford Foundation, “served a useful purpose as
a go-between between the new ‘grass roots’ board of education and the old blue-blood element in
the community.”138 Detroit school board members who came from “modest means” and were
“dedicated but inexperienced” could not govern a broke school district on their own.139 New
York’s school finance commission advised Winkelman to house the Detroit Education Task Force
outside the central district office.140 District staff would support, but not lead. The Task Force (or
commission or committee or panel)’s independence was protected by its “low profile work habits
relative to the community” paired with private funding and review.141
Private funding preserved the Task Force’s independence from the school board that
authorized it and the school district it served while exposing the public to the research movement
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described in Ch. 2 “The Sentinels.” The Ford Foundation granted a third of the total cost, around
$400,000, until the Task Force closed in 1976.142 The other major Task Force donor was the
Citizens Research Council of Michigan, whose in-kind donations of staff time contributed another
third of the budget, with local foundations and businesses making up the remainder. Nominally
non-partisan, the Citizens Research Council (formerly the Detroit Bureau of Governmental
Research) was led at the time by a vice president of the Relm and Earhart Foundations of Ann
Arbor, then busy funding conservative economists and others opposed to government spending.143
The Citizens Research Council of Michigan took a hard line on school finance: the Detroit district
could “control its finances” and not “again slide into a situation that is so traumatic for so many”
with “comprehensive budgeting and the will.”144
The Task Force’s priority was finance, and its power position was a seat on the Finance
Committee. A who’s who of power brokers, the Finance Committee included the presidents of
the city’s leading banks, state legislators, the Detroit mayor, a representative from the governor’s
office, a labor-friendly city councilman, an officer of the Teamsters’ political action committee,
DFT president Mary Ellen Riordan, the UAW vice president Doug Fraser, and the president of
Chrysler, who also happened to be president of New Detroit, Inc., plus the school board appointed
several homeowners activists to the Finance Committee.145 To gain time, the Finance Committee
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recommended a $75 million loan from the state, to be repaid with a $12 million advance from next
school year’s state aid and from the proceeds of a non-voted tax, either on city property or income,
to be approved by the legislature. Writing to a Ford Foundation executive, Winkelman noted that
after “a very interesting debate,” the Education Task Force accepted the Finance Committee’s
recommendation by a vote of 34 to 8, with “homeowner group representatives mainly in
opposition.”146

When the school board accepted the Detroit Education Task Force’s

recommendation days later, none of these homeowner activists also on the central board voted
no.147
The composition of the Task Force, which would vote by majority rule on proposals for
the school board to consider, was contentious. Initially, several homeowners association and
antibusing activists like Carmen Roberts were listed as members with more added later.148 They
would never approach a majority on the fifty-seven-member Task Force. Other women were
present—Polish homeowners, a Chicana activist, a Black nationalist—but for very different
reasons, none was invested in funding the Detroit district as a whole. Ford was “aware of the
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additional state support of the Detroit public school” and warned that it “would not touch any
activity of the Task Force that involved attempts to influence state legislation.”149 More than
influence legislation, the Task Force included several members of the state legislature who wrote
legislation.150 As leaguers, unionists, and Michigan Governor William Milliken knew all too well,
it took more than a few state legislators to pass legislation, however.
The Task Force had to contend with one additional financial complication: governor
Milliken’s lawsuit, Milliken v. Green, to make local school property taxes illegal. While Detroit
and other school districts facing financial shortfalls had in the past borrowed in anticipation of
future state aid, the Milliken v. Green lawsuit jeopardized district revenue, and banks refused to
lend in anticipation of state aid advances.151 If local property taxes were unconstitutional sources
of school funding, the state could not lend against their collection to districts like Detroit. Fearing
that taxpayers would refuse to pay, school boards would not be able to fund bonds, and that the
state could not disburse aid, the attorney general had earlier declined to issue an opinion on
Serrano’s effect on school property taxes.152 After urging the Michigan Supreme Court to rush
the Milliken v. Green trial, the governor amended his lawsuit to request a decision after July 1,
1972, thereby allowing the Detroit school board to borrow to keep schools open for the rest of the
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fiscal year.153 While this maneuvering kept the lights on in the short-term, the thin trial record
threatened the district’s long-term financial stability.154
In the waning days of 1972, the Michigan Supreme Court declared the state’s school
finance system unconstitutional.

Methodically applying fundamental interest and suspect

classification criteria to the equal protection and education clauses of the state constitution, four
of the court’s seven justices found there was no “compelling state interest” in local control based
on wealth classification. The idea that poor districts could equal rich districts’ spending was a
“hoax.”155 As the governor had merely asked for a judgement not an order, the Michigan Supreme
Court directed the legislature to equalize finances amongst districts, perhaps through perfecting
the existing state aid formula or changing school district boundaries.156 The MFT president
observed the opinion threw “the problem back to the legislature with the gun of the Supreme Court
aimed at its head and an invitation to any taxpayer to pull the trigger before the 1973-74 school
taxes are levied.”157
Before taxpayers could sue, legislators renewed talks on “the single most controversial
question” that had dominated their sessions since 1969—school finance reform.158 After the
November property tax cut and graduated income tax ballot initiatives lost, state senator Gilbert
Bursley contacted the governor and state superintendent, who sent their school finance advisors to
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draft a statute.159 As Detroit’s Education Task Force began to meet in the new year, Senator
Bursley held public hearings across the state and introduced legislation that many feared would
hurt big city school districts.160 Bursley championed legal scholars John Coons’ and Stephen
Sugarman’s formula to guarantee local school taxes yielded the same amount of revenue,
regardless of the tax base, rather than Detroit labor leaders’ egalitarian proposal to fund students’
educational needs.161 The Michigan Federation of Teachers determined that the thrust of Bursley’s
proposal was in the “opposite direction” of the federation’s position.162 The League of Women
Voters of Detroit dismissed it as a “carrot and stick approach.”163

The state house of

representatives failed to pass the full-state funding bill the labor movement preferred because the
per pupil increase of $203.72 and total budget increase of nearly $444 million was “unattainable”
in one year.164 The Bursley Act, officially Public Act 101, increased state aid by $121.2 million,
or 10.9 percent when it passed during the summer of 1973.165
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The new state aid formula was too little too late to help Detroit. Days before teachers
scheduled April 1, 1973 layoffs, the DFT paused its strike planning as financiers maneuvered for
state-backed debt for school operations.166 Bonds were easier to issue than taxes were to levy
because Michigan’s 1932 fifteen-mill property tax limitation exempted debt, and school boards
could issue bonds for up to five percent of their district’s adjusted property tax base without a
vote.167
Days after the schools had been scheduled to close on March 15, 1973 the Detroit bankers
on the Task Force met with their peers from the National Bank of Detroit, First Independence Bank
of Detroit, Michigan Bank, Bank of the Commonwealth, City National Bank of Detroit, Detroit
Bank & Trust, and Manufacturers National Bank of Detroit. The Citizens Research Council of
Michigan hosted, a Task Force co-chair attended, and the bankers dictated. The prior fall, after
“much conversation with the local banking institutions,” the school board reported to the state
superintendent that bankers had indicated that “unless we can secure the full faith and credit of the
State of Michigan behind the loan, we will not receive a bid.”168 In the short-term, banks had been
willing to loan the school board money to make payroll but their appetite for larger or longer-term
loans shrank by the spring.169
Bankers again refused to buy city school bonds unless they were backed by the state of
Michigan, for which they were willing to charge one-half to one percent less in interest. The
Citizens Research Council reported the “consensus of the group” that two-tier borrowing with the
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state as borrower and lender could begin without “perfection of a long-term financing program.”170
At the same time, Task Force staff met with bond ratings agencies Moody’s and Standard and
Poor’s. While Detroit’s city and school bonds were rated Baa, the lowest investment grade,
Moody’s threatened to downgrade the products of a school district sale, which could have a
“snowballing” effect on the city and the state.171 Although state bonds were rated Aa by Moody’s
and AAA by Standard and Poor’s, the Task Force reported that “a downgrading of credit ratings
in Detroit could also adversely affect investor confidence” in other state and local bonds.
The first two acts of the 1973 state legislative session permitted debt issuance to address
the fiscal crisis. Public Act 1 allowed high-debt school districts like Detroit to issue bonds at a
maximum interest rate of 6.5 percent while Public Act 2 restricted the rate at which the state
treasurer could borrow to 6 percent. With repayment legalized pending a Michigan State Supreme
Court opinion, the state loaned the Detroit Board of Education $30 million from the treasury and
$30 million from the Department of Education.172 The district paid the state back with 5 percent
interest.173 Before the state superintendent would advance the district money to finish out the
school year, the Detroit Board of Education passed resolutions requesting the state consider twotier borrowing under Public Act 2, and promising to “attempt to bond itself” in the absence of a
such a loan.174 Private banks, backed by a special non-voted tax on Detroit personal and corporate
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income permitted by the legislature, loaned $14 million.175 By the end of the summer, the school
district had repaid the private loan but had to wait until the fall for the court’s ruling to float bonds.

High Politics and Teacher Strikes for a Non-Voted City Income Tax
The school taxes of the most inland district in the American mid-continent are affected by
the interplay of the locality with its wider economic setting; and also with the ebb and flow
of influence among White and Black, European and African, Asian and American, and so
on through the long inventory of civilizations, classes, and interests that figure in the
coalitions of active politics.
Harold D. Lasswell, “Technique of Decision Seminars,” 1960, 222

Political scientist Harold Lasswell brought his technique to the inland school district of
Detroit in the spring of 1973 but could not resolve conflict over race and unionism. By the fall of
1973, UAW members struck Chrysler over a speed up, and DFT members struck the school board
over merit pay.176 Educational administrators and politicians like auto companies had called for
Taylorism “in the same manner that an automotive production machine is checked for pieces per
hour.”177 In Politics: Who Gets What, When, How, Lasswell defined the field of his title as “the
ability to make decisions allocating values to various groups and individuals in a society.”178
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Together, inside and outside politics secured enough revenue to keep the Detroit district solvent
and to raise teachers’ wages by eight percent even as tax resistance spread statewide and inflation
made school money less valuable. Detroit teachers agreed to their first mandatory arbitration
clause: for the length of their contract, a third party, not a strike, would settle disputes.
As perhaps the first enactment of the consensus politics the Detroit Education Task Force
hoped to prefigure, the Task Force recruited staff from Michigan’s college sports rival, The Ohio
State University in March 1973. Describing himself as a “policy scientist” in the Lasswell mold,
educator Vern Cunningham had been influenced by Lasswell since his graduate school days at the
University of Oregon, where his dissertation on school board politics relied on Lasswell’s Power
and Society.179 Teaching in Chicago and later in Columbus, OH, Cunningham saw cities through
the eyes of the poor on brief tours and developed lasting relationships with Black community
leaders.180 As Dean of The Ohio State University School of Education, Cunningham gained a
reputation for engaging antiwar protesters and Black power advocates, defusing tensions that led
to violence at other campuses like nearby Kent State. Cunningham promoted a Black educator to
full professor in response to student demands, and took “lily white students into Cleveland,”
earning the nickname “Red Dean.”181 Approached by Winkelman about the job of Task Force
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Executive Director, Cunningham interviewed by mediating a heated community meeting in
Detroit, and was hired.
Acting as a “social psychiatrist,” Lasswell ran decision seminars combining defense
intellectual Hans Speir’s war games, psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud’s free association (“brainstorming”), and diplomat Paul Reinsch’s role-playing.182 Before decisions, there were predecisions: faculty in Columbus, OH held a “pre-decision seminar” to inform decisions about
Detroit educational finance and other issues.183 Lasswell’s problem-solving technique included
processes to set goals, implement decisions, model social processes, and evaluate institutional
values.184 Listening from the back of a seminar room segmented into eight values—power,
enlightenment, wealth, well-being, skill, affection, respect, rectitude—and hung with microphones
and charts, Lasswell “would just in a few paragraphs lay it all out and things that were muddled
would become clear.”185

While Lasswell played “social psychiatrist,” Task Force director

Cunningham facilitated participation, shuttling between Michigan and Ohio in the university plane
or, with graduate students on board, in an “unhealthy, unsafe old VW wagon.” The Detroit
superintendent visited the Columbus pre-decision seminar and brought back data displays and a
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facilitator to a Detroit decision seminar with “key school administrators” like regional
superintendents.186
Detroit’s was the most successful application of Lasswell’s decision seminar, which
Cunningham ran in a variety of Ohio contexts in addition to the San Francisco and St. Louis school
districts.187 Whereas businessmen in San Francisco micromanaged Cunningham and insisted on
school progress through “hard headed business practice,” in Detroit, businessmen brought the
urgency of missionaries or soldiers “down in the trenches…to save the lives of these kids.”188
Nonetheless, Cunningham observed “social and racial distance” in Detroit, where neighborhood
leaders brought “a little brown bag with a sandwich” to their lunch meetings with “racist business
leaders” at the city’s finest hotel.189 Still, Ford officers believed Detroit Education Task Force
leaders had “an impressive story” to tell and were “pleased to have had some part in your
continuing adventures.”190 However, Ford’s school finance program officer thought other civic
leaders’ attitudes towards a public schools task force would be “Let’em sink in their own mire, we
don’t want to touch them.”191
The Detroit Education Task Force could not resolve conflict over race, unionism, and
accountability. Cunningham reported on “major problems” that were “so involved and apparently
non-solvable” they had been avoided: “One is segregation; the other is collective bargaining and
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its implications for learning.”192 Elsewhere, Cunningham wrote that these issues were “so
emotionally charged” that Task Force members could not even discuss them, let alone propose
solutions.193

Cunningham supported school desegregation throughout his career, and was

appointed special master commissioner in the Columbus desegregation case in 1977, but surely
struggled to persuade Task Force members. The Michigan Federation of Teachers president
observed that the “Detroit desegregation case and accountability had had ‘a paralytic effect’ on
organizations.”194
Union teachers contended with education administrators like Cunningham “for school
system control.”195 Observing the “aggressive” and “powerful” DFT, the bemused Task Force
director reported that “teachers in Detroit take their cues from ‘Mary Ellen’ seemingly even more
than from the superintendent, regional administrators, or principals.”196 Mary Ellen Riordan,
described by everyone who knew her as a “fighter,” was the first female teacher union president
to sign a labor contract. Cunningham attracted Detroit teachers’ ridicule with a job description for
educational leaders from outside education who were a “cross between the first Henry Ford, Plato
and Martin Luther King, Jr.—a manager who gets things done, a thinker to who no intellectual
realm is unattractive, a human being whose involvement with his fellow men is both goal and
reward.”197 The DFT snapped: “get out of the classroom where the work is and the money ain’t.”
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School boards strategically used issues like evaluation and hired paraprofessionals as
employees to hold the line on teachers’ wages.198 The Detroit school district’s labor negotiator
intended to use new evaluation Form 4046 for merit pay.199 Teachers thought merit pay was about
getting them “back under control” and attempted to protect their contractual salary schedule for
satisfactory teachers.200

Detroit’s superintendent, a former DFT member, could not stop

performance evaluations when Black school district administrators and conservative school board
members joined causes.201 After all the teachers’ union had done to keep the district solvent—for
example, postponing contract negotiations and delaying raises—DFT members would not
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compromise on accountability or tolerate another round of layoff notices.202 Teachers’ statewide
education organizations had long urged coordinated bargaining against school boards that colluded
with each other to shift classroom teaching from full-time teachers to “less costly
paraprofessionals.”203 Fired full-time teachers resented competition from casual workers, who
were often Black in cities like Detroit.
Detroit teachers who struck for forty-three days beginning on Labor Day, 1973 defied a
court injunction half that time, and struggled to maintain community support.204 Walking out
together with comrades across the metropolitan region, teachers in more than thirty unions struck,
and in four unions, defied injunctions; Detroit labor militancy was spreading.205 Union members
struggled to be flexible in conversations about race during rigid collective bargaining negotiations:
in a school district adjoining Detroit, Black parents locked teachers in. However, lawsuits to
defend strikes risked restrictive decisions in the appellate court.206 Michigan Federation of
Teachers members would “have to talk to our brothers and sisters, and work, and talk, and work
harder” to resolve the federation’s own position before they could “talk more forcefully with our
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neighbors and legislators.”207 Some Black teachers worried that now that teachers had recognized
unions, there were no “white bad guys in control” to villainize.208
By then, Detroit teachers successfully negotiated with civic leaders as well as district
educational administrators and school board members. AFL-CIO and UAW leaders, the Detroit
mayor, and representatives from New Detroit, Inc. in addition to the Detroit Education Task Force
helped settle Detroit teachers’ contract through private arbitration. Considering this group a “third
party,” Cunningham wrote that its leadership nonetheless “came from private sector labor
professionals.”209 No foundation-funded third party intervened in the 29 other struck school
districts, where wage increases were lower than in Detroit: the DFT settled a contract with more
generous raises (eight percent) than school boards (three percent), the average Michigan
Federation of Teachers-represented district (more than three percent), or cost-of-living increases
(just above six percent) dictated.210
To pay for Detroit teachers’ new contract, the state conditioned emergency loans on
accountability. The Task Force submitted a “plan for a plan” to the state school board that vaguely
“aimed at dissolving controversy about this concept and refocusing it on enlisting the positive
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contributions of all elements in the school community.”211 The state superintendent had steps in
mind, including performance objectives, state testing on those objectives, and reorganization of
educational delivery systems, but first had to conduct a study and report back.212 Task Force
director Cunningham solicited a proposal from a joint university Institute of Labor Relations after
Detroit teachers’ victory over performance evaluation Form 4046. The sly response was suited to
the Task Force model: establish a five-person committee including DFT president Mary Ellen
Riordan and the district’s labor negotiator Aubrey McCutcheon to “make sure there are no school
strikes in Detroit next year.”213 A committee of a sort had helped settle the 1973 strike.
During the fall 1973 teacher strikes, the Detroit Education Task Force urged elected leaders
to speed up the Michigan Supreme Court’s long-awaited ruling on the constitutionality of the
legislature’s spring borrowing bills. A delegation including the state treasurer, the Citizens
Research Council president, the Task Force’s co-chair, and Detroit Public School superintendent
had visited the state superintendent’s office on September 12, eight days after the start of the
strike.214 Cunningham reported that state leaders spent three hours deciding how to approach the
court.215 The state treasurer suggested that the state superintendent and the Citizens Research
Council send him a statement, which the officers could raise at their September 18 meeting with
the governor “in order to focus public attention on this problem.” In a remarkable letter to the
Michigan Supreme Court, the governor and his cabinet gamed out funding timelines based on
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possible rulings, giving the court a deadline to decide by October or early November if one or both
acts were unconstitutional.216 Ten days after sending the letter, Milliken et al. received a court
decision on October 17.217
The Michigan Supreme Court issued its advisory opinion on state debt and non-voted taxes
for schools on the same day that Detroit teachers called off their strike. Six justices in the majority
ruled that the legislature’s “special fund” for repayment of Detroit debt, although it did not extend
the state’s full faith and credit or access to general tax revenues, was unconstitutional. Recognizing
precedents—“The camel having gotten its nose under the tent for revenue bonds, and this having
been extended to users’ privilege tax bonds”—the court nonetheless determined that the people
must vote to remove “limitation on state borrowing.”218 With one justice dissenting, the Supreme
Court upheld the legislature’s provision for non-voted taxes to repay bonds so long as the total
levy was under the 1932 fifteen-mill property tax limitation.
The Task Force went back to private bankers to sell public bonds, arranging what financiers
call a beauty pageant for the Detroit school issuance. Ratings agencies Moody’s and Standard and
Poor’s were invited to a luncheon at a private downtown club with the “power structure of the
business, educational, and financial communities.”219 The presence of the president of the
Chrysler Corporation, the city’s largest employer, was particularly reassuring to investors.220 The
luncheon led to a higher bond rating and a lower interest rate, convincing several insurance
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companies inside and outside Detroit to buy “deficit bonds” and saving taxpayers millions of
dollars in financing costs. The Task Force installed a finance director to prepare and manage the
school district’s budget, which was balanced for the 1972-1973 and 1973-1974 school years per
the state’s emergency relief legislation.221 However, raising revenue, more than spending it, would
continue to be the major problem.
At the end of 1973, Michigan lost its legal precedent against local school property taxes.
The “property-rich” school district defendants in Milliken v. Green had asked the Michigan
Supreme Court to rehear the case.222 With two new members since its last decision, the court voted
four-to-three to review new briefs but declined to hear new oral arguments. The combination of
Bursley’s legislation to partially equalize localities’ school revenue raising ability with the U. S.
Supreme Court’s Rodriquez v. San Antonio Intermediate School District ruling persuaded the
Michigan Supreme Court to vacate its Milliken v. Green ruling.223 The state’s equal protection
clause required sufficient, not equal, funding for an adequate education.
In denying the constitutionality of state assumption of school debt, the court eliminated the
last avenue for full-state funding. There was still hope for labor’s other finance priority: income
taxes. The school board income tax was modeled on the city income tax, which generated more
than three-quarters of its revenue from resident individuals, with the remainder split between nonresident individuals and corporations, which paid the least.224 From 1970 to 1972, Detroit taxed
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utilities at five percent.225 Banks and pensions were exempt from the income tax. While the Board
was authorized to levy a non-voted tax on individual and corporate income, voters demanded to
share costs with property-owning businesses, and replaced the income tax with a 0.007 percent
property tax.226 League Women Voters of Detroit leaders wrote letters to the editors of the Detroit
News and Michigan Chronicle noting that since business “contributes about half of the local
property tax revenue” millage was the “better way to finance schools right now.”227 The school
board imposed a 0.0225 percent property tax from 1974 to 1979.228 The longest school tax
campaign yet yielded less than the district asked for, and only under threat of an income tax.229

Conclusion
In the 1970s, antidemocratic taxing and spending crossed party ideological lines. Voters
rejected routine local school taxes, and their elected legislative representatives failed to
compromise. The administrative state—in local school boards as well as the governor’s office—
issued plan after plan, accepting help from private foundations, researchers, and companies to
convene interested parties. Appointed state and federal judges decided time-sensitive financial
issues based on the influence of bankers and teachers, in addition to statutory and constitutional
interpretation. However, Michigan’s temporary non-voted local school tax provoked a lasting
conservative reaction. Tax limiters had to eliminate public sector unions’ ability to exert political
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pressure when labor refused to bear the burden of the fiscal crisis. In California, where the labor
movement was weaker than in Michigan, and where a sitting governor cut government from
within, new constitutional restrictions on taxing and spending developed more quickly, as Chs. 5
and 6 describe.
Back in Michigan, the Ford Motor Company received requests for funding from a very
different group of concerned citizens than the businessmen who led New Detroit, Inc. and the
Detroit Education Task Force. A Dow Chemical Company lobbyist and his new taxpayers group
approached Henry Ford II for a donation to their campaign to bring California’s 1973 tax limitation
ballot proposal to Michigan. When the progressive income tax next appeared on the Michigan
ballot, even long-time advocates of ability to pay like the League of Women Voters withheld their
support, focused as they were on defeating tax limitation, the subject of Ch. 7.230 The refusal to
fund schools became its own justification for further cuts.231 Describing a tax revolt that became
a “self fulfilling prophecy,” the former Detroit Education Task Force director observed that people
who believed that “the schools are getting worse and worse and worse” because of “desegregation
and efforts at achieving more equity in life” said “I’m not going to put anymore money in those
schools. They’re just going to hell in a hand basket.”232
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Ch. 5 Tax the Rich in California
Governor Ronald Reagan’s reaction to illegal public sector strikes in California during the
1968-1969 school year presaged change for the labor movement. Before President Reagan fired
federal air traffic controllers in 1981, Governor Reagan fired unionized San Jose State professors
supporting ethnic studies and protesting education budget cuts in January 1969.1 K-12 teachers
first struck the same year voters elected Reagan governor in 1966; when the state legislature passed
a collective bargaining bill for teachers in 1973, Reagan vetoed teachers’ rights. As the former
Screen Actors Guild president first told Los Angeles teachers and later air traffic controllers,
Reagan did not believe in public employee unionization because government “cannot shut down
the assembly line.”2 In California’s hostile climate for public employee unionism, teachers had
few options for protest: the Los Angeles school board denied teachers permission to collect petition
signatures during breaks and lunch periods, and a trial court agreed since harmony among public
employees was a state interest.3 There would be little harmony as long as California’s governor
and teachers were at odds.
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California covered little more than one-third of the K-12 spending by the time Governor
Reagan took office.4 The California Teachers Association (CTA) wanted this amount to return to
the half the state had promised; the California Federation of Teachers (CFT) wanted full-state
funding. United only in opposition, teachers split over an unsuccessful 1970 school finance ballot
measure to shift school funding from the local property tax to the state sales tax. Governor Reagan
line item vetoed 7.5 percent of the legislature’s 1971-1972 appropriations to education, welfare
and healthcare for the poor.5 Thus, local property taxpayers would bear a larger share of education
costs. Whereas teacher strikes forestalled teacher evaluations and accountability in Michigan, in
California, the desperate CTA helped Reagan passed a bill to evaluate teachers based on their
ability to improve student test scores and pay them accordingly.6 CFT members believed such
measurement “sought to turn the classroom into assembly lines.”7 Merit pay, according to an
influential education journalist, was a “special reward” for teaching productivity.8
Thus it was a continuity not a break when legal scholars and University of California,
Berkeley professors John Coons and Stephen Sugarman developed a legal theory of equal reward
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for equal effort or “power equalizing” that displaced the “foundation” program of state subsidies
for an adequate or minimum education. Local taxes on property, whether residential, commercial,
industrial, or agricultural, would return the same revenue for the same rate.9 The legal scholars
did not take a position on how the state would raise its share. School finance reform came to be
known for applying new formulas to property rather than finding a replacement tax base. Lawyers
filed the foundational “power equalizing” court case filed in California, Serrano v. Priest. The
California State Supreme court’s August 1971 Serrano ruling that unequal local property taxes
were unconstitutional wealth discrimination effectively undid Governor’s Reagan’s budget veto a
month before and briefly increased education spending without reference to teacher performance.
The Ford Foundation’s network of researchers, litigators, and advocates applied Coons’
and Sugarman’s legal theory and changed the course of school finance reform after the Detroit
school board’s egalitarian vision of full state funding for students’ educational needs failed in the
courts.10 I argue that state aid to education after Serrano secured white suburbanites’ defense of
their borders and wealth because the Ford Foundation’s school finance reform invoked a colorblind
rhetoric of freedom of choice and local control. As historians of the south show, parents’ and
policymakers’ arguments about free choice of neighborhood schools purposefully obscured the
role of race in structuring education and housing.11 In the west, the legal system embraced local
taxpayers’ freedom to choose the level of state school subsidy. Professors Coons and Sugarman
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were indifferent to whether aid went to public school districts or tuition vouchers.12 Like Governor
Reagan and many conservatives, Coons and Sugarman supported vouchers piloted in Alum Rock,
CA: parents could choose which public school their child attended rather than be bound by
neighborhood attendance zones.13 Over time, school choice would include public money for
private and religious schools. School finance is a bridge between the 1960s and 1970s, between
federal power to make social policy and local control to defund it, between labor liberalism and
fiscal libertarianism, between urban and state fiscal crises.
The first section constructs a history of teacher unionism in California to show how
democratic and representative politics failed to resolve the urban school finance crisis that left Los
Angeles schools unable to tax or borrow in 1969. The second section describes the Ford
Foundation’s elaborate school finance reform infrastructure, and contrasts its aims and personnel
with the labor movement’s efforts. The third section presents a close reading of Coons’ and
Sugarman’s Private Wealth and Public Education to show the early connections between school
finance and school choice.

“Rollon Ronnie, the Governor of Cantaffordit”14
California school boards asked voters to approve spending more than constitutionally set
rates during special elections held frequently and unsuccessfully during the 1960s. School leaders
found forty-four ways to bypass maximum limits in the years since Progressive-era limits on high

12
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school taxes and Depression-era limits on elementary school taxes.15 During the 1968-69 school
year, a majority of local school tax and bond elections failed: voters rejected half of tax increases
and two-thirds of bond issues.16 California, like a minority of states, required that two-thirds of
voters approve school bonds. Ongoing litigation argued this requirement violated the U. S.
Supreme Court’s one-person, one-vote jurisprudence. In the short-term, the urban school fiscal
crisis spread: as of April 28, 1969, California could not sell bonds because interest rates exceeded
the state’s five percent usury limit. A large, permanent Los Angeles school tax increase failed that
spring; the last general tax rate increase had been approved in 1957. Los Angeles teachers became
members of a union local affiliated with both the National Education Association and the
American Federation of Teachers (AFT): both teachers’ organizations attempted to raise school
funds.
The CFT offered members access to radical politics during the 1950s and 1960s when
California’s interracial civil rights movement influenced school and housing desegregation
nationally and struggled for community services and labor contracts locally.17 (The CFT also
wrote vanguard newsletters, defended teachers’ political expression in the courts, and attempted
to meet member teachers’ basic needs, negotiating a group health insurance plan through Kaiser.18)
CFT members support the United Farm Workers in their 1965 campaign on California growers,
and heard Oakland assemblymember and civil rights activist Willie Brown’s advice to take power
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in the streets.19 A future U.S. congressman from Los Angeles, Howard Berman, and the labor law
firm Levy, Van Bourg, Geffner, and De Roy represented their “favorite union causes: teachers and
farmworkers” pro bono.20 Weeks into Governor Ronald Reagan’s first term, the CFT joined with
the New Left to lead a ten thousand person march on Reagan and his “19th century attitudes” on
higher education: charging tuition, cutting budgets by ten percent, and interfering politically at the
University of California and state colleges.21
February 11, 1967 march on the state capitol. James
Degnan, “California’s Militant Professors,”
Changing Education, Winter 1967: 34-39, Folder 15,
Box 3, California Federation of Teachers records,
UCLA Library Special Collections, Charles E.
Young Research Library, Los Angeles, CA.
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California teachers slowly organized teacher union majorities with financial and
organizational support from UAW president Walter Reuther.22 Los Angeles’ teachers union took
twenty years to rebuild after the AFT revoked its affiliation over alleged communist ties during
the second red scare alongside locals in New York and Philadelphia. As homemakers in Pasadena
koffee-klatched for Barry Goldwater and working-class homeowners in South Gate attempted to
disaffiliate from the Los Angeles school district, teachers tried unsuccessfully for union
recognition in 1965.23 Backed by the AFL-CIO Industrial Union Department and AFT’s $1
million organizing fund, the CFT first won recognition for East Bay and college campus locals.
The California federation and local unions, like the national AFT, sold bonds to members to raise
additional hundreds of thousands of dollars for new organizing.24 AFT leader David Selden, who
won the union’s first contract in New York in 1962, reminded California teachers that “The clearest
road to collective bargaining has a sign on it which says—STRIKE.”25
The CTA remained a larger and more powerful lobbyist even as the militant CFT grew.
As teachers across the country won union contracts during the 1960s, the CFT reached nearly
15,000 members in 100 locals by 1970, and 25,000 during the 1970s.26 The CFT was particularly
successful organizing college faculty. Marjorie Murphy, whose Blackboard Unions was long the
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only history of teacher unionism, was a member of a California State University union as a
graduate student.27 Nonetheless, CFT historian Fred Glass calls his union the tail wagging the
dog.28

Other educational organizations considered the CFT a “gadfly” that kept the CTA

“honest.”29 The CTA raised $500,000 per year in voluntary contributions from its 120,000
members for politics and helped elect legislators through an Association for Better Citizenship.30
The CTA gave the third largest amount of any interest group to legislators. At the time, the CTA
kept a staff of five lobbyists and a public relations specialist in Sacramento, where the CFT had
one staffer, and the state’s five largest school districts shared a lobbying office.31
It would take three years and three strikes, but when teachers organizations cooperated,
Los Angeles finally got recognized a union. First, teachers elected a pro-union school board with
a community and labor coalition, and money and manpower from both the AFT and the CTA.32
Los Angeles’ 2,200 member Local 1021 began a new card drive at the start of the 1967 school
year to as much as double membership.33 Despite a 10,000 signature petition, the Los Angeles
teachers could not persuade the legislature to consider collective bargaining legislation.34 In Los
Angeles, school board members were no more supportive of teachers’ educational policy priorities
than were state legislators. The “ultra conservative L. A. Times” school board refused to apply for
Elementary and Secondary Education Act Title III funds, as the Detroit school board did, to
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support the AFT’s More Effective Schools program to halve class sizes in Watts, East Los Angeles,
and other neighborhoods.35 The Los Angeles school district would have to contribute to the cost
of More Effective Schools, and with an additional $21 million in revenue available under the tax
limit, the school board could afford the expense. Instead, the Los Angeles school board decided
to fund previously agreed-upon teacher raises with cuts to education programs. Local 1021 voted
10 to 1 to strike for one day, May 31, 1968.36 To each other, teachers cheered: “Hell no, we won’t
stay. To prevent student drop out we’ll take a walk-out.”37 However, the CTA’s lobbyist thought
“violent campus disturbances and teacher agitation” were the last straw for frustrated taxpayers
who saw property taxes but not school achievement rise.38
Members of the CTA affiliate and the teachers union walked out together on September
10, 1969, pushing towards union recognition.39 With nearly half of Los Angeles schools closed,
the sixty percent of teachers striking picketed buildings running on skeleton crews or marched on
the civic center. Hoping to keep teachers out, Local 1021 extended the strike by a day but the
association refused to go one day longer.40 With the support of the AFT president, the nearly
17,000 member association and the 2,000 to 3,000 member union resumed merger talks that had
begun as early as 1965 and founded United Teachers-Los Angeles (UTLA) in February 1970.41
Immediately, UTLA began negotiating with the school board. Told “there is no money available”
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teachers responded: “This is absurd.”42 California was the wealthiest state in the country yet spent
$460 less per pupil than in New York.
Too many teachers did custodial and clerical work; too few taught in the classroom:
California ranked 44th among states in pupil-teacher ratio.43 The previous school year, the district
had cut $23 million from its budget in janitors, extracurriculars, and equipment, but forecast
teachers would be next. Los Angeles class sizes averaged 33.84 students, higher than any other
big city school district, with New York at 20.2 and Detroit at 28.2.44 Union teachers’ goal was an
average of twenty students, with a maximum of twenty-five.45 This meant twice as many teachers
but the CFT hoped not so many more administrators. Previous state aid increases had gone to
administrators’ salaries, not teachers’. The CFT proposed to link funding to pupil-teacher ratios
and teacher salaries in the state aid formula.46
At a March 1970 special election, the first tax override in Los Angeles history, the district
proposed a temporary twenty-seven percent increase in local school property taxes. Los Angelinos
would pay $358 million more for construction and operating expenses for three years. Newspapers
warned that failure “may also assure a strike in the spring by teachers.”47

The acting

superintendent of Los Angeles walked a fine line for the press: he did not hope for a strike, but he
understood teachers felt “they can strengthen our action (in appealing for more state aid) by being
demonstrative.”48 The Los Angeles school district had survived by increasing special taxes for
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healthcare, adult education, vocational education, and special education that did not require voter
approval, nearly $1.73 worth of property taxes over a decade and a half compared with the district’s
new request for $1.31 more in a year. The district could also shorten the school day or year.
Elsewhere in Los Angeles County, districts that lost tax override elections closed schools but
ongoing litigation over racial segregation made this a risky option in LA.49 With a little more than
one-third of eligible voters turning out, the school tax measure lost four to one.50

The

superintendent blamed the winter integration decision and college student protests.51
Los Angeles school leaders appealed to Governor Reagan for emergency aid from the state
that paid only twenty-eight percent of the city’s school costs. In Sacramento, the governor and
senator Al Rodda proposed to distribute funds from wealthy to poor school districts.52 The
governor had long insisted on separating school finance and tax reform. However, Democrats in
the Assembly blocked Reagan’s tax plan to shift the burden from local property to statewide taxes
on sales, income, and business.53 UTLA asked Governor Reagan to support the CTA’s June school
finance balance initiative, and to institute a temporary fifty cent increase in the state sales tax in
the meantime.54 Despite his professed resistance to taxes, Reagan had campaigned for such a sales
tax the year before to fix flooded roads. After Reagan refused the same support to schools in a
meeting with union teachers, the union president declared “The governor’s malicious neglect of
public school children makes a teachers’ strike in Los Angeles almost a dead certainty.”55 When
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the school board offered teachers a five percent raise for the current school year only, UTLA
scheduled an April 13 strike vote.
In April 1970, Los Angeles teachers struck for four and a half weeks for a union contract
and state aid. With 654,000 students and more than 28,000 teachers, the Los Angeles school
district was the country’s second largest, and its teachers’ strike the year’s largest.56 Walking out
on April 14 with sixty percent of teachers, union leaders estimated nearly sixty-five percent of
teachers stayed out the second day, even after .57 Los Angeles Superior Court judge issued a
temporary injunction on the first day of the strike.58 While district administrators put the
proportion lower, everyone agreed a majority of teachers were on strike. Teachers rallied at eight
locations across the sprawling city. The school board’s attorney pledged to ask the court to hold
union leaders in contempt but the acting superintendent shied away from imprisonment. At the
time, AFT president David Selden was serving a sixty day jail sentence for his role in the Newark
teachers strike.59 As the school board postponed a meeting to discuss $41 million in cuts, one
board member publicized administrators high salaries, noting “teachers are the lowest people on
our totem pole.”60 If only the community stayed on teachers’ side long enough for the board to
get to yes, Los Angeles would finally be a union town.
Los Angeles teachers have been asking for the same things for schools for five decades. A
week into the 1970 strike, parents representing community councils at ten percent of the district’s
schools met to endorse many of teachers demands—“smaller class sizes, better reading programs,
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better building maintenance, more nurses, expanded anti-narcotics programs, and increased
teacher salaries” —without choosing the union or school board’s side.61 These parents pledged to
study the CTA’s school finance ballot initiative, but had not yet reached consensus. By week two,
only half of teachers stayed out and many schools re-opened. Nonetheless, spirited picket lines
kept the pressure on. Adapting contemporary folk ballads, labor movement classics like “Which
Side Are You On,” and anthems like Woody Guthrie’s “This Land Is Your Land,” Los Angeles
teachers asked all who would hear to take responsibility for “our school / With its broken windows,
unpainted hallways, / The crowded classrooms, the lack of textbooks, /”62 During the third week
of the strike, forty five percent of students stayed home. Bus drivers and fifteen building trades
unions struck in sympathy.63 By the fourth week, an agreement was in sight.
Teachers’ strike victory was tenuous. After a majority of board members struck a deal
with teachers to end the month-long strike, the district’s labor negotiator and administrators tried
to persuade the school board to scrap the agreement.64 A UCLA labor law professor mediated the
settlement, conditioning a seven percent raise, optical and prescription drug benefits, a no-strike
clause, professional concerns like a say for teachers on textbooks and curriculum in addition to a
grievance procedure and daily prep period, and a ten percent increase in staff and services for poor
schools on new funding.65 Class sizes would be capped at 32, still highest among big cities. As
several hundred UTLA members defected to an anti-strike professional educators group based in
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the San Fernando Valley during the walk out, the union’s de facto role as sole bargaining agent
was not guaranteed.66
Los Angeles teachers decided to forego their seven percent raise to fund remedial programs
for students when they voted to end the strike. Immediately before and after teachers struck, the
Superior Court of Los Angeles County found the school board had de jure segregated students in
the long-running Crawford v. Board of Education case.67 A supporter of racial integration in local
schools, the CFT focused its advocacy on state aid.68 In their own case which quickly went to the
same Los Angeles court, judges negated teachers’ contract because California law did not
recognize public employees’ rights to collectively bargain. Around 5,000 UTLA members turned
in their union cards. Nearly that many members of the Los Angeles CTA affiliate had voted no
on merger just months before.
The Los Angeles school board tied teachers’ strike settlement to the June passage of a
CTA-sponsored ballot initiative to shift social policy away from local property taxes.69
Proposition 8 required the state legislature to appropriate $1.13 billion from “sources other than
property taxes” to fund no less than half of K-community college costs ($585 million) and ninety
66
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percent of community mental health, social security, welfare ($445 million), in addition to a $250
increase in each homeowners’ property tax exemption ($100 million).70 California’s legislative
analyst offered two finance mechanisms: higher state taxes and non-property county taxes,
authorized by the legislature. Either sales taxes or income taxes could double.71 The CTA and the
County Supervisors Association of California suggested the state sales tax could fund this entire
amount.72 The League of Women Voters of California and the CFT objected to sales taxes for
school funding. The detailed proposition also prohibited the state legislature from “reducing local
taxing authority.”73
In southern California, where UTLA set the militan tone, many CTA members preferred
business taxes to sales taxes. In a statement, the UTLA observed: “It is obvious that if the governor
had any intention of helping education instead of pampering oil companies and other corporate
favorites he would have done so in his own tax package.”74 The Southern Section of the CTA
suggested yet more obscure business taxes, or even sin taxes, could make up for property tax cuts.75
One local association urged legislators to “touch the coffers of some of the opponents of
Proposition 8 (California Taxpayers Association, California Farm Bureau, both organizations of
large corporations, not individual, ‘little fellow’ taxpayers) and raise substantial amounts.”76
Indeed, while corporate taxes had only doubled in the last decade, personal income taxes had
quintupled.77
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With the 1970 ballot measure, the CTA hoped to hold the state accountable to a successful
ballot measure for half-state funding that it had passed decades before. The California political
consultancy Whitaker & Baxter, which fought one man, one vote after the U.S. Supreme Court’s
Baker v. Carr decision, ran these and many other CTA school finance campaigns.78 Co-founder
Clem Whitaker argued Proposition 8 was “the first meaningful property tax reform in California
in 35 years.”79 After state voters authorized sales and income taxes to take the tax burden off
property during the Great Depression, government outgrew the new taxes, a process many feared
would be repeated. The last school year the state had funded its fifty percent share of local school
budgets was 1953-1954.80 Although the Assembly passed a law requiring the state meet its
obligation, the legislature did not allocate the money.81
Staged with all the high drama of a California ballot initiative—strange bedfellows,
professional consultants, misleading ads, court intervention—the campaign for the tax measure
cost upwards of one million dollars. The CTA had hoped to raise double this amount from allied
groups and its 175,000 members who donated fifteen dollars, or one day’s pay; regular
membership dues approached $3,000,000 in 1969.82 Despite the proposition’s broad issue base,
more groups lined up against the CTA than with the association. Long-time income tax advocate
the League of Women Voters of California joined long-time income tax foe the California
Taxpayers’ Association in leading the opposition alongside the CFT, Real Estate Association,
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School Boards Association, and State Employees’ Association.83

A vice president of the

California Taxpayers Association chaired Californians Against a Tax Hoax, which distributed a
booklet the Prop 8-supporting Parent-Teacher Association found so misleading its president held
an emergency press conference urging opponents to “repudiate the quoted statements as lies.”84
No advertisement was more contested than a clip of Reagan flip-flopping. The Superior
Court of Los Angeles County issued a temporary restraining order against pro-Prop 8 ads featuring
a Reagan campaign speech for tax reform, but allowed the radio spots to be aired a week before
the vote.85 “I hope we will be able to restore the historic 50-50 ratio” of state to local school
funding, Reagan had told the CTA upon his inauguration as governor. Newspaper ads further
quoted Reagan’s 1967 speech to the CTA: “The state must bear a fair share and larger share of the
school cost. It must bring relief to the property taxpayer in so doing…”86 Whitaker & Baxter
would again use Reagan’s words against him during tax limitation campaigns. In fact, the
governor campaigned against the Proposition 8, bringing up his opposition in speeches and cabinet
discussions, and even asking the state Democratic party for help.87 Reagan feared running for reelection as a Republican who raised taxes, which Proposition 8 would force him to do by July 1.
Los Angeles politicians supported the short-term fix while media worried that the removal
of tax rate limits would let teachers rather than voters set budgets in the long-term. The city’s
mayor and school board backed Proposition 8, as did the county’s board of supervisors. However,
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the Los Angeles Times editorial board advised readers to vote no on Prop 8, claiming the average
property tax savings for a family would be $25 while the average state tax increase would be $200.
The newspaper was “confident that men of reason” in the state legislature and Reagan
administration could assemble a “better package” than the measure offered by the CTA, led by a
woman.88 The Los Angeles-headquartered Property Owners’ Tax Association of California
objected to two of the ballot measure’s provisions to make future state school aid easier: inflation
indexing to rising nominal costs of services and inserting legislative overrides of school tax
ceilings into the state constitution.89 That is, as newspaper editors argued, the constitution would
ban property tax ceilings, allowing school boards to raise local budgets and the state’s
contribution.90
The Los Angeles school board laid off non-tenured teachers in predominantly Black
schools after California voters rejected the 50-50 state-local school finance split by a two-to-one
margin.91 The chairman of the Los Angeles Chapter of Black Educators, Incorporated wrote to
the AFT president for assistance restoring as many jobs as possible.92 An educator but not a union
member, this leader had found an AFT organizer on Los Angeles strike duty “most inspirational
and helpful” and requested him by name. Teachers organizations in California and elsewhere
competed for the loyalty of Black members. While the NEA waited a decade longer than the AFT
to begin expelling segregated affiliates, the NEA elected a Black president in 1968 and recruited
educators marginalized by racism in the labor movement.93 Borrowing rather than taxing, the state
shared $5.6 million to build nine elementary schools in South-Central and East Los Angeles far
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less than the Proposition 8 ballot measure would have provided. After a successful June 1970
referendum, the state legislature could raise the interest rate limit to seven percent on public debt
if bonds went unsold.94
With a recession beginning in California in 1970, and inflation accelerating nationally,
teachers needed raises to maintain purchasing power. As President Nixon imposed wage controls
that fall, the AFT funded lawsuits to preserve teachers’ previously negotiated cost of living
increases. The CFT’s Los Angeles lawyer threatened to seek a court order to force school boards
to follow contract law and maintain existing agreements.95 As more than a dozen teacher
organizations planned strike votes in the fall over wages, benefits, and working conditions, the
UTLA president had threatened a statewide teacher strike if Proposition 8 failed.96 Using its
authority to tax up to a constitutional limit, the Los Angeles school board approved a small 0.28
percent increase in school property taxes.97 Thus, direct democracy, legislative lobbying, and
militant action failed to secure sufficient school funding by the end of 1970. The way was clear
for a legal solution.
Inequality Knowledge
“Before turning to the substance of the issue, it may be worth noting that few who argue that
money ‘makes no difference’ in education have ever tried to run a school without it. Nor
have financially privileged suburban school districts been volunteering to share their
resources with less privileged urban districts, an event that, however unlikely, might lend
behavioral credibility to rhetoric about the uselessness of dollars.”
Ford Foundation program officer James A. Kelly in a 1974 report to the trustees, 24.
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Legal scholars found no clear answer when the reviewed the 1960s social science evidence
on the relationship between school cost and quality, much of it funded by the Ford Foundation.
Arguing there was no time to waste waiting for one, Johns Coons and his co-authors of Private
Wealth and Public Education regarded “the fierce resistance by rich districts to reform as adequate
testimonial to the relevance of money.”98 The Detroit and Los Angeles school boards had begun
relying more and more on the Ford Foundation, whose midcentury modern headquarters were in
Midtown Manhattan but whose endowment came from Detroit area auto plants. After the Detroit
school finance case in 1968, Ford program officers strategized dozens of grants for school finance
research, advocacy, and litigation over the next decade. Civil rights organizations had “not shown
initiative in local and state school finance reform conversations” because they were “pre-occupied
with desegregation questions.” 99
From the start of its school finance grantmaking, Ford funded policy ideas rather than
political action, looking to the courts for top down orders to end the discriminatory use of property
taxes to fund schools. As a foundation, Ford funded different approaches to social problems. Yet,
the ideas behind Ford’s public education grantmaking conflicted: should democracy be based on
voting or participation? should schools be run by the community or experts? should legislatures
volunteer or courts require school finance reform? Although the leadership of the Ford Foundation
and the Ford Motor Company that endowed it diverged over time, the foundation carried forward
a preference for making decisions through private economic choices rather than labor movement
action.
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Founded as a tax dodge in 1936 when estate tax increases threatened the family automobile
company, the Ford Foundation began disbursing national grants in the aftermath of postwar labor
militancy.100 When Edsel and Henry Ford’s estates settled, the stock transfers were conservatively
valued at $451 million in 1951, more than double the value of the next largest endowment of a
foundation (Carnegie) or a university (Harvard).101 A study committee interviewed more than one
thousand people about how to spend this money to fulfill the Foundation’s “general purpose of
advancing human welfare.” While the Ford Motor Company violently fought unionism only a
decade and a half before, the Ford Foundation now sought the “viewpoint of labor.”102
Acknowledging the psychological stresses of mass production, Henry Ford II’s Ford Foundation
searched for “new sources of satisfaction” for individuals beyond the “significance of their daily
work.”103 Trustees approved five areas for action: world peace and a world order of law and
justice, freedom and democracy, economic well-being and improved economic institutions,
expanded educational facilities and methods and greater equality of educational opportunity, and
the human and behavioral sciences. Rather than Henry Ford’s prewar interest in fascism, the
foundation aspired to liberalism.
The Ford Foundation was embedded in the new decision science tested in the defense
industry and applied by civilian executives. Henry Ford II, who brought in U. S. Air Force analysts
to rationalize the Ford Motor Company when he took control in 1945, soon set them loose on the
Ford Foundation. Attorney H. Rowan Gaither, Jr., formerly of the National Resources Defense
Counsel and MIT’s Radiation Laboratory, then chair of the Rand Corporation, chaired Ford’s study
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committee and presided as foundation president from 1953 to 1961.104 As Rand spun off from
Douglas Aircraft in 1948, Henry Ford II had given Gaither an emergency loan that turned into a
grant totaling $1 million.105 When President Eisenhower commissioned a secret report on nuclear
war preparedness in 1957, Gaither assembled a committee which imagined a missile gap, and
recommended the defense spending decisions to close it be made by systems analysts rather than
politicians. Thus, two Gaither reports made the Ford Foundation in a Cold War image.
The Ford Foundation remade managerial science to strengthen the economy. From 1953
to 1964, the Ford Foundation poured $35 million into economics departments and business schools
at universities like Columbia, Chicago, and Stanford that would become centers of school finance
research.106 During the 1950s, the foundation openly backed board member Frank Abram’s
campaign to encourage businessmen’s voluntary donations to colleges and universities and a Fund
for the Advancement of Education that bet on educational television.107 Abrams, the chairman of
Standard Oil of New Jersey, argued that managers had a “social responsibility” to balance claims
of the public with those of stockholders, employees, and customers.108 While the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce emphasized voluntary business assistance to eliminate urban problems like crime,
education, housing, and manpower, many of its ideas about community development and
education modernization converged with the Ford Foundation’s.109
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The Ford Motor Company’s executives and managers knew that politics as well as
education led to business success. Henry Ford II sent thousands of Ford Motor Company
employees to the U. S. Chamber’s “Action Course in Practical Politics” to learn how to bring the
business viewpoint into political life.110 Various managers reported joining, donating to, or
volunteering for a political party after their Chamber coursework.

Quoted in a Chamber

publication, Henry Ford II noted that the company used leaves of absence, rehire provisions, and
recognition to “assist employees in taking on political assignments.” The auto company created a
parallel structure to the autoworkers’ union precinct walkers who built the Democratic party.
Henry Ford II, a member of the Business Group for Latin America, became increasingly involved
in private contracting of international and domestic public policy. During the War on Poverty,
Ford II chaired the National Alliance of Business, which directed federal funds to job training.111
In education and urban policy, Ford’s educational philanthropy emphasized economic
growth and econometric measurement.112 The board included the Harvard Business School dean
and Committee for Economic Development economist Donald K. David and investor Alfred
Cowles, founder of the Cowles Commission for Economic Research that promoted a new
subdiscipline of econometrics during the Great Depression.113 Ideally, economists wanted to
measure the value added by various educational inputs, like teachers, to student test scores. To
model the role of schooling and training in economic production, Theodore Schultz and other
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economists at the University of Chicago promoted the concept of human capital.114 Schultz, a
member of Ford II’s study committee, continued to advise the foundation’s economic programs.115
Evidence on returns to education was mixed but believers in economic growth ranging from
moderate business group the Committee for Economic Development to the National Education
Association invested in human capital.116 Resolution of a related claim, that more money led to
better schools and thus more economic growth, awaited more descriptive data and more advanced
regression methods to separate the effects of potentially causal inputs.
Foundation and federal investments made education research a knowledge industry.
Foundation leaders entered the federal government to develop national education studies and tests
and regional education research labs. The U.S. Office of Education-funded Project TALENT, a
cross-sectional study begun in 1960, promised longitudinal data that could control for individual
variation as its high school student subjects aged, improving upon “cost-quality studies” of
previous decades.117 Authorized by the Cooperative Research Act of 1954, the U.S. Office of
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Education created educational research and development centers to apply, disseminate, and
implement findings.118 As with Elementary and Secondary Education Act Title 1 funds, the labs
authorized under Title IV were distributed to reward congressional supporters.119

U. S.

Commissioner of Education Francis Keppel, the former Carnegie Corporation president and
Harvard Graduate School of Education dean, commissioned Stanford’s Center for Advanced Study
in Behavioral Sciences to write the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), an
achievement test that has been an important source of information on urban school performance
since the late 1960s. Ford had founded Stanford’s center, and Carnegie funded the NAEP test
development.120
As education research proliferated, policymakers disagreed over what it meant. The Civil
Rights Act of 1964 produced the study with the most lasting impact, sociologist James S.
Coleman’s “Equality of Educational Opportunity.” Coleman’s 1966 report was publicized as
evidence of the importance of family and community rather than school for students. When U.S.
Commissioner of Education Harold Howe II and other federal officials were reluctant to explain
the controversial work in progress, U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan encouraged Coleman to

ratio and larger special staff and instructional expenditures per student—increased scores. However, these “costquality studies” did not control for the full range of student differences that could impact the effect of school
finance. See the cost-quality citations in Ch. 4 School Services and Pupil Performance of James W. Guthrie, Robert
T. Stout, Henry M. Levin, and George B. Kelindorfer. Schools and Inequality (Cambridge, MA.: Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, 1971). Ethan L. Hutt, ""Seeing Like a State" in the Postwar Era: The Coleman Report,
Longitudinal Datasets, and the Measurement of Human Capital." History of Education Quarterly 57, no. 4 (01/2017
2017): 615-25.
118
The U.S. Office of Education began planning for R&D centers in 1962. Simon-McWilliams, 2007. USOEFunded Research and Development Centers: An Assessment,” Journal of Research and Development in Education
1:4 (Summer 1968). Lagemann, An Elusive Science.
119
R & D centers established in 1963? Title IV of the 1965 ESEA amended the 1954 Cooperative Research Act. 20
R & D centers and RELs were initially funded, although this number diminished over time. Dershimer, 1976 cited in
Simon-Williams, 2007.
120
Keppel took over as president of the Carnegie Corporation in 1923 from acting president Pritchett, who had
criticized Strayer and Haig for ignoring the quality of education in their focus on funding equalization.
https://www.carnegie.org/about/our-history/past-presidents/. Bott, “Private Foundation Activism.”

302

disseminate his findings in The Public Interest.121 Due to what foundation leaders called “the
Moynihan problem,” referring to the Senator’s purported “reverification” of Coleman’s data about
the limits of school effects, Ford needed to fund another round of education research before it
could reform school finances.122 For half a century, economists have disputed the Coleman
Report’s conclusion that more money did not improve schools in the pages of the Journal of
Human Resources.123
In 1969, the Ford Foundation funded a new causal study by California researchers to
persuade the Michigan government to give more aid to school districts like Detroit’s.124 Aiming
to link school money to educational services to student and career performance, Schools and
Inequality randomly sampled school districts, plus Detroit, and applied inferential techniques to
data published in the 1966 Thomas study for the Michigan state legislature and the national
Coleman report.125 Confirming what many suspected, the study authors found that the poorer the
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school district, the fewer and lower quality the school services.126 Four professors, two already
working on foundation projects, and two affiliated with Stanford University who would become
frequent Ford collaborators, co-authored Schools and Inequality.127 The most prominent among
them, Henry Levin, received a Ph.D in economics and is to this day both a critic of the Coleman
report’s methodology and also an advocate of privatization. The quantitative consultant had
received a Ph.D. at Carnegie-Mellon, a new business school whose reputation Ford grants
established.128
Ford funded the study with a $200,000 grant to the Detroit school board supervised by Dr.
James A. Kelly at the National Urban Coalition. An adjunct professor at Teachers College, Kelly
had researched educational expenditures as a graduate student in Stanford’s School of
Education.129 Years later from his home in suburban Detroit, Kelly recalled that National Urban
Coalition president John W. Gardner had asked his future employer the Ford Foundation for money
to “do a study in Michigan to see if there was a basis for a lawsuit.”130 A preview of school finance
grantmaking to come, the early Michigan study prioritized management and economic expertise
and was administered by a third party. While the Schools and Inequality authors hoped their work
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would set an example of useful research for courts and legislatures, they had to assure Ford its
money would not fund litigation.131
As Ford’s leadership shifted from business executives to public officials, the foundation’s
investments in cities both shaped and were shaped by the War on Poverty’s public-private
approach. With the Great Cities School Improvement Program, the foundation transitioned from
investing in education for national security to education for urban peace.132 This compensatory
education program for large city school districts, piloted in several Detroit schools in 1959 with
the support of the city’s Board of Education and the Ford Foundation, supported those whom it
considered “underprivileged” students inside and outside the classroom.133
As the Great Cities program made its way into federal Model Cities legislation and back to
Detroit and Los Angeles, Ford used the newly established bureaucracy of the Great Society in the
states.134 The U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity’s Office of Legal Services, founded in 1965,
assembled advocacy lawyers who later filed school finance suits in state courts. During the 1960s,
the foundation and its grantees shared programming goals and budgeting technologies with the
Johnson administration’s expansion of government through private contracts.135 After five years
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advising presidents on escalating the Vietnam War, McGeorge Bundy took charge as Ford
Foundation president in 1966.
Under Bundy, Ford grants challenged the social order with programs for political
participation. As Karen Ferguson argues, the Ford Foundation turned from funding desegregation
for assimilation in the 1950s to financially backing the core organizations of the Black power
movement in the 1960s.136 The foundation attempted to change education from the ground up by
giving the community control through local school boards. After the 1968 controversy over the
Ocean Hill-Brownsville Governing Board and the 1969 Tax Reform Act ban on legislative
lobbying by tax-exempt private foundations, Ford backed away from grassroots politics and voter
registration, forcing some grant recipients “underground.”137
Ford focused on public education, recruiting an experienced staff of educators and
administrators while questioning the effectiveness of their past policies. Traditionally Ford had
defined education as higher education but with one of every two or three citizens forecast to be
involved in public education, in the summer of 1968, program officer Edward Meade Jr. pushed
for a separate program.138 Months later, Ford appropriated $4 million for work on education in
big cities, initially New York and Philadelphia, and potentially Minneapolis, San Francisco,
Hartford, Indianapolis, Huntsville, and Detroit.139 After President Nixon promised to fire the U.
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S. Commissioner of Education who oversaw implementation of desegregation orders and also
federal aid, Ford hired Doc Howe as vice president of its Education and Research Division.140 At
the same time, researchers from Syracuse University received Ford funds to show that Elementary
and Secondary Education Act funds were responsive to the power of individual members of
congress rather than students’ needs.141 Nonetheless, disparities in per pupil funding prompted
Ford to plan for school finance reform with a white paper in the fall, and program officer James
Kelly’s arrival the next spring.142
While the foundation’s nearly $30 million in grants was the “driving force” behind school
finance reform, Ford’s public engagement strategy depended on the perception that organizations
acted independently.143 When Meade began convening an annual meeting of foundations to
informally stimulate grantmaking in the field of public education, he was careful to avoid the image
of “big brother” Ford, alternating as host with officials from Danforth and Kettering.144 The
Carnegie Corporation, John Hay Whitney Foundation, Kettering Foundation, and Rockefeller
Foundation contributed funds to school finance reform.145 However, these active foundations were
a small portion of the thirty total attending Meade’s annual meeting. The federal government
followed the foundation’s policy lead. The new National Institute of Education, with no other than
school finance scholar Arthur Wise as assistant director, and the U.S. Office of Education’s School
Finance Task Force contributed too.146
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Hundreds of Ford grantees carried out research, advocacy, and legal work for school
finance equalization.147 Early on, Ford program officer Meade discussed a state aid formula to
increase urban school funding with researchers at Syracuse’s Maxwell School.148 From the
beginning, Ford considered public and private funding mechanisms. In 1970, Ford backed both
the vouchers under study at Stanford and “ability to pay” tuition at the Manhattan Country
School.149 After a 1971 internal grant to “develop and refine program strategy and activities,”
Ford funded research and training by Rand and various university centers and institutes, state
legislatures or citizens committees and commissions, outreach to minorities by the National Urban
Coalition and to the public by the League of Women Voters.150 The two city-specific grants went
to New Detroit, Inc. and the Los Angeles Board of Education. With the Council of Great City
Schools, the Los Angeles school board developed a “school finance information system.” Ford
was also interested in a system of standardized testing, establishing a Center for Statewide
Educational Assessment at the Educational Testing Service.151 Alongside a sprawling Child and
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Government program at the University of California, Berkeley, Ford’s largest grant went to the
Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law.
The foundation pursued two school finance strategies: supporting groups reforming
discriminatory school finance and building “intellectual strength.”152 While Kelly had supervised
educational researchers while at the National Urban Coalition, at Ford, Kelly intentionally situated
school finance reform outside schools of education, full of scholars he called “traditionalists”
publicly and “soft, under-trained, and quite ignorant” privately.153 Housed in education, law, and
public policy schools, Ford funded graduate programs to train school finance reformers, including
women and racial minorities, at the University of Chicago, the University of California, Berkeley,
Columbia University, Stanford University, Syracuse University, and Rutgers University.154 The
Ford Foundation, Kelly insisted, had the “good sense and the institutional modesty not to tell” the
“first-rate minds from laws, political science, and economics” its grants funded “what to think.”155
As long as researchers shared the goal of “equitable” school finance, Ford’s epistemological
preference was to be “scrupulously neutral” among their proposals.156 Frequently, staffers noted
the breadth of grantees’ ideologies and politics.157
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While Ford program officer Jim Kelly believed that he had funded a network not a
movement, the reformers described their work with the zeal of movement organizers. Kelly took
pride in his selection of school finance scholars: they had “taken over the field…because they were
smarter and better educated and…could make the case better with governors and state
legislators…and…could be better expert witnesses with better research when these cases…went
to trial.”158 A Stanford undergraduate who became a school finance lobbyist for the League of
Women Voters, one of Ford’s grantees, titled her Teacher College dissertation “Private Foundation
Activism in the Early School Finance Equalization Movement.” In the “highly-charged but often
contentious intellectual environment” of school finance reform, this lobbyist observed, scholars
traveled, researched, strategized, and advocated to the point of fatigue.159
The reformers had backgrounds more like Ford’s school finance program officer: a short
career as a teacher and administrator, international public service, doctoral education at Stanford,
and policy experience.160 Kelly, who received his B.A. from Shimer College during its affiliation
with the University of Chicago, stayed on for a master’s degree from 1954 to 1956. After an
undergraduate great books curriculum, Kelly studied history and education but given his lifelong
admiration for economics, surely familiarized himself with Theodore Schultz’s human capital
theory and Milton Friedman’s education voucher proposal while in Hyde Park. Kelly credited
Schultz with launching the economics of education field in the late 1950s.161 Later, Kelly put

158

Quoted in Bott, "Private Foundation Activism,” 199.
Some burned out scholars left the field. Joel S. Berke died young. Bott, “Private Foundation Activism,” 295.
160
Upon graduation from the University of Chicago in 1956, Kelly was a teacher then administrator in Ladue,
Missouri before working for two years in Pakistan on assignment from Indiana University’s School of Education
and then starting his Stanford PhD in 1963. After receiving his doctorate in 1966, Kelly worked for the National
Urban Coalition from 1968 to 1969, concurrently served on the project board of the National Educational Finance
Project from 1968 to 1971, and began an adjunct professorship at Teachers College in 1970. FA 743, Series 2, Box
6, Folder Staff Bios K, RAC.
161
Schultz also worked in school finance, developing a method to calculate imputed value of depreciation and
interest for public school construction. Kelly, Confidential…Reforming the Economics of Public Education. James
159

310

Becker’s book Human Capital on a school finance conference reading list, and had Schultz himself
facilitate a panel on education and income.162 After courts dismissed Wise’s theory of educational
need, Ford turned to the discipline of economics already central to its grantmaking.

The Bible of School Finance Reform, or School Choice?
Considering whether to publish the “bible” of school finance reform, Harvard University
Press predicted the manuscript Private Wealth and Public Education would “play a major role” in
the U. S. Supreme Court’s deliberations on the constitutionality of unequal property taxes due to
its “intrinsic merits” and “the fact that there is little else out.”163 John Coons, William Clune III,
and Stephen Sugarman presumptively dedicated their book to “nine old friends of the children.”
The legal scholars dismissed what else was out there in the “spawning” literature on school finance
reform as “utopian reforms” or “utter immobility.”164 As Coons wrote to a professor and funder
at Yale Law School, he had “been active in the effort to restructure the litigation that started so
badly in Detroit and Chicago.”165 Indeed, pre-publication copies of Private Wealth and Public
Education and other work by Sugarman circulated among Detroit lawyers.166
The legal scholars John Coons, William Clune III, and Stephen Sugarman singled out
California and Illinois as “the most promising places to start,” coyly assuming that “litigation was
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planned for such a state.”167 These happened to be the two states where Coons and Sugarman
taught. Coons had first learned of education spending disparities when he wrote a report for the
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights about racial discrimination in Chicago schools.168 Professor
Coons and his students Clune III and Sugarman, who met at Northwestern on the North Shore of
Chicago, objected to their South Side colleague Arthur Wise’s equal protection approach under
the fourteenth amendment to the U.S. constitution because state constitutional provisions for
education did not create “federally enforceable rights.”169 As they sought foundation grants from
Ford and others, and secured professorships at the University of California, Berkeley, Coons and
Sugarman proposed a new legal standard for school finance equalization. In contrast to the earliest
school finance suits to meet the educational needs of minority students in Detroit and other cities,
the new cases modeled on Serrano v. Priest advanced a needblind and colorblind principle of
rewarding local tax effort.
In August 1971, the California State Supreme Court’s Serrano opinion that local school
property taxes were unconstitutional wealth discrimination threatened to upend school finance
across the country. The Western Center for Law and Poverty located in the Watts neighborhood
of Los Angeles and directed by former NAACP counsel and future legal scholar Derrick Bell had
adopted the NAACP’s approach to advocacy lawyering: Bell found plaintiff John Serrano, who
had moved his sons to a middle-class suburb of Los Angeles for better schools, and filed suit in
August 1968.170 After Illinois and California district courts dismissed the Detroit school finance
case’s “educational need” standard as “nebulous” and “vague,” the Western Center for Law and
Poverty brought in University of California, Berkeley law professors John Coons and Stephen
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Sugarman to refile on new grounds.171 Beginning with California, dozens of courts adopted the
legal scholars’ formula for distributing state subsidies to school districts based on local taxing
effort—“District Power Equalizing”—as a legal standard during the 1970s.172
Coons, Clune, and Sugarman began Private Wealth and Public Education with a “simple
formula with modest aspiration” that they termed Proposition 1: “The quality of public education
may not be a function of wealth other than the wealth of the state as a whole.”173 Recent state aid
formulas by economists and educators improved on the traditional foundation program, which
allowed low minimum per pupil spending. However, if local property wealth varied depending on
whether a school district included industrial plants or residential homes or family farms, then equal
tax rates produced unequal revenue in different places. The legal scholars wanted to give school
districts equal power to fund school budgets through variable state subsidies. Coons and his coauthors called this legal standard that the same local tax rate should return the same tax revenue,
from combined local and state sources, “fiscal neutrality.” Despite their glib commentary on the
literature of educational administration, what the lawyers proposed was an old idea of
“demonstrated interest,” first formulated at the behest of New York agricultural groups in 1922 to
standardize the amount of state aid school districts received for a given tax effort.174
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Private Wealth and Public Education proposed two state aid formulas: “District Power
Equalizing,” cited by amicus curiae briefs in court cases like Serrano, and “Family Power
Equalizing” for educational allowances to individual students. The former proposed to allocate
state aid to public school districts based on the effort they made to raise taxes locally. The latter
proposed to grant parents a voucher to enroll their child in any public or private school of their
choice. Thus, the lawyers who provoked the most significant change in education spending in half
a century also advocated Milton Friedman’s libertarian ideas. In 1978, Coons and Sugarman
published Education by Choice: The Case for Family Control with a foreword by sociologist
James S. Coleman advocating school tuition vouchers.175 Coleman, the previous decade’s most
famous skeptic that more money for schools could make a difference for students, wrote essentially
the same foreword for Private Wealth and Public Education in 1970.176
Ford’s school finance program officer James Kelly later admitted that he did not know
whether legal theorists Coons and Sugarman used their Ford grants to work on school finance or
school vouchers—Ford had invested in independent scholarly minds and intellectual
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community.177 Internally, however, Kelly described a 1970 grant to Stanford University as
“Support for an analysis of the economics of educational voucher plans.”178 Vouchers were a
controversial experiment in education economics. Harvard Center for the Study of Public Policy
executive director Christopher Jencks, whose influence Ford hoped to counter, wrote a voucher
plan that President Nixon’s Office of Economic Opportunity experimented with in Alum Rock,
CA.179 A scholar Ford backed for the better part of a decade contributed too. Bragging to another
funder, Coons wrote that his 1969 statute, renamed the Family Choice in Education Act, “had
significant (though, in my view, insufficient) influence on the later proposals supported by the
O.E.O.”180
Earlier than scholars realize, Coons completed his self-described journey from
“desegregation through integration, through fiscal discrimination, and into planning for radical
restructuring of urban education through vouchers.”181 At the end of 1968 as he sought funding to
turn his idea of “Family Power Equalizing” into an article “and perhaps a model statute,” Coons
proposed to spend a summer reading literature on decentralization, subsidiarity, and “the mutually
competing literatures of Friedman and Keynesian schools on the role of government in
education.”182 As the Taconic Foundation noted while reviewing another grant proposal a few
months later: “If time permits he would also work out a similar model for equalizing fiscal power
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among school districts as compared to equalizing among parents.”183 Thus, Coons, Clune, and
Sugarman constructed the idea of “fiscal neutrality” from their reading of the economics of
education and the philosophy of subsidiarity, by which they meant choice and control.
In addition to vouchers, economic ideas like free enterprise and competition supported the
legal scholars’ analysis of school finance. In a philosophical mode, they recognized the potential
contradiction between values of equality, opportunity, individualism, mobility, preparedness, and
subsidiarity. Taken to opening chapters with quotations from literary men, and footnoting Plato
and Aristotle alongside American pedagogues Horace Mann and John Dewey, the legal scholars
staked their expertise on their erudition. However, unlike Dewey who theorized the role of public
schools in American democracy, Coons, Clune, and Sugarman thought public schools were
“charged” with the realization of “American free-enterprise democracy.”184 In a willful narrowing
of American education history to economics, the authors insisted public schools were “designed
to permit the poor to compete.”185
Citing Milton Friedman, Friedrich Hayek, and James Buchanan, the legal scholars left local
school districts free to choose their own tax rate while making no commitment to a minimum, or
foundation program. In the complicated equation of fiscal federalism, parent-voters had to
optimize their tax burden and benefits subject to the constraints of federal aid, moving costs, and
private school tuition. When a Yale Law School seminar on Public Schools reviewed Coons’ draft
in the fall of 1969, students were skeptical that a system permitting extra payments like federal
grants could truly level competition for local funds. In arguing that school funding should not be
tied to the geography of property wealth, Arthur Wise had implicitly rejected the economic
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doctrine of Tiebout sorting whereby parental consumers choose their tax rate by voting (or
moving) with their feet.186 Coons, Clune, and Sugarman’s “District Power Equalizing” formula
would stop this sorting by providing only enough equalization to prevent wealthy families from
enrolling students in private schools.187
While U.S. Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell surely appreciated the economic
references, and indeed his law clerk urged him to read Private Wealth and Public Education, no
argument was likely to persuade the former Richmond, Virginia lawyer and school board member
that finance equalization was compatible with local control.188 In internal court deliberations,
Powell attributed the idea that wealth was a suspect classification to “communist doctrine.”189
Arguing that “rich v. poor” and “business v. people” was the “cheapest and most dangerous kind
of politics,” Powell had advised the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Education Committee on
protecting the American free enterprise system in a 1971 memo written two months before
President Nixon nominated him as a justice.190 Observing the activity of the American Civil
Liberties Union, labor unions, civil rights groups, and public interest law firms in the courts prior
to his appointment to the bench, Powell suggested to the Chamber that an “activist-minded
Supreme Court” could make the judiciary “the most important instrument for social, economic and
political change.” In a sign of the divergence between the company and the foundation after the
Powell memo, Ford Motor Company’s personnel director joined various iterations of the
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Chamber’s Education Committee focused on job training.191 Throughout its surveys, forums, and
meetings in the 1960s and 1970s, the Chamber identified school finance as an issue but never
proposed solutions except cost savings.192
On March 21, 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a five-to-four ruling that education was
not a fundamental right, with Powell’s majority opinion establishing the constitutionality of local
school property taxes. In their Rodriguez amicus brief, the state attorneys general who defended
against “educational need” lawsuits filed in 1968 cited Wise as the inspiration for school finance
reform.193 Grudgingly, Texas attorney Arthur Gochman appended some of Coons, Clune, and
Sugarman’s arguments to the Rodriguez case he initially filed without Ford Foundation support.194
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Thus, we can understand the Rodriguez decision not as a flaw in research, coordination, or
preparation but as a feature of poverty law remade uneasily for the neoliberal order.195
Between Serrano and Rodriguez, school finance reform included another vision of
equality: metropolitanization. The classic American success story of metropolitan governance has
its origins in school finance reform. During a special session in the fall of 1971, the Minnesota
state legislature created a metropolitan tax base around Minneapolis and St. Paul and passed a
series of bills to increase the state school funding share to seventy percent, lower property taxes,
and raise sales and income taxes.196 Kelly observed these reforms were “exactly what was hoped
for by the framers of the Serrano legal argument.” Coons had done more than hope. Minnesota
legislators acted in anticipation of a ruling in Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, a school finance case
initiated by a district judge who persuaded an activist lawyer to file and Coons to join.197 To school
finance amici like the National Education Association, metropolitan desegregation lawsuits were
another option to equalize finances across municipal lines.198
While Kelly insisted that “School-finance reform is, quintessentially, tax reform,” the
foundation and its grantees refused to take a position on who should pay school taxes.199 Coons,
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Clune, and Sugarman’s rationale was legal reasonableness and economic efficiency rather than tax
justice, and although they favored income over property as a measure of wealth and progressive
over regressive state taxes for equalization, the legal scholars made no firm recommendation about
whether the tax base should be property, income, or sales. Ford vice president Howe II told the
trustees that staff had “no formula it is trying to sell to states and localities for the reform of taxation
and the distribution of tax funds to schools.”200
Within months of the highest court’s Rodriguez v. San Antonio Intermediate School
District ruling unequal local property taxes constitutional, the Ford Foundation school finance
reform network established a new state court precedent for redistribution. By then, public interest
law firms had brought approximately fifty-two suits in thirty-one states, primarily on fourteenth
amendment grounds.201 Two weeks after the Rodriguez opinion, the New Jersey Supreme Court
decided that the state constitution required a “thorough and efficient” education, and ordered
funding equalization in Robinson v. Cahill. The Ford Foundation’s school finance network
mobilized quickly. During a spring 1973 conference after the Rodriguez and Robinson rulings,
economists Henry Levin and Charles Benson in addition to legal scholars John Coons and Stephen
Sugarman spoke alongside local lawyers involved in the Michigan and New Jersey cases.202 By
November 1973, school finance cases had moved to state courts in approximately forty-five states.
As they watched court filings pile up, thirty governors pre-emptively asked for tax reform and
twenty-one for school finance reform during 1973 state legislative sessions. In the decade after
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Ford hired Kelly, even as student enrollment declined, total education expenditures increased by
24.6 percent, adjusted for inflation. While local funding for public schools slightly declined over
this period, state funding increased by nearly half.203
While lawsuits reduced inequality in school funding, urban school district budgets never
equaled those of the wealthiest suburban school districts. In the decades since, state courts have
settled dozens of school finance cases on the legal grounds of adequacy, rather than need or even
equality.204

Reforms in both court houses and state houses failed to equalize educational

opportunity in school houses. Struggling to define adequate funding, advocates lowered their
standards to literacy. In April 2020, a federal court handed down a decision in another Detroit
case, Gary B. v. Snyder, establishing a right to literacy and beginning anew negotiation for state
funds.

Conclusion
Ford found it easier to work with union critics than union teachers. While the foundation
funded week-long institutes on public policy in 1971 and 1972 for “teacher organization leaders,”
the AFT received no direct grants.205 When the AFT sued Newark, NJ journalist Robert Braun
and the publisher of his book Teachers and Power: The Story of the American Federation of
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Teachers for libel, Ford’s president McGeorge Bundy took an interest.206 Ford suspected the
publisher had been “frightened into passiveness and neglect,” and lamented that Braun’s expose
of unionized teachers as “special interests” and “enemies” would be advertised only to colleges
but not to school boards or legislators.207 A teacher reviewer described it as a well-written and
mostly accurate history of the AFT that read like a “gossip session.”208 However, the author was
“an objectively unfriendly critic of the AFT, which he seems to think of as an organization
comprised of a few rascally national reps.” Braun’s account of regimented strategy and routinized
bargaining could not account for generations of female teacher leaders who did their own
organizing and asked for solidarity from the labor movement.
Analyzing the societal forces that led to school finance reform for the many public
audiences who wanted to hear about Ford’s success, Kelly listed legal, political, geographic, and
demographic explanations alongside events like Sputnik and reports like Conant’s.

In a

confidential memo to the Ford trustees, he added “developing teacher militancy with its
concomitant salary hikes and cost inflation put additional strains on the financial picture of the
public schools.”209 Nonetheless, Kelly defended raises because teachers would be more likely to
work in disadvantaged districts. As the previous chapters show, unionized teachers were the
fiercest campaigners for the ballot initiatives in California and Michigan and elsewhere that Kelly
judged “major overhauls, one of those rare moments in U. S. state political history when structural
revisions have become possible.”210
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Much less than doubling funding to halve class sizes in the signature AFT More Effective
Schools program, the NEA agreed to test performance contracting with Nixon’s Office of
Economic Opportunity.211 Performance contracting, a Department of Defense technology to pay
private contractors based on results, arrived in education in the late 1960s.212 An early study of a
dozen such contracts found that military contractors and electronics manufacturers like Dorsett
Educational Systems, Westinghouse, Thioko, RCA, and GE spent only 55 percent of their budgets
on teachers’ salaries while school districts spent 70 to 75 percent. The AFT published a book of
scathing cartoons critiquing the practice.

As on performance accountability, teachers’

organizations split on accountability, which an AFT local called a “synonym for new big-business
schemes.”213
Despite their differences, teachers tired of spending dues and time on dual representation
in Michigan and many other states. Jailed for months after the 1970 Newark teachers strike, Selden
had come to believe that local strikes and collective bargaining were no longer effective as school
boards adapted and teachers’ militancy naturally declined. For years, Selden proposed that
teachers’ two organizations—the AFT and the NEA combine their power bases.214 With a
“splinter group” of NEA teachers, DFT president Riordan pushed for merger.215 At its 1973 annual
meeting, the NEA formally initiated talks with the AFT. However, Riordan observed: “the NEA
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top leadership was terrified of Al Shanker…They were literally afraid of him.”216 New York’s
United Federation of Teachers president Shanker’s ascendance within the AFT and AFL-CIO
leadership threatened the merger.217 In 1974, David Selden stepped aside for Shanker, whose
public profile grew when he lent New York City money from the United Federation of Teachers’
pension fund to avert bankruptcy.218
A divided teacher union movement could win only as long as conservative and business
attempts to slow government growth were weak. After the merger collapsed, the NEA, AFSCME
and others formed a rival political organization to the AFL-CIO’s Committee on Political
Education, the Coalition of American Public Employees. Thus, teacher organizations’ response
to tax revolt would remain separate for most of the 1970s. When inflation surged and tax limiters
learned, more was required of teachers and their allies. However, organizations like the Ford
Foundation did less. Far from the full state funding within sight of so many in 1972, a Ford-funded
study recommended a 50-50 state-local funding split just a few years later.219 The foundation’s
own grantmaking was shrinking. The foundation planned to halve its budget as price level
increases and stock market declines decreased the nominal and real value of endowments like
Ford’s.220
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Ch. 5 “Don’t Spend It Faster Than I Can Make It:” 1 Elite Conservative Politics and the
1970s Tax Revolt
Governor Ronald Reagan, who tried and failed to “cut, squeeze, and trim” government
programs in California, traded the political costs of the line item veto for the economic logic of tax
limitation. When Reagan crossed out legislative appropriations for healthcare, legal aid lawyers
successfully sued to restore benefits to the poor.2 The governor also targeted state subsidies for
welfare and education, which labor-liberals had unsuccessfully attempted to increase by ballot
initiative, as described in Ch. 5 “Tax the Rich in California.” Since politicians struggled to control
such concentrated benefits with diffuse costs, public choice economists argued interest groups
should have to compete for their share of a fixed amount. Constitutional tax limitation tied
legislators’ purse strings, allowing the state budget to increase by the growth rate in personal
income, less a factor meant to ratchet down the real level of government spending to seven percent
in fifteen years. Tax limitation was about reducing the overall size of government by slowing its
growth.
Written by economists and lawyers, strategized by a sitting governor, California’s 1973 tax
limitation ballot measure was elite conservative politics. For the last five decades, the driving
force behind tax limitation at the state and national level has been Lew Uhler, a California attorney
and developer who campaigns to this day, and whose story I tell through research in new sources.3
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When I first visited Uhler, he invited me to join a conference call with then-U.S. House speaker
Paul Ryan about redistricting the Wisconsin state legislature. I declined, saying that while we
might disagree about politics in the present, we could agree on the importance of Uhler’s work in
the past. This chapter is the first political history of the 1970s constitutional tax limitation
movement. Students of James Buchanan wrote California’s Proposition 1, the first tax limitation
ballot measure of the 1970s.4 Milton Friedman was the constitutional amendment’s most famous
publicist. Like Reagan, these Nobel prize-winning economists had personal experience of the
bureaucracy, having worked for the federal government and defense industry, and they also wanted
someone else to shrink it.
When it came to a defining accomplishment of his presidency—tax cuts—Reagan relied
on a brain trust of free market economists trained in tax limits. As conservatives failed and learned,
defeat turned into victory. Business conservatives never stopped fighting Keynesian ideas about
the stimulative effects of government policies like deficit spending or reducing high tax rates on
the rich during downturns. State tax limitation campaigns kept free market economic ideas in
circulation. When Keynesian economics collapsed during the simultaneous unemployment and
inflation crisis of the 1970s, an alternative economics of low taxes and balanced budgets was
available. By bringing state government into political history, I show how the world of economic

and left reports and original documents at Columbia University. The Coalition of American Public Employees, the
NEA and AFSCME’s 1970s alternative to the AFL-CIO’s COPE, published a reader with original documents.
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conservatism was made by the exchange between fringe operatives and the mainstream GOP,
between peripheral theorists and the Chicago school. Rather than by excluding extremists, the
right rose by idea laundering.
“Don’t Spend It Faster Than I Can Make It” explains how influential late twentieth and
early twenty-first century conservative networks at the state and national levels developed in the
intellectual and organizational milieu of constitutional tax limitation. Conservatives organized
ideologues and scholars, fused ideas and politics, and founded organizations including the
American Legislative Exchange Council to turn California’s 1973 ballot loss into Tennessee’s
1978 success just months before California voters passed the Proposition 13 property tax cut.5
Conservatives spread the new idea to limit government across the country, testing policymaking
in the states and creating the political conditions for national power. Tax limitation architects
would sit on the U.S. Supreme Court—Sacramento law professor Anthony Kennedy wrote the
constitutional amendment, Senator Sandra Day O’Conner introduced it in the Arizona legislature
—and lead the new conservative think tanks— businessman Frank Walton was an early president
of the Heritage Foundation, and public choice scholar Bill Niskanen long chaired the board at the
Cato Institute.6 Prop 13, by contrast, traveled further as a media narrative than a fiscal policy. By
the end of the 1980s, more than twenty states passed limits on taxing and spending; less than a
handful halved property taxes.7
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Historians misunderstand the origins of the tax revolt and overemphasize the role of Prop
13. Reporters asked why voters cut or limited local and state taxes in 1978, and for the last four
decades, scholars have proposed compelling explanations—the distribution of tax benefits and
burdens between races or classes, the hidden state, assessment modernization or false
consciousness—about why so many Democrats joined Republicans in doing so.8 To this day,
fiscal history and fiscal sociology most often seek to explain tax cuts. Before there were tax cuts,
there were tax limits. When social scientists researched tax and spending limitation, they found
only location in the West explained passage.9 However grassroots the support, revolt had to be
organized. Majorities had been voting no for a decade prior.10 The tax revolt was a long, strategic
political campaign, not one “Mad as Hell” moment of voter backlash.11
Conservative pamphleteers took a different lesson from the 1978 elections: “Forget the
meat-axe approach to tax reform. Voters want spending limits that will effectively hold down tax
hikes!"12 The co-sponsor of California’s Proposition 13 property tax cut, Paul Gann, backed a tax
limit that bears his name, and the Massachusetts group behind Proposition 2 ½ originally
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campaigned for a tax limit.13

Signing the “Spirit of 13” initiative petition during a press

conference, former Governor Reagan noted its similarity to Proposition 1, his tax limitation
measure that Californians rejected in 1973. Gann recalled responding “Governor, it should look a
little familiar because we copied as much as we could.” Gann’s intention behind Prop 13 had
always been two-fold: “to cut property tax and reduce the size of government.”14 After California
voters halved property taxes, the 1979 Gann limit constrained the legislature’s ability to find
alternative taxes. Half of California teachers received pink slips after Prop 13, although many
were later recalled back to work. Just a decade before, teachers had seemed on the edge of
economic security.
The “arsonist in charge of the fire department:” The Career of Political Operative Lew
Uhler15
How long could labor-liberals defend generous public services in the most populous state?
At the end of the 1960s, California provided higher education for all, healthcare subsidies to
Medicaid, long-term care for the disabled, and cash aid to poor families.16 State and local taxes
collected 12.6 percent of Californians’ personal income, fifth highest in the country.17 Less than
a quarter of this amount, however, went to K-12 schools, dropping California to thirty-fifth in the
rankings. Teachers, divided into a moderate professional association and a militant labor union,
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disagreed on alternatives to the hated local property tax, which funded nearly three-quarters of
school costs in cities like Los Angeles. As workers lost purchasing power, they organized a left
tax revolt with welfare rights, consumer, environmental, and community groups demanding
corporations pay more to cities.18 Trapped in an economic order not of his own making, even
Governor Ronald Reagan quickly raised revenue to fix an inherited deficit upon taking office, and
eventually withheld state income taxes from workers’ paychecks.
Reagan needed help shrinking government, and stocked his California administration with
conservative political appointees. Robert Carleson, who would fill the same position first in
Nixon’s, then in Reagan’s, presidential administration, took on welfare.19 Lew Uhler, who did not
follow Reagan to the White House, was the “hatchet man” at California’s Office of Economic
Opportunity. Claiming that radicals decorated the federal office with hammer and sickle posters,
Uhler thought the philosophy of the War on Poverty was that capitalism created poverty, and
socialism and communism were better systems.20 Asked by an oral historian whether he was
brought in to dismantle the state office, Uhler dissembled, arguing that only the U. S. Congress
could defund federally-mandated programs. Nonetheless, his California staff gave Uhler a “Brass
Balls” award for his fortitude. In 1978, Uhler gave a pair to Howard Jarvis, the charismatic
spokesman for California’s Proposition 13 property tax cut. Behind Jarvis, there was Uhler.
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Fig. 1: The Brass Balls Award from his State OEO Staff Uhler holds in his office reads: “To a man born in the front
bunkers of the national mileau who has undergone shell-fire and returned it in kind.” Brass Balls labeled Jarvis from
Box 2122 of his collection at the California State Library.

Uhler’s politics were formed in conservative mid-twentieth century California and
Connecticut. His family of Philadelphia doctors, originally from the German town of Uhler
(pronounced Yoo-ler), headed west for the tuberculosis cure, where his father shipped California
oranges around the world for SunKist. Uhler was born and raised in Alhambra, California, in the
San Gabriel Valley northwest of Los Angeles and identified as a conservative from the moment
he began to think politically.21 Taking the train east to attend Yale College, Uhler arrived on
campus the same year William F. Buckley, Jr’s God and Man at Yale warned of the political
hardships that awaited him. At Yale, Uhler majored in political and economic institutions and
learned to campaign, making friends with conservatives and enemies of liberals.22 A scholarship
21
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student who joined the Reserve Officer Training Corps, Uhler returned home to California, first to
afford law school at Berkeley, and later to work as an Army intelligence officer during his father’s
brief battle with cancer.
Uhler took the economic idea of making decisions at the margin into politics, where he has
worked ever since—at the margin of political culture as a conservative, at the margin of
conservativism as an extremist, at the margin of institutions that he helped create. More of a singleissue campaigner than an institution builder, Uhler was present at the creation of a number of
conservative organizations he was only too happy to let others run and fundraise for, including the
American Legislative Exchange Council and the Council for National Policy. Though he was
always attached to a law firm as a land developer, Uhler seemed to do more campaigning than
lawyering.23 First within the insurgent Young Republicans, then on established county and state
party central committees, and through his campaign firm Public Affairs Associates, Uhler tried to
push the Republican party right.24 When Uhler’s candidates won primaries, he ran their campaigns
for the California and U.S. legislature.25
At some point, Uhler joined the John Birch Society, the conspiratorial anti-communist
group with a large California membership. Uhler ran the successful U. S. House campaign of John
Rousselot, one of only two Birchers elected in 1960, and worked as his administrative assistant
until the congressman was redistricted out in 1962.26 After a career spent working with Reagan
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and hundreds of other politicians, Uhler still judged Rousselot the most gifted.27

Uhler’s

association with Rousselot continued even after he left the John Birch Society in 1963, and
Rousselot stayed on to direct the Society’s western states operations, then its national public
relations. Uhler was Rousselot’s personal attorney, and presumably helped elect the congressman
in a new district in 1970.28 Clearing his name with reporters, Uhler later claimed the Society was
not “an effective tool for (his) particular interests.”29 At the time, he wished the small conservative
movement would have been more tolerant as it grew.30 Uhler quickly moved on to the next
campaign.
By the time he joined the conservative presidential candidate Barry Goldwater’s 1964
campaign, Uhler was a known Republican party operative. One of Uhler’s candidates for state
office, the pilot Bill Richardson, flew the pair to Goldwater’s California convention, where,
lacking tickets, they talked their way in, and up to the candidate himself. Though he knew
Goldwater would not win, Uhler moved his family to Washington D.C. in October to join a
speechwriter friend on the communications team.31 At the same time, Uhler ran businessman
Frank Walton’s congressional campaign on the Goldwater ticket.32
After spending the 1960s electing a handful of conservative state legislators, Uhler decided
he could not trust the majority of their colleagues and aimed for more influence in state
government. Uhler offered a Democratic Assemblyman a judicial appointment to maintain the
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Republican majority in the California legislature in 1968.33 While judgeship trading was a
characteristic Reagan tactic, Uhler now denies responsibility for the scandalous barter. Uhler does,
however, take credit for the governor’s appointment of his law partner to the Los Angeles County
Superior Court.34 Uhler first met Ronald Reagan when he recruited the famous actor to speak at
an all-day rally in John Rousselot’s congressional district, and at a testimonial dinner in the Bircher
congressman’s honor. Uhler was one of the few Birchers Reagan let in to his inner circle.35
Uhler came to the Reagan gubernatorial administration as many seemed to: first as a
volunteer, then an appointee recruited by a friend.36 Reagan’s staff secretary Ed Meese brought
Uhler, his friend from college and law school, to Sacramento as an appointee to the Office of
Economic Opportunity.37 In an article for the conservative magazine Human Events that could
have been a job interview, Uhler had proposed incentivizing civil servants to cut government from
the inside.38 Uhler in turn recommended the businessman whose 1964 congressional campaign he
had managed, Frank Walton, as Secretary of Business and Transportation.39
In charge of his own bureaucracy, Uhler hired a new staff willing to investigate Office of
Economic Opportunity grantees, anonymously surveyed lawyers and judges to uncover violations,
and fielded complaints from businesses and small town mayors.40 A lawyer by training, Uhler
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quickly targeted poverty law to protect capitalism.41 By representing braceros and unionized
farmworkers, poverty lawyers threatened growers’ cheap and controllable agricultural labor
supply. The California Office of Economic Opportunity administered the federal grants that
funded California Rural Legal Assistance, the largest legal aid practice in the country.42 Declaring
there was no contradiction in investigating complaints made by subsidy-seeking agribusinesses,
Uhler insisted he did not support spending public dollars on legal aid or farm aid. If something
were worth doing, someone in the private sector would do it. Attorneys volunteered their services
and cut their prices to represent the poor. The “public treasury” should not finance an assault on
the capitalist system that produced economic growth and high living standards.
After determining that California Rural Legal Assistance overreached by attacking
structural economic conditions rather than representing individual clients—it was the United Farm
Workers’ “right arm,” for example, during the union’s nationwide grape boycott—Uhler
convinced Reagan to veto a $1.8 million federal grant, effectively ending the state program.43 As
backlash built, Nixon’s U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity and a panel of retired jurists
dismissed Uhler’s evidence and reinstated the grant. Reagan agreed not to veto again so long as
new conditions were imposed on legal aid.”44 His job done at the Office of Economic Opportunity
by August 1971, Uhler was promoted to Assistant Secretary of the State Human Relations Agency,
where he imposed work requirements on welfare recipients. With his new appointment, Uhler
attended cabinet meetings and moved closer to Reagan.
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The Reagan administration wanted to cut education costs but was constrained by the
California Supreme Court’s recent Serrano v. Priest ruling that local property taxes were an
unconstitutional source of school funding. The governor’s self-trained school finance expert,
formerly an associate at Reagan’s long-time campaign firm Spencer-Roberts and Associates,
worked with the California Teachers Association, an affiliate of the National Education
Association, to write a school finance bill that included a mix of taxes on sales and income. When
California Teachers Association members marched on Sacramento and picketed the legislature,
Reagan said they were “doing the right thing.”45 Dismissing the bill as “just patchwork,” the rival
labor-aligned California Federation of Teachers withheld its support. The California Federation
of Teachers had “long advocated a Statewide School Finance program based on a progressive
graduated income tax withholding formula.”46 State senator Al Rodda, a former teacher union
local president, lobbied colleagues in the senate against the school finance bill.47 Without the
support of two-thirds of legislators, the bill stalled.
As they had in 1968, the governor and the teachers fended off the Los Angeles county
assessor’s proposed constitutional amendment to halve property taxes in 1972.48 On the November
ballot alongside President Nixon, the Watson Initiative lost by a two-thirds margin among 82
percent of registered and 65 percent of eligible voters.49 Years before Prop 13 passed in 1978,
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California voters were unwilling to approve a similar measure. Reagan declined to endorse the
property tax cut because sales and corporate tax increases replaced the lost revenue, and because
he wanted credit for tax reform.50 Given the contemporaneous school finance bill, it seems
Reagan’s objection was to raising corporate taxes. Instead, Governor Reagan threatened to cut
income taxes by $450 million if the legislature did not reduce property taxes, and proposed to pay
for additional school aid with sales, cigarette, and liquor tax increases.51 Reagan compromised
with the Democratic assembly speaker on a bill to raise sales taxes by one percent and increase the
upper bank and corporation tax bracket to thirteen percent. Two-fifths of the funds came from
one-time payments: from federal revenue sharing, and from previous income tax rate increases
and the implementation of withholding in 1971.52
A week and a half later, the legislature passed Senate Bill 90 to reduce local property taxes
through state aid to education that came with conditions: a spending cap on school boards.53 A
year after Reagan vetoed half a billion dollars of the education and social services budget, the
governor signed a bill to put $225 million back into K-12 schools while allocating $229 million to
local property tax relief.54 Homeowners and businesses got property tax exemptions while renters
and counties got credits. These exemptions and credits were not indexed to rising price levels and
would become less valuable as inflation increased. The state superintendent received $25 million
for early childhood education, much less than the hundreds of millions he pitched. Capitol
watchers argued an $82 million payment to urban schools for assemblymember Willie Brown
clinched the deal. Brown, who had advised the California Federation of Teachers to demonstrate
50
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in the streets earlier in a career that would lead to the assembly speakership, could also have
advised the union about operating in the halls of power. Affiliated with both the California
Federation of Teachers and the California Teachers Association, United Teachers Los Angeles
delivered the vote of one of four key urban state senators.55
Whereas before, school boards could raise taxes up to constitutional limits, now Senate
Bill 90 required local voters to approve any tax or spending increases above inflation or population
growth.56 The new limit was on revenue, not rates, previewing tax limiters’ approach to eliminate
loopholes for government growth. Importantly, schools did not benefit from rising property tax
revenue between 1972 and the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978.57 As the governor negotiated
with the legislature over school finance reform, ignoring the court’s Serrano v. Priest ruling, the
Reagan administration had been discussing constitutional limits on the overall size of government
since the spring of 1972. The bureaucrats were ready to cut their own budgets.
In April 1972, the Reagan administration had begun considering internal proposals to
reduce total taxes, and rejecting others to shift taxes. Uhler issued a memo warning that legislators
would “put an end to the Republic in the name of improving it” by increasing taxes and
expenditures unless the people changed the “rules of the game.”58 Reagan’s cabinet discussed
Uhler’s memo at a two-day retreat to determine the Governor’s legacy in Sacramento and his
platform for a 1976 presidential campaign. Secretary of Business and Transportation Walton
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asked a McKinsey & Company consultant to facilitate the retreat. From lists written on butcher
paper hanging on the walls, attendees selected crime, local government reform, and tax reduction.
The management consulting company volunteered advice on “Legacy” Task Forces structure and
procedures.59 Together, Walton and Uhler publicly led the Tax Reduction Task Force which
drafted the tax limitation ballot initiative Proposition 1.
Conservatives had not called “on the intellectual horsepower around the country, the brain
trust” as liberals had.60 Uhler “wasn’t interested in the John Kenneth Galbraiths or the Hellers,”
liberal public economists who argued that public sector jobs, which were mostly in the service
industry, had lower productivity and thus higher costs than in the private sector.61 Indeed, both
Galbraith and Heller would oppose tax limitation in California. Richard Musgrave, founder of
public finance economics in the United States, lamented that the “eminent economists” who
endorsed tax limitation had not pointed out the “inaccurate and biased” data behind it.62 Though
public finance economists often sided with tax revolt opponents like the League of Women Voters,
they were not “street fighters” like Milton and Rose Friedman.63 Securing Reagan’s permission
to “find the best free market minds in the country,” Uhler recruited three primary economic
advisors: Craig Stubblebine, Bill Niskanen, and Friedman himself.64
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Tax limitation was applied economics salve for Nixon appointees chafing at the fasteroding Keynesian economic order. President Nixon’s Council of Economic Advisors chair Paul
McCracken enforced wage and price controls he did not believe in. Returning to his job as a
professor of economics at the University of Michigan, McCracken backed Reagan and Uhler’s tax
campaigns, and advocated for tax limitation in Michigan. Working in the Office of Management
and the Budget, William “Bill” Niskanen tested a “compositive” method of aggregating individual
preferences borrowed from a social science increasingly skeptical of society-level analyses, but
quickly left for a position in the University of California, Berkeley’s Institute of Government
Affairs. The college and university campuses Governor Reagan had been fighting with for years
now supplied his Tax Reduction Task Force with economic expertise.65
Walton and Uhler met Reagan’s future Council of Economic Advisors chair Bill Niskanen,
a Republican and self-described “oppressed” minority on the liberal Berkeley campus.66 Niskanen
had studied under Milton Friedman at the University of Chicago and received his economics Ph.D.
in 1962 while working in the Cold War defense industry. First at RAND, then under Robert
McNamara, who brought the corporation’s characteristic systems analysis to the U. S. Department
of Defense, Niskanen planned, programmed, and budgeted military strategy. On government
contract outside the federal department at the Institute for Defense Analysis, Niskanen met Gordon
Tullock, a foreign service officer turned lawyer who encouraged him to write about the failings of
bureaucracy and representative government.
Niskanen thought “middle-demand” voters would be better represented by legislators with
less control over their committees and staffs and by executives who used their veto power to keep
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the bureaucracy in check.67 While Niskanen hoped competition in the supply of public services
would shrink government, if a bureaucracy were truly entrenched, he admitted a role for limits.
With his The Calculus of Consent co-author economist James Buchanan, Tullock intervened in a
lively mid-twentieth century academic debate about how individuals and groups made decisions
in democracy.68 Tullock and Niskanen’s encounter in the military-industrial complex shows that
the study of non-market decision-making was underway before Buchanan marketed its
applications.69
Finishing his term as president of the international thought collective the Mont Pèlerin
Society in 1972, Friedman joined the cause of tax limitation to put ideas into action.70 Friedman
built an academic career at the University of Chicago researching monetary policy and defending
economics as a positive science.71 Nonetheless, Friedman had policy opinions, which he shared
with everyone from Newsweek readers to South American dictators.72

During the Great

Depression, Friedman had worked for the federal government, first at the National Resources
Planning Board and then in the Department of Treasury, where he calculated optimal tax levels.73
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As federal income tax rates rose, and during WWII, the base expanded, government spending grew
to forty-three percent of the economy.74 “Something historic,” Friedman believed, needed “to be
done to stop that process.”
California’s Proposition 1 was, in Friedman’s words, “the only measure taking place
anywhere in this country that offer(ed) some real hope.”75 When a fellow member of the American
Enterprise Institute’s Council of Academic Advisers wrote to get Friedman more involved in
policy research, Friedman wrote back to urge the think tank to study tax and spending limitation,
the “most promising short-term possibility” to solve the “fundamental problem” of “the growth of
government.”76 Even as he endorsed “cutting taxes under any circumstances, for whatever excuse,
for whatever reason,” including Proposition 13, Friedman expressed his preference for Proposition
1.77 The country’s most prominent libertarian economist would spend the better part of a decade
advocating for state and federal constitutional caps, including on the day he won the Nobel prize
in economics while campaigning for tax limitation in Michigan.78
In answer to the question he heard most often about tax limitation being “undemocratic,”
Friedman declared that there was fundamental bias or defect or flaw in the constitution: taxpayers
did not get to vote on the budget as a whole.79 The middle class could unite against the very rich
and very poor, what a Chicago colleague called the “law of public expenditures.”80 Special

74

Milton Friedman, “It’s in the Public Interest,” in Sonenblum, ed., The California Tax Limitation Amendment, 9394. Elsewhere, for example in his Manion Forum interview, Friedman lowered this figure to forty percent.
75
PBS television program The Advocates episode “Proposition #1 taped October 29, 1973 and aired on KTLA on
November 3, 1973.
76
Milton Friedman to Professor Paul W. McCracken, June 10, 1977, Box 18, Folder Correspondence, 1975-1976,
N, Paul Winston McCracken papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan (PWM).
77
Milton Friedman, "The Limitations of Tax Limitation," Policy Review (Summer 1978).
78
See Ch. 6 in this dissertation.
79
Hand-edited transcript of an undated Milton Friedman talk, Folder 1, Box 101, ACU. Milton Friedman, 236 “A
Simple Idea Whose Time Has Come: Tax Limitation,” sound recording of interview for the Manion Forum
broadcast October 28, 1973, Box 236, Milton Friedman papers, Hoover Institution Archives (MF).
80
Aaron Director. Friedman lectures in 1977-1978.

342

interests like teachers or the Maritime Tea Tasters Board formed coalitions and logrolled
legislation that voting majorities would not choose.81 Friedman argued tax limitation was in the
public interest.82 “Let’s have the school teachers demonstrate that their need is greater than the
need of the people who want to create welfare,” the economist told conservative talk show host
Clarence Manion.83

School teachers thought Californians needed welfare too, as they had

demonstrated by petitioning for state funding for education and welfare in the 1970 ballot initiative
Proposition 8.
Friedman, of the Chicago school known for advocating free markets in the private sector,
introduced Uhler to Buchanan, of the Virginia school known for applying neoclassical economic
theory to the public sector. Trained at the University of Chicago, Buchanan never achieved
Friedman’s mainstream appeal but rather built an academic program on the margins, accepting
private funds for research centers at public institutions of higher education.84 Friedman’s son
David worked with Buchanan at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, where he researched the
relationship between taxes and expenditures.85 While Friedman made frequent trips to plan and
campaign for tax limitation, starting with California’s Proposition 1 in 1973, Buchanan left the
day-to-day work to his graduate students. While Friedman was tax limitation’s publicist, public
choice scholars were its theorists.
At Virginia universities in the 1950s and 1960s, economists studied non-market—or as
they later called them, public—choices with James Buchanan in seminars and centers. Public
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employees, who public choice theorists called bureaucrats, were motivated by self-interest, not
service, and thus tried to increase the size of government. Buchanan predicted government
spending would take one half of national income in a decade.86 Writing for Reagan’s Tax
Reduction Task Force, Buchanan recommended imposing “constitutional restrictions” to force
legislators “to face up to the inherent conflict between the interests of the citizenry and those of
the bureaucracy.” In campaign materials for California’s 1973 Proposition 1, Buchanan warned
against “an all-embracing bureaucracy-judiciary that threatens us.”87
Buchanan used academic papers to recommend public policy, urging a “political
entrepreneur” to solve the collective action problem of too many public goods, and coyly advising
the “economist who may serve as consultant to a taxlimit group.”88 Applying the geometry of
indifference curves from his work on pollution and the logic of defection from game theory,
Buchanan predicted taxpayers in disequilibrium would “revolt” when they perceived that the
quality or distribution of public spending had changed, or when inflation increased the burden of
graduated, but not proportional, tax rates. To illustrate, Buchanan took examples from his personal
politics: campus protests, like those he witnessed at UCLA in 1968 before abruptly resigning his
professorship, and the War on Poverty demonstrated how taxpayers got fewer goods, and fewer of
them.
During the 1972-1973 academic year, papers presented at Buchanan’s Workshop on NonMarket Bureaucracy were commissioned by Reagan’s Tax Reduction Task Force and funded by
UCLA’s Foundation for Research in Economics.89 Works in progress, these papers were presented
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at a December 1-2, 1972 Task Force conference in California, and published in the edited
collection Budgets and Bureaucrats: The Sources of Government Growth.90 Buchanan and seven
of his students together researched the question “What Motivates Government Spending?”
Arguing that nineteenth-century industrialization did not meaningfully expand government,
Buchanan wanted to know if twentieth-century public spending responded to “people’s desire for
programs, or independently of those desires.”91
Among their findings: productivity grew faster in the private than in the public sector,
taxpayers underestimated their income taxes when they were withheld from salaries, and their
property taxes when they were paid with mortgages, and educators consolidated school districts
because it gave them more bargaining power. Tullock thought that bureaucracies grew because
“the factor supplies,” or public employees, were “permitted to vote.”92 While tax limiters never
formally proposed removing the franchise, they did impose constitutional restrictions that shifted
fiscal decisions away from public employees. Buchanan thought performance contracting or
privatization would more effective than budgetary limits. With the 1971 Stull Act, California had
imposed performance measurements on teachers and yet they still demanded collective bargaining
rights. Perhaps tax limitation, or “power limitation” as Uhler called it, was necessary to change
education policy.
Reagan’s Task Force commissioned applied research from Claremont McKenna College
professor of economics Craig Stubblebine. UCLA Department of Economics chair La Force and
Claremont’s Art Kemp recommended Stubblebine, “a known and recognized student of Jim
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Buchanan,” and one of the few in California.93 Indeed, Stubblebine who earned his PhD in
economics under Buchanan at the University of Virginia in 1963, had just returned to California
after a year as a visiting scholar at Buchanan’s new Center for the Study of Public Choice at the
Virginia Polytechnic Institute. As president of the Western Tax Association, Stubblebine was also
experienced in tax politics. In September 1972, Uhler arrived at Stubblebine’s office in the
Department of Economics at Claremont. Although he remarked at the time that Uhler and his
associates were “three crazies,” by the end of the month Stubblebine had agreed to survey
taxpayers about their views on public spending.
As Reagan told it, his Task Force was greeted with “bear hugs” at UCLA, then known as
“Chicago West.” As Walton remembered, UCLA economists like Clay LaForce and Phoebus
Dhrymes had “been looking for some government somewhere that would have the courage to
really take a hard, objective look at what’s happening to this country.”94 Funded by The
Foundation for Research in Economics and Education, managed by La Force and his UCLA
colleague Armen Alchian, Stubblebine conducted a “motivational research study” to test the
appeal of tax limitation in the fall of 1972. Identifying the “fundamental issue (as) whether
Californians will continue to live in a world of growing governmental involvement in their daily
activities” Stubblebine hoped his fellow Californians would choose “a more private world.”95
Stubblebine had not known public finance economists to poll, but thought “it would be fun to cut
(his) teeth.”96 The market research firm Haug Associates, Inc. helped Stubblebine design and run
the survey, his first.
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With a survey design closer to a push poll than a scientific instrument, Stubblebine put a
price on government services and asked if they were worth it. The price mechanism, the Chicago
school taught, was the only “rational, fair, responsible” way to allocate scarce resources.97
However, without user fees or specific taxes for public goods, California’s budget “obscured or
masked” the information people needed to make decisions about how much government they
wanted.

To get “people to try to make choices in a sensible context,” surveyors showed

respondents a chart of benefits from additional public spending by tax income bracket.98
Stubblebine found that Californians underestimated the cost of government. Public finance
economists routinely criticized public choice economists like Stubblebine over their calculations.
Not an objective measurement, cost was a political debate. To approach the forty plus percent of
income tax limiters claimed government took, the Tax Reduction Task Force included receipts like
college football tickets.
The Tax Reduction Task Force looked to the long history of American tax resistance—
from nonpayment to restrictions on the tax rate or base—and rejected past methods of restraining
tax revenues in favor of a constitutional approach to limiting overall government spending.
Drafting an amendment to the California constitution, Uhler copied the methodology of the “other
side,” which recognized “that the way you make progress is to embed something in law.”99 A
spending limit was stronger than a taxing limit, which could be evaded by inflating or borrowing
money. Still, depending on whether or not states levied an income tax, either might work.
Nonetheless, everyone called it tax limitation.
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Tax limitation was designed for an age of cost of living increases. The limit would allow
the state budget to grow each year by the growth in total personal income (or gross state product),
less a factor meant to ratchet down the real level of spending to seven percent by one-tenth of one
percent over the next fifteen years. For the purposes of bounding the budget, an “Economic
Estimates Committee” of economists would calculate income. By contrast, inflation made liberal
property tax relief alternatives like homestead exemptions and circuit breakers less effective.100
The limit was designed to incentivize property tax rate cuts, but not these rebates to the elderly
and poor.101 Inflation had, however, made California’s highly progressive income tax more
effective. Through a tax refund, lower rates, and higher exemptions, California’s tax limitation
also targeted the state income tax Governor Reagan had reluctantly begun withholding from
workers’ paychecks just two years before.102 During the ballot campaign, promotional materials
listed these income tax benefits first.
At 5,700 words, the constitutional amendment attempted to prevent tax limit avoidance.
Counter-cyclical spending required a super majority of state legislators to overturn the limit. The
measure prevented cost shifting by requiring the state to pick up the tab for any newly-mandated
local services. However, Proposition 1 prepared for the eventuality of “Serrano-type” school
finance equalization, lifting the limit for school costs future courts shifted to the state.103 Drafters
could not rewrite the whole tax code, however. Talking with Los Angeles reporters, Milton
Friedman deflected a common question about tax loopholes raised by the left tax revolt saying, in
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the memory of one Reagan public relations staffer, that “it didn’t do anything about loopholes
because it was not designed to do anything about loopholes or measles, either.”104

The “most damaging political defeat of the Gipper’s career:” Proposition 1 in Reagan’s
California105
As the only initiative to qualify for the November 6, 1973 special election, tax limitation
was known as Proposition 1. In the course of forty-four drafts, Uhler’s proposed five percent tax
limit rose to seven percent; California was then at eight and three-quarters. Seeking victory at the
state ballot box, Uhler removed limits on federal spending and local taxes, permitted a reserve
fund, slowed the automatic spending decrease to one-third percent a year, and added a “hold
harmless” clause to maintain local budget levels. These were significant concessions, and in 1973,
they were not enough. During a campaign involving lawsuits, judgeship trading, and personal
rivalries, the Reagan administration split over ideological and political priorities while liberal and
education organizations united to stop the amendment. Reagan loyalists wrote Walton and Uhler
out of political history because they were responsible for what Reagan biographer Lou Cannon
called the “most damaging political defeat of the Gipper’s career,” Proposition 1.106
Proposition 1 was supposed to remake Reagan, whose California administration had
increased taxes and budgets, into a fiscal conservative for a presidential run. At the end of the tax
revolt decade of the 1970s, the journalist Bob Kuttner, now of the American Prospect, declared
Proposition 1 “the very first of the frankly ideological tax and spending limit attempts.”107
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Conservative journalists thought so too: Wall Street Journal editorialist James Ring Adams argued
Proposition 1 “may be the most logical” starting point for the tax revolt.108 Although Uhler was
too far right for Reagan to keep in a public role, after tax limitation was adopted elsewhere, he and
his National Tax Limitation Committee advised the Reagan White House.
The campaign for tax limitation began within a Reagan administration protective of the
governor’s political success. To circumvent skeptical aides, Uhler had mailed a crucial memo
directly to Reagan’s father-in-law in Scottsdale, Arizona where the extended family spent the 1972
Christmas. At fourteen pages, Uhler’s memo was longer than Reagan’s one page preference, but
it made a lasting impact.109 Reagan kept one copy of Uhler’s memo in his Sacramento office desk,
where archivists discovered it at the end of his governorship, and another in his Pacific Palisades
home, where the economist Martin Anderson found it while clearing out the late president’s
desk.110 Though they would later tell a different story to journalists, Reagan’s kitchen cabinet
opposed tax limitation for a variety of reasons: it was too partisan, complex, or restrictive.111
Reagan’s budget director told the biographer Lou Cannon that Uhler was a “loudmouth” who “sold
the governor on his idea.”112
Once Reagan decided to pursue tax limitation after twenty-six hours of cabinet meetings
at the Mansion Inn outside Sacramento, everyone fell in line. As the economist Craig Stubblebine
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wryly observed, "The hallmark of a Reagan administration is team effort.”113 While Reagan
previewed the idea in his 1973 State of the State Address, he made an official announcement to a
gathering of California newspaper reporters on February 8, before the amendment language was
finished. Stubblebine commuted to Sacramento from Claremont throughout the winter of 1973 to
write the amendment with Uhler, his staffer Charlie Hobbs, and Anthony Kennedy, then practicing
and teaching law in Sacramento.114 Uhler and Kennedy had been introduced through their law
partners, and Kennedy would continue to offer legal advice throughout the campaign.115 Bill
Niskanen and the Hoover Institution’s Roger Freeman came to consult a few times, and other
advisors were reached by phone and mail.
Controversially, Freeman paid for his work on the tax limitation ballot initiative with a
government contract to plan school finance after the Serrano v. Priest ruling that unequal local
school property taxes were unconstitutional.116 Freeman had other sources of government funding.
Nixon’s Presidential Commission on School Finance solicited a paper from the Hoover Institution
economist on income tax credits for private school tuition.117 Reagan’s Tax Reduction Task Force
took another approach: rebating income taxes by constitutional amendment.
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Fig. 2: Uhler hands Reagan the Tax Reduction Task Force’s Final Report in a photo Uhler keeps in his office. The
widely available “blue book” contained the tax limitation language.

The Reagan administration, perhaps with an eye to the 1976 presidential election or to low
voter turnout during an off-year election, insisted on a special fall election for voters to consider
tax limitation. Held the same day as a number of local elections, the tax limitation vote would cost
an additional $3 million. The state promised to pay even as Reagan raised the estimate to $6.5
million in the fall.118 Knowing the majority Democratic legislature was unlikely to put the measure
on the ballot, the Task Force began a petition drive to collect more than half a million signatures
by the end of June.
Initiative petitions were “big business in California,” with voters deciding 20 or more ballot
measures in June and November elections every other year throughout the early 1970s. One
professional signature gatherer joked that for $500,000 he could qualify “a measure to execute the
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governor by Christmas.”119 To circulate petitions, Deaver hired an advertising firm,
Larson/Bateman, Inc. which recommended presenting the campaign as a “peoples” fight by
appealing to the “little guy for support” to avoid it being a “‘Big Business’ supported issue.”120
Larson/Bateman decided newspaper ads announcing the petition “should not look too slick or arty”
but rather “sincere.”121

In addition to recruiting petition circulators through these ads,

Larson/Bateman purchased commercial lists of conservative donors and bookbuyers, sportsmen,
and environmentalists for direct mail.122
The short timeline meant that Reagan had to find volunteer signature gatherers as well.123
When Reagan called Howard Jarvis to enlist his United Taxpayers Organizations, Jarvis cut off
the Governor’s explanation of tax limitation: Jarvis already knew of the plan, and was for it.124
Even the Tax Reduction Task Force Steering Committee chair Frank Walton got involved,
collecting signatures with his wife on the weekend at the supermarket.125 By the beginning of
June, the campaign was within 200,000 signatures, and Larson/Bateman thought “someone would
be generous enough to donate $60,000 so you could buy them and be done with it.”126 Local
taxpayers associations like Contra Costa County’s participated in a “big push” mid-June, and lucky
circulators handed in their petitions to Reagan himself at rallies.127
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With Reagan out in front, Proposition 1 never became the citizens’ campaign, the
“Committee of Ten Thousand,” Uhler desired.128 A new group, Californians for Lower Taxes,
was supposed to organize broad-based support for Proposition 1, but took orders from the
governor’s aides. The University of Southern California president emeritus Norman Topping, who
had led the group opposed to the Los Angeles county tax assessor’s property tax cut the year
before, was named Citizens for Limited Taxation chair in April.129 Where the Watson Initiatives
were dismissed as a tax shift, California institutions now endorsed Proposition 1. Indeed, Watson
himself sat on the steering committee, the Hewlett-Packard co-founder, the president of the
California Taxpayers Association, a Reagan appointee to the presidency of the State Board of
Education, the president of the California Farm Bureau, the director of the state Department of
Finance, and a hotel chain owner.130 Proposition 1 was the first tax measure the influential
California Taxpayers Association gave its full support.131
Over the summer, business endorsements had rolled in, from the California Chamber of
Commerce to the Greater San Francisco Chamber of Commerce to the Los Angeles Chamber of
Commerce.132 Reagan raised money alongside the president of Southern Pacific Company, a
leader of the California Chamber of Commerce.133 Californians for Lower Taxes Chairman
Norman Topping sent members of the 84 Chambers of Commerce that endorsed Proposition 1 the
brochure and urged “we taxpayers” to “inform and involve as many people as possible.” The
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National Federation of Independent Business provided free Proposition 1 brochures for
distribution. After an address by Ronald Reagan, and a debate, seven out of ten participating
members of the influential Commonwealth Club of California voted to support Proposition 1.134
When tax limitation qualified for the ballot, the legislature finally passed the tax relief that
Reagan had been asking for, rebating twenty percent of the previous year’s income taxes and
reversing the SB 90 one cent sales tax increase.135 Uhler thought the legislature passed these bills
to “pull the teeth” out of tax limitation, putting Reagan in a tough position.136 Nonetheless, the
governor signed. The opposition group Californians Against Proposition No. 1 sued, arguing that
the legislature had passed some of what the ballot measure promised, forcing ballots to be reprinted
with new language.137 Reagan even approved a tax override election for LA schools after Prop 1
qualified for the ballot.138 Politics diluted the ideological bite of tax limitation.
Within the Reagan administration, Uhler, who had been a liability since he persuaded the
governor to cut California Rural Legal Assistance, was increasingly marginalized as allies and
enemies reacted to his idea. During the petition drive, Reagan brought Uhler, who the governor
acknowledged “could probably give better answers,” to interviews.139 During the Proposition 1
campaign, Reagan put his long-time aide Mike Deaver in charge.

Uhler’s friends told a

Sacramento reporter that whenever he or Walton called the campaign office, Deaver quickly
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reversed their orders.140 When Uhler sent a memo directly to Reagan in early August, Deaver
reprimanded him: “Since all correspondence relative to the tax initiative addressed to the Governor
comes to me ultimately, you will save time by addressing it to either Terry Chambers or me.”141
Deaver wrote the staff of Californians for Lower Taxes, insisting that contact with the Governor’s
office go through an assistant, and that Deaver pre-approve any requests for the Governor’s
time.142
Deaver let the campaign, his first, slip over the summer. During this time, presentations
by the CTA and other opponents to local councils and boards persuaded them that Prop 1 would
shift costs to communities, and led to resolutions against the measure.143 The Sacramento
journalist Bill Boyarski thought Reagan’s aides, trained in “easy and relatively gentlemanly
contests against weak opponents” were unprepared for the kind of contentious ballot initiative
California had a long history of.144 Reagan’s long-time political campaign firm, Spencer-Roberts
and Associates, was unavailable as its co-owner helped the assembly speaker fight Proposition 1.
Referencing the open secret of Deaver’s alcoholism, which would be his downfall in the Reagan
presidential administration, one California state senator remarked "the governor assigned some of
his top pygmies to” Proposition 1 whose “only good characteristics were mixing a drink.”145
By the time Deaver had the campaign up and running again in the fall, inexperienced
professionals were in charge. Deaver formed his own firm, which he hoped would run Reagan’s
presidential campaign, with advertiser Peter Hannaford, who coordinated Bay-area Prop 1 efforts.
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A consultant solicited donations from wealthy Republicans. The advertising agency, LarsonBateman, Inc., which had coordinated the petition drive, wrote campaign materials and fundraising
letters in its first “big political campaign.”146 Based on pollster Decision Making Information’s
questions of Prop 1 supporters, Larson-Bateman designed three ads to feature Reagan, and appeal
to supportive demographics: conservative Democrats and the “working man-union member,”
middle-class suburban housewives, and “the egghead,” who showed how tax limitation benefited
education.147
California’s most experienced political consultancy, Whitaker & Baxter, ran the opposition
campaign. At the outset, Proposition 1’s opponents came “principally from the educational
community and the League of Women Voters.”148 These groups had followed tax limitation as a
legislative bill and initiative petition in the spring. In August, the California Teachers Association
seeded an opposition campaign with $50,000. As the new school year began, the United Teachers
Los Angeles board of directors voted to oppose Proposition 1.149 Californians Against Proposition
No. 1 mailed informational and educational materials targeting organizations rather than
individuals. Campaign staff and volunteers followed up in person with these organizations,
newspapers, and stations. California Teachers A leaders spoke with businessmen, and the no
campaign blocked a number of endorsements.

Both Walton and Reagan personally and
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unsuccessfully pleaded with the League’s president to tone down the general interest group’s
criticism.150
Divided as they were over how to fund schools, labor leaders and Democrats agreed that
Proposition 1 would worsen the school fiscal crisis. Unions like the United Auto Workers and the
International Ladies Garment Workers Union stated their opposition, and the California Labor
Federation distributed materials to its 1,600,000 members.

Local coalitions, as they were

financially able, placed ads presumably designed by Whitaker & Baxter in newspapers and on
radio broadcast. Californians Against Proposition No. 1 coordinated with the assembly speaker,
who paid for television ads, and other political opponents, who contributed resources. At a joint
press conference, every Democratic candidate for governor in 1974, including the assembly
speaker, announced their opposition to Proposition 1. Californians for Lower Taxes blamed the
assembly speaker for turning their “non partisan” campaign into a “political fight.”151
After the California Teachers Association filed a lawsuit over the use of state funds to put
Proposition 1 on the ballot, six Reagan staffers took leaves of absence from the Governor’s Office
to work full-time on tax limitation. The economist Craig Stubblebine joked with his wife Carol, a
teacher and California Teachers Association member, that she sued her husband “over a paltry
$900” the Tax Reduction Task Force had paid him.152 Berkeley economist Bill Niskanen earned
at most $500. Uhler issued contracts to these and other economists from his position in the
Department of Health Care Services with little regard for civil service rules. Pulling staff
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assistants, technical assistants, graphic artists, and secretaries from their work elsewhere in state
government, the Tax Reduction Task Force spent $161,000 in public funds.153
On leave from his administration, the governor’s staff coordinated the tax limitation
campaign. By the end of August, supportive state legislators had assigned staffers to the tax
limitation campaign.154 By the end of September, one of Frank Walton’s former aides, now in
charge of Californians for Lower Taxes’ daily operations, began sending weekly memos to the
organization’s newly recruited county chairmen with quotes from Reagan and his economists,
sample resolutions for organizations to pass, sample letters to the editor, a twenty-five minute
sample speech “It’s Your Money Make Them Give It Back,” and various organizational forms.155
As the election approached, the governor’s staff urged county chairmen to secure endorsements
from newspapers, civic clubs, school boards, city councils, and “local thought-leaders” including
“respected businessmen, ministers, club presidents, and community-minded ladies.”156
Speakers Bureau sent speakers across the state.

A

Lucky organizations like the Apartment

Association of San Fernando Valley who requested speakers heard from Howard Jarvis, who was
“extremely well versed in all the details of the Tax Initiative.”157 Jack Bacon and Associates
conscripted local realty boards.158 However, secretary of Business and Transportation Frank
Walton faulted this recruitment outside traditional party channels.159
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Again, the campaign relied on Reagan’s celebrity to appeal to ordinary people. With a
robo call and a letter to his “Resources team,” Ronald Reagan recruited campaign volunteers.160
Only two weeks before the election did the campaign send “marching orders” to “get out the vote.”
Californians for Limited Taxation county chairman worked alongside the Republican State Central
Committee—sometimes “these two organizations (were) one and the same”—to identify yes
voters. Worried that campaigners might turn out no voters, staffers advised the “effective and
thinking precinct chairman” to “stick your toe in to test the temperature of the water before jumping
in” to avoid getting burned.161 Increasingly frenzied, Californians for Limited Taxation urged
volunteers to “WIN THIS ONE AS A START TOWARD CHECKING THE GROWTH OF
SOCIALISM IN THE UNITED STATES.”162 Still, party discipline required a stick. Rumors
abounded: Reagan would withhold funds from Republican opponents, Deaver kept an enemies
list.163
At the end of October, California businesses stuffed employees’ pay envelopes with proProposition 1 messages. Californians for Lower Taxes vice chairman J. S. Fluor, of the eponymous
energy construction company, sent five sample inserts for payroll envelopes and asked 3,000
“Fellow Employers” not only to send them out to their employees but to ask ten of their peers to
do the same.164 Purex Corporation, Ltd. promised employees a 7.5 percent reduction in the next
year’s state taxes if only they’d “ask for it” by voting for Proposition 1. 165 Setzer Forest Products
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told much of the state’s lumber industry that Proposition 1 would fix a constitutional flaw, asking
them to pass on materials to “friends and employees.166 Bechtel Corporation, a San Francisco
construction company, delegated an employee for the campaign’s last week.167
In Los Angeles, the tax limitation campaign pulled out all the stops. At a United
Organizations of Taxpayers rally at Hollywood High School run like a religious revival, a
dissenting school board member led the pledge of allegiance, a Baptist preacher delivered the
invocation, a country musician sang about taxes, and Howard Jarvis introduced Ronald Reagan,
telling attendees their ticket would be a souvenir when Reagan was president.168 Jarvis handed
out buttons reminding campaigners to bring eight people to the polls to vote yes before 10 am on
election day. The wealthy had their own campaign swag: Los Angeles County airline ticket agents
offered absentee ballots to travelers, likely to be Republican, as they flew out.169 Stubblebine
suggested that the campaign had secured the city council’s endorsement of Proposition 1 by
offering a judgeship to Councilman Brown, the tie vote.170 However, LA politicians split.
Alongside the League of Women Voters president, the Los Angeles mayor appeared in anti-Prop
1 commercials.171
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Los Angeles teachers recognized the new measure as part of Reagan’s presidential platform
to dismantle “the entire structure of government services which grew out of the great depression
and the New Deal” influenced by “a topsy-turvy view of the world emanating from such
anachronistic thinkers as Milton Friedman.”172 In answer to the question “Who is really behind
proposition 1?” UTLA told its members “Rich people who dislike the income tax.”173 The union
mocked Reagan as “Rollon Ronnie, the Governor of Cantaffordit” who designed Proposition 1 as
a “clean-cut solution” to remove services until people were desperate enough to need what
government was for: “giving out traffic tickets, putting people in jail and executing criminals.”174
One of teachers’ campaign advantages was their ability to distribute material at schools
and to homes. The LA school board ran a Proposition 1 Information Center, and the teachers’
union distributed its flyers, including an orange “trick or treat” sheet that predicted a preHalloween football game would be schools’ last if Proposition 1 passed.175 Responding to the
governor’s objections, the LA school board president argued that the Los Angeles Superior Court
judge assigned to Prop 1 advertising cases had approved the flyers as impartial.176 Californians
for Lower Taxes hoped to counter “the Teachers Association diatribe being sent home through the
schools” with a mailing to every principal in the state; if parents or newspapers had questions, a
manager would answer them.177 Suggesting several more ideas to “COUNTER THE C.T.A.
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PROPAGANDA MACHINE,” the staffer concluded “I WOULD NOT THINK OF
ATTEMPTING TO TELL YOU HOW TO STIR UP THE LOCALS—JUST DO IT!—NOW.”178
Teachers fought back because Reagan targeted them. The Senate majority leader, a
Democratic candidate for governor, had finally passed a collective bargaining bill after years of
failed attempts.179 Weeks before the Proposition 1 election, Reagan vetoed teachers rights.180
Editing a form letter to union leaders, Reagan turned public sector unions against private. The
governor insisted he had “never ceased being proud of the results” he obtained at the “negotiating
table” as a private sector union official, and now wanted to reduce the “% of the workers earning
the state takes in taxes.”181 When the California Correctional Officers Association endorsed
Proposition 1, they did so by arguing that collective gains were eroded by inflation and taxes.182
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Fig. 3: Cartoon from the UTLA’s United Teacher, 1 (7), November 5, 1973, 3, UTLA. Reagan’s hand-written edits
on a letter to union leaders in support of Proposition 1.

Californians for Lower Taxes encouraged non-union administrators from the Professional
Educators Group to form Educators for Lower Taxes.183 These educators, often school or
university board members in management positions, noted that Reagan had increased state funding
for education during his time in office without mentioning the governor’s line item vetoes.
Eventually, the Reagan-appointed State Board of Education endorsed Proposition 1.184 One
county taxpayers’ association tried to appeal to teachers by reminding them it lobbied the school
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board to “put a higher % of school money into actual class room TEACHING.”185 Days before
the election, Milton Friedman told television audiences that “school teachers,” who were a “special
interest,” drove spending “up at a tremendous rate without any corresponding increase in
performance.”186
With Reagan rather than Friedman as spokesman, the tax limitation message got muddled.
The campaign ad politicos thought most effective was Whitaker & Baxter’s spot using Reagan’s
own confusion against the campaign. Asked by a television reporter “Do you think the average
voter really understands the language of this proposition?” Reagan responded “No, he shouldn’t
try. I don’t either.”187 Reagan, who at many other moments clearly explained the complications
of tax limitation, must have been joking.188 Nevertheless, the day before the election, Whitaker &
Baxter placed full-page ads in newspapers across the state arguing “when a proposition’s chief
sponsor doesn’t understand his own measure, it is time to vote ‘No.’”
While teachers’ unions could hire lawyers and lobbyists and run advertisements and
canvasses with their members’ voluntary political contributions, teachers’ power was in their
people, not their money. To the No on Prop 1 campaign, California Teachers Association members
contributed $2 each and UTLA members $5.189 UTLA urged union chapters to raise money and
hold koffee-klatches with parent groups, and union members to call and send postcards to friends
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across the state.190 While four-fifths of the funds to oppose Proposition 1 came from the California
State Employees Association and the California Teachers Association, the anti forces were
massively outspent .191 Whitaker & Baxter reported Californians for Limited Taxes spent $1.8
million on the yes campaign while Californians Against Proposition No. 1 spent $355,000, in
addition to the costs of efforts by allies. As even Uhler admitted, what counted for these tax limit
opponents was “bodies walking the street,” not dollars.
Recognizing Proposition 1’s passage relied on low voter turnout, the no campaign focused
on getting voters to the polls. UTLA helped to form Los Angeles Citizens Against Proposition
One, which canvassed voters. The California Federation of Teachers president called on “every
teacher in the state of California to enlist actively in the campaign to defeat this measure.”192
Sacramento teachers protested outside the state capital in early November.193 On election day,
10,000 Californians Against Proposition No. 1 volunteers participated in what Whitaker & Baxter
considered “one of the most massive voter turnout and precinct walking operations in the history
of California ballot issue campaigns.”194 The political consultancy judged Proposition 1’s “fatal
flaw” was the measure’s inability to keep bipartisan support or diverse community leaders.195
Nearly half of eligible voters turned out, and fifty-four percent of them voted no.
Before and after Proposition 1 lost, Uhler blamed “public employees and liberal special
interest groups.”196 Mike Deaver, much to the surprise of Reagan biographer Lou Cannon, said
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he had been “naïve about the power of the teachers.”197 UTLA celebrated the power of its political
action, “Proposition 1 Dies A Glorious Death” ran the front page of the union’s newsletter full of
plaudits for public employees generally, and active teachers particularly.198 State after state, tax
limit proponents always identified their main opponent as the teachers’ association, not the
American Federation of Teachers union locals and federations. National Education Association
affiliates used many of the same political campaign tactics—sometimes the same firms—as
conservatives; perhaps their lobbying was recognizable.
As California teachers lobbied and pressured state legislators for collective bargaining
rights, they threatened the balance of power in the state. During the 1973-1974 school year, fortytwo California Federation of Teachers locals took “militant action”—picketing, packing school
board meetings, striking.199 The California Federation of Teachers grew to 30,000 members.
However, while tax limitation strengthened over the course of the 1970s, the California Federation
of Teachers weakened as a collective bargaining law eroded its membership gains. Named after
Sacramento senator and former teacher union president Al Rodda, the 1975 Rodda Act provoked
the greatest “jurisdictional battles in the history of blackboard unionism” as rival National
Education Association and American Federation of Teachers affiliates sought to represent
California teachers.200
Teachers’ collective bargaining bill restricted bargaining to wages, benefits, hours, and
working conditions. School boards had accepted teachers as employees but not policymakers.
Teachers who wanted “a more humane and creative environment for learning” were denied the
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authority to formally negotiate over “smaller classes, adequate supplies, better books.”201
Moreover, the Rodda Act did not cover professors, forcing members working in higher education
out of the California Federation of Teachers. During the 1970s, California teacher unions too
frequently accepted short-term deals that came with restrictions on long-term power. Senate Bill
90, passed in 1972 with support from Governor Reagan and the California Teachers Association,
imposed spending caps on school boards in exchange for state aid to education. The American
Federation of Teachers’ More Effective Schools program, which halved class sizes, was off limits
under the Rodda Act. The Los Angeles and San Francisco labor movements were not strong
enough to help teachers as the United Auto Workers did in Detroit.
As California Teachers Association affiliates acted like unions and signed contracts, the
California Federation of Teachers lost 10,000 members in two years. Drained after fighting district
by district, the California Federation of Teachers asked members for a dues increase in 1978.202
Internally, teachers’ federation faced opposition from a caucus of New Leftists who had gone into
teaching with the intention to shift the union left. Even though teachers’ organizations united in
opposition to Proposition 1, teachers could only block tax limitation for so long. The deep division
between teachers prevented a real labor alternative.
By contrast, the New Right put aside many of the disagreements that had divided a
conservative movement out of power during the previous decade. Uhler had always described tax
limitation as “power limitation.”
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the phone, and at home.204 By the end of the decade, seventy-two percent of public school teachers
were members of unions that bargained collectively.205 Teacher unions rather than teachers are
named in this chapter in part because California teachers did not need a charismatic leader to know
that school finance politics were part of their job. More so than social movements for welfare
rights or healthcare for the poor, the teacher union movement was a power base the right had to
break. If conservatives could convince voters teachers were greedy, they could convince voters
any public employee was.

New Right: Institutions to Share Model Legislation and Remake Political Parties in the
States
Even in defeat, California’s tax limit was a model for other states. Reagan had sent the tax
limitation plan, which received nationwide press coverage, to every governor by the end of March
1973.206 Democrats and moderate Republicans, as well as conservative Republicans, responded
favorably. Though he would later share his opposition, at the time, Georgia’s Jimmy Carter noted
his interest, as did New York’s Nelson Rockefeller. The governor of South Carolina wrote Reagan
requesting more details.207 Some Southern states took up tax limitation even before the Proposition
1 vote.208 During the 1973 Louisiana constitutional convention, Baton Rouge representative and
American Legislative Exchange Council leader “Woody” Jenkins proposed “a looser version of
the California measure” with a ten percent limit.209 Louisiana’s governor, who had previously
written to Reagan about Proposition 1, endorsed Jenkins’ proposed tax limit just days after the
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California measure lost, and the constitutional convention adopted it.210 In Texas, the earliest
attempt to enact a tax limit came during the state’s 1974 constitutional convention.211
Uhler needed his own campaign organization to field calls from elected officials and
business leaders who wanted to try tax limitation at home. Watching Prop 1 fail, Uhler decided if
it was not possible to limit taxes in Reagan’s California, he had better do something else.212 In
December 1973, Uhler had set up a suburban Sacramento office of his new Southern California
law firm, Harris, Noble, Uhler & Gallop. As Reagan prepared to leave state office, Uhler and
Secretary of Business and Transportation Frank Walton strategized with the governor’s assistant
Mike Deaver and his appointee, the cattleman Monroe Brown, in support of the “Reagan cause.”
At a dinner party attended by these four men and their wives in the spring of 1974, the group
decided Uhler should start a tax organization, Walton should work in Washington (he would lead
the Heritage Foundation), and Brown should start a conservative California think tank, the Institute
for Contemporary Studies in San Francisco.213 Everyone knew Deaver, a close friend of Nancy
Reagan’s, would be by her husband’s side. By the summer, Uhler was circulating a memo to
fundraise the $21,000 a month he estimated a tax organization needed.214 In the meantime, Uhler
relied on the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) to spread limits.
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ALEC was founded in a moment when signature 1960s organizations—the American
Conservative Union, the Foundation for Economic Education, and the Young Americans for
Freedom—stopped fighting for credit and started cooperating to build conservative institutions.215
Founded in 1964 after Barry Goldwater’s presidential election loss, the American Conservative
Union saw itself as a conservative organization to “build political power” modeled on the liberal
Americans for Democratic Action’s program of electing politicians and shaping their policies.216
The ACU opposed federal aid to education and a federal Department of Education, and supported
an anti-busing constitutional amendment and tax credits for private schools. A decade later, the
ACU incubated organizations that liberals today struggle to copy, chief among them the
Conservative Political Action Conference and the American Legislative Exchange Council. ACU
established a Legislative Exchange Committee to specialize in state-level policy after years spent
cultivating conservative legislators. Illinois state representative Don Totten took the group out on
its own. The Illinois legislative staffer who had originally named the group the Conservative
Caucus of State Legislators, liked to say that “a conservative legislator in some of our states is just
about as lonely as a Maytag repairman.”217
ACU, and thus ALEC, leaders were in Uhler’s personal and political network. As Uhler
joined the Reagan administration, his Yale College classmate M. Stanton (“Stan”) Evans had been
elected chairman of the American Conservative Union.218 The athletic Uhler had followed the
literary Evans through Yale in William F. Buckley’s wake: Berkeley College, Comment board,
Political Union. Together, Uhler and Evans built an Independent Library of conservative books
215
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in an Old Campus basement and even revived the Calliopean Society of John C. Calhoun’s time.219
During their senior year in 1955, Buckley, who founded the National Review that same year,
praised Evans’s work on the college paper the Independent, and subscribed.220 During the 1950s,
Evans edited for signature conservative publications The Freeman and Human Events, and for
publisher the Intercollegiate Society of Individualists. In 1960, Evans took a position as editor of
the metropolitan paper the Indianapolis News, where he advocated tax limitation throughout the
1970s.
Evans’s and Uhler’s support of the John Birch Society may explain why national
conservative media did not cheerlead tax limitation.

Buckley abandoned the ACU for

accommodating members of the John Birch Society, and attempted to purge the right of extremists.
Evans in turn quit the board of Buckley’s Young Americans for Freedom over the presence of a
particularly objectionable leader, and took over the American Conservative Union in 1970.221
Later, Evans allowed the Bircher John Rousselot, who Uhler had elected U.S. Representative, to
join the ACU board during the congressman’s second, non-consecutive term. Still, Evans wrote
frequently for Buckley’s National Review, and served as master of ceremonies at the popular

219

Driving east from California, where Evans had visited Uhler one school break, their car engine failed outside
Evans’s family home in Texas. Stranded, Uhler and Evans packed their loose clothes in paper suitcases and boarded
a bus, serenading their fellow passengers with Evans’ ukulele and Uhler’s baritone, in order to make it back to New
Haven in time for classes. Interview with Lew Uhler, week of March 4, 2019.
220
Wm. F. Buckley, Jr. to Stan Evans, January 25, 1955, Evans, M. Stanton (1955) Folder, Box 2, Part 1, WFB.
221
Evans objected to YAF New England Regional Chairman Dan Carmen. M. Stanton Evans to Robert Bauman,
November 11, 1963, Evans, M. Stanton Folder, Box 25, Part 1, WFB. After initially convincing his fellow ACU
board members to exclude Birchers from ACU leadership as part of a larger project to force the extremists out of the
mainstream conservative movement, Buckley resigned at the May 6, 1965 meeting after the board reversed itself.
Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors of the American Conservative Union, December 18-19, 1964, The
Statler-Hilton Hotel, Washington, D.C., Folder 12; Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors of the ACU,
May 6, 1965, Overseas Press Club, NYC, Folder 16, Box 20, ACU. By contrast, Evans identified with the “rightwing” thinking of many California Young Republicans who were members of the John Birch Society, which he did
not attack but sometimes disagreed with. M. Stanton Evans to Vernon C. McRee, July 20, 1965, M. Stanton Folder,
Box 35, Part 1, WFB.

372

conservative magazine’s 25th anniversary celebration.222 Evans’s and Buckley’s correspondence
reveals a mutually admiring but somewhat uneasy relationship, which Christopher Buckley
nonetheless remembers as “warm.”223
Many state legislators learned of tax limitation through the famously secretive and
conservative lobby ALEC. At ALEC’s first meeting in Chicago in July 1973, guest speaker Milton
Friedman told the assembled politicians and activists about Reagan’s Proposition 1.224 ALEC had
1,800 legislators’ names in its files by the end of 1973, but struggled to schedule an inaugural
conference, pushing it back to the summer of 1974. Thirty legislators from twenty states gathered
in Chicago to hear from politicians like balanced budget supporter and U.S. Senator from Kansas
Carl Curtis, American Conservative Union leaders Phyllis Schlafly and Stan Evans, and Uhler,
who described tax limitation efforts across the country with another University of Chicago
economist.225 ALEC’s first three chairman campaigned for tax limitation in their states: Don
Totten in Illinois, Buz Lukens in Ohio, and Woody Jenkins in Louisiana.226 Donna J. Carlson, an
Arizona representative from Mesa elected in 1974, chaired ALEC’s first two suggested state
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legislation committees.227 ALEC distributed model tax limit legislation suggesting a maximum
state budget growth rate between six and fourteen percent of state gross domestic product.228

Fig. 4: Flyer from the ACU collection at Brigham Young University. Tax limit from ALEC’s 1980 book of suggested
state legislation.

Governor Reagan returned to the campaign trail months after the Proposition 1 loss to
promote constitutional tax limitation in Arizona. While on vacation at his in-laws’ house outside
Scottsdale during the spring of 1974, Reagan spoke before fifteen hundred local Republicans at
the Trunk N’Tusk Club’s annual fundraiser. Reagan met with Sandra O’Connor at the Phoenix
Country Club to prepare for his speech. O’Connor, then the Speaker of the Arizona Senate and a
member of ALEC, struggled as Reagan had the year before to convince legislators to authorize a
tax limitation ballot measure. The House appropriations committee chair, famous for controlling
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the Arizona budget by keeping it in his car trunk, held up the amendment language for months.229
U.S. Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona telegrammed the Arizona speaker of the House to offer
his support for O’Connor’s measure which in his view “(overcame) all the objections” to
California’s original.
Much as Reagan’s administration had done, O’Connor raised the limit to increase its
political chances. Arizona’s proposed 7.9 percent limit, chosen to lock in the 1975 state budget’s
share of income, increased to 8.4 percent in order to push the constitutional amendment through
the legislature and onto the fall 1974 ballot. In addition, O’Connor dropped the California
language to ratchet down spending over time. When she sent Reagan Arizona’s Proposition 106
that summer, O’Connor thanked the California Governor for his “kindness and support.” While
O’Connor told a Reagan aide that the Governor had a “great idea in developing the proposal in
California,” it was Lew Uhler who O’Connor invited to Arizona to design tax limit legislation, and
who her husband asked to address his local Rotary Club. Although the tax limit lost, O’Connor
won, first her election to a county judgeship, then appointment to the state appeals court, then the
U.S. Supreme Court when President Reagan nominated her in 1981.
To shrink state government, ALEC grew. In 1975, ALEC opened a Washington, D.C.
office, issued a newsletter, First Reading, and established its own board including then-American
Conservative Union chairman Stan Evans, U.S. Representative and Young Americans for Freedom
leader Bob Bauman of Maryland, a Mr. Winter, Heritage Foundation founders Paul Weyrich and
Ed Feulner, and Reagan’s Tax Reduction Task Force chair Frank Walton, also an early president
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of Heritage.230 In its early issues, ALEC copied Reagan’s California Task Forces and earned the
governor’s endorsement of its “long overdue” and “fine work.”231 When North Carolina’s newly
Republican U. S. senator Jesse A. Helms fundraised for ALEC, he celebrated the group’s
“considerable effect” coordinating “welfare reform and tax limitation legislation in many state
legislatures.”232 Indeed, ALEC hoped to strengthen “grassroots government” with “ideas for
reducing and controlling the bureaucracy, promoting fiscal responsibility, lowering the tax burden
and safeguarding precious individual liberties.”233

Conclusion
After a year talking with Proposition 1 backers across the country, Uhler founded the
National Tax Limitation Committee in 1975 with National Review writers William Rickenbacker
as chair and Jameson Campaigne, Jr. as treasurer.234 Rickenbacker thought the Committee’s work
was to “coordinate the various efforts that are cropping up in many, many states,” serving as a
clearinghouse for tax limit lessons.235 As he told conservative radio host Dean Manion, the
committee’s purpose was to stop tax protest “100 per cent manned by amateurs, by political
virgins.”236 Tax revolts succeeded due to political professionals’ practice in the states rather than
to populist uprising.
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Tax limiters debated the role of people in tax politics but relied on elite conservatives for
expertise. The National Taxpayers Union, formed in 1969 to “reduce taxes in any way possible,”
was “granddaddy” to 1970s tax groups.237 Local organizations sometimes affiliated with both the
National Taxpayers Union and Uhler’s National Tax Limitation Committee. Claiming Woody
Jenkins, who advocated loose tax limitation language for the Louisiana constitution, as one of its
leaders, the National Taxpayers Union insisted in a piece of direct mail that his organization
“would like to achieve the same results in your area.”238 When the National Taxpayers Union
circulated an organizing manual, the tax reform it recommended was tax limitation, using
Louisiana as example. Thus, the National Taxpayers Union, which prided itself on being a
grassroots tax group, still took policy direction from Uhler, whose committee it dismissed as
“mainly a media event.”239
The journalist Bob Kuttner observed that “although the National Tax Limitation
Committee itself (was) not a grass-roots organization, many of the state and local groups assisted
by the NTLC (were).”240 If they were, they had not followed the committee’s advice. The National
Tax Limitation Committee encouraged local groups to build a professionally managed and scripted
“citizens’ movement,” and offered to recommend state leaders with the right connections.241 The
group needed a “neutral name”—“Citizens United, Taxpayers for Proposal One, Concerned
Taxpayers”—to secure support from the broadest base possible. To state campaigns, the National
Tax Limitation Committee provided research and technical assistance, publicity, membership
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recruitment, start-up funds, and campaigners. 242 Uhler established a Tax Limitation Research
Foundation to take money and fund economist Craig Stubblebine’s time advising state
campaigns.243
In a how-to guide, the National Tax Limitation Committee shared the first and only rule of
politics: “Politics requires money.” At the start, the National Tax Limitation Committee solicited
charter members, both individuals and businesses, with hand-signed letters but a year later, had
professionally-designed stationary and literature that played on the imagery of the American
bicentennial, calling fed-up taxpayers to join the National Tax Limitation Committee’s Boston tea
party.244 In the early years, contributors referred their friends, who received an article from Human
Events, “A Call to Arms” fundraising memo, and a list of sponsors.245 Later, the National Tax
Limitation Committee hired direct mail impresario Richard Viguerie to fundraise from custom lists
with a steady stream of membership appeals, congressional endorsements, and “push poll” surveys
full of leading questions. More often than donations, citizens sent requests for information. When
correspondents were from Michigan, the National Tax Limitation Committee directed them to
Dow Chemical’s Bill Shaker, where the story picks up in Ch. 7 “Model Legislation.”246
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Ch. 7 Model Legislation: How Business Institutions Spread Spending Limitation Across the
Country
Ahead of its 1973 annual meeting featuring a forum “Taxation: A business agenda for
action,” the U.S. Chamber installed a federal spending clock outside its Washington, D.C.
headquarters near the White House.1 Ticking down an average American family’s income of
$10,000 in federal spending every 1.26 seconds, the clock also counted up to $250 billion that first
fiscal year. The clock started after a technical glitch Nation’s Business spun to note “even the
most sophisticated device has trouble keeping up with federal spending.”2 The Associated Press
counted 55 minutes missed, and $25 million.3 “Should the clock run at a faster or slower pace”
the U.S. Chamber asked.4 A month later, the business association published an interview with
President Richard Nixon’s advisor John Ehrlichman, who forecast that restraining spending would
“be one of the central issues of the 1974 campaign.”
Held over into the next presidential administrations after Watergate became the central
campaign issue instead, Secretary of the Treasury and former municipal bond trader William
Simon borrowed the federal spending clock. Seeing clock hands spin in the U. S. Department of
the Treasury’s lobby, tourists were “amazed” at “how fast and how much money the American
government spends each day.”5 The U. S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association
of Manufacturers (NAM) began a parallel effort to California conservatives’ state tax limitation
campaign, described in Ch. 5 “Don’t Spend It Faster Than I Can Make It,” to shrink the federal
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government.6 Business associations needed effective grassroots movements in the states to
constrain the U. S. Congress’s spending. As Treasury secretary, Simon did his part to slow local,
state, and federal spending, denying a federal loan to New York City in 1975, and joining the board
of the National Tax Limitation Committee, founded by California political operative Lew Uhler
after the 1973 defeat of tax limitation ballot measure Proposition 1.7
Business expenditure ceiling and conservative tax limitation campaigns quickly intersected
as fiscal politics played out in the states before limits on the overall size of government could
return to the national stage. This chapter argues businesses organized connected local, state, and
national efforts to cut government, fine-tuning an organizational repertoire that succeeded when
economic crisis created political opportunity at the end of the 1970s.8

That business and

conservative fiscal programs developed along initially separate but similar lines suggests the
importance of shared economic advisors and business donors, in addition to the ubiquitous appeal
of controlling government growth by limiting taxing and spending.
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School finance reforms and teacher strikes threatened to increase education costs in the
early 1970s.9 The U. S. Chamber believed the absence of fiscal and management accountability
“spurred state legislation imposing spending or tax lids as a means to control school
expenditures.”10

NAM monitored the school finance lawsuits discussed in Ch. 3 “Detroit

Education Cases” and believed that school finance was a “high-priority concern and interest on
the part of the business community.”11 When the President’s Commission on School Finance
investigated a federal tax on the value added to goods at each stage of production, the U.S.
Chamber produced educational materials and NAM’s Education Committee angled for a
commission seat.12 Both business associations endorsed public aid to nonpublic schools and
consulted with leading scholars of tuition vouchers, a controversial experiment in education
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economics.13 Teachers strikes forestalled accountability measures like performance contracting,
as explained in Ch. 4 “Tax the Rich in Michigan.”14
Business associations functioned as political operations with an apparatus for electoral and
policy work, in addition to lobbying. The U. S. Chamber’s “Action Course in Practical Politics,”
founded in 1958, taught managers to bring the business viewpoint into political life by joining,
donating to, or volunteering for a political party.15 Companies used leaves of absence, rehire
provisions, and recognition to support employees taking on the union precinct walkers who built
the Democratic party.

Amway co-founder Jay Van Andel founded the U. S. Chamber of

Commerce’s political group Citizen’s Choice out of lessons learned from his direct selling
company’s unsuccessful campaign for tax limitation in Michigan in 1974 and 1976.16 Halfway
13
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between presidential candidate Barry Goldwater’s failure and Ronald Reagan’s success, career
managers and company executives affiliated with libertarian parties and conservative caucuses
campaigned alongside grassroots activists.17 On the eve of Reagan’s election in 1980, the National
Chamber Alliance for Politics funded candidates for U. S. Congress that shared the U.S.
Chamber’s agenda to balance the budget, repeal pro-union laws, deregulate industry, cut taxes,
and reduce the size of government.18
The

professional

services—temp

workers,

polling,

advertising,

marketing,

communications and public relations—tax limiters used cost money, which California political
operative Lew Uhler fundraised in crucial early days from companies like Michigan’s Dow
Chemical and Colorado’s Coors Brewing.19 Long-standing tax fighters like big, conservative
businesses and their taxpayers associations were early constitutional amendment backers, as were
multi-level marketers like Amway and newer federations of small or independent businesses.
While state conservative parties affiliated with the American Conservative Union, chaired by
Uhler’s Yale College friend M. Stanton Evans, recruited volunteers, campaigns also paid
temporary workers from Kelly Services and Manpower, Inc. to collect enough signatures to qualify
tax limitation for the ballot.
The first section describes business associations’ national plans for expenditure limits in
the early 1970s, piecing together U. S. Chamber of Commerce and National Association of
Manufacturers strategy, policy, and lobbying.

The second section follows businessmen’s
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application of the federal legislative idea through their local and state chambers of commerce, as
they adapted California’s Proposition 1 tax limitation language for Michigan in 1974 and 1976.
Importantly, economist Milton Friedman, stumped for spending limitation in Michigan and in
Tennessee, where the first victory came in March 1978 after state legislators opened the spending
rather than taxing articles of the constitution to head off an income tax.20 The Tennessee victory
opens the next chapter. This chapter is about defeat.

Business Plan
When the federal budget expanded during the Nixon presidential administration,
businesses paid for trying to slow government growth. After the U.S. Congress tied a 1968
expenditure ceiling to a ten percent income tax surcharge, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 capped
income tax rates at fifty percent while shifting the burden from individuals to corporations by
eliminating deductions; as Nixon’s 1971 wage and price controls contributed to record profits, the
1972 Humphrey-Hawkins full employment bill threatened cheap labor.21 Amidst these threats, the
National Federation of Independent Business and the Business Roundtable emerged to represent
small and large corporations, respectively, and the proposed merger between the National
Association of Manufacturers (NAM) and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce collapsed in 1976.
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However, business associations cooperated on pan-industry issues including regulation, labor
unions, trade liberalization, and taxes.22
Facing scrutiny from consumer activists, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s executive
director retorted “High Tax Bills Are Caused By Government Spending, Not ‘Loopholes’.”23 The
U.S. Chamber’s economic logic for why federal deficits grew previewed the public choice theory
cited by California tax limiters: “First, we all tend to favor cuts anywhere but in those programs
that benefit us. Second, Congress is not organized to stick to a budget it is organized to spend.”24
NAM’s Education Advisory Council included a University of California, Los Angeles economist
whose foundation funded early tax limitation studies.25 To reduce government spending in the
early 1970s, NAM and the U.S. Chamber coordinated to introduce federal legislation and enlist
local members of chambers of commerce and manufacturing, trade, and employers’ associations
to lobby senators and representatives.
From 1970 to 1972, the U.S. Chamber’s Special Committee on Long-Range Tax Policy
and Balanced Growth made “proposals that would stimulate balanced growth in the 1970’s.”26
Members on the committee included the chairman of Bethlehem Steel, the chief economists of
IBM and the NAM spin-off the National Industrial Conference Board, the tax law professor C.
Lowell Harriss and the economist Norman B. Ture, the CEO of the Union Oil Company of
California and the American Petroleum Institute’s tax director, Detroit bankers and a
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manufacturer, a variety of New Yorkers, and the Chicago corporate real estate lawyer who long
chaired the Chamber’s Tax Committee.27
More than an exceptional, temporary committee, the Special Committee on Long-Range
Tax Policy and Balanced Growth reflected the U.S. Chamber’s long-standing interests and ideas.
Harriss was an advisor to the Tax Foundation, itself founded in 1937 as a hinge between state and
federal constitutional taxing and spending limits, and sat on Governor Ronald Reagan’s Tax
Reduction Task Force in 1972.28 The Detroit bank was none other than First National, the bank
General Motors had taken an ownership stake in during the 1933 Michigan bank holiday. In
Chamber policy documents, taxation and energy policy were both tied to economic growth,
perhaps explaining why oil companies contributed to the Chamber’s tax policy.29 As executives
exported the American steel industry abroad, domestic legacy costs mattered all the more—
Bethlehem Steel paid $200 million in taxes in 1971.30 Challenged by community and consumer
groups to pay property tax bills in full, Bethlehem Steel’s chairman joined the U.S. Chamber’s
Taxation Committee while a U.S. Steel executive chaired the committee responsible for
implementing the Powell memorandum.31 Not just a program of extractive or heavy industry, light
manufacturers and technology companies campaigned for federal and later state limits.
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Fig. 2: Special Committee meeting on January 28, 1971. Ture at right. Taxation Committee chairman Walker
Winter last on left, reading from pamphlet. Special Committee chairman Stewart S. Cort, chairman of Bethlehem
Steel, sitting in the rear center.32

The U. S. Chamber baited the federal government with sticks and carrots. A month after
the Powell memo identified threats to capitalism including inequitable taxation, uncontrollable
inflation, and subversive ideology, the U.S. Chamber spoke out publicly for budget control.33 The
U.S. Chamber addressed President Nixon and members of the U.S. Congress who froze wages and
prices during the fall of 1971: “Let’s freeze government too” read full-page ads printed in the
Washington Post and covered in newspapers across the country.34 Calling on government to “do
its part” and “show self-discipline” by cutting federal spending and restraining money creation,
the U. S. Chamber’s ad argued taxpayers—workers subject to wage controls as well as businesses
subject to price controls—could not fight inflation alone. In the winter of 1972, President Nixon’s
deputy assistant secretary of the Treasury for tax policy joined economist Norman Ture and others
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for a U. S. Chamber meeting on the special committee’s recommendations for tax policy and
expenditure ceilings.35
An economic advisor to several presidential administrations and consultant to business
associations, Norman Ture is best known for his role in President Ronald Reagan’s 1981 tax cuts.
Ture finished his masters in economics at the University of Chicago in 1947, and took positions
on the Treasury Department’s tax analysis staff and at the National Bureau of Economic Research
while working on his dissertation.36 As economist on Congress’s Joint Economic Committee, Ture
advised U.S. House Ways and Means Committee chairman Wilbur Mills.37 Alongside Paul
McCracken and Arthur Burns, Ture was one of the economists the Democratic power broker called
upon for the cost-push view of inflation to counter the Johnson administration’s demand-pull
view.38 After receiving his Ph.D. in 1968, Ture started his own tax institute and economic
consultancy. Upon his later nomination as President Reagan’s undersecretary of the Treasury for
Tax and Economic Affairs, press releases noted his affiliation with conservative think tanks like
the American Enterprise Institute but neglected to list Ture’s consulting clients, namely NAM and
the U. S. Chamber.
In a 1972 white paper for the U.S. Chamber’s special committee, Ture argued that over the
long term, government taxing would produce balanced growth if rates were low and flat and levied
on as little income as possible.39 In particular, the corporate income tax should be eliminated in
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favor of pass-through S corporations or individual income taxes.

Redefining loopholes as

unneutralities that corrected penalties on work effort and productivity, saving and investing, and
risk-taking inherent to the income tax, Ture singled out a favorite business tax break—accelerated
depreciation—as an example of efficient allocation of scarce resources.40 Dismissing ecological
critiques of economic growth, Ture located problems elsewhere: “uncontrollable” programs that
grew automatically as beneficiaries increased and graduated income tax rates that raised revenue
faster than production grew. Ture, a member of President Nixon’s Task Force on Business
Taxation, cross-referenced his own work as legitimation, endorsing the presidential Task Force’s
recommendations that any additional federal revenue be raised through a value-added tax, rather
than an increase in income tax rates.
Expenditure ceilings, which aimed to change the way the U.S. Congress worked, were
harder to implement than the U. S. Chamber’s tax policy goals. Over time, the U. S. Congress had
split budgeting powers between committees for appropriations (expenditures) and finance or ways
and means (tax revenues). Continuing resolutions kept the government open during deficit years.
Thus, a southern Democrat like Wilbur Mills could demand cuts to Great Society programs from
his position as a committee chairman in the House with the authority to veto taxes. As the 1968
expenditure ceiling and its successors exempted budget lines such as the Vietnam War and Social
Security, business associations sought another way to fight budget inflation. In 1970, 34 percent
of gross national product went to government spending; if nothing changed, by 1980, this figure
would grow to 40 percent.41 Booth thought the necessary first step was reviving the Joint
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Committee on the Legislative Budget to “get the money-raisers together with the money-spenders,
to consider income and outgo at the same time.”42
The U.S. Chamber developed a five-point program: vote on the budget as a whole, project
costs for five years, start annual budgets at zero rather than the previous year’s appropriation, pilot
test new programs, and list all federal spending in one place. Several national chamber committees
and the sixty-three-member board of directors approved these points.43 “How Can We Control
Government Spending?” Executive Director Arch Booth’s monthly by-line editorial asked in April
1972.44 Booth encouraged local chambers and other business organizations to pressure their
congressmen to adopt the U.S. Chamber’s five-point program. The U.S. Chamber’s ad campaign
“See here Uncle!” also encouraged local chambers to use the five points in their work.45
The U.S. Chamber launched this budget control program in the weeks leading up to its
1972 annual meeting featuring discussions of local, state, and federal spending. Nine Action
Forums on the agenda included issues that could be resolved with less public spending: Public
Employee Labor Disputes: Strikes and Alternatives, Better Education for Your Tax Dollar, and
New Concepts in Taxation—What Business Can Do About the Property Tax?46 California
Governor Ronald Reagan addressed the second general session of the Sixtieth Annual Meeting.47
In California that April of 1972, the Reagan administration’s Legacy Task Forces began meeting
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to discuss tax reduction, among other planks of a future presidential platform.48 Perhaps the U.S.
Chamber’s federal expenditure ceiling influenced state tax limitation. Certainly, business’s
program shaped the Republican Party platform. When President Nixon ran for re-election that
fall, he campaigned for the unilateral authority to cut spending above a propose spending limit.49
That is, Nixon wanted to line item veto programs he considered wasteful. Reagan, who had failed
to shrink state government with the same powers at his disposal, could have advised Nixon that a
constitutional fix was needed.

Fig. 3: Exhibit at 1972 U.S. Chamber Annual Meeting on left; Reagan speaking on right.50

The U.S. Chamber recruited politicians to introduce legislation based on the business
association’s five-point program. In September 1972, U.S. Senator William E. Brock of Tennessee
introduced the “Federal Act to Control Expenditures and Upgrade Priorities” numbered Senate
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Bill 40 or 3984. Writing readers of the Chamber’s magazine Nation’s Business at the end of 1972,
Brock compared the U.S. Congress to a five-hundred member board spending a corporation into
bankruptcy.51 With minor modifications, the Brock bill as it came to be known, was the U.S.
Chamber’s five-point program, the result of a “two-year study by a committee of experts on fiscal
policy,” that is, the U.S. Chamber’s Special Committee on Long-Range Tax Policy and Balanced
Growth.52 Adapting the principle of zero-based budgeting to favor the benefit theory of taxation,
the Brock bill exempted major programs funded by user taxes from mandatory evaluations every
three years. Specifying the proportion of federal spending allocated automatically at seventy
percent, the Brock bill required each “trust fund” budget line be appropriated every year.
The U.S. Chamber never expected the Brock Bill to pass in 1972, but instead worked with
NAM to create the political conditions to carry the next bill, and the next bill after that. Sharing
the business community’s support with members of the U.S. Congress, Booth telegrammed the
U.S. Chamber’s intent: “to develop the groundswell of grassroots demand that will help assure
passage of the bill when it is reintroduced next year.”53 NAM endorsed the Brock bill and prepared
its own federal spending limit legislation to be introduced in February 1973.54 Not only did the
U.S. Chamber and NAM share legislative drafting and lobbying responsibilities, the business
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associations jointly produced economic knowledge. For example, economist Norman Ture wrote
related but not identical reports on tax policy for each organization.
NAM’s expenditure ceiling legislation built on years of internal work that gained
momentum as federal spending increased.55 Since 1969, a subcommittee of NAM’s Government
Operations/Expenditures Committee on the Expenditure Process had been meeting to discuss
expenditure ceilings.56 In 1971, NAM invited members to develop “a business-like program to
rationalize and improve the public expenditure process.”57 Recruitment proved challenging, with
U.S. Steel’s economist and a McGraw-Hill vice president, among others, saying no to a position
on the subcommittee.58 Michigan businesses Diamond Crystal Salt Company and Gerber Products
Company said yes.

When NAM convened a budget study task force to focus on federal

expenditures at the end of 1972, business participation increased. Western Electric Company, Inc.
sent its manager of economics and actuarial research, Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. its vice
president and treasurer, and Exxon and Merck & Company their top economists.59
Consultants including Norman Ture performed analysis while NAM staffers ran the
Expenditure Process subcommittee.

Ture’s 1971 report to NAM’s full Government

Operations/Expenditures Committee on “Federal Finances in the 1970’s” was followed by a May
1972 Taxation Committee request for a report on corporate taxation.60 Ture recommended tying
federal spending to economic growth in a more complicated manner than the California
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conservatives slowing state spending, but the basic principle was the same.61 NAM’s Expenditure
Process subcommittee resolved that an expenditure ceiling should limit exemptions for
“uncontrollables” like Social Security and apply to both congressional and executive budgets. If
effective, this spending limit would keep taxes reasonable and encourage public sector
productivity.62 As it prepared to introduce its version of an expenditure ceiling in the U. S.
Congress at the beginning of 1973, NAM publicly released Norman Ture’s study “Tax Policy,
Capital Formation and Productivity,” an econometric substantiation of the argument the economist
made for the U.S. Chamber just months before. Ture argued eliminating tax penalties for private
savings and “capital formation” would grow the economy.63 Ture presented twenty years’ worth
of data that redistributive taxation did not reduce income equality. The previous month, Ture held
a press conference for NAM, and the next month, addressed “The Fiscal Crisis” at NAM’s
Industry/Government Dialogue for Action, Public Policy, and Economic Growth conference.64
NAM called on leading conservative economists who later advised the tax limitation
movement in the states. Bill Niskanen, then at the U. S. Office of Management and Budget, shared
his standard advice that it “was necessary to change the ‘conventional wisdom’ of officials” like
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bureaucrats who wanted to expand government.65 The American Enterprise Institute presented a
study on the federal budget study by University of Michigan economics professor Paul
McCracken.66 A member of Eisenhower’s and Nixon’s Council of Economic Advisors and of
Johnson’s Presidential Commission on Budget Concepts, McCracken would advocate for
constitutional amendments in California and Michigan. At the end of 1973, economist Milton
Friedman, American Conservative Union chairman and U.S. representative from Illinois Phil
Crane, and the conservative writer and editor Bill Buckley, Jr. spoke at NAM’s annual Congress
of American Industry at New York’s luxurious Waldorf-Astoria hotel.67 With the exception of
Friedman, these were the economists the Democratic Ways and Means chairman Wilbur Mills
consulted.68
Within weeks of the introduction of the U. S. Chamber of Commerce’s Brock Bill, the U.S.
Congress had convened a Joint Study Committee on Budget Control. Business kept up the
pressure as members of appropriations and revenue committees in the House and Senate negotiated
over budget control. As they revised the Joint Committee’s bill, senators introduced favored U.S.
Chamber provisions including estimates of outlays for five years, pilot testing of new programs,
and time limits for any program authorization.69 Internally, the Chamber of Commerce Newsletter
and magazine Nation’s Business advertised “Take your choice. Control spending or raise taxes.”70
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Coordinating with local and state chambers of commerce in addition to NAM, the U.S.
Chamber lobbied politicians to control spending.71 U.S. Chamber board member David Packer,
chairman of technology company Hewlett-Packard and Nixon’s recent Secretary of Defense,
chaired the advocacy group Citizens for Control of Federal Spending.72 Rather than a “substantial
decrease in federal outlays,” NAM expected to turn the tide “away from the runaway growth in
spending experienced over the past decade.”73

With statements and testimony before

congressional committees, personal communications with legislators and staffers, pamphlets,
bulletins, and NAM Reports articles, and targeted outreach from members in key states and
districts, NAM lobbied for the strongest bill possible. NAM judged itself “one of very few
organizations with the membership, resources, and policy positions necessary to maintain a
constant watch over the legislation…”74 However, monitoring was not enough to remove federal
legislators’ prerogative to spend.
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 established a new
Congressional Budget Office, budget committees in the House and Senate, and a new process of
resolution and reconciliation, ending what one scholar called the “Seven-Year Budget War.”75
However, many of the Chamber’s provisions, in particular the spending ceiling, were stripped from
the final legislation and replaced with targets.

Existing practices, for example, backdoor

legislation and off-budget agencies, were banned only for new programs.76 For permanent limits,
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business temporarily shifted focus from the U.S. Congress to state constitutions. The U.S.
Chamber and NAM achieved one clear victory: nearly every financial decision would require
approval from multiple committees. In many ways, the Johnson administration opened the conflict
by spending on guns and butter and implementing programming-planning-budgeting. Nixon
escalated in 1973 by insisting on a binding expenditure ceiling, vetoing departmental budgets like
Health, Education, and Welfare’s, and impounding appropriated funds. Importantly, the U.S.
Congress re-established its authority over the federal budget by requiring a vote to keep money
frozen.77
The legislative budget restored the U.S. Congress’s constitutional power of the purse and
located political power in state-level campaigns for federal legislators, where business was
prepared to gain influence. The U.S. Chamber devoted more money and manpower to electing
legislators, favorably comparing its success rate to the labor federation the AFL-CIO a few years
after the 1971 election campaign finance reforms.78 NAM published legal advice on “what a
corporation can and cannot do to encourage employee political contributions and other forms of
political activity.”79 What should be done in the nation’s capital could be done in state capitols
too.

Michigan Losses
During the early 1970s, striking teachers demanded a say over curriculum and
accountability in addition to salaries. Public sectors strikes threatened business interests because
representatives lost the “free choice” to budget when the “civil servant tail” tried to “wag the
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government dog.”80 Public employees like teachers who provided the “most vital services” were
in “the best position to extort excessive pay packages” from state and local governments.81 The
U. S. Chamber observed the AFL-CIO’s contribution to New York teachers’ strike fine and warned
that financial penalties alone could not deter the whole labor movement. Moreover, public sector
strikes encouraged private sector militancy.82 The U. S. Chamber established a subcommittee on
Public Employee Bargaining and held a National Symposium on Public Employee Unionization.83
Four hundred companies were involved in state and local fiscal projects by the end of the 1970s.
Michigan, where business conservatives including chemical engineers and direct sellers
put tax limit language before legislators and voters in 1974, 1976, and 1978, was a laboratory for
Uhler’s political program. Dow Chemical Company industrial engineer and lobbyist Bill Shaker,
was inspired by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to lead his Midland, MI chamber of commerce’s
state tax and spending limitation efforts. Dow Chemical’s Chairman of the Board sent the
company’s money and lobbyist to support California’s Proposition 1 tax limitation.84 Bill Shaker
spent three weeks campaigning with Uhler and a week after the 1973 defeat “poking through the
ashes.” Carbon copying a Dow USA executive vice president, Uhler wrote to the general manager
of the chemical company’s western division, thanking him for Dow and Shaker’s “excellent
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support and assistance.”85 The University of Michigan economist Paul McCracken, who endorsed
Prop 1 and wrote Uhler that there was “some interest” in a similar program for Michigan, could
have learned about tax limitation from Dow, on whose board he sat.86
In those days, a “bunch of cowboys,” not “your traditional Wall Street types,” ran Dow.87
Uhler remembers: “They weren’t very tolerant of invasive government or anything else and they
fought back.” Dow, which did not consider itself a “team player,” had left the National Association
of Manufacturers in the fall of 1972, but kept its membership in the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.88
After fierce student protest over Dow engineering recruitment on college campuses focused public
attention on the napalm producer’s role in the Vietnam War, Dow invested in public relations.89
At the same time, Dow hired tax limiters to quietly roll back state electricity regulations.90
Throughout the 1970s, Dow’s Manager of Public Affairs sat on the Chamber’s Public Affairs
Committee and its director of government affairs served on the Government Operations and
Management Committee.91 After rejoining NAM towards the end of the decade, Dow’s renamed
Director of Public Affairs led the manufacturers’ association’s Public Affairs program.92
The company’s public relations abilities surely influenced Shaker’s self-presentation as a
concerned citizen. Shaker was an engineer steeped in a long tradition of anti-union management
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practices who held the title Manager of Government Relations Technical Analysis for Dow.93
Based on Shaker’s mathematical model of manpower and his time measurement methods, Dow
first cut then sped up its workforce.94 When Shaker spoke publicly, he hid his training in industrial
relations, his work in lobbying, and his chairmanship of the Michigan State Chamber of Commerce
state affairs committee. Explaining his role in tax limitation, Shaker told journalists he took a
leave of absence from the company to travel to California after independently coming up with the
same idea for his local chamber of commerce, based in the Michigan city where Dow had begun
processing chemicals in the nineteenth-century.95 Given property tax limitation’s long history as
a fiscal concept in Michigan, as described in Ch. 1 “Tax Slackers,” Shaker may very well have
thought up his own version. Or perhaps state tax limitation, which the Boston Chamber of
Commerce was considering at the time, was a U.S. Chamber of Commerce program.96
Shaker claimed his inspiration for tax limitation amendment petition language was a March
1972 Midland Area Chamber of Commerce policy statement that taxes should be set at a fixed
proportion of governmental units’ ability to pay.97 A chamber tax study committee had examined
Michigan taxes and proposed that government at all levels control costs to restrain inflation and
encourage economic growth. These findings echoed the U.S. Chamber’s contemporaneous calls
for a federal spending ceiling described in the first section of this chapter. Local chambers received
the Chamber of Commerce Newsletter, which ran several ads about the U.S. Chamber’s campaign
to slow federal spending, and participated in the National Council. Chambers of Commerce
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coordinated tax campaigns with At the end of the 1960s, of all the taxpayers’ organizations the
Chamber worked with, local chambers operated twenty-two percent.98 Also in 1972, Shaker and
a Saginaw, MI lawyer started an informal tax organization, which would later divide its labor
between elite and grassroots organizing.99 Announcing taxpayer group support for the state tax
limit in a conservative Detroit newspaper, Shaker added reasons that echoed the U.S. Chamber’s
explanation of the “taxation and spending explosion”—“the lack of effective management tools in
the legislative spending process, the snowball effect of government spending programs and the
underestimated cost of government services”—and public choice economists’—“(t)he power of
special interest as contrasted with the general interest.”100
Backed by business associations, Dow brought tax limitation to the industrial Midwest,
where Uhler hoped the fiscal concept would launch to the nation. Upon returning to Midland, MI,
Shaker immediately and unsuccessfully tried to “sell (the Michigan) legislature on the idea.”101
Republican politicians like Michigan’s moderate governor thought that since taxation followed
spending, a limit on taxes alone was too simplistic.102 Failing to get his bill out of committee in
the state House, Shaker and his company sought Uhler’s help.103 Angling for a consulting contract,
Uhler proposed to help Dow improve its “political technology,” prodding Shaker to pursue a “farreaching, aggressive, carefully calculated strategy” to save the petroleum products industry from
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regulation or nationalization.104 Tax limitation, Uhler implied, would preserve the free enterprise
system.
Uhler positioned his interest in Michigan as strategic as well as financial. In the pages of
Human Events, Uhler predicted adoption in a “major industrial state” like Michigan would
“precipitate a groundswell of such efforts in the Midwest and Northeast” and “provide the
necessary support base from which to launch federal tax limitation.”105
Lessons from California included: the public sector was a “potent force” that “must be
neutralized”; petition signers were potential campaign volunteers; the electorate needed to be
“immunized” with “(c)omplete but simple information” in advance; the sponsoring committee
should be non-partisan; the amendment should include short-term tax breaks; local school taxes
should be subject to the limit too.
Regrouping, Shaker cleared petition language for a 1974 ballot initiative by several
Michigan law firms and by Uhler’s aides and economists, including Milton Friedman, Bill
Niskanen, and Craig Stubblebine.106 The Michigan amendment limited forty-seven state and local
taxes and other state revenue to 8.3 percent of personal income, the state’s share in 1974. If the
state exceeded its limit, taxpayers would be refunded taxes proportional to what they paid, and if
the state mandated new local services, it would have to pay for them. With forty co-sponsors in
the state House, the tax limit bill was expected to die in committee.107 A petition drive would be
necessary.
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Shaker aimed to reverse the past few years of school finance reform and forestall
metropolitan governance. A director of the Conservative Party of Michigan, founded in 1971 by
“professionals, small businessmen, anti-union workers, and angry housewives” drawn from “antigun control, anti-busing, anti-ERA, Pro-life, libertarian, anti-tax and other groups,” Shaker likely
heard an address on “Education and Anti-Busing” at the 1973 Conservative Legislative
Conference held at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport before flying off to California’s Proposition
1 campaign.108 In a rejection of the Detroit Board of Education’s new state-granted ability to levy
a non-voted income tax, the 1974 tax limitation petition required voter approval for all local taxes.
By effectively requiring voter approval for new political units too, Shaker hoped the amendment
would “cut the jugular vein of the social planners and others at the public trough” who advocated
metropolitan busing for school integration and regional land-use planning.109 Detroit anti-busing
activist Carmen Roberts later joined the conservative party.110 Shaker picked a date dear to leftists
everywhere to launch his petition drive: May Day.111
Uhler advised assigning signature goals in a “pyramid organizational structure” to hold
individuals and groups “accountable,” and assigning a full-time staffer, possibly from the
Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, who was “highly organized” and a “real salesman.”112
Whether or not the state chamber provided a staffer, its board voted unanimously to support the

108

William H. Shaker listed as director, alongside chairman Norman Hughes and others, with a term expiring in
1975. The Michigan Conservative Viewpoint, undated circa 1973 party publication; Flyer for the Conservative
Legislative Conference, Hilton Inn, Detroit Metropolitan Airport, August 11, 1973, Folder 19, Box 59, ACU.
Norman R. Hughes to M. Stanton Evans, June 2, 1975, Folder 11 Conservative Party of Michigan, Box 59, ACU.
109
William H. Shaker to Rocket Committee Member, May 22, 1974, Box 1, Folder TUTL Correspondence 1973,
TUF.
110
Flyer for Michigan Conservative Union, CPAC 78: A Blueprint for Action, Folder 19, Box 59, ACU.
111
News Release, April 29, 1974, Michigan Drawer, Loose 1974 Papers, LKU.
112
Lewis K. Uhler to Bill Shaker, May 22, 1974, Michigan Drawer, Shaker Folder, LKU.

403

tax limitation amendment Shaker presented and printed petitions for all who asked.113 The
National Federation of Independent Businesses surveyed its 15,493 Michigan members about the
amendment, and circulated petitions after their favorable response.114 A state legislator, one of
fifty-four who endorsed tax limitation, asked the Gas Station Dealers Association and the
Restaurant Association to display petitions in member businesses.115
Ideological lines drawn far to the right of bipartisan, Shaker collected signatures through
conservative groups. A professor of history in Cereal City, USA, executive secretary of the
Michigan chapter of Young Americans for Freedom, and member of the Conservative Party of
Michigan coordinated the petition drive.116 Another party member was Oakley Bramble, veteran
of 1960s tax groups and author of the Inflation Survival Newsletter.117 The Conservative Party of
Michigan was centrally concerned with loss of freedom due to deficit spending, and proposed
reducing federal debt, returning to the gold standard, and revoking the minimum wage to stabilize
the economy.118 The American Conservative Union circulated petitions too.119 The Michigan
Americanism Council, a proven group which gathered 200,000 signatures to roll back the gas tax,
also gathered signatures.120 Suggesting potential supporters to Shaker, the executive secretary of
the Michigan Americanism Council listed anti-abortion, pro-gun, local control, Liberty
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Amendment, and tax revolt groups, and signed off by noting that he “must make a J.B.S.
presentation in two hours” surely referring to the John Birch Society.121 Over 80 homeowner and
taxpayer groups signed up.122
These volunteers did not collect enough signatures, and the campaign searched for funds
to buy more. As Uhler admitted to a California businessman whose midwestern contacts he hoped
to raise money from, corporate funds could not be used for the petition drive under Michigan
law.123 Dr. George Roche, president of the conservative Hillsdale College in western Michigan,
fundraised, and deputized his assistant.124 Even University of Chicago economist Milton Friedman
recommended Michiganders to solicit, including business economist Ted Yntema, former
Committee for Economic Development researcher and vice-president for finance at Ford Motor
Company.125 While a number of bank, power, manufacturing, insurance, and transportation
companies somehow managed to give hundreds of dollars in 1974, the donations that stand out
were in the thousands: Amway Corporation ($3,000), General Motors Corporation ($5,000),
Chrysler Corporation ($1,500), American Motors Corporation ($1,000), Federal-Mogul
Corporation ($1,000), The Bendix Corporation ($1,000), Dow Chemical Company ($10,000).126
These Michigan companies were all active members of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.127

121

Malcolm W. Dale to William Shaker, December 15, 1973, Folder TUTL Correspondence 1973, Box 1, TUF.
William H. Shaker to Rocket Committee Member.
123
Lewis K. Uhler to Edwin A. Seipp, June 4, 1974, Michigan Drawer, Michigan Fund-Raising Folder, LKU.
124
Lewis K. Uhler to Don Lipsett, April 12, 1976; George Roche to Mr. Lewis K. Uhler, May 31, 1974; Lewis K.
Uhler to George C. Roche, III, July 2, 1974, Michigan Drawer, Interested People Folder, LKU.
125
Friedman told Uhler to try an executive from the auto industry, Theodore Yntema, and an economist, Andrew
Court. Lewis K. Uhler to Bill Shaker, May 28, 1974.
126
Untitled donation list from 1974, Box 1, Folder TUTL Finances 1974, TUF.
127
Amway’s chairman served on the Task Force on the Powell Memorandum. Chrysler’s lobbyist was on the Special
Panel on Multinational Corporations. A General Motors vice president chaired the Tax Committee beginning in 1976.
Auto company executives served on many Chamber committees. The chairman and president of Federal-Mogul
Corporation served on the Special Committee on Long-Range Tax Policy and Balanced Growth. The Bendix
Corporation’s Director of Taxes sat on the Chamber’s Tax Committee. Membership of National Chamber Committees
and Panels, 1970-1976, Box 22, Series I, U.S. Chamber records.
122

405

Ultimately, the 1974 Michigan petition campaign fell 110,000 out of 265,000 signatures
short.128 Michigan’s Attorney General cleared the way for the next campaign: that summer, he
decided Shaker’s 155,000 signatures could be used in a 1976 petition drive.129 Reporting on the
tax limitation campaign’s successes, Shaker asked his company to decide if it was “in Dow U.S.
Area interest to continue this effort” and what his future involvement should be.130
In the meantime, Dow hired Uhler to help Shaker deregulate electricity markets in
Michigan. While other business backers of the 1974 tax limit turned back to economic education,
or “more graphically, ‘selling the profits system,’” Dow cut its production costs by lowering
electricity prices.131

With economists including University of Michigan professor and tax

limitation supporter Paul McCracken advising, Uhler ran a “Blackout Prevention and Job
Development Project” that pushed through 1975 legislation to eliminate public utility status,
introduce peakload pricing, and permit insurance.132
With Dow’s attention elsewhere, the American Conservative Union and American
Legislative Exchange Council kept tax limitation on the Michigan agenda. In the spring of 1975,
ACU chairman Stan Evans, Uhler’s college friend, and a staffer spoke at a one-hundred person
rally and testified at a Michigan Senate hearing on a tax limitation bill, “essentially the same as
the T.L.A. Petition.”133 When the Conservative Party of Michigan sought to affiliate with the ACU
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that summer, it offered “assistance to your Legislative Exchange Council.”134 ALEC had begun
as a committee of the ACU. When an early ALEC executive director visited Michigan, the
Conservative Party of Michigan contacted twenty-four state legislators, and convinced a western
Michigan representative to be the state’s ALEC coordinator, one of forty-six members by 1976.135
By the next ballot initiative, the ACU had 4,500 financial contributors in Michigan.136

The 1976 Michigan Loss
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Fig. 4: Michigan Drawer, Schedule Folder, LKU. Barry Rohan, “Economist Learns of Prize On Tax Vote Trip to
Detroit,” Detroit Free Press, October 15, 1976, 3.

During the height of the 1976 campaign season, Milton Friedman boldly predicted a “littlenoticed” measure on the Michigan ballot would have more impact on the country’s future course
than who was elected president.137 Proposal C asked voters to amend the state constitution to limit
tax revenues to a fixed share of state income. Friedman traveled to Michigan to campaign for the
proposal and was greeted by a crowd of reporters in the parking lot of the Detroit Press Club,
presumably the start of a long day of news conferences. A photographer handed Friedman a sheet
from the wire service: the University of Chicago economist had won the Nobel Prize. Would
Friedman stay to stump or tend to media inquiries? Friedman left the decision up to his hosts from
the National Tax Limitation Committee; it took them all of five seconds to request the country’s
most famous conservative economist stick to the day’s scheduled events. Friedman happily
obliged as National Review editor Bill Rickenbacker personally flew him to speak across the state.
Asked why he was so committed to “the cause of constitutional tax-limitation,” Friedman replied:
“Because it’s our only hope.”138
While the NTLC hoped Michigan would be the breakthrough for tax limitation in 1976,
the campaign was too important to leave to Michiganders.139 Uhler managed the campaign from
a distance and lived in Michigan on and off, the better to run phone banks and supervise actions.140
After Taxpayers United held a Lansing luncheon to “kickoff” the new initiative drive in early
March, Uhler vetted consultants including the famed political campaign managers at Public Affairs
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Analysts, Inc.141 F. Clifton White, organizer of the Goldwater grassroots in 1964, agreed to
“remain in the background and on a low profile basis” as “outside professional help.”142 Michigan
too had consultants steeped in tax campaigns, including a public relations counselor who had
managed corporate urban affairs for Ford Motor Company and worked with the Michigan State
Chamber of Commerce to defeat a constitutional amendment to graduate the income tax in 1960.143
Whether or not he subcontracted campaign planning, Uhler proposed founding a
“Taxpayers United of ______ County” in each of Michigan’s twenty largest counties to “be the
local level operational vehicle for the campaign.”144 In June, a township supervisor and a labor
leader lead twenty county groups in protesting property taxes at the state capital; by the end of the
summer, they held a conference on the conservative western shore of Michigan, in Grand
Rapids.145 Analyzing Republican registrations, votes on comparable issues, including apparently,
the 1972 presidential candidacy of George Wallace, and property taxes, Uhler had selected twenty
counties in which to base the campaign.146 Organized together as a Taxpayers Federation, these
groups surely followed Uhler’s campaign outline. The “overriding need” in Uhler’s estimation
was “to make the people resistant to the lies and scare tactics of the opposition.”147 Motivational
research should influence the media message that would immunize voters. Every word mattered:
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when Shaker approached petition signers, he found if he “said anything to them about limiting
spending that scared them away.”148
Uhler used commitments from businesses like Amway and Dow as collateral for a loan
from Joe Coors. Pledges secured by June, Uhler asked Coors for a $10,000 loan to keep the “hired
hands” gathering signatures from Manpower, Inc. “in the field continuously.”149 Coors, the scion
of the Colorado brewing company who had recently founded the Heritage Foundation in
Washington, D.C., hoped to bring tax limitation to Colorado. The example of a prominent
conservative businessman personally lending money to pay temp workers to collect ballot
initiative petition signatures suggests the ways tax limit campaigns benefitted the bottom line by
reducing business expenses for some and increasing revenue for others.
While taxpayers’ organizations, the Michigan Association of Realtors, the National
Federation of Independent Businesses, and Amway helped collect 350,000 authorizing petition
signatures, Taxpayers United again hired Kelly Services and Manpower, Inc.150 During one week
in which Uhler kept count, realtors brought in 12,788 signatures and Manpower, Inc. 7,500.151 At
one point, the Teamsters, just about the only labor union to support tax limitation, collected 3,000
signatures.152 The petition needed 300,000 signatures to qualify the constitutional amendment for
the ballot. However, the temp agencies would only release signatures when their bills were paid.
Uhler, whose secretary was “no more systematic” than he, was notorious for sending late
payments.153 However it happened, the tax limit qualified for the ballot as Proposal C.
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Michigan conservatives constructed a grassroots image for their professionally designed
campaign. After, Taxpayers United boasted it had 20,000 petition circulators, 2,500 financial
supporters, and two hundred chairman or coordinators of grassroots organizations.154 However,
when calculating direct mail costs, Uhler estimated there were “10,000+” circulators.155 Richard
Viguerie turned down the direct mail account, and Taxpayers United later bought its own mailing
lists—Conservative Republican Contributors, Inflation Survival Actives, Right to Work Poll
Respondees, Human Events subscribers.156 Wayne Klein Communications placed op-eds and
arranged interviews for Friedman, among others.157 After a competitive search, Taxpayers United
hired advertiser Alan Baldridge of Bloomingdale, IL to draft a professional brochure to look like
an amateur sketch.158

By contrast, when the Michigan Education Association mailed its

publication Teacher’s Voice to members, its cartoon critique of Proposal C campaign materials
was actually clumsily-drawn.
The difference between public and private presentation shaped campaign strategy. While
House Democratic staffers were aware of some individual tax limiters, and their inspiration in
California’s Proposition 1, seeing the press releases, photos, and conferences, they thought
Proposal C’s Michigan origins were in the House of Representatives’ Republican caucus.159 A
Taxpayers United press release named Mrs. Flora Whan as “The Birmingham, Michigan,
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grandmother heading the grassroots Taxpayers United for Proposal C” when Dow Chemical Co.
executive Bill Shaker was in charge behind the scenes.160

Fig. 5: Alan Baldridge’s brochure draft on the left; the Proposal C brochure center; the MEA’s cartoon on the right.161

Uhler relied on the Michigan State Chamber of Commerce president to organize
businesses.

With a Democratic legislature and a moderate Republican governor, business

associations had felt forced to accede to a single business tax, but were able to structure it like a
value-added tax that corporations could pass on to consumers. Dow Chemical Company lobbyist
Bill Shaker had approached the Michigan businessman and former president of the Junior Chamber
of Commerce, Richard Headlee, to be “front man” for the 1976 Michigan tax limit campaign, but
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Headlee would not say yes for another year.162 When the Chamber asked Uhler for advice on
permissible “corporate contributions and activities,” the NTLC commissioned an opinion from a
Lansing, MI attorney known as a political fixer.163
The Michigan State Chamber of Commerce recommended a budget of $350,000 for media,
and $332,000 more for printing, polling, public relations, and advocacy.164 Since the spring, Uhler
had been fundraising from out-of-state donors, and from Michigan businessmen who the state
Chamber of Commerce introduced him to.165 Donors introduced tax limiters to potential donors.
An insurer hosted a dinner with Uhler, Rickenbacker, and Niskanen.166 Shaker met Justin Dart of
Southfield, MI’s Dart Industries at luncheon at Pepperdine University, and appealed to their shared
support of Ronald Reagan.167 Elsewhere in Michigan, Shaker met with Saginaw Steering Gear
and Benton Harbor’s Whirlpool Corporation. Uhler and Hillsdale College president George Roche
co-chaired a fundraising campaign advised by a professional firm, which netted dozens of
individual donations, some in cash.168 Hoping to encourage General Motors and Ford Motor
Company to deduct donations, the Chamber launched an “educational fund” and fundraised at a
private Detroit club with the retired president of the utility company Detroit Edison as host.169
Uhler hoped Ford would follow GM in donating, but even Ford’s Chief Economist, the NTLC
board member Bill Niskanen, could not persuade the car company.
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With the Michigan State Chamber of Commerce out front, the Michigan Manufacturers
Association quietly alerted its members when tax limitation qualified for the 1976 ballot, and
shared the organization’s “How Much Is Enough?” brochure.170 The National Association of
Manufacturers had an agreement not to “‘touch’ state issues” but promised the Michigan tax
limitation campaign they would “go to work on MMA along the lines we discussed w/” an
intermediary, and named one Detroit business to contact.171 The result was a dry pro and con
mailing similar to the association’s briefs on other ballot initiatives.172 Individual manufacturers
like the Kuhlman Corporation mailed pro-tax limitation material to their employees and
stockholders, and to fellow businesses like the Manufacturers National Bank of Detroit.173 The
newspaperman in charge of the Panax Corporation gave $5,000 in cash, and printed the petition
for his 500,000 Michigan readers.174
Cheekily, the vote no campaign suggested that the Michigan State Chamber of Commerce
could “hold down state expenditures” through “full employment opportunities which will reduce
welfare costs and unemployment costs and crime costs and will reduce government
employment.”175
As in California, tax limiters minimized the importance of the general interest group the
League of Women Voters, which ran the opposition coalition, Michigan Taxpayers Voting ‘No’
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on Proposal C.176 Six weeks before the election, the League called 135 organizations to a “meeting
to work for the defeat of Proposal C.”177 The League opposed Proposal C’s constitutional
restrictions on the Legislature’s “broad and fundamental taxing power.”178 A frequent lobbyist on
education and environmental bills, the League felt representative government worked for it and
the organizations whose leaders chaired No on C subcommittees including the Michigan Catholic
Conference, the Michigan Education Association (MEA), and the American Association of
University Women.179 University of Michigan public finance economist Harvey Brazer spoke at
No on C press conferences across the state.180
In addition to distributing buttons, bumper stickers, and brochures, and communicating
through letters to the editor, press conferences, and public speeches, the League’s coalition
broadcast radio spots on 72 stations, and hired a survey firm to adjust the message going
forward.181 The ads were recorded by white and Black and male and female announcers, and as
in California, local coalition members could pay to air them.182 To start, the No on C coalition
warned that police, prison, mental health, hospital, and school budgets would be cut, and that
vulnerable populations would lose their property tax breaks. Retired teachers were urged to vote
no.183 The 169 people who attended Speakers Bureau seminars in late September and early
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October were urged to “avoid government-school conflicts as well as beaurocracy (sp) vs. taxpayer
in their presentations.184
As teachers saw it, school finance reform and tax limitation were in conflict by design.
MEA members saw Proposal C as “a threat” to programs and salaries, which depended on “a fair,
flexible system of state taxes and finances.”185 After the Detroit Board of Education v. State of
Michigan case in 1968, the state had assumed more school costs as the threat of school finance
reform opened wallets. However, strapped for cash, Governor Milliken issued executive orders
reducing education funding in 1976.186 Thus, the 1976 spending levels Proposal C locked in could
not finance the state’s programs. When the Detroit Federation of Teachers urged its members to
vote no on Proposal C, it argued the limit would shift school finance back to regressive local taxes
on property.187 The Michigan Federation of Teachers worried that, since public schools were the
only state program with local revenue sources, Proposal C would lead to tuition increases or
programs cuts in communities that could not pass property tax millages. As Michigan’s state
superintendent observed, producers like teachers could not tax consumers like property owners
without the consumer’s approval. Since enrollments were declining, but costs accelerating, this
was an untenable position.188
Teachers were effective communicators with direct stakes—the ideal campaigners—but
they were divided into two unions. Only four years before, the AFT and NEA state affiliates had
split over whether to ask businesses with property wealth, or individuals with high incomes, to pay
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more for schools. As the 1976 election approached, the two teachers’ unions again diverged over
the labor movement’s latest proposal for who should pay. In 1976, another tax proposal was on
the ballot: the Michigan Citizens Lobby which had two years earlier exempted food and drugs
from the sales tax proposed to graduate the state’s income tax, raising rates on incomes above
$20,000 and dropping them from 4.6 to 3.9 percent on incomes below.189 The League of Women
Voters, as it had during the 1972 election, took a “neutral stand” on this proposal to graduate the
income tax.190 The state’s largest AFT local, the Detroit Federation of Teachers, was focused on
passing a routine millage to keep city schools open after years of fiscal crisis.191
Teachers did cooperate to stop Proposal C.

The Michigan Federation of Teachers

distributed the League coalition’s research and campaign materials, written by the MEA public
affairs director, to presidents of AFT locals.192 When the MEA public affairs director turned up a
copy of California political consultancy Whitaker & Baxter’s report on the California Teachers
Association’s 1973 anti-Proposition 1 campaign, the Michigan Federation of Teachers received a
copy too.193
While public employee union members went door-to-door for reasons both personal and
professional, independent contractors from Amway canvassed for the free market. Taxpayers
United had its own supply of “bodies:” a former Reagan gubernatorial appointee and Amway
Corporation lobbyist on the tax organization’s Steering Committee offered the services of 5,000
to 8,000 active, part-time Amway distributors.194 Part of the direct-selling company’s mission to
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promote the American Way was to preserve the free enterprise system. Management theorist Peter
Drucker and economists Bill Niskanen, Paul McCracken, and Milton Friedman recorded messages
of support for tax limitation, which Amway distributors played at “in-house” gatherings.195
Realtors also reached voters in their homes. A California realtor wrote Uhler a campaign
manual transforming the “farm system” realtors used to cultivate clients into political territory to
“educate, inform, and persuade” homeowners to vote for tax limitation.196 “One-to-One contact”
would benefit both the campaign, which could gauge support, and the realtors, “through proven
dollar return from client relationships that are developed.”197 The chairman of the Michigan
Association of Realtors’ Political Action Committee claimed that “many members found that the
petition opened the door to listings and sales.”198 The proposed program, scheduled to begin two
months before the election, planned two in-person canvasses, and one phone bank.199 The
Michigan Association of Realtors hosted a meeting of tax limitation supporters, including
representatives from the Michigan Merchants Council, the Michigan State Chamber of Commerce,
the Michigan State Grange, Panax Corp, and Hillsdale College.200 At the association’s annual
business meeting a month before the election, Michigan realtors heard a program on the “Tax
Limitation Campaign.”201
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Unlike in California, the Republican governor joined with public employees to campaign
against tax limitation. In the spring, Governor Milliken had declared a new “Age of Limits” in
which government wisely managed limited natural and financial resources.202 However, he did
not support tax limitation in 1976. Various public institutions distributed anti-Proposal C material:
the Office of Services to the Aging to retirees, Michigan State University to parents and students,
the suburban Detroit Ferndale school district to parents.203 A Detroit newspaper even charged that
the moderate Republican governor sent state employees on state time to “spread ‘vote no’
messages into the hustings.”204 Indeed, like the teachers, Governor Milliken, who pre-emptively
sued his state treasurer to ward off another school finance lawsuit two years before, feared Proposal
C would reverse the state’s assumption of local tax burdens.205 Two legislators unsuccessfully
filed suit to keep the amendment off the ballot, arguing that it should be considered at a
constitutional conventional instead.
Michigan’s Attorney General had not permitted corporate spending on ballot initiative
campaigns until the end of July, too late to purchase “(g)ood television time spots” and counter
opposition advertisements and mailings. At the end of August, Uhler had warned that the
“overriding need” was to inoculate or immunize voters from the “lies and scare tactics of the
opposition.”206 Tax limiters objected to one opposition advertisement in particular:
Would you vote to reduce your state police force? Would you vote to limit the number of
prisoners the state will accept? Would you vote to eliminate property tax credits for senior
citizens, farmers, the handicapped? Well, that’s what supporters of Proposal C, the so202
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called tax limitation amendment are asking you to do. Don’t be deceived by this hidden tax
shift to higher property taxes. Vote NO on Proposal C. Paid for by Michigan Taxpayers
Voting No on Proposal C.207
Citing the Federal Communications Commission’s fairness doctrine, Taxpayers United sent cease
and desist letters to newspapers and radio and TV stations demanding they stop printing and
broadcasting deceptive and misleading advertising. When Taxpayers United unsuccessfully
requested an injunction against the ad, the California-based Pacific Legal Foundation represented
the group pro bono.208 Shaker described the firm as one that did “public interest work but along
the free-enterprise line.”209

Considering the MEA’s Court of Appeals counsel would cost

$150,000, the in-kind donation to tax limitation was significant. A Detroit judge ruled that the
MEA’s ads were misleading and inaccurate but protected by the first amendment.
In both California and Michigan, polls showed strong support for tax limitation until the
waning days of the campaigns, when television and radio ads forced voters to consider whether
they could get something for nothing. The NTLC faulted “the vicious techniques of the public
sector special interest groups” whose $500,000 investment in radio, television, and newspaper
advertisements Taxpayers United ran out of money to counter.210

Fewer voters approved

Michigan’s 1976 Proposal C than California’s Proposition 1. In Michigan as in California three
years before, “the representatives of teachers’ unions and the AFT…were mainly responsible for
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the propaganda” that turned two-thirds majority support into a narrow loss.211 Talking with
legislators around the country, Milton Friedman claimed this “media blitz is what killed it.”212
Tax limiters blamed one interest group for their Michigan defeat with less than 43 percent
of the vote: teachers. In a press release Taxpayers United weaponized gender, quoting one of the
group’s few female leaders, identified as a mother and grandmother, to attack the Michigan
Education Association as a backer of the objectionable ad.213 Detroit newspapers attributed the
defeat to teachers’ last-minute television spots arguing Prop C would raise local taxes.214 The
lesson the University of Chicago professor taught was to “organize the ground root understanding”
of tax limitation.215 First, the University of Michigan economist Paul McCracken vented to Bill
Niskanen, then the Ford Motor Company’s chief economist. McCracken found “poetic justice” in
the “education industry’s frantic effort to defeat” a measure which he thought would have
strengthened the economy, and education.216
As part of a project for McCracken, economist Steve Mariotti found only government
employees, people in densely populated areas, and homeowners voted in their economic selfinterests on Proposal C.217 The effect was relatively small, though, and income, race, welfare and
education funding had no predictive power. Mariotti’s regression analysis revealed similar results
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as did later political science work but was packaged in the language of the free rider problem—
Michigan’s increased state spending was a result of special interest lobbying for concentrated and
well-defined benefits with diffuse and generalized costs. Publishing in the journal Public Choice,
Mariotti referenced public choice theorists Gordon Tullock and James Buchanan, and Austrian
school theorists Ludwig von Mises and Murray Rothbard. Mariotti offered these results to guide
“campaign strategies (for) both opponents and proponents of future tax and expenditure limitation
initiatives.”
Analyzing the conditions for a victory in 1978, Shaker judged large funding commitments
and professional staff from the start, in addition to keeping the idea of tax limitation in circulation,
were necessary. Shaker insisted a voluntary tax organization could not “run an effective campaign
against the heavily funded monolithic education lobby.”218 When Taxpayers United relaunched,
a labor-relations manager for an agricultural equipment manufacturer was the professional
executive director.219 The $233,000 the MEA spent was a little more than a third of the amount
the Michigan State Chamber had budgeted but not raised for the pro-campaign; by the next election
fundraisers met their goals.220 As stagflation accelerated, conservative infrastructure strengthened,
the labor movement weakened, and a Tennessee tax limitation campaign succeeded, Michigan
prepared to try again.

Conclusion
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The national debt clock, a more famous cultural object than the spending clock, would not
debut in New York’s Times Square until the late 1980s. Our era of government shutdowns is
based in the earlier countdown, in spending limits as much as debt limits. Borrowing as well as
cutting could fill budget holes.221 During the 1970s, the refusal to tax and spend created demand
for debt during the worst inflation of the American century. To lower interest rates on new debt,
state legislatures and voters imposed constitutional limits on taxing and spending. In states like
Tennessee where usury clauses set interest rates on public debt, political pressure to raise interest
rates opened the state constitution to revision, leading to the first state limit in March 1978. While
tax limits date to the 1870s, limits on how much governments could spend, which would invariably
limit how much they could tax, first shaped constitutions a century later. By sociologist Isaac
William Martin’s count, twenty states had passed statutory or constitutional limits on budget
growth by the end of the 1980s.222
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Ch. 8 Victory in the States
After losses in California in 1973 and in Michigan in 1974 and 1976, campaigners for
constitutional limits on taxing and spending began to win in Tennessee in 1978. The low-spending
south seemed an unlikely place to start a tax revolt. Ranking last among states with six percent of
personal income going to state and local taxes in the mid-1970s, Tennessee constitutionally banned
taxing income from wages.1 California by contrast spent nearly twice as much as a percent of
personal income and had taxed income since the early 1930s. Economic growth kept taxes low in
Tennessee, and Sunbelt migration promised more expansion.2 Worries were about the rate of state
government growth. Once the Tennessee budget breached $1 billion, within a few years, it
approached $3 billion. The state’s second largest source of revenue was federal aid, and the
programs it funded off limits.3 The Tennessee Education Association, the National Education
Association affiliate in the right-to-work state, regularly secured about half of any tax revenue
increases for education.4 Recently, state legislators had passed budgets without specifying funding
sources and the Democratic governor campaigned to permit income taxes.5 The governor vetoed
a non-binding 1976 referendum passed by the legislature: should there be constitutional tax
limitation in Tennessee?6 However, the governor could not veto a constitutional convention.
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Beginning a year before California’s Proposition 13 property tax cut passed in June 1978,
a steel fabricator and Conservative Caucus member of the Tennessee state legislature organized
one hundred constitutional convention delegates to pass a referendum on to voters focused on
concurrent ballot measures to unfreeze credit and integrate schools and marriages. Tax limitation’s
particular victory among hundreds of thousands of Tennessee voters legitimized the general idea
of constitutional spending control.
Conservatives learned to recruit activist economists, petition signers, independent
contractors, and members of new state conservative or libertarian parties as campaign volunteers.
National organizations like the American Conservative Union offered technical, legal, and
strategic support to state groups, helping to prioritize investments to populous states most likely to
win. Reagan administration staffers formed the Pacific Legal Foundation to represent campaigns
pro bono in a variety of lawsuits against teachers and good government groups. Former U.S.
Solicitor General Robert Bork volunteered his services in Michigan courts.
Businesses learned to donate enough money to outspend powerful public sector unions on
fiscal politics. After the New York City fiscal crisis and California’s Proposition 13 property tax
cut, tax limiters got free publicity for their preventative, moderate-by-comparison measures. As
campaign finance laws permitted more and more corporate spending, businesses could buy
publicity too. Business associations aimed to weaken the power base of labor by attacking
organized teachers—the fastest growing union in the AFL-CIO during the 1960s was the American
Federation of Teachers—in addition to cutting public benefits like food stamps for strikers and
weaking law labor for private and public sector workers.7
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Constitutional amendment drafters learned to simplify their message and offer immediate
property tax relief, including by limiting local school property taxes. Tax limiters developed a
body of literature to vividly convey complex concepts. Borrowed and repurposed warnings about
the dangers of government spending, traced in Ch. 2 “The Sentinels,” reappeared: the American
Legislative Exchange Council introduced model legislation like tax limitation with anecdotes from
the nineteenth-century French polemicist and economic liberal Frederic Bastiat.8 Tax limiters
cited an apocryphal quote attributed to the eighteenth-century Scottish historian and jurist
Alexander Fraser Tytler.
Tax limiters learned to target teachers and demonstrate that limits were no threat to
education. An Arizona consultant compiled “A Checklist to use in planning your tax limitation
campaign” including “Consult with Lew Uhler…He is the best resource in the nation in this
specialized area.” National Tax Limitation Committee leader Uhler included “welfare rights
organizations, public employee unions, and the education lobby,” in the opposition camp, singled
out teachers as “the natural-born enemy of tax-limitation.” 9 Who, they asked, “is to control this
country—the teachers, or the taxpayers?”10 If voters were unsure whether limits would harm
education, they would vote them down. “Defusing this issue” the Arizona consultant insisted “will
eliminate the strongest resistance you will encounter in your campaign.”11
Privatizers benefitted when tax limitation forced government programs to compete against
each other for funding. Alongside tax limits, the earliest version of the American Legislative
Exchange Council’s Source Book included templates for bringing the market into the state through
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tax credits for private schools, student testing, hiring freezes, financial reporting, and enterprise
zones.12 Tax limiters strategically supported campaigns for public aid to private schools to divert
teachers’ political opposition from ballot measures.
As the first section reveals, an American Legislative Exchange Council co-founder used
Tennessee’s environment of low-taxes, rising spending, and fragmented, non-union opposition to
put a ballot measure before state voters, several hundred thousand of whom legitimized
constitutional restrictions on government spending, and thus by definition, taxing, for the rest of
the country. The second section shows that tax limiters prevailed over a Proposition 13-style fifty
percent property tax cut in 1978 when the Republican governor reluctantly supported tax
limitation, teachers unions were on the defensive in the courts, labor-liberal alternatives had failed,
and a mainstream businessman was the face of the campaign. The third section sketches the
unsuccessful campaign for federal tax limitation, connecting conservative, business, expert, and
labor actors.

Tennessee Nutcracker
Tennessee, the first state to constitutionally tie government spending to a fixed percentage
of state income did so on March 7, 1978, three months before the Proposition 13 property tax cut
passed in California. Tennessee’s tax burden fell by 19.60 percent between 1978 and 1982,
slowing to decrease by 10.96 percent between 1978 and 1985.13 Compared to rates of change in
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other southern states, this was the most dramatic drop during the earlier period, and among the
most dramatic during the later period. Unlike many other states, Tennessee lacked a nineteenthcentury constitutional limit on overall debt but enforced a limit on interest rates. Struggling to
borrow in an age of inflation, legislators called a constitutional convention for 1977 in order to
raise the state’s interest rate ceiling.14 Bankers had begun urging the legislature to permit them to
charge more than ten percent in interest in 1974. However, calling a convention could introduce
other amendments: increased school funding, desegregated schools, an income tax, a tax limit.
After consulting with Uhler and ALEC, state representative David Copeland of
Chattanooga decided to revise the appropriations rather than the taxation section of the state
constitution to avoid a runaway convention that approved an income tax. Combined with a
balanced budget requirement, controlling how much Tennessee could spend would necessarily
limit taxes. A member of the legislative committee responsible for issuing the call to convention,
Copeland found a use for interest groups besides inflating budgets. Copeland asked the Tennessee
Farm Bureau to help persuade legislators, and later credited the financial community with putting
the motion “over the top” in August 1976.15
After winning re-election to the House in 1976 but before being sworn in, Copeland started
the Taxpayers Coalition, whose only paid staffer was a secretary, with an attorney on retainer too.16
Taxpayers Coalition board members ranged from department store and insurance company and
machine and chemical company owners to a law firm partner to an accountant to a dairyman to a
general contractor to a retired nuclear engineer to a former teacher and educational administrator.
Many had connections to chambers of commerce. All were men. Copeland observed that this
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“(g)rass roots participation” proved the distinction between “special interests” and “citizen
interests.”17 Recruiting board members by congressional district, Copeland desired people with
“a history of community activity, not elected office holders, preferably not known for being
extreme partisans.”18 He did not expect their duties—selecting other directors, organizing citizens
to contact delegates, attending one meeting with convention delegates, voting on the convention
amendment—to take much time.19
Copeland, who turned his father’s window treatments business into a steel fabricator, ran
one of many small manufacturers setting up shop in the Sunbelt. Born in Florida, Copeland moved
to Tennessee as a young man, where he came into his own politically as a conservative. Brought
to a meeting by a friend, Copeland enjoyed volunteering, and within several years, ran for the state
legislature.20 A co-founder of the American Legislative Exchange Council, Copeland heard Uhler
speak on tax limitation at the 1974 ALEC conference and was inspired by the tax limit from
ALEC’S Sourcebook of American State Legislation.21 As of its 1977 annual report, ALEC had
distributed 18,000 copies of Suggested State Legislation to 7,600 state legislators.22 A member of
the legislature’s finance committee, Copeland’s single issue was taxes. In a local newspaper ad,
Copeland explained “Why Taxes Rise” with the economic logic of public choice theory: “The
potential cost to you did not persuade you to invest your time and effort to halt tax increases but
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the benefits received by others was great enough to persuade them to invest great amounts of time
and energy to cause tax increases.”23
Copeland introduced a motion from the convention floor during the late summer of 1977
to solve the state’s multiple fiscal problems. Copeland’s constitutional amendment declared the
state could not spend at a rate greater than its economic growth, which he estimated using a
University of Tennessee econometric model.24 Simplifying Uhler’s formula by focusing on
spending rather taxing and removing special conditions for emergencies and debt, Copeland’s
legislation did “not frighten Convention delegates.”25 However, when Copeland told the state
comptroller’s office “we’re going to limit the growth of government by restricting the amount of
its expenditures” the response was “Oh my God!”26
Echoing Ronald Reagan, the Tennessee Taxpayers Association declared “tax limitation
may be an idea whose time has come.” Although the limits were “really fairly lenient,” the
taxpayers association recommended approval in Tennessee and copies around the country for their
psychological effect on legislators tempted to grow government faster than the private economy.
Copeland’s constitutional amendment was “the best expenditure control device” the Tennessee
Taxpayers Association had seen in many years.27 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s magazine
Nation’s Business called the Tennessee amendment “careful and responsible in the way it puts a
lid on public outlays.”28
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One of the states where chamber of commerce ran taxpayers associations was Tennessee.
Attributing the “support of many large and well-organized groups” to the changes he made to
ALEC’s model legislation, Copeland listed backers such as the “Tennessee Farm Bureau, business
oriented groups (including individual Chambers of Commerce and Tennessee Taxpayers
Association which is our equivalent of a state Chamber of Commerce), and even segments of
organized labor” in a “not for publication” letter to Uhler.29 While the Nashville Area Chamber
of Commerce refused to share its mailing list with Copeland early in the campaign, its supportive
leaders passed on information to members.30
The Tennessee Taxpayers Association followed the California and Michigan limit
campaigns closely. Tennessee’s state chamber equivalent noted that teachers, local officials, labor
unions, League of Women Voters were opposed while businessmen like “an engineer for Dow
Chemical Company, and the chief economist of the Ford Motor Company” were the “chief
sponsors.”31 As Copeland organized delegates to lobby the convention chair, one worried if
nothing were done about taxes “at this rate Tennessee will be in the category with Michigan.”32
Alongside three Nashville residents and a handful of other $1,000 donors to Reagan’s 1976
presidential campaign, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce board member and president of Dart
Industries of Southfield, MI appeared in a folder of “useful contacts” Copeland solicited for
funds.33
Whereas Tennessee convention delegates who invited Friedman to address their
constitutional convention waited months for a no, Uhler knew how to reach the famous economist.
29
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Watching Friedman endorse state and federal constitutional amendments to “set a maximum limit
to government spending” on “Meet the Press” during the 1976 Michigan campaign, a Tennessee
convention delegate candidate immediately invited Friedman to her state.34

To Copeland,

Friedman wrote that after receiving more speaking requests than he could “possibly handle” he
had “decided that I can probably contribute more to the cause by a general writing and speaking
on the broad spectrum of the issues, than by participating in actual political campaigns to any
significant extent.”35 In his correspondence with Copeland, Friedman copied Uhler at his home
address, signaling a familiarity between the two men. Uhler’s personal relationship with Friedman
was one of his most valuable assets, and by the fall the economist had cleared an hour in his busy
schedule.
From a room at a Midtown Manhattan hotel while traveling on other business, Friedman
called in to the convention of nearly one hundred delegates. Some commentators considered
Friedman’s presentation the “turning point” in the Tennessee legislature’s decision to forward
constitutional language to voters.36 Friedman urged Tennesseans to set a limit before state
employees exerted pressure to drive up spending. Earlier that day, Friedman had asked municipal
bond issuers what effect a tax and spending limit like Tennessee’s would have on credit ratings, a
pressing concern for state legislators. He passed on the good news: “showing a real sense of fiscal
responsibility, by limiting the claims—the levies that will be made on the income of the people”
would improve the state’s credit rating and reduce the need to borrow.37
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More than creditors, a tax limit would equip legislators to negotiate with special interests.
Based on his conversations with state legislators about the difficulty of turning down expenditures,
Friedman imagined what a constitutional amendment would let them say:
They have said, you know, somebody comes up to me and propagandizes for bigger state
expenditures for a perfectly good purpose—they say they want more money for a mental
hospital or for aid to the handicapped or for schools and, if I say to them, well, gee, I’d like
to vote for that but you know that would mean higher taxes and we really can’t do that,
they’ll turn to you and say well you are a hardhearted fellow, you have no interest in the
welfare of your fellow human beings and the legislators say, you know it is very hard to
resent that kind of pressure. On the other hand, they say if we had a spending limitation in
the constitution, I could say to such a proponent—well, you know I agree with you. That’s
a very good cause but you know we have a total budget. What do you think we should
substitute that for?38
Friedman took questions, but repeatedly referenced Uhler and Rickenbacker’s booklet for answers
and model amendment provisions.39 After Friedman testified, the con-con brought in Walter
Heller, an economist opposed to tax limitation but known for his Keynesian federal tax cuts in the
Kennedy administration.40
In addition to Friedman’s call, several factors turned the convention. After the Tennessee
Supreme Court enforced the state’s ten percent interest rate ceiling, lenders shuttered, borrowing
stopped, and the convention scheduled a referendum in six months.41 During the convention, the
Tennessee Employment Association sent an outreach list, and the Tennessee chapter of Young
Americans for Freedom, on whose advisory board Copeland sat, a petition.4243
Not merely a product of financialization, tax limitation enabled financialization. Tennessee
banks, including Pioneer Bank of Chattanooga and American National Bank and Trust Company,
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that supported increasing the rates they could charge also endorsed the spending limit.44 An NTLC
board member employed at the New York firm Hornblower, Weeks, Noyes & Trask, which itself
underwrote municipal securities, arranged for a letter from ratings agency Fitch Investors Service
to remove any lingering doubts about the impact of spending limits on debt.45 Of legislation to
“restrict borrowings of municipalities to a percentage of income/revenues,” Fitch felt “that this
approach to borrowing will be most helpful in maintaining the credibility of subordinate entities
provided that too many loopholes are not included in the law.”46 Some economists worried the
state would turn to non-tax revenue like debt if the tax lid worked as intended.47
Persuaded, legislators set a referendum date of March 7, 1978 for voters to constitutionally
limit their budgetary powers. The convention nicknamed Copeland “NUTCRACKER.” Copeland
proudly explained: “they’re right, when it comes to government spending, I’m a conservative
nut.”48 Even the Democratic convention chair, who wanted to run for U.S. Senate, recognized the
popularity of the issue.49 After the convention, the Tennessee Manufacturer’s Association, Retail
Merchants Association, Wholesale Grocer Associations, Retail Gasoline Dealers, Hospital
Associations, Insurance Organizations joined the cause.50
When all the calculations settled, the amendment permitted a maximum spending increase
of 10.38 percent in 1979.51 Even at this high growth rate, since productivity was lower in the
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public than private sector, limiting the budget to total productivity growth would cut the public
sector.52 The new Section 24 of Article II of the Tennessee constitution proposed other fiscal
checks: balanced budget, regulated borrowing, pay-go appropriations, cost mandating. Bonds
could only be issued for capital improvements, not operational spending. Copeland did not get
everything he asked for: a narrower measure of economic growth, personal income; limits on
county and city spending; automatic exceptions for natural disasters and federal mandates; supermajority margin for emergencies.53
The Tennessee tax limitation amendment was not contested with the same fervor as in
California or Michigan. When the League of Women Voters invited Copeland to a debate over
tax limitation, which it opposed, the group found itself apologizing for another speaker’s
invocation “of the name of a particular political group” and Copeland benignly commended the
League on its “active participation.”54 The Tennessee Education Association, an NEA affiliate,
labor unions, and many Democratic politicians were also opposed.55 However, tax limitation
proponents argued TEA was “an embarrassment to teachers,” who were used by the special interest
group.56 Copeland was at pains to single out any teachers in attendance at meetings, and recruited
one to the Taxpayers Coalition board. The legislator suggested to several letter writers that they
start an organization of teachers for spending limits.57 Within the Tennessee Department of
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Education, the director of the Division of Vocational-Technical Education supported Copeland’s
proposal for “logic in government.”58
Full-time lobbyists at the Chamber of Commerce, the Farm Bureau, and the Retail Grocers
Association recruited their members to vote and volunteer for tax limitation. During its annual
meeting, 1,200 Tennessee Farm Bureau delegates voted against the ERA and for Copeland’s
limit.59 Earlier, the Farm Bureau pledged to raise $5,000 for Copeland’s effort.60 The National
Federation of Independent Businesses polled its 10,000 Tennessee members; of the fifteen percent
responding, seventy percent supported constitutional spending limitation.61 “Tire Dealers for
Limited Government Spending” shared literature.62
Many corporations bought education materials from Copeland’s Taxpayers Coalition.63
Paycheck mailers cost as much as $3,000 for companies with more than 501 employees.64 The
state attorney general approved business contributions to advertising during the convention and
before the referendum.65 Although Taxpayers Coalition’s attorneys interpreted the tax code to
mean such goodwill and institutional advertising was tax deductible, the secretary of state later
questioned the group’s charitable purpose.66 Copeland himself registered as a lobbyist.67
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The ACU, NTU, and NTLC provided money to combat the expensive, last-minute media
blitz that had been so successful elsewhere.68 Even though the ACU Task Force on Tax Reduction
Copeland had joined did not target Tennessee, coordinator Yvonne Chicoine persuaded the
organization to back the Tennessee tax limitation campaign, sending a staffer for two months.69
Uhler’s group, the National Tax Limitation Committee, also provided its research director.70
Radio ads played on repeat in the days before the election: “Elected officials can write statutory
laws; but only voters can write constitutions.

Laws govern men—constitutions govern

government. Isn’t it time that we controlled our government?”71 Newspaper ads ran the day before
and day of the election.72
Copeland estimated the referendum campaign cost $200,000, much less than the California
and Michigan ballot initiatives.73 Far from the professional speakers bureaus tax limit proponents
ran in these two states, Tennessee’s Taxpayers Coalition gently suggested organizers hold local
gatherings, adding “(we can probably supply a speaker for a civic club or other meetings).”74
Copeland had built a list of “known conservatives” political district by district over many years,
and now added names from sources everywhere.75 Volunteers phone banked enough yes votes for
a special election including a number of constitutional amendments.

The Nashville Area
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Taxpayers Association, an affiliate of the National Taxpayers Union, got out the vote as well.76
With eighteen percent of the electorate voting, Proposition 9 passed with sixty-five percent of the
vote. That night Copeland said “We’ve seen history made today…We’ve seen a taxpayers’
rebellion in a nonviolent manner—completely within the system.”77
Conservative commentator James J. Kilpatrick’s syndicated column announced the good
news in local papers across the country. Governors, legislators, realtors, educators, housewives,
and businessmen wrote to Copeland requesting information. Chairman of the Republican National
Committee Bill Brock warmly congratulated Copeland and predicted benefits for the Republican
Party and the country.78 Brock, a former U.S. Senator from Tennessee, had introduced the U.S.
Chamber’s budget control bill in 1972. Milton Friedman titled his Newsweek column “A Progress
Report,” sharing “the present state of the grassroots movement that Ronald Reagan started in
California five years ago when he sponsored Proposition 1”: “One down, 49 to go.”79 Speaking
to the National Association of Manufactures ahead of the fall tax limitation ballot initiatives,
Milton Friedman compared government spending to chattel slavery.80

If the growth trend

continued, Friedman warned Americans would lose their freedom.81

Mainstream Michigan
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Michigan tried again to limit taxes as the threat of government bankruptcy in an imagined
past and in present day New York City spread in state houses and newspapers. The state
representative responsible for Tennessee’s tax limitation victory urged fellow legislators to write
their U.S. senators in opposition to a federal bail-out for New York City. Tennessee legislators,
Copeland observed, “have imposed controls on ourselves, and we are unwilling to have our taxes
used to support citizens elsewhere who are not willing to impose on themselves a similar kind of
fiscal discipline.”82 On the occasion of the nation’s bicentennial, a Tennessee state senator shared
an apocryphal quote attributed to the forgotten Scottish historian Alexander Frazer Tytler warning
against government largesse, and worrying about New York.83 During the 1976 election season,
a Michigan state representative referenced New York’s bankruptcy and Alexander Tytler in a letter
to the editor of the Detroit Free Press.84 Dow Chemical Company lobbyist Bill Shaker drafted an
editorial for Panax papers, a cash and in-kind donor to tax limitation, closing with Alexander Fraser
Tytler.85 The various spellings of Tytler’s name indicate how loosely economic popularizers
translated his work, and how widely the Foundation of Economic Education’s version traveled, a
process of bricolage described in Ch. 2 “The Sentinels.”
The Michigan State Chamber of Commerce leader and insurance executive Richard
Headlee, who joined the tax limitation campaign as frontman in 1978, used the same Tytler quote
every time he spoke:
“A democracy cannot exist as a permanent form of government. It can only exist until the
voters discover they can vote themselves largesse from the public treasury. From that
moment forward, they will always vote for the candidate promising the most from the
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public treasury until the democracy ultimately collapses in fiscal chaos, always followed
by a dictatorship.”86
Legitimized by the authority of European men of letters, these apocryphal words circulated widely
in conservative circles during the 1960s and 1970s as a shorthand explanation of how unions grew
public budgets, and why they must be stopped.87 Teachers unions were a particular danger.
Wondering “do we keep teachers as good guys,” Uhler decided: good teachers, bad
unions.88 When readers responded to Friedman’s Newsweek columns about the Michigan tax
limitation ballot measure, “the only angry letters (he) got were from teachers that felt (he) had
slandered them by saying they were all uniformly opposed to the amendment.”89 Judging by his
signature type font, Uhler scripted radio spots—when he did not have a speaker in mind, he left a
placeholder label: union leader/member, teacher, school board member, local government official,
farmer. The “teacher” identified themselves as an Michigan Education Association (MEA)
member who objected to the association’s leadership—“a bunch of people who are not teachers”—
and goals—“to be the dominant political force in Michigan.”90 With his public relations firm,
Uhler pondered an “(e)xposé on MEA/Teachers abuses.”91
At some point, tax limiters considered running a campaign for publicly-funded vouchers
for private school tuition to “keep Education + other public employees off balance + divert their
attention.”92 As of 1977, MEA members were paying attention, warning members: “Watch out!

86

Richard Headlee, “Limiting state spending and property tax growth,” In the Proceedings of the Tax Policy for a
Healthier Economy Conference, December 6, 1978; Richard Headlee, Press Conference remarks beginning “We are
announcing the formation of a committee called Taxpayers United for Tax Limitation, Undated, Headlee, RichardSpeeches on Tax Limitation: 1963, 1977-1978 Folder, Box 1, Richard Headlee Papers, BHL.
87
See article manuscript “No Maxim More Common: Fiscal Ideas on the American Right.”
88
Hand-written notes beginning with “Brochure,” undated, Michigan Drawer, Campaign Strategy Folder, LKU.
89
Ibid., unnumbered.
90
Script titled “Teacher,” undated, Michigan Drawer, Schedule Folder, LKU.
91
Hand-written notes titled “McMaster,” undated, Michigan Drawer, Campaign Strategy Folder, LKU.
92
Hand-written notes titled “Tax Limitation Strategy” undated but likely from 1974, Michigan Drawer, Michigan
Folder, LKU.

440

Tax limit folks are back.”93 The Michigan Conservative Union, the renamed Conservative Party
of Michigan, planned to fight the MEA’s teacher licensure bill in the state legislature where union
support had elected representatives and senators.94

Teachers were “not satisfied with our

generosity,” a Michigan Conservative Union leader warned: “THEY DO NOT WANT US TO BE
ABLE TO VOTE ON THE COST OF EDUCATION.” Indeed, vouchers were on the ballot in
1978, the year Michigan voters finally approved tax limitation.95
Michigan tax limiters recruited business leaders with more mainstream appeal. Uhler noted
Michigan Conservative Union leader Norm R. Hughes’ “tenacity” in trying again after the close
1976 loss.96 Preparing for the next tax limit vote, Michigan State Chamber of Commerce leader
Richard Headlee placed one condition on help from the Michigan Conservative Union: “Don't tell
anyone you're supporting it until we get a broad-based coalition going, because we don't want the
press labeling this a right-wing thing.”97 As journalist Robert Kuttner observed at the time, his
colleagues labeled it a “populist uprising.”98 Now, Kuttner calls the tax limitation movement a
“right-wing” and “far right thing.”99
Richard Headlee, the new chairman of Taxpayers United, took tax limitation outside
libertarian and conservative parties and into the moderate republicanism Michiganders had
recently embraced in their governors. Born in Iowa and schooled in Utah, Headlee served as an
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Army officer before his business career.100 First at the Detroit-based Burroughs Corporation, a
producer of calculating machines that expanded into electronics and digital computing, and later
at heavy equipment manufacturer Morbark Industries, Headlee joined business associations, as
president of the Jaycees (the Junior Chamber of Commerce) and on the board of the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce. In 1966, Headlee moved to Michigan and advised a fellow Mormon, Governor
George Romney. The chairman of the National Taxpayers Union wrote Headlee bemoaning the
failed presidential aspirations of Governor Romney because the “country would surely be in far
better straits if you rather than Haldeman and Erlichman had been sitting outside the President’s
door,” suggesting the businessman’s prominence in the Republican Party.101 Switching industries,
Headlee ran a life insurance company named after Alexander Hamilton, a subsidiary of the small
loan company the Household Finance Corporation. As early as 1975, Headlee was vice chairman
of the Michigan State Chamber of Commerce.

Alongside Headlee and Van Andel, other

Taxpayers United business leaders included executives of the West Bloomfield Chamber of
Commerce, the Michigan Jaycees, and a past president of the junior chamber’s ladies’ auxiliary.102
Amway co-founder Jay Van Andel institutionalized his company’s experience during the
1974 and 1976 Michigan tax limitation campaigns in the U. S. Chamber’s new grassroots group
Citizen’s Choice. Van Andel built a conservative Michigan political dynasty based in Dutch
settlements on the state’s west coast near Lake Michigan.103 After the Federal Trade Commission
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investigated Amway for price fixing and other crimes from 1975 to 1979, Van Andel become more
involved in politics.104 A vice president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce at the beginning of the
1970s, Van Andel served on a number of committees including the Task Force on the Powell
Memorandum, after it was leaked to the Washington Post.105 When NAM rejected merger with
the Chamber in 1976, Van Andel joined NAM to coordinate the organizations’ efforts in 1977.106
In 1978, Van Andel became chairman of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and co-chair of
Michigan’s renamed tax limitation group.107
Perhaps a revival of Citizens for Control of Federal Spending, the group that promoted a
federal expenditure ceiling in 1973, Citizen’s Choice was “designed to represent the millions of
American citizens who resent high taxes, inflation, and increasing government interference in their
lives.”108 Citizen’s Choice planned to mail ten million invitations to membership. For an annual
fee of $15, members could access polls, a hot line, legislative and regulatory monitoring, and calls
to lobbying action. The meeting minutes of the U.S. Chamber’s Board of Directors would record
only a stock sentence: “Mr. VanAndel gave a status report on and reviewed the recent activities of
Citizen’s Choice, as well as commenting on future growth.”109 The more members said, and the
less the chamber said, the better.
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As laws about business involvement in politics loosened, the U.S. Chamber participated
more directly. The 1976 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 permitted
partisan communication to stockholders in addition to executives and their families.110 The U.S.
Chamber shared materials including sample letters, envelope inserts, and publications like “Make
Politics Your Business: It’s Your Move.”111 Businessmen-Constituents learned to influence
legislators through the Corporate Congressional Action Committee and Corporate Legislative
Action Networks.112 In 1977, the U.S. Chamber started a separate fund, the Alliance for Politics,
for legal business contributions to improve the “philosophical composition” of the national
legislature.113 By 1978, the Alliance for Politics invested in 83 races with a 61 percent win record,
trailing the AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education’s 70.5 percent rate from 1974, when the
U.S. Congress stripped a federal spending ceiling from the budget bill.114
Chambers of commerce were conduits for campaign literature. A Michigan pamphlet
likely traveled to Maryland with the 1978 tax limit campaign frontman Richard Headlee, who
served as vice president of his state’s chamber and sold life insurance in both Michigan and
Maryland. Maryland Taxpayer Coalition chair Francis Paul Lucier, the CEO of Black & Decker,
was president of his state’s chamber of commerce.115 The Maryland Taxpayer Coalition copied
the content and graphic design of Michigan’s Taxpayers United for Tax Limitation brochure, down
to the last detail, asking “Who is behind this drive for tax limitation?” and answering with the same
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list of “housewives, farmers, factory workers, professionals, a broad spectrum of men and
women.”116 The formulation of the “broad spectrum” may have come from the ACU, whose
female organizers frequently emphasized the importance of housewives.117 Moreover, a 1976
Michigan brochure draft did not mention women much less housewives.118 Libertarian parties and
chambers of commerce were at the top of ACU’s internal lists of groups who supported tax
limitation.119 Later, the general public had access to the text of the Michigan brochure in the
Taxpayer’s Guide to Effective Revolt by conservative writers Sheldon Engelmayer and Robert
Wagman.120
In marked contrast, the sponsor of a Proposition 13-style property tax cut also on the 1978
ballot, Robert Tisch, was the drain commissioner of rural Shiawassee County in mid-Michigan.
Tisch repeatedly put an amendment on the ballot— known as Tisch in 1978, Tisch II in 1980, and
Tisch III in 1982—to cut property taxes by half and require three-fifths of voters to approve a tax
increase.121 In a “Tisch for Governor” flyer, the candidate listed his business qualifications, which
diverged from the corporate pedigrees of Headlee amendment organizers: “Commercial Artist,
Co-owner of firms engaged in Outdoor Advertising, Mfr. Of School Play Furniture, Cabinets for
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Federal Government, Silk Screen Printing Plant, Registered Beef Cattle Farms, Apartment
Building.”122
Campaigning in Michigan for Tisch, California’s Proposition 13 promoter Howard Jarvis
proclaimed he would only vote for the Tisch amendment if he lived in Michigan because, as Jarvis
told a Wayne crowd, “One is a political petition and the other one a people’s petition.”123 Austrian
economist Murray Rothbard endorsed Tisch, declaring the NTLC’s “conservative moderates” had
the money, but not the guts or vision to “excite the masses.”124 While Tisch dreamed of fundraising
by making a recording with Jarvis set to martial music, Dow Chemical and chambers of commerce
topped up Taxpayers United’s war chest to $1,000,000.125 The campaign ultimately budgeted to
spend $2,000,000.126 By contrast, the MEA spent a third of this amount against three proposals:
tax limit, tax cut, tuition vouchers.127 Letters from Tisch supporters were mostly written by hand
while those to Headlee were typed on business letterhead.
Class differences created conflict between the tax campaigns as Jarvis attacked tax
limitation that fall and Tisch attacked Headlee.128 In a testy public exchange, Headlee accused
drain commissioner Tisch of being the worst kind of special interest—a bureaucrat.129 Tisch, who
like Jarvis was in the apartment leasing business, responded that Headlee’s house in Farmington
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Hills was probably worth more than all of his property combined.130 Tisch leaked the ACU’s
private offer of “thousands of dollars to keep quiet” and support the Headlee amendment,
provoking staffers to contain the “ongoing Michigan mess.”131 By the time Tisch and Headlee
appeared together before the Detroit Economic Club, the ACU had persuaded Tisch not to
comment.132 Howard Jarvis publicly attacked the National Tax Limitation Committee and the
limits it backed in Colorado and Michigan.133 Uhler wrote to the firm that publicized Jarvis’s
property tax cuts in California to affirm “free enterprise in ideas” while requesting that tax limit
and tax cut advocates not “kill each other off.”134 “The education lobby, public employees unions,
League of Women Voters and other such powers are very worthwhile adversaries in their own
right” he added.
Conservative politicians, operatives, businessmen, and economists learned from losses that
voters wanted more flexible limits, and more property tax relief. Language grafted on to the 1976
Taxpayers United for Proposal C amendment to create the 1978 Taxpayers United for Tax
Limitation proposal limited the growth of the property tax assessment base, in Michigan, “state
equalized value,” subject to taxation in a given year to the rate of inflation.135 In a letter to Headlee,
Uhler explained the new idea was “to deal head on with control over property tax assessments and
local spending so as to both eliminate those as issues and ride the political momentum occasioned
by the property tax revolt which (gripped) Michigan, California and many other states.”136
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Caught off guard by the passage of Proposal 13 in June, the MEA rushed to offer an uneasy
combination of tax limitation and school finance reform as an alternative to Headlee and Tisch.
The MEA understood Michigan’s circuit breaker, much stronger than California’s, as protection
against a property tax revolt on behalf of the retired couples, widows, and young couples featured
in horror stories of families forced out of their homes but recognized that many worried Michigan
taxpayers did not seem aware a circuit breaker existed.137 The MEA endorsed a ballot referendum
by one of their own, a Royal Oak teacher and association leader recently elected to fill a vacancy
in the state House.138 Making Tisch’s voluntary one percent income tax increase mandatory,
slightly raising Headlee’s limit to 9.2 percent, transferring a portion of excess revenue to the rainy
day fund, and lifting the limit for federal or court-ordered program costs, the legislation satisfied
no one.
Two factors in tax limitation’s 1976 loss flipped by 1978: the Republican governor’s
support and teachers unions’ position in the courts.

The Michigan governor’s reluctant

endorsement of the Headlee amendment once alternative tax reforms floundered was a sign of
changing times. A real estate developer who sat on Taxpayers’ United’s board advised his friend
Governor William Milliken that the only way to win re-election was to take “a strong position in
support of the tax limit proposal.”139 In a reprisal of the 1976 legal battle with the MEA, Taxpayers
United returned to court. This time, the MEA had sued to keep the Headlee amendment off the
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ballot. Yale law professor Robert Bork represented the Michigan tax limit campaign, presumably
pro bono.140 Bork was no stranger to the region’s ambitious and controversial plans for spending
public funds. As Solicitor General during the Nixon administration, Bork represented midwestern
governments appealing integration orders in Detroit’s Milliken v. Bradley school case and
Chicago’s Hills v. Gautreaux housing case.
Taxpayers United leaders consciously manipulated local control symbols to gain voter
support. Headlee argued for local control in language similar to the state’s rights plank of the Lee
Atwater-articulated Southern Strategy: “So what you have is one level of superior government
exercising unrighteous dominion over a lower level of government by mandating programs and
then requiring that local level of government to suffer the abuse from the local electorate to raise
the taxes to pay for that program.”141 Writing in The Wall Street Journal during the height of the
tax limitation campaign, University of Michigan economist Paul McCracken argued that voters
supported tax limitation because “(p)eople with middle class incomes ... find themselves in
neighborhoods where others live just as well and do not work because they find it more congenial
to work all the angles of federal programs.”142 L. Brooks Patterson, the Oakland County prosecutor
who rode a militant anti-busing platform into office and served on Taxpayers United Advisory
Committee in 1976, was optimistic in a letter to Headlee: “I feel a Tax Limitation Amendment
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ought to sail through the 1978 election wars like Sherman marching to the sea; but as we learned
in our last attempt it all depends on how it is wrapped and presented.143
Following this advice, Headlee positioned the Michigan movement as “reasonable,
responsible, comprehensive” in comparison to California’s Proposition 13.144 Headlee’s claim in
the Wall Street Journal that the Tisch and voucher proposals, each nearly as extreme as Proposition
13, would make it “a lot harder” for Taxpayers United to convince voters to limit “big-spending
government,” seems disingenuous in light of this intentional contrast.145 Taxpayers United framed
the 1978 proposal as a tax “limit” rather than a “cut” because Headlee realized “The name of the
game is winning” and cuts meant a loss at the ballot box.146

This strategy allowed Taxpayers

United to avoid any explicit discussion of spending priorities, except those voters were solidly
opposed to—namely welfare. However, Headlee argued that his framing could ultimately lead to
spending cuts, arguing you “can defeat any high cost federal program by making it fight for funds
with other public spending interests. You can’t beat it head on.”147
Both proponents and opponents of tax limitation focused campaign strategy on voter
education rather than voter turnout. NTLC chairman Bill Rickenbacker assumed the 24-30 percent
of Michigan voters who had no opinion on the 1976 proposal would support tax and spending
limitation in 1978 with “further education” and bolster the slim majority of 53-54 percent already
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in support in October 1976.148 Two years later, a Detroit News poll by Market Opinion Research,
which also conducted polls for Headlee, found 68 percent of voters in favor of the Headlee
proposal, 57 percent for the Tisch proposal, and only 41 percent for vouchers.149 A differently
worded poll by New Detroit, Inc. found much lower support when voters were told the implications
of the proposals: “replacement taxes, greater difficulty for government to offer tax breaks to
business to create jobs, and less help for schools and persons out of work.” In light of this finding,
the MEA president asked teachers to contact their acquaintances and neighbors “to inform them
of the consequences of these taxation proposals.”150 The MEA publication Teacher’s Voice
dedicated an issue entirely to the ballot proposals, titling one article “You’ve got a big teaching
job now; The stakes are high; It could mean your job.”
Unique among states to pass limits on taxing and spending in the 1970s, Michigan imposed
local limits and restricted revenues not expenditures. As Michigan required a balanced budget,
taxing and spending finance forms were equivalent. By excluding voter-approved bonds from the
revenue limit, the 1978 amendment authors argued they would prevent non-voted taxes to repay
debt.151 The implication was that the resolution of the 1973 Detroit school financial crisis—a nonvoted city income tax—described in Ch. 4 “Tax the Rich” would become illegal. The executives
of New Detroit, Inc., a civic organization formed to bring jobs and peace after the 1967 uprising,
weighed their “corporate interests against their commitment to economic development in Detroit”
and voted unanimously against supporting the Headlee proposal.152 If limits had been in place
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earlier in the decade, the National Conference of State Legislatures argued school finance reform
would have been difficult.
Tisch thought fifteen percent of teachers should lose their job, but Michigan voters
disagreed and voted the property tax cut and the voucher proposal down.153 The Headlee tax limit
passed with 52.5 percent of the vote, and once the calculations settled, the limit started at 9.84
percent of personal income.154
Following the passage of the Headlee amendment in 1978, University of Michigan
economists surveyed voters about their reasons for voting for or against the spending limitation,
finding the only government programs voters wanted to cut was welfare.155 Headlee’s internal
polling found much the same state spending preferences before the election, adding parks and
recreational facilities to the cut list.156 For supporters of the Tisch property tax cut, welfare was
code for Detroit. In later years, Headlee described Detroit as a “massive entitlement scheme” and
welfare as “rewarding failure.”157 The welfare-Detroit association stuck. In 1985, when a pollster
interviewed newly minted “Reagan Democrats” of Macomb County north of Detroit—union
members and working-class voters who left the Democratic Party—he found a general feeling that
“Detroit was just a big pit into which the state and federal governments poured tax money never
to be heard from again.”158
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Federal Limitation
After his home state victory, Tennessee legislator David Copeland traveled the country in
support of tax limitation, which only a few years before had been a “dirty word.”159 With the
exaggerated pride of a winner, Copeland told a Washington Post reporter that the movement for
tax limitation was “the most important philosophical change in the operation of government in 200
years.”160 One of Copeland’s first stops was Denver, where ALEC and tax limitation supporter
Joe Coors gave the Tennessee state representative a personal tour of his brewery.161 Copeland’s
1978 Tennessee limit was a return on Coors’ investment in Uhler’s 1976 Michigan campaign.
ALEC named Copeland its 1978 state legislator of the year during the organization’s annual
meeting in Sun Valley, ID.162 Chairman Louis “Woody” Jenkins of Louisiana, himself an early
adopter of tax limitation, announced the award, commending Copeland’s leadership, drive, and
zeal. The work took a toll: at the end of the 1978 legislative session, Copeland fell ill, was
hospitalized, and “out of circulation for close to two and a half months.”163 Others followed in
Copeland’s lead.
The plan had always been to amend the U.S. constitution. Days before the 1973 California
election, Proposition 1 campaign staff had motivated volunteers: “Win—lose—or draw—we are
dedicated to…making it SPREAD ACROSS THE COUNTRY TO THE BANKS OF THE
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POTOMAC.”164 Jack Kemp, U.S. Representative from New York and co-author of the epochal
1981 Kemp-Roth tax cut, introduced federal legislation modeled on California’s in 1973.165 Uhler
hoped six to eight state limits would convince the U.S. Congress to approve federal constitutional
tax limitation, while the ACU’s Phil Crane set the range at twelve to fifteen.166
Two months after the Tennessee win, ALEC and Uhler’s National Tax Limitation
Committee held a National Legislative Conference on Tax Limitation on May 19-21, 1978 in
Chicago with 300 participants from 38 states.167 Of course, Milton Friedman gave the keynote
address during a luncheon panel featuring leaders of the ACU, NTLC, and ALEC. State tax
limitation campaign leaders from Michigan, Massachusetts, and Tennessee presented on “Putting
the People and Organization Together” while familiar economists Niskanen and Stubblebine took
on analysis and zero-based budgeting. At ALEC’s spring workshop, ACU chairman Phil Crane
had pointed out an important difference between state and federal limits: the federal government
could create new revenue by printing money.168 The federal effort, he warned, must ‘inflation
proof’ the system by indexation, a concept the Heritage Foundation presented on.169
Passed on June 6, California’s Proposition 13 raised interest in and competition over tax
reform at all levels of government. During the summer of 1978, a U.S. representative from
Minnesota who co-sponsored a federal constitutional amendment solicited tax-deductible
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donations for ALEC’s Tax Reduction Program.170 However, the property tax cut also increased
disagreement over the means of reduction: California’s “rolling back and limiting taxes” or
Tennessee’s “limiting future taxes of growth.”171 Copeland urged the president of the National
Taxpayers Union to begin a “national dialogue among organizations whose objectives” were
similar but efforts fragmented to reach consensus on the right approach. After Prop 13 passed,
Reader’s Digest, which had planned an article on Tennessee’s amendment, instead condensed a
piece from Time on California.172
The movement and business conservatives who supported tax limitation claimed credit for
the 1978 tax revolt. Soliciting donations for a fall NTLC conference, sponsors argued “serious
observers of the movement” like Dunn’s Review, Forbes, and Business Week knew Tennessee’s
Proposition 9, not California’s Proposition 13, was the starting point.173 Surely thinking of its
early 1970s campaign for a federal spending ceiling, the U.S. Chamber’s Washington Report
editorial on Proposition 13 noted that California voters had not begun the tax revolt, and would
need to cut spending too.174 In the ALEC newsletter First Reading, Copeland acknowledged that
California’s property tax cut and Tennessee’s tax limit were “only two ways through which the
taxpayers have voiced their discontent with the present system.”175 Other types of spending
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restraints would surface, and a more viable one could be found, likely in “the legislators' idea bank
for those who hold government should be controlled by the governed," ALEC.176
That summer, another conference sought to broaden the base of tax limiters. Alongside
tax groups like ACU’s ACT NOW, ALEC, NTLC, NTU, general conservative groups like the
Young Americans for Freedom and established tax groups like the Tax Foundation joined the
ACU’s Taxpayers Action Conference on July 28-29, 1978 in St. Louis, MO.177 The registration
list included tax limitation campaign leaders from Missouri, Illinois, Michigan, Massachusetts,
South Dakota, and Washington in addition to ACU leaders Phyllis Schlafly and Phil Crane and the
ALEC president.178 Representatives from the National Association of Realtors, the Teamsters, the
anti-busing National Association of Neighborhood Schools, and the National Association of
Manufacturers were present as well.
As tax limiters prepared to try again in Michigan and other states, they published
increasingly professional how-to guides. In a newsletter for the growing membership of state
conservative unions, the ACU recommended recruitment and contact methods, and coordinated
calls, letters, telegrams, and as a last resort, form letters to pressure the U.S. Congress.179 Once,
the ACU asked members to “Send A Tea Bag To Your Legislator.”180 The ACU published Phil
Crane’s Tax Limitation: The Time Is Now and distributed the NTLC’s A Taxpayer’s Guide to
Effective Tax Revolt.181 Rickenbacker filled the popular Taxpayer’s Guide, sold by local tax
organizations and promoted by Ronald Reagan, with stylized cartoons and engaging stories—he
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opened with the tale of Friedman’s Nobel.182

Even public sector unionists had seen

Rickenbacker’s “book that's been around a lot."183
ACU state chapter members had voted to make tax limitation a priority in May 1977. The
ACU committed $100,000 to a Tax Limitation Task Force to work in Michigan, Illinois, and
Massachusetts with veterans of California’s Proposition 1 including Bob Carleson, Charles Hobbs,
Richard Kazen, Clay LaForce, and Frank Walton.184 To state conservative unions running tax
limitation campaigns, the ACU offered signed letters or a personal appearance from chairman Phil
Crane, in addition to staffers and resources.185 The Massachusetts tax limitation campaign
previewed a pattern: voters rejected a graduated income tax but passed property tax cuts for the
poor and elderly, business associations mobilized for tax limitation instead, launching their ballot
initiative or referendum with a visit by Milton Friedman, collecting material from campaigns in
California, Michigan, and Tennessee, and recruiting at least one Democratic campaign sponsor.186
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Pedigreed scholars joined the cause. Yale Law School professor Robert Bork, in the midst
of rehabilitating himself as an antitrust scholar after his controversial term as acting Attorney
General in the Nixon administration, served as “chief scrivener.”187 With the support of economist
Craig Stubblebine’s Center for the Study of Law Structures at Claremont College, Bork drafted a
memo for the federal drafting committee to review on September 22, 1978 at the Mayflower Hotel
in Washington, D.C. A Michigan pollster and a D.C. PR man joined Bork, the economist Bill
Niskanen, Reagan advisor Robert Carleson, and Uhler on the agenda.188 Around that time, Bork
also joined Michigan tax limitation frontman Richard Headlee at an AEI Public Policy Forum
“Should we impose constitutional limits on the growth of government?”189
The ACU rebranded its Task Force for Tax Limitation as the Americans to Cut Taxes Now
(ACT NOW) Committee to remove “conservative” from a campaign it hoped would cross
ideological lines.190 Distinguishing between union members and union bureaucrats, the ACU
wanted public employees’ support for “No Growth for Government.” ACU chair Phil Crane
thought a ceiling on government employees would reduce “upper levels of bureaucracy, top-heavy
with unneeded administrators” gradually through attrition.191 In the meantime, Crane warned tax
limiters not to “ever underestimate the extent of the opposition’s power.”192 Public sectors
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employees and their unions had “experienced and efficient campaign managers” with money to
spend and an organizational structure to mobilize.193
Unlike competing tax networks, labor coalitions did not cooperate. A new group, the
Coalition of American Public Employees (CAPE), represented the majority of public employees
when, dissatisfied with the AFL-CIO’s Public Employee Department, the American Federation of
State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) and the National Education Association
(NEA) founded CAPE in 1972. CAPE published a collection of tax limit materials and liberal tax
policy alternatives to help locals organize in Limiting Government: Ties That Bind in 1978.194
At the 1978 AFSCME convention, President Jerry Wurf characterized California’s
Proposition 13 property tax cut as “a public outcry for fair play.”195 The Service Employees
International Union (SEIU) too thought the lesson of Proposition 13, besides the limitation of
lawsuits, which were thrown out, and advertising, which its consultants had mishandled, was to
“offer a better alternative.” At the SEIU’s 1978 Public Workers Conference, devoted in part to
“tax politics,” the Los Angeles mayor who had fought off Prop 1 but not Prop 13 urged union
members to be “active in the shaping of positive tax reform measures.”196 The SEIU-listed
alternatives included: progressive income tax, state funding for education, health, and welfare;
circuit breakers, homestead exemption, classification; sales tax exemptions for food, drugs, and
clothing. It was “every union leader’s responsibility” to “actively support” such tax reforms at all
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levels of government, the mayor went on. Many union leaders supported these alternatives, and
yet voters wanted more.
Public sector unions urged members to cut government costs by the end of 1978. In a
Service Employees International Union booklet titled “The Real Tax Crisis and What You Can Do
About It,” international president George Hardy argued that his members would “continue to be
blamed for the high cost of public services unless we take the lead in calling for better management
and increased productivity in government."197 Robert P. Muscat, International Public Employee
Coordinator on "government efficiency" and "government waste," offered the SEIU California
chapter model: monitor budgets to cut inefficiency and waste directly. The AFT advocated two of
the same responses—“creative efforts at tax reform and tax justice” and scrutiny of “government
efficiency and waste.” However, teachers believed “larger economic solutions” to “control
inflation” and “federalize welfare” were also needed.198
After the 1978 election season, the NTLC tallied five victories, one short of Uhler’s
minimum criteria to launch the federal limit campaign.199 The ACU supported tax limitation
elections in Colorado, Michigan, Arizona, Texas on November 7, 1978, and had worked in South
Dakota, Missouri, Minnesota, Iowa.200 Legislators in Georgia introduced a bill, there were plans
for Washington, Florida, and Ohio.201 However, a public employee coalition fought off tax
limitation in Ohio. Despite the support of the ACU, chaired by Illinois state legislator Phil Crane,
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the 1978 Illinois tax limit failed. In Boston, Uhler and the NTLC’s research director worked
closely with a campaign that changed direction when leadership shifted and Proposition 13 passed;
the measure that the Massachusetts legislature sent to the ballot in December 1978 bore only a
faint resemblance to Uhler’s ideal.202 After a waiting period and court review, Massachusetts
voters approved Proposition 2 ½ in 1980.
As the first successes rolled in, financial, strategic, and personal differences strained the
tax limitation coalition. Uhler hired a local public relations firm to plan and film the NTLC’s
November 1978 Nashville conference to launch federal tax limitation after state election victories.
Had it been finished, “Tax Limitation: Reason of Revolution?” would have been distributed to
businesses and K-12 schools for employee and student education. Working with direct mail
impresario Richard Viguerie, the local firm sent out a tax limitation mailing.203 When a Tennessee
public relations firm sued for payment for its work on the documentary, NTLC officers requested
an audit.204

After clashing with Uhler over the NTLC’s “bad reputation for financial

management,” the failed film, and sporadic newsletters, which, when written by Uhler, lacked “a
graceful and interesting English prose style, or a sense for news,” Chairman Bill Rickenbacker
bowed out as the federal campaign picked up.205

Perhaps the rift was due to ideology:

Rickenbacker urged Uhler to make the tax limitation movement bigger than the ACU, and to
distance it from “such partisans as Kemp.”206 Still, Rickenbacker reminded Uhler of his “greatest
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strengths:” equanimity, joviality, zeal, urge, the ability to convey dignity and portentousness.207
An unincorporated association under California law, the National Tax Limitation Committee was
under Uhler’s control. For several months as Uhler reorganized, Copeland and other “perfunctory”
or “honorary” board members did not hear from the operative.208
How could a disorganized financial planner organize tax revolt? By the fall of 1978, Uhler
had 60,000 names of “NTLC disciples” on his own mailing list.209 With new donors willing to
pay to limit their taxes, anything seemed possible. However, Uhler did not relish making the “ask”
for money. Uhler had always kept some distance from the independently wealthy conservatives
he worked with—economist Bill Niskanen had timber money from his Bend, Oregon family;
investor Bill Rickenbacker had airline money from his famous WWII pilot father. Rifling through
his files, stashed haphazardly in boxes and cabinets, stacked precariously on shelves and floors, I
saw numerous lawsuits and IRS investigations that implied Uhler has not always paid on time, or
what he owed. At a certain point, his wife Cindy started paying the bills, surely a difficult feat to
manage in a household where her husband liked control. Uhler, lamenting their “internecine
warfare” and “debilitating combat,” suggested to Rickenbacker that their disagreement about
whether to accept certain accounting practices was part of long-running discussions about how
much control corporations should have over the campaign, which increasingly relied on direct mail
contributions.210 However, in 1978, the committee spent almost as much as it raised on mailing,
just over one million dollars.
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By the end of 1978, federal tax limitation was an idea too big to pause. Business
associations that actively supported state limits such as the American Farm Bureau Federation, the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, the National Federation
of Independent Business, and the United States Industrial Council lined up for the federal
campaign.211 Tax limiters spoke at the ACU’s increasingly influential Conservative Political
Action Conference: a 1979 panel included Donna Carlson and Harry Bandouveris of Arizona,
David Copeland of Tennessee, and Richard Headlee of Michigan.212 By 1981, the tax limitation
operation was inside the White House, where Office of Management and the Budget economist
Annelise Anderson managed the many conferences and hearings on tax limitation that flooded
Washington, D.C. after Reagan’s inauguration.
Uhler and the National Tax Limitation Committee joined forces with the rival tax
organization the National Taxpayers Union, then campaigning for a balanced budget amendment
to the federal constitution. Though known as the “BBA,” the legislation that the NTU and NTLC
co-wrote was also for tax limitation. There are two ways to amend the U.S. constitution: by an act
of the U.S. Congress, or by a convention of the states. For the rest of the decade, BBA supporters
tried both but fell short of the supermajority margin of congressional votes and state resolutions.
The U.S. Congress came within four dozen votes of constitutionally limiting overall
spending in 1982. Riding Reagan’s coattails, Republicans picked up 34 seats in the U. S. House
and 12 seats in the U. S. Senate; the moment had arrived to try for federal tax limitation. After all
these decades, Uhler remembers the high political drama as if he were whipping votes yesterday.
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The Senate passed the BBA on August 4, 1982 with 69 yes votes, including from a number of
Democrats, and 31 no votes.213 Under Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill’s leadership, the Ways
and Means Committee refused to pass the BBA. The only way around the speaker was a petition
to discharge the bill from committee and force a floor vote. At any given time, 205 or 206
representatives’ names were on the discharge petition; as Uhler’s team added a new name, the
Democratic Party leadership would convince a representative to remove their signature lest 218
names trigger the roll call. Uhler developed a strategy to go “below the radar.” Each morning,
BBA supporters met in a congressional office to pick a representative to target that day.214 Uhler
had a Southern California public relations team on retainer to call reporters from the chosen
representative’s district, who would in turn reach out to their representative to inquire why they
were not supporting the BBA. Four hours later, the representative would call Uhler and plead
“uncle.” Uhler asked for the representatives’ support, but not their signature. With a dozen or so
additional signers pledged, Uhler invited vice president George H. W. Bush to convey President
Reagan’s support for the BBA in an anteroom off the House floor. Lock step, the representatives
filed into the chamber and signed the discharge position; the full House would vote. Thus, the
BBA made it farther than any other constitutional amendment for fiscal discipline. Nevertheless,
the final vote was 236 to 187, 46 votes short of the required two-thirds majority.215 The
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amendment was unlikely to pass in a 243 D to 192 R U. S. House but nearly one-fifth of the
Democratic Party caucus voted for it.216
Tax limiters turned back to states before trying again in the U. S. Congress in 1984. Uhler
ran into opposition from fellow Republicans in addition to Democrats when he urged state
legislatures to pass resolutions calling for a federal constitutional convention. As Uhler tried to
save his grandest political campaign yet, John Birch Society members who feared a “runaway
convention” blocked the state resolution strategy from the right. Phyllis Schlafly’s Eagle Forum,
perhaps recognizing that once called to limit taxes, a federal constitutional convention could also
add the Equal Rights Amendment she had blocked throughout the 1970s, also opposed a federal
constitutional convention. Still, 33 legislatures out of the 34 required made the call.217 When
Uhler revived the BBA state constitutional convention campaign in 2010, legal questions surfaced
about how long state resolutions remained in effect.

Conclusion
After the federal limit fell one state short of a constitutional convention, Uhler continued
to shape the conservative movement. When Uhler finally wrote up his experience in the 1989
Regnery-published book Setting Limits, he canceled the nationwide book tour to re-launch his next
campaign, for term limits.218 Despite his success shortening the terms of state legislators in
California and across the country, Uhler now regrets the time he put into an idea that has only
given more power to bureaucrats, who do not face the same time restrictions as their elected bosses.
Others credit term limits with an increase in lobbying by groups like ALEC. Over the years, Uhler
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consulted with Pope John Paul II about taxes and fertility, and advised U.S. Representative Paul
Ryan on gerrymandering state legislatures. Disappointed by big businesses’ willingness to
compromise, Uhler has sought out ideologically committed small businesses to fund his new
campaigns. When he travels to Virginia for the annual conference of the Council for National
Policy, Uhler attends the Tax Cut Working Group hosted by Grover Norquist.219
In the mid-1990s, Lew’s wife Cindy started her own capital campaign, founding an
evangelical church, Granite Bay, which has grown to thousands of members and several campuses.
Loathe to retire, Uhler played golf on the side, and developed courses in suburban Sacramento and
southern California.220 Before family dinners, Uhler prays in the name of his latest campaign to
“Rescue” California from renewed campaigns for rent control and a split property tax roll. After
a sixty-decade political career, some things never change. However, the California of today is not
the California of Ronald Reagan’s governorship; K-12 school spending has fallen, and AFT locals
are striking and bargaining protected by law. United Teachers Los Angeles lost the 2020 split
property tax roll ballot initiative with a smaller margin than labor’s last attempt to partially repeal
Proposition 13. The Gann tax limitation measure, the “Spirit of 13,” remains.
Conservative ideologues and businesses transformed government services through antidemocratic fiscal control.

The American Legislative Exchange Council’s political action

committee flipped the Michigan Senate Republican by recalling two legislators who supported an
income tax increase in 1982.221 By the end of the decade, Detroit schools were under mayoral
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control, governed not by labor-liberals who could elect a school board, but by budget cutters.
Although businessman Richard Headlee’s 1980s campaigns for governor fell far short of majority
support, another veteran of 1970s tax limitation campaigns, John Engler, was elected Michigan
governor in 1990. A former member of the Michigan Conservative Party, and later president of
the National Association of Manufacturers and of the Business Roundtable, Governor Engler
presided over a devil’s bargain for Michigan’s public schools in 1994.222 In exchange for
authorizing a compromise school finance ballot measure that redirected some property tax revenue
from wealthy school districts to poor school districts, Democratic state legislators lifted a cap on
charter schools.223
Turning to venture philanthropy after years spent trying educational policy trends,
many Detroit policymakers hoped to charter schools that could raise the city’s record-low
scores on the National Assessment of Educational Progress.224 However, foundation officials
failed to persuade national chains of charter school operators to locate in Detroit, where as
many as four-fifths of the city’s charter schools were run by private, for-profit, anti-union
companies. Still, teachers unions had enough power to revoke Teach for America’s license
to place uncertified trainees in Michigan schools for a time. Following the model of New
Orleans after hurricane Katrina, Detroit reformers dissolved the traditional public school
district and hired a graduate of the Broad Foundation’s Superintendent Academy to oversee a
portfolio of re-organized schools.
When mayoral control failed to work in Detroit’s schools or city government, the state
stepped in. Conservative Republican state legislators imposed an emergency manager on schools
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from 1999 to 2005 and again from 2009 to 2016, and on the city during Detroit’s bankruptcy
proceedings in 2013 and 2014. Unlike during 1970s budget negotiations, the Ford Foundation did
not step in to save the Detroit schools directly. Instead, a coalition of private foundations spent
hundreds of millions of dollars to ensure the city’s publicly-owned art collection, a remnant of
businessmen’s civic welfare spending spree in the early twentieth century, was off limits during
the nation’s largest municipal bankruptcy. Municipal bondholders lost one-quarter of expected
revenue while public sector workers only lost four and a half percent of their monthly pension
checks. Thus, the Ford Motor Company’s industrial wealth again cushioned the fallout from urban
fiscal crisis.
Unregulated competition did not produce excellent schools.225 An expose in the
Detroit Free Press found the kinds of corruption long chronicled in the traditional public
schools in the charter schools too.

Still, out-state universities like Grand Valley State

University in conservative western Michigan wanted to authorize more charter schools.
Detroiters instead asked the state for the authority to regulate the opening and closing of
charter schools in the city, but were denied. Student, parent, and community organizers tried
two familiar strategies from the 1970s: a school finance lawsuit and an income tax ballot
initiative. The lawsuit, Gary B. v. Snyder, led to only a $90 million settlement negotiated
with a cooperative Democratic governor in 2020. The income tax language made it onto a
petition stalled by the pandemic. The Detroit Federation of Teachers, so active in previous
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decades’ state education politics, instead focused on internal reorganization. School finance
campaigners have recently turned to rural Michigan counties for political support, a dynamic from
the 1930s.
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Conclusion
The property tax emerged as a source of education funding in the United States when
territorial expansion linked land and residence to mass elementary schooling.

Land sales

capitalized nineteenth-century state school funds, which invested in state-chartered banks and
contributed interest to the many forms of public and private schools in the early republic. Local
property taxes increasingly replaced bartered goods and services as contributions to schools during
the common school movement begun in the 1830s. State constitutions charged state legislatures
with responsibility for providing free, public education but outlawed borrowing on behalf of the
school districts doing the teaching and spending after the financial panic of 1837 led to a debt
crisis. During the depressions of the 1870s and 1930s, statutory and constitutional property tax
limitations restricted how much property tax revenue voters and legislators could raise for schools,
the major expense of state and local government. As homeownership spread in the twentieth
century, the first choice parents made about education was where to live, and thus how much to
pay for schools.
School reformers throughout the twentieth century attempted to resolve inequitable school
property tax revenue by moving families to new houses, students to new schools, or new dollars
to schools. Voters contested the property tax during moments of uneven racial integration.
Property owners stopped paying school taxes during the 1960s and both conservatives and
community control supporters on local school boards stopped levying school taxes in the early
1970s. Northeastern states offered cities with tax-exempt nonprofits like Yale University a
payment-in-lieu-of-taxes or PILOT for the loss of property tax revenue. In the Midwest and West,
where “municipal overburden” payments from the state were insufficient to resolve the urban
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school fiscal crisis, organizers set their sights on new taxes. Cities asked states to tax the wealth
of suburbs to fund schools statewide.
Powerful, organized public sector employees like teachers, changed the U. S. political
economy to increase public spending. During the 1960s, dynamic social movements for public
employee in addition to civil, welfare, women, and gay and lesbian rights secured new government
programs that needed new revenue. The bill came due during the 1970s. However, federal
spending could not keep up with welfare and warfare: the Kennedy income tax cuts lowered
marginal rates and Nixon wanted to decrease them further. In California, conservative political
operatives and appointees purged War on Poverty programs from state agencies. Nonetheless,
liberal and labor groups pushed for progressive state income taxes on the rich as late as 1976.
School finance is a bridge between the 1960s and 1970s, between federal power to make social
policy and local control to defund it, between labor liberalism and fiscal libertarianism, between
urban and state fiscal crises.
Federalism creates a system of state and local finance with many veto points, complicating
efforts to find alternatives to the local school property tax. Public schools are part of government,
and part of struggles about the contours of the state. Reformers organized to change state
constitutions, statutes, and administrations governing education. As late as the nineteenth century,
funding limited education was a problem of religion and nativism. In the twenty- and twenty-first
centuries, funding mass education is a problem of capitalism and democracy. Rich associational
life during the takeoff of growth, or transition to capitalism, transformed into federated
organizations for an industrial economy by the turn of the twentieth century. Capital and labor
needed political power and social policy to win economic gains. One venue of contest was
education.
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The literature on the history of twentieth-century education is more commonly about local
communities, national policy, and metropolitan conflict than state power, and it is always about
property taxes. In southern history, states and state subdivisions were sites of white supremacy.
Esther Cyna shows that counties in North Carolina stole Black property taxpayers’ money to fund
segregated public schools for white students during the Jim Crow era. Only federal preemption,
the stories of reconstruction and civil rights go, protected the multiracial democracy ex-slaves and
community and labor organizers fought for. During the rights revolution of the 1960s, courts were
briefly open to legislative reapportionment, school desegregation, and school funding cases filed
on equal protection grounds. However, racial capitalism distributed wealth and thus municipal or
suburban school debt unevenly, as new scholarship by Destin Jenkins and Mike Glass shows.
Levittown, the prototypical racially-exclusive suburb, alongside Black Long Island suburbs
struggled to finance schools with local property taxes.
I focus on Michigan and California after internal migration reshaped schools during the
1920s and 1950s, respectively. Chapter one opens with Michigan farmer and Grange leader Clem
Bramble to suggest that teachers’ long campaign to fund public schools in the north and west was
shaped by rural interests. Chapter eight ends with contemporary Michigan organizers’ efforts to
cultivate support for school finance reform in rural counties to suggest that geographic divides are
with us still but so are the possibilities for solidarity. The geography of “Tax the Rich” emerges
from several counterintuitive arguments. States with the initiative and referendum, and without
the South’s preference for local statutory school tax limits or New England’s for town meeting
budgets, are the test for democratic fiscal governance in industrial society. The Midwest and West,
governed by nineteenth-century constitutions drafted for an agricultural economy, were more
unequally apportioned than the South before the civil rights movement.
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Schools became a proxy for an ideologically-charged conversation about the state
involving conservative activists and business groups. Thus, the story of the rise of conservatism
needs to be told through political and ideological contests over local and state policy. In the 1930s,
business influence on fiscal policy was as direct as the chamber of commerce-affiliated research
bureau in Detroit or taxpayers association in Los Angeles, which led local efforts to cut budgets
and assisted state campaigns to curb taxes. After the rise of industrial unionism challenged
business interests’ role in government, funders taught free enterprise in new institutions for
economic education. “Tax the Rich” focuses on simplicity rather complexity, which is the
approach intellectual historians take to post-WWII societies that made capitalism safe for
democracy. Lay organizations formed prosaic ideas into a popular economic knowledge. These
organizations received significant sums of money from automobile manufacturers. Business
conservatism shaped the industrial Midwest of Henry Ford, General Motors, and Walter Chrysler
as well as the light industrial Sunbelt of Barry Goldwater or Ronald Reagan.
Private sector unionism, particularly in Michigan’s auto industry, cleared the way for
public sector unionism but not interracial solidarity. Teachers unions required cooperation from
the administrative state to bargain contracts beginning in the 1960s; the autoworkers’ union
provided the behind-the-scenes connections. The autoworkers union also helped elect a labor
lawyer as chair of the Detroit school board, where board members sued the state of Michigan to
double school funding, a lost alternative for school finance reform litigation. When courts refused
to substantially redistribute wealth between rich and poor parts of the state, the Detroit school
board voted to racially integrate a dozen high schools, provoking voters to recall the board, and
then the NAACP to file the Bradley v. Milliken lawsuit that the U. S. Supreme Court would use to
set a legal precedent against metropolitan busing. In a civil rights union town like Detroit, Black
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teachers represented forty percent of the workforce by the end of the 1960s and believed for a time
that they could influence their teachers union from within. However, some union teachers joined
an uneasy pro-tuition voucher coalition of conservatives, neoliberals, and former civil rights and
labor organizers.
The conservative reaction to teachers’ long campaign to fund public schools shows that
anti-majoritarian fiscal rules were not imported from abroad in the 1970s. Take for example the
popular narrative of free market economist Milton Friedman in Chile after a coup removed the
socialist president Salvador Allende. In March 1975, Friedman met with dictator Augusto
Pinochet and sent proposals to privatize, deregulate, and reduce taxes a month later. By the time
Friedman landed in Santiago in 1975, however, the University of Chicago economist had spent the
better part of two years publicizing political campaigns to constitutionally restrict government
spending in the United States’ states, as Part III of the dissertation shows. In 2021, Chile’s
constitutional convention delegates changed their voting margins from two-thirds to one-half in
order to rewrite the country’s constitution. California and other states that require a two-thirds
legislative margin in order to raise taxes will likely need to change fiscal rules too.
The fiscal crisis was everywhere by the early 1970s and places outside New York offered
left authoritarian options to manage budget shortfalls. New York City’s teachers struck for only
five days at the start of the 1975 school year without pressuring the city or state to raise new school
taxes, and eventually lent money from teachers’ pension fund to stave off a bankruptcy. American
Federation of Teachers president Al Shanker, who replaced David Selden as president in 1974,
ushered in an era of accommodation in the teacher union movement that would see labor endorse
charter schools during the Reagan era. As recently as October 1973, Detroit teachers in Selden’s
home state of Michigan had struck for forty-one days and won an eight percent raise. The
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Michigan state legislature authorized the Detroit school board to tax city residents’ income without
their consent and thus convinced bankers new bonds would be repaid. City schools were funded
through the first oil shock—the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries embargoed days
after the Detroit teacher strike settlement.
Conservative idealogues turned anti-majoritarian ideas to different ends, restricting the
growth of government with constitutional limitations that required a two-thirds majority to revise.
As inflation and unemployment rose together during the 1970s, elite conservatives organized a tax
revolt beginning in the states. Tax limits were more common than tax cuts: dozens of states passed
tax limits while only a handful halved property taxes, imitating the “meat axe” approach of
California’s Proposition 13. Many successful tax limits incorporated smaller, temporary property
tax cuts. I focus on tax limits because they also restricted progressive income taxes on the rich.
These limits accomplished their goal: education’s share of United States gross domestic product
returned to 1960s levels after beginning to rise in the early 1970s, and has remained around four
percent ever since. By contrast, healthcare’s share of United States gross domestic product
quadrupled over the same time period.
“Tax the Rich” investigates the limits of democratic fiscal governance under capitalism in
schools, the institution most commonly tasked with mediating economic inequality in the United
States. However, education is no longer a path to economic security. During economic crisis
when taxes fall and debt accumulates, influential bond investors, determined political operatives,
and small minorities of voters can remake fiscal rules. I began this project during the global
financial crisis as an undergraduate at a public university and continued it in graduate school at a
private university months after the largest municipal bankruptcy in U. S. history—Detroit’s. I did
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not expect to finish my dissertation at the conjuncture of the climate crisis, the pandemic, and the
academic job market crisis.
My generation’s experience of austerity in K-12 and college classrooms and debt in
personal bank accounts shapes the growing field of historical scholarship on school finance. Our
moment raises the stakes for schools. Today, school reformers frequently ask courts to move
money rather than students, as the Warren court once did to racially integrate schools. The teacher
strike wave of the 2010s suggests that labor power may again force redistributive fiscal decisions.
It is important to look to the past for insight into the challenges statewide ballot initiatives for
progressive income taxes already confront. When federal pandemic emergency aid runs out, K12 schools will be left with the same problem they are after every economic crisis: how to raise
funds from state and local governments. This dissertation explains why it is so difficult to tax the
rich, then and now.
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